Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A fast-casual restaurant chain hired an individual with arthritis in her knees for a cashier/service-team member position. Prior to starting, she requested to be allowed to sit for five minutes after every ten minutes of standing, due to her medical condition. The restaurant required employees in her role to multitask and maintain mobility throughout their shifts, handling various duties such as operating the register, restocking, cleaning, and serving customers. The employer concluded that her requested accommodation would prevent her from performing essential job functions and did not permit her to begin work until the accommodation issue was resolved.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed the case after the employee sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), alleging failure to accommodate her disability and failure to engage in the interactive process. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, holding that the requested accommodation was not reasonable as a matter of law, and that her claim regarding the interactive process could not proceed without a viable accommodation claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the employee’s proposed accommodation—sitting for five minutes after every ten minutes of standing—was not objectively reasonable because it would fundamentally alter essential functions of the cashier/service-team member position, which required continuous mobility and multitasking. The court further held that, because no reasonable accommodation was shown, the claim arising from the employer’s alleged failure to engage in the interactive process also failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed. View "Bowles v. SSRG II, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee was hired by a security services company in 2012 and, as a condition of employment, signed an arbitration agreement requiring that any employment-related disputes be resolved through arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In 2023, the employee was assigned to work at Oracle Park, where he was subjected to hostile and derogatory conduct by supervisors and coworkers based on his perceived sexual orientation, including intrusive questioning, mocking, and reduction of work hours. After formally complaining about this treatment, the employee was terminated. He then filed a lawsuit against his employer and two individuals, asserting multiple claims, including sexual harassment under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on the prior agreement, arguing that all claims fell within its scope and that both federal and state law required enforcement. The plaintiff opposed the motion, challenging the agreement’s validity but not specifically referencing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco issued a tentative ruling, later adopted as final, finding that the EFAA rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable because the plaintiff stated a valid sexual harassment claim. The court further found that the EFAA barred arbitration of the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim, and that the plaintiff’s conduct showed he elected to pursue his claims in court.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the EFAA applies to cases involving sexual harassment claims and bars enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements for the entire case at the plaintiff’s election, without requiring an explicit invocation of the EFAA. The court also held that the trial court properly considered the EFAA’s applicability and provided due process, even without supplemental briefing. View "Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA" on Justia Law

Two individuals worked as delivery drivers for a transportation company for over a decade, primarily out of the company’s New Jersey terminal. Their work mainly involved picking up and delivering goods in New Jersey, with occasional deliveries in neighboring states. Each driver had a contract with the company that included a forum-selection clause requiring any disputes to be litigated in Memphis, Tennessee, and a choice-of-law clause providing that Tennessee law would govern any disputes. The company is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in Illinois, and has operations nationwide, including in Tennessee, but neither the drivers nor the company’s relevant activities were based in Tennessee.The drivers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the company violated New Jersey wage laws by withholding earnings and failing to pay overtime, among other claims. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee pursuant to the forum-selection clause. The company then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision applied and that Tennessee law did not recognize the claims brought under New Jersey statutes. The district court agreed, upheld the choice-of-law provision, and dismissed the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the enforceability of the choice-of-law provision under Tennessee’s choice-of-law rules. The court held that the contractual choice-of-law clause was unenforceable because there was no material connection between Tennessee and the transactions or parties. As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not reach the question of whether Tennessee law was contrary to the fundamental policies of New Jersey. View "Andujar v. Hub Group Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The case centers on an employee who brought multiple claims against her former employer, including several for violations of California’s Labor Code and a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The employee had signed an arbitration agreement at the start of her employment. As a result, all non-PAGA claims were compelled to arbitration, while the PAGA claims (both individual and representative) were stayed. The arbitrator found in favor of the employer on all Labor Code violations, concluding that the alleged violations did not occur.Following the arbitration, the Superior Court of San Bernardino County confirmed the arbitrator’s award and granted judgment on the pleadings against the employee on her PAGA claim, ruling that the arbitration results established she was not an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA, and therefore lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim. When the employee appealed, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the denial of her motion to vacate the arbitration award but reversed the judgment on the pleadings as to the PAGA claim, holding that the arbitration did not preclude her from pursuing PAGA penalties.Subsequently, the employer filed a renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that subsequent appellate court decisions and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., constituted an intervening change in the law, rendering the law of the case doctrine inapplicable. The trial court denied this motion, finding that its prior ruling remained law of the case. Reviewing this denial, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the law of the case doctrine properly applied because there had been no controlling intervening change in the law. The court denied the employer’s writ petition, confirming that the arbitrator’s findings on non-PAGA claims did not preclude judicial determination of the employee’s standing under PAGA. View "Prime Healthcare Management v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A Black male employee worked as a sales representative for an insurance company, where he was required to obtain and maintain licenses to sell insurance in various states, including New York. He applied for a New York license but failed to respond to requests for information from the New York Department of Financial Services, resulting in the denial of his application. The denial was not timely communicated to the employer due to an internal error, which eventually led to corrective actions by the company. After the denial was discovered, the employee was informed that his continued employment in sales required the New York license. He was offered a chance to transfer to another department but was not selected for that position. Separately, the employee requested and was approved for intermittent FMLA leave, but he missed work for an extended period beyond what was approved. He was ultimately terminated for failing to obtain the required New York license and for not informing the company about the denial.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging retaliation under the FMLA and ADAAA, and race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. It found the employee had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext to support his retaliation claims, concluding the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination was not shown to be false or a pretext for unlawful conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in its analysis of the prima facie case of race discrimination but found this error harmless. The appellate court held the employee failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext regarding both his discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims. View "Plump v. Government Employees Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was hired as a “Full Time Jewish Educator” at a religious institution and was responsible for teaching in religious classrooms, planning and attending religious events, and supporting the synagogue’s mission to develop a strong Jewish identity. Soon after starting her job, the plaintiff was confronted by a rabbi about her co-authorship of a blog post that was critical of Israel and Zionism. Although she assured the rabbi she would not share her personal views at work and was told her teaching abilities were not in question, she was terminated less than a week later.The plaintiff filed suit in New York Supreme Court, alleging that her dismissal violated Labor Law § 201-d(2)(c), which prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees for engaging in legal recreational activities outside of work. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claim failed because the activity was not protected, there was a material conflict with the employer’s interests, and the ministerial exception barred the claim. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the termination was for the content of the blog post, not the act of blogging itself, and did not address the other grounds for dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed on the same basis and declined to reach the alternative arguments.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but on a different ground. The Court of Appeals held that, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s activity was protected under Labor Law § 201-d, the ministerial exception—which bars application of employment discrimination laws to the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers—applied. The plaintiff’s offer letter conclusively established that her core duties were religious in nature, and thus her claim was barred as a matter of law. View "Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple" on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

