Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. v. Figueroa
In this appeal regarding the scope of the law-enforcement exception to the "going and coming rule" in workers' compensation matters the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer, holding that the appeals officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer's accident.Plaintiff, a police officer, was struck by another vehicle during his drive home from work. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries he sustained in the accident. His claim was denied. On appeal, the appeals officer also denied the claim, concluding that Plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment. The district court granted Plaintiff's petition for judicial review and concluded that Plaintiff's accident indeed arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court must look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis in determining whether the law-enforcement exception to the going and coming rule applies; and (2) Plaintiff qualified for the law-enforcement exception under the totality of the circumstances test. View "Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. v. Figueroa" on Justia Law
Allman v. Walmart, Inc.
Federal regulations require commercial truck drivers to undergo annual physicals to be “medically certified as physically qualified." A driver is not physically qualified if he has a clinical diagnosis of a respiratory dysfunction likely to interfere with his ability to drive a commercial motor vehicle safely. Respiratory dysfunction includes sleep apnea.Allman was diagnosed with apnea after a sleep study and was instructed to wear a CPAP machine when sleeping in his truck. Allman complained about the device, which was remotely monitored. Allman was suspended twice for noncompliance. Allman independently completed a second sleep study, which showed that Allman did not have sleep apnea. Allman stopped wearing the CPAP and obtained a new DOT certification card without another examination. Walmart instructed Allman to participate in another sleep study because the doctor who performed Allman’s independent study was not board certified. A third study resulted in a second diagnosis of sleep apnea. Allman refused to wear the CPAP machine. Rather than taking the conflicting sleep studies to a DOT medical examiner, Allman resigned and filed suit, asserting discrimination based on perceived disability and retaliation under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims. Walmart offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its CPAP requirement; Allman failed to rebut that reason as pretextual. Walmart’s CPAP requirement was not an unsafe working condition but was a disability accommodation meant to promote public safety and to ensure compliance with federal law. View "Allman v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law
Krile v. Lawyer
Robyn Krile appealed from a district court order granting defendant Julie Lawyer’s motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In February 2017, Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Lawyer received an anonymous letter concerning a Bismarck police officer's destruction of evidence. Lawyer averred her decision to review the officer files was to ensure the state’s attorney’s office was fulfilling its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). As part of her investigation, Lawyer reviewed the file of Sergeant Robyn Krile. In Krile’s file, Lawyer discovered two letters of reprimand and several performance evaluations, which Lawyer believed raised Giglio issues. Lawyer further investigated the incidents for which the letters of reprimand were issued, and concluded Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer shared her belief that the letters of reprimand and performance evaluations raised Giglio concerns with Bismarck Police Chief Dan Donlin. Chief Donlin disagreed and advised Lawyer that he did not see the incidents for which the letters of reprimand were issued as amounting to Giglio issues. Despite Chief Donlin’s pleas, Lawyer continued to believe Krile’s conduct amounted to a Giglio issue. Lawyer informed Chief Donlin that the results of her investigation would have to be disclosed to defense in cases in which Krile was involved pursuant to Giglio and, as a result, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office would no longer use Krile as a witness in its cases. Because the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office was no longer willing to use Krile as a witness in its cases, the Bismarck Police Department terminated Krile’s employment. Krile filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Human Rights claiming the Bismarck Police Department discriminated against her. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed dismissal of Krile's defamation claims for Lawyer's disclosure of the results of her investigation (the Giglio letter) to Chief Donlin. The Court affirmed dismissal of Krile’s defamation claims for Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio letter and affidavits to the Department of Labor and Human Rights because the communications were absolutely privileged. On remand, the district court may decide whether Lawyer’s communications to Chief Donlin and the POST Board are entitled to a qualified privilege. View "Krile v. Lawyer" on Justia Law
Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Ass’n
The Supreme Court held that the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act's (PEPRA), Stats. 2012, ch. 296, 1, amendment of the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL), Cal. Gov. Code 31450 et seq., did not violate the contract clause under a proper application of the California Rule and declined to reexamine and revise the California Rule.At issue was whether a provision of PEPRA amending CERL's definition of "compensation earnable," which affected the pensions of persons who were first employed by a county prior to the effective date of PEPRA, violated the contract clause. The Supreme Court held (1) county employees have no express contractual right to the calculation of their pension benefits in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the PEPRA amendment; (2) the challenged provisions added by PEPRA met contract clause requirements; and (3) the test announced in Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 (1955), as explained and applied in this case, remains the law of California. View "Alameda County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law
International Union v. Trane U.S. Inc.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the union's claims against Trane concerning an arbitration award. In this case, the June Award indicated that the arbitrator did not intend for it to be final because he explicitly retained jurisdiction "until the terms of the award are met." When a dispute did arise regarding damages, the arbitrator resolved that dispute in the September Award and then expressly stated that he was "no longer retaining jurisdiction in this matter." Therefore, the express relinquishment of jurisdiction in the September Award indicated that the arbitrator intended the September Award to be final and did not contemplate further disputes regarding the award.The court held that the union is not time-barred from seeking to vacate the arbitration award because the text of the June Award indicates that it was not the final award. The court stated that the September Award is the final award and the union filed its claim to vacate within 90 days of it. Therefore, the union's claim was timely and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "International Union v. Trane U.S. Inc." on Justia Law
Patel v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc.
