Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (Packers) employed Jose A. Parra Rodriguez (Parra) in California from April 2019 to July 2021. In February 2022, Parra filed a complaint against Packers under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), seeking civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code and California Code of Regulations. Packers moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Parra allegedly signed, which included a clause for binding individual arbitration. Parra opposed the motion, arguing he did not recall signing the agreement, his PAGA claims lacked an individual component, and the claims fell under exceptions to arbitration.The Superior Court of Imperial County held an evidentiary hearing and found Parra had signed the agreement. However, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, interpreting "current law" to mean the law as it stood in 2019, when Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC held PAGA claims were not subject to arbitration. The court concluded the parties had not agreed to arbitrate PAGA claims at all.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Packers argued that under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, Parra’s individual PAGA claim should be compelled to arbitration, and non-individual claims should be dismissed. Parra contended his complaint did not include individual PAGA claims, citing Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., which held a plaintiff could forgo individual relief and bring a representative PAGA action.The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with Parra that his complaint did not assert individual PAGA claims. The court found that Parra had not sought individual PAGA relief and thus, there were no individual claims to compel to arbitration. The court did not address whether a PAGA action must include an individual claim, as this issue was not ripe for consideration in this appeal. View "Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services" on Justia Law

Gary Waetzig, a former employee of Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., filed a federal age-discrimination lawsuit against the company. He later submitted his claims for arbitration and voluntarily dismissed his federal lawsuit without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). After losing in arbitration, Waetzig sought to reopen his dismissed lawsuit and vacate the arbitration award, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as the basis for reopening the case.The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado reopened the case, ruling that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b) and that Waetzig made a mistake by dismissing his case rather than seeking a stay. The District Court also granted Waetzig's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Halliburton appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count as a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that a case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b). The Court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is "final" because it terminates the case and aligns with the definitions and historical context of the term "final." The Court also concluded that a voluntary dismissal qualifies as a "proceeding" under Rule 60(b), encompassing all steps in an action's progression. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Carmen Quintana-Dieppa, a 62-year-old Puerto Rican woman, worked for the Department of the Army since 1988 and served as a Child Youth and School Services Coordinator at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, since 2009. In 2014, she filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging national origin discrimination. While her complaint was pending, the Army conducted two investigations into her management style, finding that she fostered a toxic work environment. Consequently, she was reassigned to a nonsupervisory role in 2017. Quintana claimed this reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, finding no genuine issues of material fact. The court determined that Quintana failed to properly contest the Army's Statement of Facts according to Local Rule 56, and thus, the Army's facts were deemed admitted. The court concluded that Quintana did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if she had, she failed to show that the Army's reasons for her reassignment were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that Quintana did not meet her burden of showing that the Army's stated reasons for her reassignment were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The court noted that the Army's investigations provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the reassignment, and Quintana's arguments, including claims of hearsay and fabrication, were unsupported by the record. The court also found that the temporal proximity between her EEOC complaint and reassignment was insufficient to establish a causal link for retaliation. View "Quintana-Dieppa v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Claudia C. Conner, the plaintiff, was employed by the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (OESC) as General Counsel and Chief of Staff. She was terminated in November 2021, at the age of over sixty, despite having satisfactory job performance and receiving a raise a month prior. Conner alleges that her termination was due to age and gender discrimination, and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by a state vendor. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which issued a right to sue letter, leading her to file a lawsuit in the Oklahoma County District Court.The OESC moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Conner failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The District Court of Oklahoma County denied the motion, citing material conflicts between the GTCA and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The OESC then sought and was granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that there are no material or irreconcilable conflicts between the GTCA and the OADA regarding the notice provisions. The court found that the GTCA's notice requirements apply to claims under the OADA. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with the GTCA notice provisions is a jurisdictional requirement for tort suits against governmental entities. View "CONNER v. STATE" on Justia Law

Mark L. Sadler, a former employee of the United States Army, was suspended and then removed from his position for insubordination. Sadler claimed that these actions were retaliatory under the Whistleblower Protection Act and sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). He also requested sanctions against the government for the destruction of evidence. The Board denied both his motion for sanctions and his request for corrective action.The Merit Systems Protection Board initially dismissed Sadler’s first complaint, finding it did not sufficiently allege protected activity. For his second complaint, the Board acknowledged that Sadler engaged in protected whistleblower activity but concluded that the Army had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions regardless of the protected activity. The Board also denied Sadler’s motion for sanctions, finding that the destruction of evidence was part of the Army’s ordinary procedures and did not warrant sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The court agreed that Sadler’s first complaint did not allege protected activity and that the Army had provided clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. The court also upheld the Board’s decision on the sanctions issue, agreeing that the destruction of evidence was part of routine procedures and did not meet the intent standard required for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "SADLER v. ARMY " on Justia Law

