Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Mary Ann Arnold worked for United Airlines from 1994 to 2020. She alleged age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge after experiencing changes in her job responsibilities and being placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Arnold claimed these actions were due to her age and previous complaints about discrimination and harassment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines on Arnold's claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The court dismissed her constructive discharge claim without prejudice, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Arnold did not provide sufficient evidence to show that she suffered adverse employment actions due to age discrimination. The court also found that her retaliation claim failed because the actions taken by United were not materially adverse and were not shown to be causally connected to her complaints. Additionally, the court held that Arnold did not demonstrate a hostile work environment based on age, as the incidents she described were not severe or pervasive enough to meet the legal standard. The court also upheld the dismissal of her constructive discharge claim due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees and independent contractors of White Oak Radiator Service, Inc., were injured while performing work at Enable Midstream Partners, LP's natural gas processing plant. The work involved removing and replacing amine and glycol coolers. During the work, a glycol surge tank ruptured, causing injuries. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking damages for their injuries.The trial court found that the claims of Joey Miller and Davy Dowdy against Enable sounded in tort rather than workers' compensation. The court awarded damages to Mr. Dowdy for injuries to his cervical spine and hearing loss, but found that White Oak bore a greater percentage of fault than assigned by the trial court. The trial court assigned 90 percent fault to Enable and 10 percent to White Oak. Enable appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the Louisiana workers' compensation laws and challenging the allocation of fault and damages.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that the manual labor exception under La. R.S. 23:1021 (7) does not apply to the employees and independent contractors of an independent contractor. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Enable sound in tort. The court found no manifest error in the trial court's award of damages to Mr. Dowdy for his cervical spine injuries and hearing loss. However, the court found that the trial court erred in the apportionment of fault and amended the judgment to assign 70 percent fault to Enable and 30 percent fault to White Oak. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as amended. View "McBride v. Old Republic Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Anthony Sullers, Sr., an African American elevator mechanic, filed a lawsuit against his union, the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2 (IUEC), alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his claim of racial discrimination by his employer, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation (TKE). Sullers and another employee were laid off, and while Sullers was without work, TKE hired a white mechanic. Sullers informed the union of his layoff and his belief that it was racially motivated. The union filed a grievance on his behalf but did not include allegations of racial discrimination. Sullers followed the union's advice to file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of IUEC. The court found that the union had fulfilled its duty of fair representation by obtaining the maximum remedy available for Sullers, including his reinstatement and backpay. The court also noted that Sullers had not requested the union to file a racial discrimination grievance and that the union's actions were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the union's decision to pursue the grievance as it did, rather than filing a racial discrimination grievance, was within its discretion and not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The court also found that Sullers did not suffer harm attributable to the union's actions, as he was reinstated and received backpay. The court concluded that the union had properly represented Sullers and that he had not shown how he would have achieved a better outcome through arbitration. View "Sullers v. International Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2" on Justia Law

A group of entities managing a university hospital and a union representing the hospital’s service workers have been negotiating a successor agreement since 2016. The hospital proposed three key changes: granting itself unilateral control over employment terms, imposing a no-strike clause, and eliminating binding arbitration. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these proposals collectively constituted bad faith bargaining, as they would leave union employees worse off than if no contract existed.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially sustained the complaint against the hospital, concluding that the hospital violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by bargaining in bad faith. The ALJ found that the hospital’s proposals, including a restrictive grievance-arbitration procedure and a broad management rights clause, indicated an intent to undermine the bargaining process. The hospital’s regressive bargaining tactics further supported this conclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, agreeing that the hospital’s conduct amounted to bad faith surface bargaining. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the hospital’s proposals, taken together, would strip the union of its representational role and leave employees with fewer rights than they would have without a contract. The court also upheld the NLRB’s procedural decisions, including vacating an earlier decision due to a board member’s financial conflict of interest and seating a new member for the final decision.The court denied the hospital’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement, affirming the NLRB’s order for the hospital to recognize and bargain with the union, rescind unilateral changes, compensate affected employees, and submit periodic reports on bargaining progress. View "District Hospital Partners, L.P. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

James Jurgensen sustained a work injury on July 29, 2021, while employed by Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. He hired attorney Joshua E. Borken, who agreed to a contingent fee of 20% of the first $130,000 of compensation and 20% of any excess amount, subject to approval. Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), caps attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases at $26,000. The parties settled for $150,000, and Borken sought $30,000 in fees, including $4,000 in excess fees. The compensation judge approved $26,000 but denied the excess fees after applying the Irwin factors.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the compensation judge’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the excess fees. The WCCA also concluded that automatic approval of unobjected-to excess fees is inconsistent with section 176.081, which provides a presumptive cap on attorney fees. The WCCA did not address the constitutional issue due to a lack of jurisdiction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the 2024 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 176.081, which increases the cap on attorney fees, does not apply retroactively. The court also held that the WCCA did not err by declining to automatically approve the requested excess fee. Additionally, the court found that Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that the WCCA did not err by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of excess attorney fees under the Irwin factors.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the WCCA, upholding the denial of the $4,000 in excess attorney fees. View "Jurgensen vs. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves members of the Auburn University Board of Trustees and various Auburn University employees (defendants) who were sued by Patti Northcutt and her husband, Walter Northcutt (plaintiffs). Patti, a former employee and doctoral student at Auburn, alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for previous lawsuits and grievances she had filed, which were settled through agreements. She claimed that the defendants breached these settlement agreements and interfered with her ability to complete her doctoral program and obtain employment at Auburn.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Lee Circuit Court, which they amended multiple times. The third amended complaint included claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, and procedural due process violations, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, asserting federal qualified immunity and State immunity under the Alabama Constitution.The Lee Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied the motion regarding the other claims. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 for equal protection and procedural due process violations, based on federal qualified immunity. The Court also directed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to state-law claims for prospective injunctive relief, based on State immunity. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to federal-law claims for prospective injunctive relief and the state-law claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte B.T. Roberts" on Justia Law

