Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc.
A property management company in Los Angeles employed an individual from April 2023 to September 2024. As part of the hiring and onboarding process, the employee was required to sign an arbitration agreement that mandated all employment-related claims be resolved through binding arbitration and included a waiver of class and representative actions. The employee later filed a class action lawsuit against the employer, alleging wage-and-hour violations and unfair business practices.The employer responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel arbitration of the employee's individual claims, dismiss the class claims, and stay the action. The employer made clear that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply and relied on California law. The employee opposed, arguing that under California Labor Code section 432.6, it is illegal for an employer to require an employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment unless the agreement is enforceable under the FAA. The Superior Court denied the employer’s motion, finding that the arbitration agreement was required as a condition of employment, thus violating section 432.6, and that, since the FAA did not apply, the agreement was unenforceable under California law.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under California law, an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment in violation of section 432.6 is unenforceable unless it is otherwise enforceable under the FAA. Because the parties agreed the FAA did not apply and the agreement was required as a condition of employment, the employer could not enforce it. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc." on Justia Law
Smith v. Burbank Unified School Dist.
Douglas Smith, a long-term high school science teacher, refused to comply with his employer’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate due to his religious beliefs. The Burbank Unified School District granted his request for a religious exemption but placed him on indefinite unpaid leave, stating that no other accommodation could be provided without undue hardship. Smith requested alternative accommodations such as masking and weekly PCR testing, but the District denied these, citing concerns about health and safety for staff and students. After a year on unpaid leave, Smith found employment at a school without a vaccine mandate and eventually resigned from the District.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Smith’s claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which included religious discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. The District moved for summary judgment, arguing that unpaid leave was the only reasonable accommodation that did not pose an undue hardship, given the nature of Smith’s teaching responsibilities and the operational impacts of allowing unvaccinated teachers on campus. The trial court found that Smith established a prima facie case for religious discrimination, but concluded the District met its burden in showing that alternative accommodations were not feasible, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of the District.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, independently reviewed the summary judgment. It held that, under FEHA, unpaid leave can be a reasonable accommodation where other options pose an undue hardship, especially given the District’s obligation to protect health and safety during the pandemic. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, specifying that the parties would bear their own costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Burbank Unified School Dist." on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
Bauer v. Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction
Alexander Bauer, an employee of Evans Plumbing, Inc., was injured on a construction site after falling from a second-story balcony. He alleged that Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction, LLC had negligently reinstalled a temporary wood railing, which caused his fall. Bauer received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries and subsequently filed a civil suit against Myers for negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence. Myers argued that because both it and Evans were contracted by Stack Construction, LLC, they were co-employees under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law and therefore immune from suit under the exclusive remedy rule.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, reviewed Myers’ motion for summary judgment. The court determined that Myers was a subcontractor of Stack based on the contract language, making Myers Stack’s employee for purposes of the Act. As a result, the court held that Myers was entitled to exclusive remedy immunity and dismissed Bauer’s claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho examined whether Myers’ status as a subcontractor or independent contractor was determinative for exclusive remedy immunity. The court clarified that the right to control test, not mere contract labels, must be applied to distinguish between employees and independent contractors under the Act. The court found that the district court erred by failing to apply this test. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the right to control test must be used to resolve whether Myers was an employee or independent contractor for purposes of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. View "Bauer v. Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction" on Justia Law
District of Columbia Department of Public Works v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
A sanitation worker employed by a District of Columbia government agency sustained a right ankle injury in 1993 after stepping into an uncovered drain while performing his duties. The injury led to ongoing physical problems, and the worker received temporary total disability benefits for an extended period. As the statutory cap on temporary benefits approached in 2020, he sought a determination of permanent disability status. Medical evidence was mixed: while government physicians attributed his ongoing impairments to factors unrelated to the original injury, his treating doctors linked his broader decline to the workplace accident.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the worker’s only compensable permanent injury was to his right ankle, a scheduled body part under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), and awarded a schedule award. The worker appealed to the Compensation Review Board (CRB), arguing for a permanent total disability (wage-loss) award. The CRB disagreed with the ALJ’s approach, holding that the worker could qualify for a wage-loss award if he could demonstrate permanent total disability, even if the disability stemmed from a scheduled body part, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ awarded a wage-loss benefit, which the CRB affirmed. The government agencies then sought review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that under the CMPA, a claimant who is permanently totally disabled due to an injury to a scheduled body part is not limited to a schedule award and may seek a wage-loss award if they can prove entitlement. The court vacated the CRB's order and remanded for the ALJ to determine eligibility for a wage-loss award under the proper statutory factors. View "District of Columbia Department of Public Works v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law
Doe v. Catholic Relief Services