Angelica Ramirez sued her former employer, Charter Communications, Inc., under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Ramirez during her onboarding process. The trial court found the agreement contained unconscionable provisions and refused to enforce it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the arbitration agreement to be a contract of adhesion and identified several substantively unconscionable provisions, including shortened filing periods for claims, improper allocation of attorney fees, and lack of mutuality in claims subject to arbitration. The court denied Charter's motion to compel arbitration. Charter appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the agreement contained multiple unconscionable provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and concurred that three provisions were substantively unconscionable but remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to reconsider whether the unconscionable provisions could be severed from the agreement. On remand, the Court of Appeal concluded that severing the unconscionable provisions would not further the interests of justice. The court found that the agreement's central purpose was tainted with illegality and that the multiple unconscionable provisions indicated a systematic effort by Charter to impose arbitration in a manner that favored the employer. Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Rosemary Morgan-Lee, a former employee of Therapy Resources Management, LLC (TRM), alleged that she was discharged in violation of the whistleblower protections under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (RIWPA). Morgan-Lee claimed that her termination was due to her efforts to report fraudulent activities by TRM. The district court found that while she had engaged in some protected activity and TRM had general corporate knowledge of this, she failed to prove that her protected conduct was the but-for cause of her termination.The case was initially tried before a jury in 2017, resulting in a mistrial. The district court then conducted a four-day bench trial, during which it heard testimony from ten witnesses. The court ultimately ruled against Morgan-Lee, finding that her termination was due to unapproved absences and her refusal to provide specifics about the alleged fraudulent activities, rather than any retaliatory animus from TRM.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Morgan-Lee argued that the district court committed legal errors and that its factual findings were clearly erroneous. However, the appellate court found that many of her arguments were waived, unpreserved, or without merit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court properly applied the law and that its findings, including the lack of but-for causation, were well-supported by the record. The appellate court also rejected Morgan-Lee's arguments regarding the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the causation standard, affirming the district court's use of the but-for causation standard as consistent with precedent. View "United States ex rel. Morgan-Lee v. Therapy Resources Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Gilbert Menke died on July 13, 2016, following a work-related injury. He was survived by his common law spouse, Maia Beh, and their daughter. Beh received a letter from the decedent’s employer’s insurer, informing her that she and her daughter might be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Beh provided the necessary documentation and requested benefits for her daughter, which were authorized by the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL). In October 2020, Beh requested to be added to the list of dependents for death benefits allocation, which the insurer denied, arguing that her request was outside the statute of limitations.The DOL ruled that Beh’s request was not a new and separate claim and was not barred by the statute of limitations. The insurer appealed to the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB), which held a de novo hearing and concluded that Beh’s request was a separate claim barred by the statute of limitations. Beh’s motion for rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that adding a dependent to an open death benefits claim does not constitute a separate claim. The court held that the New Hampshire Workers’ Compensation Law does not set a time limit for a dependent to request allocation of benefits under an open death benefits claim. The court reversed the CAB’s decision, ruling that as long as a timely claim for death benefits is filed by any dependent, subsequent requests for allocation by other dependents are not barred by the statute of limitations. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Appeal of Estate of Menke" on Justia Law

John Sigley applied for a Material Handler position with ND Fairmont LLC (NDF) and was offered the job contingent on passing a physical exam. During the physical, conducted by Industrial Therapy Solutions (ITS), Sigley denied having any back issues or seeing a chiropractor, despite having undergone three back surgeries and having a metal rod in his back. He passed the physical and began working on September 13, 2021. On October 28, 2021, Sigley called out of work due to back spasms and later disclosed his back condition to NDF's HR Manager, Joyce Hardway, and Environmental Health & Safety Manager, Justin Darrah. NDF confirmed Sigley's omission of his back condition during the physical and terminated him for dishonesty on November 2, 2021.Sigley filed a lawsuit against NDF, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of NDF, finding that Sigley was terminated for dishonesty, not because of his disability. The court also dismissed Sigley's claims of breach of confidentiality and failure to accommodate, as they were not properly pled in his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Sigley failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, as he could not demonstrate that his termination raised a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. The court found that NDF had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Sigley—his dishonesty during the physical exam. The court also noted that Sigley's claims of breach of confidentiality and failure to accommodate were untimely and meritless, as he did not properly plead them and admitted he did not require an accommodation. View "Sigley v. ND Fairmont LLC" on Justia Law

Attorney Jon Rhyan Fritz was admitted to practice law in Kentucky in 1998. He was retained by client Vera Williams to pursue a wrongful termination claim against her employer, House of Bread and Peace (HBP). Williams paid Fritz a $3,500 flat fee, which he deposited into his general business account without a written advance fee agreement. Fritz failed to provide billing statements or memoranda explaining how he was earning the fee. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated Williams's case but ultimately declined to pursue it further. Fritz did not respond to Williams's subsequent emails or requests for meetings, and no lawsuit was filed against HBP within the statute of limitations.Williams filed a Bar Complaint against Fritz, leading the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) to open the matter for informal resolution. Fritz responded to initial inquiries but failed to provide Williams's client file as requested. The Inquiry Commission charged Fritz with multiple violations of the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), including lack of diligence, communication, and safekeeping of property. Fritz did not respond to the formal Charge, and attempts to serve him were unsuccessful, leading to constructive service via the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) Executive Director.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that Fritz failed to answer the Charge or participate in the disciplinary process. The court granted the OBC's motion to indefinitely suspend Fritz from practicing law in Kentucky. Fritz is required to notify all courts and clients of his suspension, cancel pending advertisements, and take steps to protect his clients' interests. The suspension order takes effect twenty days after its entry. View "In re Fritz" on Justia Law