Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A jurisdictional dispute arose between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) over maintenance work at SSA Terminals in the Port of Seattle. Both unions claimed the right to perform the work under their respective collective bargaining agreements. SSA initially assigned the work to ILWU, but IAM threatened economic action, prompting SSA to seek a resolution from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB assigned the work to IAM, leading ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA, which an arbitrator upheld.SSA then filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU's pursuit of the grievance violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects primary union activity. The NLRB rejected this defense, stating it was not applicable in pure jurisdictional disputes where multiple unions have valid contractual claims. The NLRB ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NLRB's position was foreclosed by its previous decision in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), which established that a valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for the NLRB to evaluate the merits of ILWU's work-preservation defense. The court also denied the petitions for review by IAM and the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A psychiatric hospital in Florida, Suncoast Behavioral Health Center, and its management company, UHS of Delaware, Inc. (UHS-DE), were cited by the Secretary of Labor for violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s General Duty Clause by failing to protect employees from patient-on-staff violence. The citation followed an OSHA investigation that revealed numerous instances of workplace violence at the hospital.The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) affirmed the citation, concluding that Suncoast and UHS-DE operated as a single employer and that the Secretary of Labor had proven the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed abatement measures. The Commission did not address the economic feasibility of two specific abatement measures related to hiring additional security staff, as the feasibility and efficacy of the other six measures were undisputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the Commission’s finding that Suncoast and UHS-DE operated as a single employer, noting that they shared a common worksite, integrated operations, and common management. However, the court found that the Secretary of Labor failed to prove the economic feasibility of the two security staffing-related abatement measures. Consequently, the court set aside the ALJ’s finding regarding these two measures but upheld the citation based on the six undisputed abatement measures.The court denied in part and granted in part the petition for review, affirming the citation but clarifying that Suncoast and UHS-DE are not obligated to implement the two security staffing measures. View "UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Dr. Sari Edelman, a female rheumatologist, was employed by the New York University (NYU) hospital system. After nearly five years of employment without disciplinary issues, she had disputes with Joseph Antonik and David Kaplan regarding her office space. Edelman claimed that Antonik used a gender-based slur and behaved aggressively, and that Kaplan's subsequent handling of the issue was discriminatory. She lodged complaints with NYU human resources, alleging gender discrimination and hostile behavior. Her employment contract was not renewed the following year, leading to her termination.Edelman sued various NYU entities and individual employees, asserting claims under the federal and New York Equal Pay Acts, Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in favor of some defendants and dismissed certain claims. The jury found in favor of Edelman on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik, awarding her $700,000 in damages, but found for the defendants on all other claims. The District Court later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants, vacating the jury's verdict in favor of Edelman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts in Edelman's favor on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik. The court vacated the District Court's grant of JNOV for these claims and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. The court also vacated the District Court's decision granting JMOL in favor of Kaplan on the retaliation claim and remanded for a new trial on that claim. The judgment on the remaining claims was affirmed. View "Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System" on Justia Law

A fifty-nine-year-old General Manager (GM) at a Chili’s restaurant in Nashville, Tennessee, was terminated and replaced by a thirty-three-year-old with no managerial experience. The employer, Brinker International, Inc., claimed the termination was due to the GM creating a toxic "culture" and not "living the Chili’s way," despite the restaurant being one of the top performers in the market. The GM alleged that the termination was due to age discrimination, as he was the oldest manager in the region and believed Brinker was systematically replacing older employees with younger ones.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment in favor of Brinker, accepting the company's explanation of "culture" as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. The court found that the GM could not sufficiently rebut this explanation to show it was pretext for age discrimination. The court also granted in part and denied in part the GM's motion for sanctions due to Brinker’s spoliation of evidence, awarding fees and costs but not excluding the TMR Report, which documented the termination decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the TMR Report could not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and was therefore inadmissible. The court vacated the district court’s order on sanctions and instructed it to consider whether additional sanctions beyond fees and costs were appropriate. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Brinker, finding that the GM had provided sufficient evidence to rebut Brinker’s explanation and create a genuine issue of material fact regarding age discrimination. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the GM’s motion for summary judgment. View "Kean v. Brinker Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, a middle school teacher and an assistant principal, were employed by a school district in Oregon. They created the "I Resolve" campaign, which included a website and a video uploaded to YouTube, advocating for policies on gender identity, parental rights, and education. They used their own devices and time but also sent emails from their school accounts to district employees with links to the campaign. Following complaints from employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator's determination that they violated district policies, the district terminated them but later reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and individual defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs alleged that their termination was in retaliation for their protected speech and that they were discriminated against based on their religion and viewpoint. The district court concluded that the defendants' interests in avoiding disruption outweighed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment. It held that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of the plaintiffs' expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim for damages due to qualified immunity but vacated the summary judgment for the district on the First Amendment claim for damages and the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also vacated the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim and the Title VII claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the credibility of the district's proffered reasons for the terminations. View "DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7" on Justia Law

