Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Davis filed sued individual Red Bull executives for age and sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Davis was 56 years old, had been employed by Red Bull for 15 years, and was in a mid-level managerial sales position until he was terminated.Red Bull filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. The individual defendants moved to compel Davis to submit his claims to arbitration. Davis filed a separate lawsuit against Red Bull seeking a declaratory judgment that his claims were not subject to the arbitration agreement. That agreement specifies it is “intended to cover all civil claims which involve or relate in any way to [Davis’s] employment (or termination of employment) with Red Bull, including, but not limited to, claims of employment discrimination or harassment on the basis of . . . sex, age, . . . claims for wrongful discharge, [and] claims for emotional distress.”The trial court concluded and the court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The court noted the "adhesion" nature of the agreement, which is not mutual and the arbitral discovery process does not guarantee adequate discovery. View "Davis v. Kozak" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, the owner and operator of four massage parlors, received three citations from the Department for violations of California's wage and hour laws. The hearing officer issued findings and an order affirming all three citations, including a total of $198,576 in unpaid wages and liquidated damages for citation no. WA-102321. Plaintiff's subsequent petition for writ of mandate challenging the Commissioner's decision affirming the assessments in citation no. WA-102321 was dismissed by the superior court after his request that it waive the bond requirement under Labor Code section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3) was denied and he failed to post a bond.The Court of Appeal affirmed and explained that, although section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), now requires employers to post a bond as a condition to filing a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Labor Commissioner's citations, employers' substantive, preenactment obligations toward their employees under the Labor Code have not changed. All that changed is the addition of the procedural requirement that plaintiff post a bond to secure payment of the assessed amounts. Therefore, application of that requirement to a proceeding that had not yet been initiated prior to the effective date of section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), does not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to waive the bond requirement. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that he was not indigent was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fushan Li v. Department of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

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The United States filed suit against the State of Washington, claiming that HB 1723 impermissibly directly regulates and discriminates against the Federal Government and those with whom it deals in violation of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. HB 1723 amended Washington's workers' compensation scheme and established for workers at the Hanford site – a decommissioned federal nuclear production site – a presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases that is rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Washington, holding that HB 1723 fell within the waiver of 40 U.S.C. 3172, which authorizes states to apply their workers' compensation laws to federal lands and projects in the states in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. Therefore, HB 1723 did not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Finally, the panel declined to resolve the remaining issues raised by the parties because they were not properly before the court. View "United States v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Amazon's motion to compel arbitration of one of the named plaintiff's federal and state wage and hour claims. This plaintiff, unlike the other three named plaintiffs, agreed to all of Amazon's Terms of Service (TOS) when he signed up to work as a delivery provider for Amazon's app-based delivery program, Amazon Flex (AmFlex), including the arbitration provision at issue here.The panel held that AmFlex delivery providers in this case are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce and are thus exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act's enforcement provisions pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 1 where they made "last mile" deliveries of goods in the stream of interstate commerce. The panel explained that the interstate transactions between Amazon and the customer do not conclude until the packages reach their intended destinations, and thus AmFlex drivers are engaged in the movement of interstate commerce, even if they did not themselves need to cross state lines. The panel noted that cases involving delivery services like Postmates or Doordash are distinguishable, because those cases recognize that local food delivery drivers are not "engaged in the interstate transport of goods" where the prepared meals from local restaurants are not a type of good that are "indisputably part of the stream of commerce." In this case, AmFlex workers complete the delivery of goods that Amazon ships across state lines and for which Amazon hires AmFlex workers to complete the delivery. Therefore, AmFlex workers form a part of the channels of interstate commerce and are engaged in interstate commerce.The panel also held that the TOS bars application of Washington state law to the arbitration provision. Therefore, there is no valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. View "Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

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Marquardt, a Cleveland EMS captain, posted on his personal Facebook page, concerning the shooting death of 12-year-old Tamir Rice. The posts did not identify Marquardt as a city employee, nor were they made during work hours. The posts stated: Let me be the first on record to have the balls to say Tamir Rice should have been shot and I am glad he is dead. I wish I was in the park that day as he terrorized innocent patrons by pointing a gun at them walking around acting bad. I am upset I did not get the chance to kill the criminal fucker” and referred to Rice as a “ghetto rat..” Marquardt removed the posts within hours and later claimed an acquaintance with access to his phone made the posts while he slept. A termination letter advised Marquardt that his speech violated city policies.Marquardt's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was rejected on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Marquardt’s posts addressed a matter of public concern. The court did not decide whether the posts amount to protected speech, which will require a determination of whether Marquardt’s free speech interests outweigh the interest of the Cleveland EMS in the efficient administration of its duties. Government, when acting as an employer, may regulate employee speech to a greater extent than it can that of private citizens, including to discipline employees for speech the employer reasonably predicts will be disruptive. View "Marquardt v. Carlton" on Justia Law

