Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
George v. Youngstown State University
In 2008, after being denied tenure, George filed a discrimination lawsuit against Youngstown State University and was reinstated as part of a settlement agreement. As soon as the university’s obligations under the agreement expired, it declined to renew George’s contract and terminated his employment as a professor. George applied to several other positions within the university but was rejected. He then filed employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.Following discovery, the district court granted YSU summary judgment, finding that George either failed to show causation, failed to show he was qualified for the job, or failed to show that YSU’s claimed reasons for firing (or not hiring) him were pretextual. The court also dismissed one of George’s failure-to-hire claims— which arose after this lawsuit was filed—based on an administrative exhaustion requirement.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to George reveals a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of the claims and the district court further erred in enforcing the administrative exhaustion requirement because the defendants expressly waived it below. View "George v. Youngstown State University" on Justia Law
McCray v. Wilkie
McCray worked at the Milwaukee VA Vet Center as a readjustment counselor, 1997-2000. After earning a Master’s degree, he returned to the VA in 2004 as a Mental Health Case Manager. McCray had served in the Army for eight years in the 1980s and sustained multiple physical and mental injuries. In 2013, his VA disability rating was 100 percent. McCray also suffers from hypertension, arthritis, diabetes, sarcoidosis (in remission), and PTSD.McCray alleges that the VA failed to accommodate his disabilities and that he suffered disparate treatment as an African-American man. The van McCray used to transport VA clients allegedly lacked adequate legroom and was unsafe; the VA waited 11 months before replacing it. In 2013, McCray experienced difficulty concentrating at work, which he attributed to discrimination and retaliation by co‐workers after he filed EEOC charges. After returning from a leave of absence and experiencing panic attacks, his reassignment request was denied. McCray indicated that he could probably continue working in an office on a lower floor. That request was denied, although there were vacant offices lower in the building.The district court dismissed his suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. McCray’s complaint presents a plausible claim for relief based on the delay in accommodating his disability with respect to the van. On remand, McCray can further develop his office space claim. McCray waived his disparate treatment claims. View "McCray v. Wilkie" on Justia Law
Arvidson v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.
After claimant Danny Arvidson received an award of permanent total disability, insurer Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the award. The ALJ dismissed insurer’s hearing request as time-barred. The question on review before the Oregon Supreme Court was whether that dismissal entitled claimant to attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2), which provided that, if an insurer initiates review of a compensation award and the reviewing body “finds that ... all or part of the compensation awarded ... should not be reduced or disallowed,” the insurer shall pay the claimant’s attorney a “reasonable attorney fee.” The ALJ determined that the statute applied to the dismissal of insurer’s claim and awarded fees to claimant. The Workers’ Compensation Board reached a different conclusion and reversed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding the ALJ correctly determined that his dismissal of insurer’s request for hearing entitled claimant to attorney fees. The board erred in concluding otherwise. View "Arvidson v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp." on Justia Law
Delgado v. United States Department of Justice
Delgado, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, sought relief under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(q)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8), for retaliation he suffered after reporting his suspicions that another ATF agent may have committed perjury during a federal criminal trial. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit held that the Merit Systems Protection Board had acted arbitrarily in dismissing his administrative appeal under the Act and that Delgado had properly alleged “a protected disclosure” and had exhausted his administrative remedies so that the Board had jurisdiction to evaluate his claim. On remand, the Board, acting only through an Administrative Judge (since 2017 the Board has lacked a quorum), denied relief.The Seventh Circuit remanded, only with respect to the relief Delgado is entitled-to. The Administrative Judge “paid only lip-service” to its earlier decision, “ignoring critical holdings and reasoning.” Delgado proved that he made a disclosure that was protected under the Act and proved retaliation for his protected disclosure, which affected decisions to deny him several promotions. Noting that it had “already remanded, only to be met by obduracy,” and that the government had the opportunity to offer evidence to support its affirmative defense, which fails as a matter of law, the court held that Delgado is entitled at least to pay and benefits as if he had been promoted effective March 2014. View "Delgado v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law
Houston Aquarium, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Commission's decision affirming the application of OSHA's commercial diving safety regulations to the dives its staff members perform to feed animals housed at the Aquarium and to clean the facility's tanks. A majority of the Commission panel affirmed the ALJ's determination that feeding and cleaning dives did not fall within the "scientific diving" exemption to the commercial standard.The court held that the ALJ did not err in crediting the compliance officer's testimony about the Commercial Diving Operations (CDO) standard as lay opinion testimony; even if the compliance officer testified to some matters that fell outside the realm of lay opinion testimony, the admission of the testimony was harmless; and the Aquarium's witnesses were properly treated as lay witnesses. Under a plain reading of the entire definition of "scientific diving," as well as the regulation guidelines and regulatory history, the court held that the activities performed during the feeding and cleaning dives fall within the plain text of the exemption. In this case, the Aquarium has shown that feeding and cleaning dives are a necessary component of its scientific research. View "Houston Aquarium, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board