Workers United initiated a unionizing campaign at a Starbucks store in Los Angeles in May 2022. The store manager, Leticia Nolda, held one-on-one meetings with employees to discuss unionization. During a meeting with shift supervisor Yesenia Alarcon, Nolda expressed her opposition to the union, mentioned potential union dues, and suggested that unionization could affect benefits and raises. Alarcon did not feel free to leave the meeting but did not face any adverse consequences or feel discouraged from supporting the union. The store later voted to unionize.An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Nolda's statements to Alarcon violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by threatening economic retaliation and coercively interrogating her about union activities. The ALJ disregarded Nolda's intent and Alarcon's subjective impressions as "immaterial." The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirmed the ALJ's decision. Starbucks petitioned for review, arguing that the Board applied an incorrect standard for Section 8(a)(1) violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the NLRB applied an improper legal standard by disregarding the factual context, including the employee's reactions, in evaluating the alleged Section 8 violations. The court emphasized that the totality of circumstances, including employees' subjective impressions, should be considered to determine if an employer's conduct would reasonably tend to coerce an employee. The court vacated the NLRB's opinion and order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Starbucks Corporation v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Lorna Orabona, a high-earning mortgage development officer, was terminated by Santander Bank, N.A. for allegedly violating the company's Code of Conduct by forwarding company emails to her private email address. As a result, she was deemed ineligible for severance benefits under Santander's Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Severance Policy. Orabona claimed that her termination was a pretext to avoid paying her severance benefits, especially since Santander was planning a large-scale layoff in her department shortly after her termination.The case was initially filed in Rhode Island Superior Court but was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Santander moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Orabona's claims were preempted by ERISA. The district court allowed limited discovery to determine the applicability of the ERISA plan. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Santander, holding that all of Orabona's state law claims were preempted by ERISA because they related to the Severance Policy and required reference to it for determining liability and damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Orabona's claims were preempted by ERISA under section 514(a) because they related to the Severance Policy. The court also found that her claims seeking relief for the denial of severance benefits conflicted with the remedial scheme established by ERISA section 502(a). The court emphasized that determining liability and damages for Orabona's claims would require interpreting the terms of the ERISA-regulated Severance Policy, thus necessitating preemption. View "Orabona v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Ryan West, a former employee of Village Practice Management Company, LLC ("Village"), sought a declaratory judgment from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. West argued that Village could not declare a forfeiture of his vested Class B Units after he joined a competitor post-employment, as the Agreement did not limit post-employment competitive activities. Village contended that West forfeited his vested Class B Units by joining a competitor, invoking the Management Incentive Plan's ("Plan") forfeiture provisions.The Court of Chancery denied Village's motion to stay proceedings and compel West to submit his claims to Village's Compensation Committee. The court then granted West's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the Agreement only restricted "detrimental activity" during employment. Consequently, Village could not enforce a forfeiture of West's vested Class B Units for activities occurring after his resignation. The court also awarded West his attorneys' fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court found that the term "Participant" in the Agreement could reasonably be interpreted to include former employees, making the Agreement ambiguous. Therefore, the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of West was improper. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of attorneys' fees to West, as he was no longer the prevailing party. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's denial of Village's request for a stay, distinguishing the case from others that required disputes to be resolved by a committee first. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Village Practice Management Company, LLC v. West" on Justia Law

Susan Miele was hired by Foundation Medicine, Inc. (FMI) in 2017 and signed a restrictive covenant agreement that included a nonsolicitation provision. In 2020, Miele and FMI executed a transition agreement upon her separation, which incorporated the restrictive covenant agreement and included a forfeiture clause. FMI paid Miele approximately $1.2 million in transition benefits. After joining Ginkgo Bioworks in 2021, Miele allegedly solicited FMI employees to join Ginkgo, leading FMI to cease further payments and demand repayment of benefits.Miele sued FMI in late 2021 for breach of the transition agreement, and FMI counterclaimed for breach of contract. Miele moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the provisions FMI relied on were unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act. A Superior Court judge granted Miele's motion in part, ruling that FMI could not enforce the forfeiture provision but allowed FMI to assert Miele's breach as a defense and seek damages. The judge concluded that the transition agreement qualified as a "forfeiture for competition agreement" under the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act does not apply to a nonsolicitation agreement, even if it includes a forfeiture provision. The court reasoned that the act explicitly excludes nonsolicitation agreements from its scope, and a forfeiture clause does not change this exclusion. The court reversed the Superior Court's order partially granting Miele's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc." on Justia Law

Jesus Yanez was hired by EchoStar Communications Corporation in 2001 and signed an arbitration agreement as part of his employment. Over the years, EchoStar underwent several corporate changes, including a name change to DISH Network Corporation and the creation of a new company, EchoStar Corporation. Yanez was terminated in 2018 and subsequently filed discrimination claims. After receiving right to sue letters, he sued in Texas state court, alleging age and nationality discrimination. The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted a motion to compel arbitration and transferred the case. The arbitration proceeded slowly, and the district court eventually dismissed the case without prejudice due to the parties' failure to file a status report.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted the motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case pending arbitration. The case was transferred to the Western District of Texas, El Paso division. The district court issued multiple show cause notices due to slow arbitration proceedings and ultimately dismissed the case without prejudice when the parties failed to file a required status report. Yanez filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied by the district court, citing a recent Supreme Court decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable under Texas law. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the dismissal was effectively with prejudice due to the statute of limitations and did not meet the heightened standard required for dismissals with prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the ruling. View "Yanez v. Dish Network" on Justia Law