Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order granting judgment to Plaintiffs on their claims under the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, 150, and the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, on the ground that by violating the Prevailing Wage Act, Defendants violated the Wage Act as well, holding that Plaintiffs may not avoid the limitations that the Prevailing Wage Act places on their recovery by pursuing an otherwise duplicative claim under the Wage Act.Plaintiffs asserted that for several years they were paid less than the wages required by the Prevailing Wage Act. The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, concluding that Defendants' "chronic underpayment" of Plaintiffs constituted a plain violation of the Prevailing Wage Act and that Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiffs at the prescribed wage rates also constituted a violation of the Wage Act. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order allowing Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that, whereas the Prevailing Wage Act and the Wage Act provide conflicting mechanisms to recover the same underpayment of wages, Plaintiffs may, in this instance, recover solely under the Prevailing Wage Act. View "Donis v. American Waste Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2013, LeVan was elected to the office of Milton Township Assessor, displacing his political rival, Earl. Shortly after he took office, LeVan discharged a group of Deputy Assessors who had publicly supported Earl in his run for reelection. The dismissed employees sued LeVan under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Deputy Assessor position is not one for which political affiliation is a valid job requirement, as the position did not authorize the employees to have meaningful input in policy decisions.The district court concluded that LeVan is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Unless political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, the First Amendment forbids government officials from discharging employees based on their political affiliation. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations about the characteristics of the Deputy Assessor position, a reasonable actor in LeVan’s position would have known that dismissing the deputies based on their political affiliation violated their constitutional rights. View "Hanson v. LeVan" on Justia Law

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The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) determined that Ernest Moreno’s retirement benefits had been incorrectly calculated and initiated proceedings to adjust Moreno’s retirement benefits and collect the overpayment. The trial court denied Moreno’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the CalSTRS actions. Moreno appealed, contending: (1) CalSTRS’s adjustment of his retirement benefits and collection of the overpayment were barred by the statute of limitations found in Education Code section 22008 (c) because CalSTRS was on inquiry notice of the problem as early as 2008; and (2) CalSTRS should have been equitably estopped from adjusting his retirement benefits and collecting the overpayments. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) CalSTRS was not on inquiry notice of the reporting error that led to overpayment until December 2014 when it began an audit of Moreno’s retirement benefits, and, therefore, CalSTRS’s adjustments to Moreno’s retirement benefits and collection of overpayments were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) CalSTRS was not equitably estopped because CalSTRS was not apprised of (or on notice about) the overpayments until December 2014. View "Moreno v. Cal. State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged defendant Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC (“Affinity”) terminated them on the basis of age and sex. They brought disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The district court dismissed (1) the Title VII disparate impact claim, (2) the Title VII disparate treatment claim, and (3) the ADEA disparate impact claim. It granted summary judgment in favor of Affinity on the ADEA disparate treatment claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Title VII disparate treatment claim. With respect to the other claims, the Court reversed and remanded to the district court, finding that when the evidence was construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it sufficed to create a genuine issue of material facts with respect to the other allegations. View "Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk" on Justia Law

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In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) to the judicial branch of our tripartite form of government violated separation of powers principles. On April 3, 1989, the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) Office of Adult Probation hired Appellant Michael Renner as a Parole Officer. In July 2011, Appellant informed Lehigh County Chief Probation Officer John Sikora that he had been diagnosed with a serious mental health condition and was hospitalized; he was subsequently absent from work for 4 to 6 weeks. During Appellant’s absence, Sikora telephoned him numerous times to confirm the legitimacy of Appellant’s condition. Upon his return to work, Appellant alleged Sikora and Lehigh County Benefits Manager Mark Surovy, both of whom supervised Appellant, pressured Appellant to resign or take a leave of absence. Appellant confronted Sikora about his hostilities towards him, but Sikora refused to discuss the matter. Subsequently, in March 2014, Sikora terminated Appellant for failing to administer a urine test to an offender under his supervision. Appellant claimed the test was not required and that the reason for his termination was pretextual. Appellant protested his termination to then-President Judge of the CCP Carol McGinley, but Judge McGinley refused to take any action. As a result, Appellant claimed he could not obtain other employment in any other court system, and, in 2014, he filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), against Lehigh County Adult Probation, Sikora, and Surovy. Thereafter, Appellant completed training as a municipal officer, and, subsequently, was offered a police officer position by Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs. Appellant alleged that the CCP and Lehigh County learned that Appellant was offered employment as a police officer, and caused an order to be issued banning Appellant from possessing a firearm or taser in the Lehigh County Courthouse, Old Courthouse, and Government Center. As a result, Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs rescinded their employment offers. Appellant eventually got his gun possession ban lifted, but as a condition, the CCP and Lehigh County required him to undergo a medical exam, which Appellant contended was a violation of the PHRA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that application of the PHRA to the judiciary would violate separation of powers principles, and thus, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Renner v. CCP of Lehigh Co., et al" on Justia Law

