Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Cheriese Johnson began experiencing a range of symptoms, including coughing and pain in her hands and feet, prior to her employment in July 2016 with The William Carter Company. She purchased a long-term disability insurance policy from Reliance Standard that became effective in October 2016. During the three months before her coverage began, Johnson sought medical care for various symptoms and received several diagnoses, but not scleroderma. In early 2017, after her policy was active, she was diagnosed with scleroderma—a rare autoimmune disease—following a lung biopsy. Johnson then filed a claim for long-term disability benefits, which Reliance Standard denied, arguing her disability was caused by a preexisting condition for which she had received treatment during the policy’s lookback period.After her claim was denied and her appeal was unsuccessful, Johnson sued Reliance Standard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). She moved for judgment on the administrative record, while Reliance Standard sought summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Reliance Standard, finding its decision to deny benefits was correct under the terms of the policy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. Applying ERISA’s interpretive framework and reviewing the plan administrator’s decision de novo, the Eleventh Circuit held that Reliance Standard’s interpretation of the policy was both incorrect and unreasonable. The court concluded that Johnson had not received medical treatment “for” scleroderma during the lookback period because neither she nor her doctors suspected or intended to treat that specific condition at that time. The court found that Reliance Standard’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Johnson v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was removed from his position in 2012. He appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and in 2013, he and the VA reached a settlement agreement. The agreement provided that the VA would furnish a neutral employment reference, disclosing only the dates of employment, job title, and that the officer resigned, with no further information. Years later, the officer received a conditional job offer from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but the offer was revoked after a background investigation. The officer learned that a VA Human Resources officer had informed investigators that her disclosures were restricted by a legal agreement, which the officer believed violated the settlement’s terms.The officer filed a petition for enforcement (PFE) of the settlement agreement with the MSPB in January 2018, claiming the VA breached the agreement, leading to the loss of his DHS job opportunity. The VA moved to dismiss the PFE as untimely. An MSPB administrative judge found that the officer became aware of the alleged breach in November 2016 and concluded that his fourteen-month delay in filing the PFE was unreasonable. The Board adopted the administrative judge’s decision, holding that, even if the officer did not fully realize the harm until his DHS offer was rescinded in September 2017, the subsequent four-month delay was also unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision. The court held that the officer filed his petition within a reasonable time under the circumstances. It found that waiting to file until the officer experienced actual harm was not unreasonable, and the ten-month and four-month periods between knowledge of the breach, loss of the job offer, and filing were both reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "REYES v. MSPB " on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an employer instituted a company-wide vaccine mandate that applied to all employees, including those working remotely. Two remote employees requested religious exemptions from the vaccine requirement. One objected on the basis of her Christian beliefs regarding the use of fetal cell lines in vaccine development, while the other cited her conscience and faith, referencing Catholic teachings. Both exemption requests were denied, and the employees were subsequently terminated.After their terminations, the two employees initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Their claims included religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and two disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): one for unlawful medical inquiry and one for being “regarded as” disabled due to their unvaccinated status. The district court dismissed all claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded that their objections were based on religious beliefs and finding that neither ADA theory was viable because vaccination status is not equivalent to a disability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ complaints plausibly alleged that their opposition to the vaccine mandate was an essential part of their religious faith and that their refusal to be vaccinated was connected to those beliefs. Therefore, the court found that the district court erred in dismissing the Title VII religious discrimination claims at the pleading stage. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both ADA claims, holding that an inquiry into vaccination status is not a disability-related inquiry and that being unvaccinated does not constitute a physical or mental impairment under the ADA. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII claims. View "Finn v. Humane Society of the United States" on Justia Law

A fatal motor-vehicle collision occurred on September 23, 2021, when Cody Conboy, an employee of Comfort Systems USA (Arkansas), Inc., crossed the center line while driving from his home to a remote jobsite. The accident resulted in the deaths of Tammy Gardner and five-year-old Christopher Skala, and injuries to three-year-old Xavior Skala. Conboy regularly traveled to various worksites as part of his employment, and his employer provided compensation for travel or per diem. The estates of the decedents and the guardian for the injured child initiated legal action against Comfort Systems and Conboy, alleging both direct and vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.The Independence County Circuit Court consolidated the related cases and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Comfort Systems. The circuit court concluded that the “going-and-coming” rule, which bars liability for accidents occurring during an employee’s commute, should apply not only in workers’ compensation cases but also in tort cases involving employer liability. The circuit court found that Conboy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and that Comfort Systems had no control over his travel. Consequently, all claims against Comfort Systems were dismissed with prejudice, while claims against Conboy remained pending.The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, and after further appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. The Supreme Court held that the going-and-coming rule from workers’ compensation law does not govern tort cases involving respondeat superior liability. Instead, Arkansas courts must apply traditional respondeat superior analysis to determine if an employee was acting within the scope of employment. The Supreme Court further found that summary judgment was improper because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Conboy was acting within the scope of his employment. The court also held it was error to grant summary judgment on direct-liability claims where no such relief was requested. The case was reversed and remanded, and the court of appeals’ opinion vacated. View "SKALA v. COMFORT SYSTEMS USA, INC." on Justia Law