An IT analyst who is openly gay was hired by a large, Catholic-affiliated nonprofit based in Maryland. At the time of hiring, he was told his husband would be covered under the organization’s dependent health benefits. However, several months after his employment began, the organization informed him that providing benefits to his same-sex spouse was contrary to its religious beliefs and terminated those benefits. The employee declined alternative compensation and ultimately resigned from the organization after several years.The employee sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, bringing claims under federal and state employment discrimination laws, including Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the employee on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims and, after certifying questions to the Maryland Supreme Court regarding the scope of the MFEPA’s religious exemption, held a bench trial and entered judgment for the employee on the remaining MFEPA claim. The parties stipulated to damages, but the employer reserved the right to appeal on liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the employer’s statutory and constitutional defenses. The court held that Title VII’s religious employer exemption does not shield religious organizations from liability for discrimination based on sex, even if the employment decision is rooted in religious belief. Similarly, under MFEPA, the court found the exemption applies only to employees whose duties directly further the core mission of the organization; the employee’s roles did not meet this test. The court also held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not apply to suits between private parties. Constitutional arguments based on the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and church autonomy doctrine were rejected as grounds for immunity. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on Title VII and MFEPA claims and dismissed the Equal Pay Act appeal as moot. View "Doe v. Catholic Relief Services" on Justia Law
McInerney v. Regents of the Univ. of California
The plaintiff, who had several drug-related convictions dating back more than a decade, applied for an office assistant position at a university. After a conditional job offer, the university initiated a background check, during which the plaintiff briefly worked part-time. The background check revealed the plaintiff's criminal history. The university sent a notice advising that his convictions might disqualify him, granting five business days to submit evidence of rehabilitation or challenge the findings. The plaintiff responded with hostile emails but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation. The university ultimately denied him the position, citing his failure to respond substantively and his unprofessional communications.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including discrimination under the Fair Chance Act (FCA), retaliation, and failure to prevent retaliation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the university on the retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation claims, finding the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity and no causal nexus existed between his complaints and the adverse employment action. The court also found that while the university failed to provide the full five-day response period required by the FCA, the plaintiff had to prove this procedural error caused him harm. The issue of harm was tried before a jury, which found the university would have made the same decision even if the plaintiff had been given the full response period.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case for retaliation or failure to prevent retaliation, and that the university properly followed FCA procedures except for the response period, but the procedural violation did not cause harm. The Court clarified that courts are not to second-guess the employer’s individualized assessment under the FCA and that actual harm must be shown for recovery. View "McInerney v. Regents of the Univ. of California" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc.
A group of former employees participated in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) established by a seafood company. In 2016, the plan used borrowed funds to purchase all outstanding shares from several company officers and directors. The employees alleged that the purchase price was grossly inflated due to false financial projections, resulting in significant financial harm to the plan and its participants. The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class, brought statutory claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), asserting breaches of fiduciary duty by the company’s officers, directors, trustee, and committee members.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent from Mason v. Continental Group, Inc. and its progeny, which required administrative exhaustion of statutory ERISA claims before filing suit. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request to stay the proceedings to pursue administrative remedies, reasoning that both it and the parties were bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s exhaustion requirement. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing the binding nature of Mason.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the case and overruled Mason and related decisions to the extent that they held ERISA itself requires exhaustion of statutory claims, including breach of fiduciary duty claims. The court determined that ERISA does not impose such an exhaustion requirement and found that the plan at issue did not mandate exhaustion either. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case to the panel for further proceedings. View "Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc." on Justia Law
Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union
A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination.The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law
Santos v. Lidl
The plaintiff worked as a store clerk and stocker at grocery stores operated by the defendant. She was scheduled for ten-hour opening shifts, four days a week, at an hourly wage. The employer required her and other similarly situated employees to report to work fifteen minutes before their listed start time. Frequently, when employees arrived at the prescribed time, the stores were locked and they had to wait outside until opening managers arrived to let them in. Managers often did not arrive until the scheduled start, preventing employees from clocking in and being paid for the waiting period, despite being required to be present. The plaintiff alleges that this unpaid waiting time occurred about once a week, sometimes resulting in overtime wages owed.The plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL), seeking to represent similarly situated employees. The defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred the claims because the waiting time was non-compensable as a preliminary activity. The district court agreed, holding that both the FLSA and NYLL claims were barred and dismissing them with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under Department of Labor regulations and Supreme Court precedents, waiting time is compensable under the FLSA when an employer requires an employee to report at a certain time and the employee is prevented from working for reasons beyond their control. The court concluded that the plaintiff stated a plausible claim for compensable waiting time and that the claim could not be dismissed as de minimis based on the pleadings. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Lidl" on Justia Law
BLUNT v TOWN OF GILBERT
Brian Blunt, a long-term employee of the Town of Gilbert, was promoted to Commander in 2021 and signed an at-will employment agreement as a condition of his promotion and pay raise. This agreement allowed either party to terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause, and was consistent with the then-existing Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights (POBR), which permitted such contractual deviations. In 2023, following employee complaints and an external investigation, Blunt was terminated without a pre-termination hearing or appeal process. He requested these procedural protections but was denied.After his termination, Blunt brought an action in Arizona Superior Court seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Town to provide him procedural protections under POBR and due process. The Town removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion, holding that Blunt had no constitutionally protected employment interest because his contract was at-will and the 2022 amendment to POBR did not apply retroactively to his agreement. Blunt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Arizona regarding the retroactive application of the 2022 POBR amendment.The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the presumption against retroactivity, codified in Arizona law, prohibits applying the 2022 amendment to at-will employment agreements executed before its effective date. The court found that the at-will employment term constituted a vested substantive right at the time of contract formation, and absent express legislative intent for retroactivity, the amendment cannot alter those pre-existing rights. The court answered only the first certified question, as its resolution was dispositive, and returned the matter to the Ninth Circuit. View "BLUNT v TOWN OF GILBERT" on Justia Law