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The Icee Company and J & J Snack Foods Corp. (collectively, Icee) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a dispute with a former employee. The employee, Taraun Collie, alleged a single cause of action against Icee under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Collie alleged that he worked for Icee from November 2014 to August 2015. When he began his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement. In July 2016, Collie filed his PAGA complaint on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees. Icee moved to compel arbitration of Collie’s “individual claim” in August 2018. It argued that the parties had agreed to bilateral arbitration only, so Collie had to arbitrate his PAGA cause of action on an individual basis—that is, he could not seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other Icee employees. And because Collie had agreed to arbitrate all claims or controversies with Icee, he had effectively waived his right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of other employees in any forum. The trial court denied Icee’s motion, concluding that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014), required that result. The Court of Appeal concluded that under Iskanian, an employee could not be compelled to arbitrate a PAGA cause of action on the basis of a predispute arbitration agreement, thereby affirming the trial court. View "Collie v. The Icee Co." on Justia Law

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Tonyan, a Dunham’s store manager, suffered a series of injuries, requiring multiple surgeries and restrictions to her shoulder, arm, and hand movement. After her doctor imposed permanent restrictions, including one preventing her from lifting more than two pounds with her right arm, Dunham’s fired her. Dunham’s claims, because of its lean staffing model, that store managers must perform various forms of physical labor, such as unloading and shelving merchandise, as essential functions of their job duties.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her claims, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate her disability, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(1)–(7). Physical tasks were essential functions of Tonyan’s job; in light of the severe restrictions on her movement, no reasonable factfinder could determine that Tonyan was capable of performing the essential functions of her position. The court rejected Tonyan’s argument under the FLSA “primary duty” test for overtime exemption; an exempt employee may spend more than 50 percent of his time performing non‐exempt work, such as manual labor. Tools were available throughout Tonyan’s employment and they did not permit Tonyan to perform her duties, which she delegated. Even with tools, a person restricted to lifting no more than two pounds with one of her arms could not lift canoes, for instance, to their proper storage space. View "Tonyan v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp." on Justia Law

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A 2012-2015 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) contained a union security clause that required Maysteel employees either to become union members or to pay a “service fee for representation.” Under a dues check‐off provision, Maysteel, with an employee’s authorization, deducted dues or fees from the employee’s paycheck. A new agreement was to take effect on March 5, 2015, the day after the old agreement expired; the parties agreed to implement it on March 2, with the start of a new pay period. The new agreement was actually signed on March 18. On March 11, Wisconsin’s Act 1, a right-to-work law prohibiting union security clauses, took effect and applied to CBAs “upon renewal, modification, or extension of the agreement occurring on or after” that date.Plaintiffs unsuccessfully demanded that Maysteel stop fee deductions, then filed charges with the NLRB, which negotiated a settlement that did not require reimbursement of the deductions or invalidation of the union security clause. The plaintiffs sued, alleging unfair labor practices under state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The judge denied remand and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal question at the heart of the complaint was whether the 2012 CBA was "renewed, modified, [or] extended on or after March 11, 2015.” Wisconsin is not entitled to give an independent answer to this question, different from federal law. The CBA was formed before Act 1 took effect. View "Sarauer v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers" on Justia Law

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FedEx twice fired Kotaska because she could not lift up to 75 pounds. The first time, she was limited to lifting only 60 pounds after a shoulder injury. Eventually, her condition improved so that she could lift 75 pounds to her waist. A FedEx supervisor rehired her “oě the books.” Within three, FedEx discovered her capabilities above the waist remained severely limited and dismissed her again. Kotaska filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213.The district court granted FedEx summary judgment because Kotaska had not shown she was a qualięed individual or that the second dismissal was in retaliation for her complaints about the first. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parties agree that lifting packages, including above the waist and shoulders, is an essential function (really the essential function) of a handler. Kotaska did not dispute FedEx’s judgment that a handler must be able to lift up to 75 pounds by herself and up to 150 pounds with help. Whatever precise weight a handler might need to lift above the waist or shoulders, no reasonable fact-finder could place that weight within Kotaska’s stringent medical restrictions. View "Kotaska v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Appellants' motion to compel arbitration in this putative class action, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" encompasses the contracts of transportation workers who transport goods or people within the flow of interstate commerce.Plaintiff was a delivery driver for Amazon.com, Inc. and its subsidiary, Amazon Logistics, Inc. (collectively, Amazon) who collected packages for delivery in Massachusetts and did not cross state lines during the course of his deliveries. Plaintiff filed this putative class action asserting misclassification of Amazon's drivers contracted with through its smartphone application as independent contractors and violations of Massachusetts labor laws. Amazon moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision of Plaintiff's employment agreement with Amazon. The district court denied the motion in part, concluding that Plaintiff's agreement was exempt from the FAA and that the provision was unenforceable based on Massachusetts public policy. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the FAA does not govern the enforceability of the dispute resolution section of the agreement; and (2) the district court rightly refused to compel arbitration pursuant to state law. View "Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law