The Court of Appeal denied the petition for review challenging the Board's finding that Gerawan committed unfair labor practices by (1) engaging in bad faith "surface bargaining," and (2) insisting on the exclusion of workers employed by farm labor contractors (FLC workers) from the core benefits of any collective bargaining agreement (CBA) reached between Gerawan and the union. The findings were based on Gerawan's bargaining conduct both before and after the Board ordered the parties to "mandatory mediation and conciliation" (MMC) under the MMC statutory scheme, Labor Code section 1164 et seq.The court held that there is no conflict between the MMC statute and the Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (ALRA) with respect to imposing unfair practice liability for acts arising from the parties' negotiation sessions held outside the mediator's presence; the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole; section 1160 empowers the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges that arise from negotiations outside the mediator's presence during the MMC process, and this necessarily includes the power, should the Board find that a party has engaged in an unfair labor practice, to, among other things, make employees whole "for the loss of pay resulting from the employer’s refusal to bargain;" and because Gerawan has not shown that Board Member Hall had an actual bias or there was an unacceptable risk of bias, the Board did not err when it denied Gerawan's disqualification motion. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
Henderson v. Wilkie
Henderson joined the VA police department Hines VA Hospital in 1986. Henderson filed an employment discrimination action against the Department of Veteran Affairs. After being denied a promotion in 2013, Henderson, who is African American, alleged race and age discrimination and retaliation claims, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the VA, following a remand for a determination of whether the VA’s explanations for not selecting Henderson for a criminal investigator position were a pretext for racial discrimination. The district court acted properly with respect to testimony on subjects not disclosed in Henderson’s interrogatory answer. Henderson failed to explain the substance of the testimony he sought to present so it is not possible to conclude that the district court erred in excluding it. The court’s decision that it would not permit evidence of discriminatory action against other African Americans after the award of the criminal investigator job was proper because some of those actions are in litigation; the slight additional value from the cumulative evidence was outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. View "Henderson v. Wilkie" on Justia Law
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court awarding $2,353,463 in damages to Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. (JCCS), a Montana accounting firm, after a bench trial on remand, holding that the district court did not err by awarding prejudgment interest but erred with regards to the date interest began accruing.Appellants, five of six shareholders in JCCS' Bozeman office, were employed under the terms of an Employment Agreement that contained a covenant restricting competition (Covenant). Appellants later began working at a newly formed accounting firm and solicited clients from JCCS' Bozeman client list. JCCS filed a complaint against Appellants to declare the Covenant enforceable and to recover damages. On remand, the district court determined that the Covenant was reasonable, Appellants were jointly and severally liable for damages arising out of the Covenant's breach, and JCCS was entitled to prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) concluding that Appellants were jointly and severally liable for JCCS' damages; (2) concluding that the Covenant was reasonable; (3) awarding prejudgment interest but erred with regards to the date interest began accruing; and (4) by denying Appellants' motion for discovery sanctions. View "Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn" on Justia Law
Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc.
Members of IATSE, lighting technicians, filed suit against CMS for wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code incurred in the 2016 production of a television commercial for Ulta Beauty. The superior court granted CMS's motion for summary judgment on the ground that CMS was not an employer of the four IATSE members.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that CMS failed to demonstrate it is not an employer within the meaning of IWC Wage Order No. 12-2001. In this case, CMS has failed to establish the AICP-IATSE Commercial Production Agreement (CPA) permits a signatory to avoid its responsibilities as an employer when it lends its signatory status to a nonsignatory producer. Furthermore, a triable issue of fact exists as to CMS's right to control aspects of the production and its failure to ensure compliance with the CPA. View "Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
McCann v. Badger Mining Corp.
McCann began her employment with Badger’s predecessor in 2010. At her 2013 evaluation, she received an overall appraisal of “Right on Track” but her supervisor noted some shortcomings in her ability to deal with conflict, work with others, communicate, and problem-solve with her coworkers. The review also noted limitations in McCann’s abilities to perform new tasks and to understand others’ roles in the department. Her supervisors noted similar problems in subsequent years. In 2015, McCann reported having arthritis and carpal tunnel syndrome and that she would need time off for medical appointments. At around the same time, the company experienced financial problems. All employees over the age of 60, including McCann, were offered an early retirement package. Involuntary staff reductions became necessary.After her termination, McCann filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Badger on her disability claim related to the elimination of her position. McCann failed to come forward with evidence that, but for her disability, Badger would not have eliminated her position. View "McCann v. Badger Mining Corp." on Justia Law