Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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In January 2011, plaintiff-appellant Virgin Bunn was hired for a one-year probationary period as a human resources assistant at the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) Albuquerque Service Center. Ten months into the job, Bunn's supervisor became concerned about Bunn's job performance. After his supervisor asked a colleague to oversee Bunn’s work, Bunn complained to his supervisor about the colleague’s comments to him. Bunn later contacted USFS’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Counselor Office about these comments. On January 6, 2012, Bunn was fired. Bunn thereafter filed an EEO complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging harassment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. An administrative law judge dismissed the suit, granting summary judgment to the agency on all claims. The USDA’s Office of Adjudication issued a final order implementing the EEOC’s decision. Bunn appealed. The Office of Federal Operations affirmed the USDA’s final decision. After its review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found: Bunn's appeal of the summary judgment order was untimely; and (2) there was no reversible error in the district court's order striking Bunn's motion to vacate. View "Bunn v. Perdue" on Justia Law

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After the Department discharged plaintiff based on her failure to report another deputy's use of force against an inmate and her failure to seek medical assistance for the inmate, the Commission affirmed the discharge. However, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate and directed the Commission to set aside the discharge, award her back pay, and reconsider a lesser penalty.The Court of Appeal reversed and held that the Department did not abuse its discretion in discharging plaintiff where plaintiff's conduct furthered the code of silence at the Men's Central Jail, requiring the Department to take action. In this case, plaintiff's conduct in following the code of silence undermined the Department's trust and confidence in plaintiff as a deputy sheriff and negatively impacted the operation of the jail. Furthermore, at the Commission hearing, plaintiff minimized her responsibility to report the use of force. Therefore, given the Department's reasoned explanation that the discharge was necessary, the court concluded that this is not the exceptional case where reasonable minds cannot differ on the appropriate penalty. The court remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate. View "Pasos v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

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In a matter of first impression, the issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was the appropriate test to determine whether a claimant who is otherwise entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits due to a separation from employment becomes ineligible for those benefits as a result of being self-employed pursuant to Section 402(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Act, known as the self-employment exclusion). The Court held that Section 4(l)((2)(B), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B), contained the appropriate test for determining whether or not an individual is in self-employment. If an individual was not in “self-employment,” then he remained eligible for benefits. Applying that test to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's ruling that the claimant was not self-employed. View "Lowman v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

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Virgil Adams, a self-described journeyman carpenter, worked sporadically from 2009 to 2011 at a house located on Snow Bear Drive in Anchorage. He suffered a “T12 burst fracture with incomplete spinal cord injury” when he fell from the house’s roof in 2011, and became permanently and totally disabled as a result of the fall. He filed a claim with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, and, because the property owner for whom he worked had no workers’ compensation insurance, the Workers’ Compensation Guaranty Fund was joined to the workers’ compensation case. The Fund disputed whether the property owner for whom the carpenter worked was an “employer” as defined in the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act and contended the worker’s intoxication caused the accident. The Board decided the injury was compensable based on two findings: (1) the property owner was engaged in a real-estate-related “business or industry” and (2) the worker’s alleged intoxication did not proximately cause the accident. The Fund appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission; the Commission reversed because, in its view, the Board applied an incorrect legal test in determining whether the property owner was an employer and no evidence in the record could support a determination that the property owner was engaged in a “business or industry” at the time of the injury. The Commission decided the intoxication issue was not ripe for review. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision, finding the Board did not legally err and substantial evidence supported its employment-status decision. The matter was remanded to the Commission for consideration of the intoxication issue. View "Adams v. Alaska Workers Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund" on Justia Law

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AdvancePierre petitioned for review of the Board's finding that it committed unfair labor practices (ULPs) over a five month span as the union conducted an organizing campaign. At issue is whether AdvancePierre unlawfully encouraged its employees to withdraw their union authorization cards, and the "read-aloud" remedy ordered by the Board.The DC Circuit denied AdvancePierre's petition for review, holding that Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act limits the court's jurisdiction to matters first presented to the Board unless extraordinary circumstances excuse such failure. In this case, AdvancePierre's petition squarely collides with Section 10(e)'s jurisdictional barrier and the court is without authority to consider all but a small portion of the company's argument. Therefore, the court cannot consider AdvancePierre's argument regarding the company's unlawful solicitation of its employees to withdraw their union authorization cards because it was not preserved under Section 10(e). Furthermore, the court held that the Board's application of In re Mohawk Industries, 334 N.L.R.B. 1170 (2001), was not arbitrary or capricious and the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. In regard to the notice-reading remedy, the court held that the Board did not abuse its extremely broad discretion when it determined that the company's 17 ULPs were sufficiently serious and widespread to warrant a notice-reading. View "AdvancePierre Foods, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court modified the opinion of the court of appeals to direct the dismissal of Plaintiff's amended petition to a limited extent, holding that there was no basis for directing Plaintiff's entire petition to be dismissed.Plaintiff was injured in an acceding arising out of and in the course of his employment. Plaintiff later filed a petition seeking reimbursement for continuing medical treatment related to the work accident, alleging that he had injured his head, neck and lower back and required treatment for depression and anxiety. The compensation court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for treatment of his lower back, as well as depression and anxiety, but that Plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for medical treatment related to head and neck injuries. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Plaintiff's depression and anxiety developed as a result of his low back condition. The Supreme Court modified the court of appeals' opinion, concluding that the petition should be dismissed only to the extent it sought reimbursement for treatment for depression, anxiety, and head and neck injuries. View "Frans v. Waldinger Corp." on Justia Law