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After a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on her claim of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or national origin by her former employer, Rockefeller University, both plaintiff and the University appealed the final judgment of $250,000 in back pay and $200,000 in remitted emotional distress damages.The Second Circuit affirmed and rejected both parties' claims of error. The court held that, at bottom, any evidence in the trial record that could even arguably justify punitive damages is sparse, and the failure to instruct the jury on such damages accordingly did not cut to the core of plaintiff's case; plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the failure to instruct the jury on punitive damages constituted an error so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial; the requirement of intentional discrimination was clearly expressed in the jury instructions and thus the court rejected the University's contention to the contrary; there was no prejudicial error in the formulation of the verdict form necessitating a new trial; the district court had the power to rescind its discharge order and, in the circumstances of this case, its decision to do so was a proper exercise of discretion; and the court rejected the University's challenge to the second verdict form. View "Emamian v. Rockefeller University" on Justia Law

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Jarboe was hired by DKD. Shortly after he began working, Jarboe was transferred to Leehan. Following his termination at Leehan, Jarboe brought this wage and hour action individually and on behalf of a putative class against the Hanlees Auto Group, its 12 affiliated dealerships (each us a separate corporate entity), including DKD and Leehan, and three individuals. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between Jarboe and DKD. The trial court granted the motion as to 11 of the 12 causes of action against DKD but denied the motion as to the other defendants. The trial court allowed Jarboe’s claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code section 2698, to proceed in court against all defendants. The trial court refused to stay the litigation pending arbitration of Jarboe’s claims against DKD. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the other defendants are entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement between Jarboe and DKD as third party beneficiaries of Jarboe’s employment agreement or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. View "Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group" on Justia Law

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Travelex filed suit against defendant to enforce an alleged agreement restricting her ability to compete with Travelex by soliciting business from certain customers. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendant, determining that the purported agreement was unenforceable.The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that summary judgment was not warranted. In this case, the district court concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because the 2008 agreement became a nullity when Travelex was acquired by Cover-More and defendant refused to sign a new agreement as a condition of continued employment and was terminated. The court held that defendant's refusal to sign the new agreement nullified the prior agreement. The court also held that defendant's alternative argument, that under New York law restrictive covenants may not be enforced when an employee is dismissed without cause, does not apply because the non-solicitation agreement is not unreasonable as a matter of law. View "Travelex Insurance Services, Inc. v. Barty" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Air Evac in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging unpaid overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).The court agreed with the district court that Air Evac is a "carrier by air," and thus plaintiff's job as a flight paramedic was exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements. In this case, Air Evac is not equitably estopped from asserting that the position is exempt, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiff's reliance on a letter to argue to the contrary was unreasonable because Air Evac had otherwise clearly and consistently communicated its overtime policy to plaintiff. Furthermore, the air-carrier exemption applies because Air Evac is a common carrier where Air Evac is willing to provide transportation services for hire to all within its definable segment and it does not discriminate within its segment. View "Riegelsberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

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FEI, Crop Venture's successor-in-interest, filed suit alleging that the individual defendants took proprietary information they developed at Crop Ventures after they left the company and co-founded Farmobile (the corporate defendant). Specifically, FEI alleges that the individual defendants' behavior constituted a breach of explicit or implicit contracts with the company; defendants were obligated to assign to their employer the ownership rights of products they worked to develop; the individual defendants breached their duty of loyalty to their employer; and the individual defendants misappropriated trade secrets. The district court denied in full FEI's motion, and granted in part and denied in part Farmobile's motion.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that because no contract bound the parties during Defendant Nuss' term of employment, Nuss was not in breach of an explicit contract; FEI has not shown that any of the individual defendants was similarly "specifically directed" during their product-development process, so no implied contracts were created under the hired-to-invent doctrine; FEI failed to show the individual defendants breached their duty of loyalty to their employer; FEI cannot maintain a trade secret claim under the Nebraska Trade Secrets Act (NTSA) or the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); and the remaining claims are unpersuasive. View "Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC" on Justia Law