Several participants in a terminated employee stock ownership plan asserted claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) following the sale and dissolution of their plan. The plan, created by A360, Inc. in 2016, purchased all company stock and became its sole owner. In 2019, A360 and its trustee sold the plan’s shares to another entity, amending the plan at the same time to include an arbitration clause that required all claims to be resolved individually and prohibited representative, class, or group relief. The plan was terminated shortly thereafter, and the proceeds were distributed to participants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants undervalued the shares and breached fiduciary duties, seeking plan-wide monetary and equitable relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration based on the plan’s amended arbitration provisions. The district court determined that although the plan itself could assent to arbitration, the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it precluded plan-wide relief authorized by ERISA. The court found that the provision constituted a prospective waiver of statutory rights and concluded that, per the plan amendment’s own terms, the arbitration provision was not severable and thus entirely void.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the arbitration provision was unenforceable under the effective vindication doctrine because it barred participants from seeking plan-wide relief for breaches of fiduciary duty, as provided by ERISA. The court joined other circuits in concluding that such provisions violate ERISA’s substantive rights and affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the arbitration procedure and denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Williams v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

Manuel Contreras worked for Green Thumb Produce, Inc., primarily in the sanitation department, and became aware that he was earning less than other employees performing similar duties, some with less seniority. He repeatedly raised the pay disparity with management, but no action was taken. After consulting with the Labor Commissioner’s Office and reviewing a FAQ about the California Equal Pay Act (EPA), Contreras believed his employer was violating equal pay laws and presented these concerns, along with the FAQ, to human resources. Shortly thereafter, he was terminated, with Green Thumb citing violations of company policy.Contreras filed suit in the Superior Court of Riverside County, asserting three causes of action, including a claim under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) for whistleblower retaliation. At trial, the jury found in Contreras’s favor on all claims and awarded damages. Green Thumb moved for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the whistleblower claim, arguing Contreras’s misunderstanding of the EPA—specifically, that he did not believe his pay disparity was based on sex, race, or ethnicity—was an unreasonable basis for a claim under section 1102.5(b). The Superior Court granted the JNOV motion, reasoning that Contreras’s belief did not relate to a violation of law.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the court addressed whether Contreras’s mistaken interpretation of the EPA defeated his whistleblower retaliation claim. The appellate court held that section 1102.5(b) requires only that an employee have an objectively reasonable belief that a violation of law occurred, not that the belief be legally correct. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Contreras reasonably believed Green Thumb violated the EPA based on his consultation with the Labor Commissioner and the potentially misleading FAQ. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s JNOV ruling and instructed it to amend the judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. View "Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce Inc." on Justia Law

A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law