Lauren Brown worked for a restaurant operated by Dave & Buster’s in Westchester, California, from November 2016 to April 2018. In June 2019, she filed a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), alleging various Labor Code violations, including failure to provide meal and rest periods, vacation pay, and accurate wage statements. Brown’s lawsuit was one of several PAGA actions filed against the same employer between June 2018 and June 2019. The employer had previously settled with another PAGA plaintiff, Andrade, whose amended complaint included claims similar to Brown’s, including vacation pay violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially stayed Brown’s case, finding it substantially identical to an earlier action. After the Andrade action settled and the San Diego County Superior Court approved the settlement, Dave & Buster’s moved for judgment on the pleadings in Brown’s case, arguing that claim preclusion barred her claims and that she lacked standing to pursue violations occurring after the Andrade settlement. Brown opposed, arguing that Andrade had not properly exhausted administrative remedies for her amended claims because she filed her amended complaint only 35 days after submitting an amended notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, rather than waiting the statutory 65 days.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court’s order independently. The appellate court held that Andrade’s failure to strictly comply with the 65-day waiting period was a harmless defect, as she substantially fulfilled the purpose of the pre-filing notice requirement and the Agency had an opportunity to object to the settlement but did not. The court found that all elements of claim preclusion were satisfied and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, dismissing Brown’s complaint with prejudice. View "Brown v. Dave & Buster's of California" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a labor claim against her employer and the employer’s business, seeking unpaid overtime and other compensation. The Labor Commissioner awarded her over $74,000. The decision was served by mail, triggering a 15-day deadline for the employer to appeal to the superior court and to either post an undertaking or seek a waiver of that requirement. The employer retained a third-party filing service, which attempted to file the appeal and waiver motion electronically on the last permissible day. The filing was rejected by the court clerk, and the documents were filed in person the following day, one day late.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco determined that the employer’s appeal and waiver motion were untimely. The court found that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the late filings. The employer argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled due to the filing service’s error, but the trial court rejected this argument.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for seeking a waiver of the undertaking requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be extended for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The only exception is for fraud, which was not alleged. The court also held that the tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 does not apply to notices of appeal from Labor Commissioner decisions. The court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the appeal as untimely. View "Dobarro v. Kim" on Justia Law

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

A labor union representing Chicago public school employees, along with one of its members, alleged that a nonprofit organization dedicated to limiting union power contributed money to recruit and promote candidates in a union election, in violation of federal law. The union claimed that the nonprofit’s actions interfered with the union’s internal election process and would continue to do so in future elections. The plaintiffs brought suit under a federal statute prohibiting employer expenditures to promote candidates for union office, as well as under Illinois law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, considered the case after the nonprofit moved to dismiss. The district court found that the relevant federal statute did not provide an express or implied private right of action for the type of pre-election relief the plaintiffs sought. The court reasoned that the statute’s enforcement mechanism required union members to exhaust internal remedies and then file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who could bring a civil action if warranted. The court also dismissed the state-law claims, as they depended on the dismissed federal claims. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action—express or implied—for individuals or unions to enforce the statutory prohibition on employer expenditures in union elections. Instead, the statute’s exclusive enforcement mechanism is through post-election complaints to the Secretary of Labor. The court distinguished this provision from another section of the statute that expressly allows private pre-election suits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, v Educators for Excellence, Inc." on Justia Law

Anton’s Services Inc. was a subcontractor on two public works projects in San Diego: the Torrey Pines Road Project and the Voltaire Street Project. On both projects, Anton’s classified its workers under the “Tree Maintenance” prevailing wage category, paying them accordingly. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) investigated and determined that Anton’s work was construction-related and should have been classified under the “Laborer (Engineering Construction)” category, which carries a higher prevailing wage. Additionally, Anton’s failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, including submitting contract award information, employing the required ratio of apprentices, and requesting apprentices from local committees.After the DLSE issued civil wage and penalty assessments for both projects, Anton’s challenged these findings in administrative proceedings before the Director of Industrial Relations. The parties submitted stipulated facts and documentary evidence. The Director affirmed the DLSE’s assessments, finding Anton’s had misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was liable for penalties and liquidated damages. The Director also found Anton’s violations were willful, given its prior record and lack of prompt correction.Anton’s then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of San Diego County through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court, applying the substantial evidence standard, upheld the Director’s decision and rejected Anton’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Anton’s misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was properly assessed penalties and liquidated damages. The court clarified that liquidated damages are owed until wages are actually paid to workers, not merely withheld by a contractor. The judgment was affirmed. View "Anton's Services v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Two former service technicians at an auto dealership in Simi Valley alleged that their employer’s compensation plan violated California labor laws. The dealership had previously paid technicians on a piece-rate basis, but switched to an hourly pay plan in December 2014, compensating technicians at double the minimum wage for all hours recorded on a biometric time clock, with additional “flag bonus pay” for certain tasks. The plaintiffs claimed they were not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime and rest periods, and brought claims under the Labor Code, the Unfair Competition Law, and the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) on behalf of themselves and other employees.The Superior Court of Ventura County initially ordered arbitration, but withdrew the case from arbitration at the plaintiffs’ request. Both parties filed motions for summary adjudication regarding the legality of the pay plan, which the court denied, finding triable issues of fact. After a bench trial, the court found the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof, noting that their evidence was insufficient and lacked specific examples to support their claims. Judgment was entered in favor of the employer on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the dealership’s hourly pay plan did not violate the “no borrowing rule” established in Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, nor did it violate Labor Code section 226.2. The court found that technicians were paid at least double the minimum wage for all hours worked and that any bonus pay was in addition to, not a substitute for, hourly wages. The court also affirmed judgment for the employer on the PAGA claim, finding the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate evidence or an adequate record to support their allegations. The judgment was affirmed. View "Mora v. C.E. Enterprises" on Justia Law