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Chris Garner sued Inter-State Oil Company alleging employment claims and seeking certification of a class action. Based on an arbitration agreement between Garner and Inter-State Oil, the trial court granted Inter-State Oil’s petition to compel arbitration of individual claims only, effectively denying Garner the ability to pursue class action claims. The trial court relied on language in the arbitration agreement stating that Garner waived his right to participate in class action lawsuits. On appeal of the order granting the motion to compel arbitration, Garner contended: (1) the plain language of the arbitration agreement gave him the right to pursue his class claims in arbitration; and (2) Inter-State Oil waived reliance on the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the arbitration agreement required arbitration of Garner’s class claims; and (2) Inter-State Oil did not waive reliance on the arbitration agreement. The Court modified the trial court’s order to require arbitration of both individual and class claims, and affirmed the order as modified. View "Garner v. Inter-State Oil Co." on Justia Law

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Sommerfield was born in Germany, where some of his family members had died in concentration camps. He emigrated, settled in Chicago, and joined the police department. His supervisor was Sergeant Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. After Knasiak insulted the Mexican ethnicity of Sommerfield’s girlfriend, Sommerfield filed a formal complaint register (CR). Two days later, Knasiak accused Sommerfield of insubordination for an unrelated incident, recommending suspension. This was the only CR Knasiak had ever issued. Sommerfield’s five-day suspension was unprecedented for the minor infraction of “failure to report location.” Later Sommerfield was denied a promotion, although he was rated “well-qualified.” Sommerfield sued. The court dismissed Knasiak. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000 against Chicago.Sommerfield again sued Knasiak and the city in 2008, alleging harassment, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation based on protected activities. The district court dismissed the claims against the city but awarded Sommerfield $540,000 in punitive damages, $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest, plus another $54,315.24 in economic damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the evidence was not “overwhelming,” there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Knasiak filed the CR out of discriminatory animus and that Knasiak was the real decision-maker with respect to the adverse actions taken against Sommerfield. Upholding the award of punitive damages, the court stated that, although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically violent, his conduct was “extremely reprehensible.” View "Sommerfield v. Knasiak" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Walden Security and dismissing the suit brought by Plaintiffs for statutory separation pay pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 80, holding that Plaintiffs had no remedy pursuant to Law 80.Plaintiffs had served as court security officers for the District of Puerto Rico for thirty-two years when Walden Security assumed the federal contract to provide courthouse security services. Walden refused to hire Plaintiffs because they lacked certification from a law enforcement training academy. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant lawsuit for statutory separation pay. The district court granted summary judgment for Walden, reasoning that Law 80 did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district erred in ignoring the theory of liability that Plaintiff's advanced: Puerto Rico's common law successor employer doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court misconstrued Plaintiffs' theory of liability; but (2) the successor employer doctrine was clearly inapplicable to Plaintiffs' case. View "Lopez-Santos v. Metropolitan Security Services" on Justia Law

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North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision terminating Gregory Beam’s benefits. Beam was injured in 2016 while working for his employer, Gagnon, Inc. (Gagnon), installing sheets of metal. At the time Beam applied for workers compensation benefits, Gagnon submitted a job description for machinist as Beam’s position with the company at the time of his injuries. A Functional Capacity Evaluation identified Beam could occasionally climb ladders and kneel, but was unable to crouch or crawl. After completion of the evaluation, WSI identified Beam’s transferable skills and physical capabilities. WSI determined Beam’s pre-injury occupation was that of a sheet metal worker, not a machinist as submitted by Gagnon. WSI forwarded a list of job descriptions to Beam’s treating physician, Dr. Kelly, for approval. The description for the physical requirements of a machinist stated the position required “[o]ccasional stooping, kneeling and crouching;” the description for a sheet metal worker were "“[f]requent stooping, handling and reaching & occasional fingering.” Dr. Kelly did not approve Beam returning to work as a machinist, stating, “I don’t think the knee will tolerate the potential kneeling.” Dr. Kelly did approve Beam returning to work as a sheet metal worker. Based on Dr. Kelly’s approval for Beam to return to work as a sheet metal worker, WSI determined Beam could return to work in the same occupation, any employer, and discontinued Beam’s benefits. The ALJ found the job description of a machinist did not match Beam’s pre-injury profession. The ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence established Beam could return to the occupation of sheet metal worker, but could not return to his pre-injury position with Gagnon. The district court determined the ALJ’s findings of fact were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and reversed. Applying its deferential standard of review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was evidence in the record from which a reasoning mind could have reasonably concluded WSI’s rehabilitation plan would return Beam to substantial gainful employment. It therefore reversed the district court and reinstated the ALJ's decision. View "Beam v. WSI et. al." on Justia Law