After the Medical Center suspended plaintiff's medical privileges, plaintiff filed suit against the Medical Center, an injunction against the suspension, and a declaration that the Health Care Quality Improvement Act provided no immunity from damages to the Medical Center.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends only that federal question jurisdiction exists over his suit, but a request for declaratory relief that a federal law does not entitle the opposing party to a defense ordinarily does not raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C.1331. The court explained that, because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge the court's jurisdiction, plaintiff must still assert an underlying ground for federal court jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff's complaint does not establish that the Medical Center could file a coercive action under federal law. Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot create federal question jurisdiction by seeking a declaration that a federal defense does not protect the defendant. Therefore, plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment does not establish federal question jurisdiction. View "Patel v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law
Gogel v. KIA Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court first held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Kia's stated reason for firing her -- solicitation of another employee to sue the company -- was a pretext to mask a retaliatory motive, and thus she has necessarily failed to show that a reasonable jury could find that but for the filing of her EEOC charge she would not have been fired.The court also held that an employee's oppositional conduct under Title VII is not protected if the means by which the employee has chosen to express her opposition so interferes with the performance of her job that it renders her ineffective in the position for which she is employed. In this case, Kia held a good faith belief that plaintiff had abandoned her responsibility to try to resolve an employee's dispute without litigation when she instead actively solicited a complaining employee to sue the company and provided the employee with the name of an attorney to use; Kia determined it could no longer keep her as its Manager of Team Relations, the department to which unhappy employees were sent to air their complaints; and Kia fired plaintiff because she chose to act in a way that conflicted with the core objectives of her sensitive and highly important position. View "Gogel v. KIA Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc." on Justia Law
Judd v. Weinstein
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of actor Ashley Judd's sexual harassment claim under California Civil Code section 51.9 against producer Harvey Weinstein. Judd alleged that, in the late 1990s, Weinstein sexually harassed her during a general business meeting and derailed her potential involvement in the film adaptation of "The Lord of the Rings" book trilogy.The panel held that, as alleged, section 51.9 plainly encompasses Judd and Weinstein's relationship, which was "substantially similar" to the "business, service, or professional relationship[s]" enumerated in the statute. The panel explained that the relationship between Judd and Weinstein was characterized by a considerable imbalance of power substantially similar to the imbalances that characterize the enumerated relationships in section 51.9. The panel stated that, by virtue of his professional position and influence as a top producer in Hollywood, Weinstein was uniquely situated to exercise coercive power or leverage over Judd, who was a young actor at the beginning of her career at the time of the alleged harassment. Furthermore, given Weinstein's highly influential and "unavoidable" presence in the film industry, the relationship was one that would have been difficult to terminate "without tangible hardship" to Judd, whose livelihood as an actor depended on being cast for roles. The panel rejected Weinstein's arguments to the contrary and held that Judd sufficiently alleged a claim under section 51.9. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Judd v. Weinstein" on Justia Law
ABM Industry Groups, LLC v. International Union of Operating Engineers
ABM appealed the district court's denial of its motion to confirm an arbitration award and granting in part the union's motion to vacate the award, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). In this case, the arbitrator issued an opinion and award, concluding that two employees were not entitled to termination pay and directing them to repay certain amounts to ABM. The district court denied the motion to confirm the arbitrator's award, concluding that the award was ultra vires and unenforceable.The Second Circuit held that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority because, under both agency law principles and federal labor law, the union possessed the authority to bind the employees to the arbitration award. The court stated that the district court plainly erred by reasoning that no precedent or authority supported the proposition that a union can bind its members to make payments ordered by an arbitrator under an arbitration agreement to which they were not signatories, following a process in which they did not participate. Rather, the court held that the record is clear that the employees did participate in the arbitration proceeding and the union possessed both agency and statutory authority to appear in the arbitration on their behalf. View "ABM Industry Groups, LLC v. International Union of Operating Engineers" on Justia Law
King v. U.S. Bank National Assn.
A jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff Timothy King against defendant U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) for defamation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, awarding King almost $24.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. King started in the position of senior vice president regional manager, market lead, and market president for U.S. Bank’s Sacramento area in January 2007. In 2012, two of King's subordinates contacted the Bank's human resources department, raising claims of gender discrimination and harassment. There was substantial evidence from which the jury found the subordinates were biased and hostile toward King, and thus there were "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant[s] or the accuracy of his [and her] reports." U.S. Bank moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts and the award of punitive damages. The trial court denied the motion. U.S. Bank also moved for new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts, the damages were excessive, and there was an irregularity in the proceedings that prevented a fair trial. The trial court conditionally granted the motion for new trial on the excessive damages ground conditioned upon King agreeing to a remittitur, but denied the motion on the other grounds asserted. King accepted the remittitur and the trial court entered judgment on the remitted award of over $5.4 million. U.S. Bank appeals, challenging the jury’s verdicts on each of the causes of action and the remitted award of punitive damages. King cross-appealed, challenging the trial court’s new trial orders on excessive damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s new trial orders, but agreed with the trial court, following its own independent review, that a one-to-one ratio between compensatory and punitive damages was the constitutional limit under the facts of this case. The Court remanded with directions to modify the judgment accordingly. View "King v. U.S. Bank National Assn." on Justia Law