The University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (the Authority) was created by the legislature in 1995 and was initially required to engage in collective bargaining under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act (Peace Act). However, in 2011, Act 10 was signed into law, which removed the Authority from the Peace Act and eliminated its obligation to engage in collective bargaining.After Act 10, the Authority ceased collective bargaining with its employees. In recent years, employees requested the Authority to recognize the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their collective bargaining agent, which the Authority declined. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding between SEIU and the Authority, and they petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine if the Authority was still required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. WERC concluded that the Authority was no longer required to engage in collective bargaining, citing Act 10's amendments. SEIU sought review in the circuit court, which affirmed WERC's decision. SEIU then appealed, and the Authority filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which was granted.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Authority is no longer required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. The court examined the statutory language and history, concluding that Act 10 ended the collective bargaining requirements for the Authority. The decision of WERC and the circuit court was affirmed. View "Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

A Hobby Lobby manager called law enforcement because Kristopher Birtcher appeared to be suffering from a mental health crisis at the store. Birtcher, who was unarmed and had committed no crime, tried to flee when sheriff’s deputies arrived. The deputies subdued him by double-cuffing his hands behind his back, securing his ankles, tying his ankles to a cord around his waist, and applying bodyweight pressure to his back while he was lying face down. Birtcher gasped that he couldn’t breathe and called for help. He stopped moving after several minutes, and the deputies kept him in a prone position for another 50 seconds before turning him on his side, then later returned him to a prone position. Birtcher died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest within 25 minutes of the deputies’ arrival.Birtcher’s minor daughter, A.B., brought state claims in state court after unsuccessfully litigating federal claims. She asserted claims for wrongful death, battery, negligence, and negligent training, and a survival action for violation of the Bane Act. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and ruling that the restraint was “by the book.” The court also ruled that A.B. failed to identify a legal basis for her negligent training theory against Sheriff Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that there were triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim, noting that the deputies’ use of forceful prone restraint with bodyweight compression could be seen as excessive. The court also found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as A.B. had identified a statutory basis for the claim, and Sheriff Gore failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of material fact. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case involves the Citizen Action Defense Fund (Fund) requesting the initial offers for collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) from the Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM) under the Public Records Act (PRA). The key issue is whether the deliberative process exemption under RCW 42.56.280 applies to these initial offers after the tentative CBAs have been signed by the parties and submitted to the OFM director but before they are signed by the governor or funded by the legislature.The Thurston County Superior Court found that OFM violated the PRA by withholding the records, ruling that the deliberative process exemption did not apply once the CBAs were signed by the state’s negotiation representative and the union. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the records were still exempt because the CBAs had not been presented to the governor for approval or funded by the legislature, and thus were not yet final.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the deliberative process exemption continues to apply until the legislature has funded the CBAs. The court reasoned that the collective bargaining process is not complete until the final step in the statutorily required implementation process, which is the approval of funding by the legislature. Therefore, the deliberative process exemption protects the documents related to collective bargaining until the CBAs are funded by the legislature. View "Citizen Action Def. Fund v. Off. of Fin. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Travis Bearden, a firefighter and paramedic for the City of Ocean Shores, joined the U.S. Army Reserves in 2013. He took periodic absences for military service, receiving paid military leave from the city. The dispute centers on military leave Bearden took between 2019 and 2021. During his first and second leaves from October 2019 to August 2020, Bearden was kept on the schedule and provided paid military leave for his scheduled workdays until his paid leave was exhausted in February 2020. The city then placed him on leave without pay status. For his third leave from August 2020 to May 2021, the city did not provide Bearden any paid military leave for the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year, arguing he had no scheduled workdays.Bearden filed a complaint in federal court in January 2021, asserting the city violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by denying him accrued leave, including paid military leave under RCW 38.40.060. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Bearden was not entitled to paid military leave during his third leave because he was not scheduled to work on any day during the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year. Bearden appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Washington’s paid military leave statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that public employees are entitled to 21 days of paid military leave for required military service during each military fiscal year, regardless of whether they are scheduled to work by the employer due to the length of their military service absence. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language and purpose support this entitlement, and the scheduling of workdays does not limit the annual entitlement to paid military leave. View "Bearden v. City of Ocean Shores" on Justia Law