Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff filed suit against Allied Pilots in state court for conversion and unjust enrichment, arguing that he was entitled to keep his whole profit sharing payment rather than give some of it to the union for "dues." The union removed to federal court, contending that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The district court held that state law claims fell away due to preemption and the federal claims did not survive summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred by relying on the complete-preemption doctrine, finding that the RLA wholly displaced plaintiff's state law claims. In this case, the RLA does not require disputes between an employee and a union to be heard by an adjustment board, so there is no federal cause of action at all, much less an exclusive one. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and instructed the district court, on remand, to return this case to state court. View "Krakowski v. Allied Pilots Ass'n" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Workers Compensation Board that clear and convincing evidence showed that an employee's impairment caused by marijuana consumption did not contribute to the employee's workplace accident, holding that sufficient evidence supported the Board's finding that it was "highly probable" that the employee's impairment did not contribute to his accident.Gary Woessner died after falling fifteen feet from a jobsite catwalk for an unexplained reason. Gary's employer, Labor Max Staffing, paid workers compensation benefits for his temporary total disability and for his treatment and care, but after he died, Labor Max stopped paying not he workers compensation claim. Carmen Woessner, Gary's widow, sought benefits. An administrative law judge ruled that Gary's injuries were not compensable because Carmen failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Gary's impairment caused by marijuana use did not contribute to his accident, injury, and death. The Board concluded that Gary's injuries were compensable and awarded the benefits, finding that, even if Gary was impaired, the impairment did not contribute to his accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board, holding that the drug test results were admissible and that the conclusively presumed impairment did not contribute to Gary's accident. View "Woessner v. Labor Max Staffing" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that when Norma and James Gund suffered a violent attack after being asked by law enforcement to check on a neighbor who had called 911 requesting help, the only remedy available to the Gunds was through workers' compensation.When members of the public engage in "active law enforcement service" at the request of a peace officer, California treats those members of the public as employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits. However, workers' compensation becomes an individual's exclusive remedy for his or her injuries under state law. At issue in this case was whether the Gunds were engaged in "active law enforcement service" when they assisted law enforcement by checking on a neighbor who had called 911, walked into an active murder scene, and had their throats cut. The Supreme Court held that the Gunds engaged in active law enforcement under California Labor Code 3366 even though the peace officer allegedly misrepresented the situation, and therefore, their only remedy was through workers' compensation. View "Gund v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

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Bell employees participated in a benefit plan, completely funded by contributions from the members of about 69 unions. The plan is administered by a Board of Trustees, governed by Trust Indenture documents that provide that plan members must contribute a fixed amount unless a member’s union has set a different contribution amount. In 2008, Bell’s union voted to increase its members’ contributions from 6% to 8% of their weekly wages. In 2014, the Trustees revealed that the plan’s financial health was deteriorating. Bell employees unsuccessfully petitioned the union to reduce their compelled-contribution rate. In 2016, Bell's collective-bargaining contract expired. During negotiations, the employees again unsuccessfully requested that the union reduce their required contribution rate. Other members of the union, working for a different employer, were either contributing at lower rates or not contributing; they were originally part of a different union that did not participate in the plan. Contract re-negotiations were unsuccessful. The employees lost certain benefits that are available only to active contributors to the plan.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(D). The Trustees’ action, interpretation of the Trust Indenture, was not a breach of fiduciary duty. The Indenture can be reasonably interpreted as permitting different segments within a union to contribute to the plan at different levels. Even if the Union controlled the amount of revenue coming into the plan, it did not act as fiduciary but as a settlor. View "Bator v. District Council 4, Graphic Communications Conference" on Justia Law

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The court of appeal previously concluded that San Francisco’s procedural approach to punishing Morgado for misconduct violated the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act by not providing a valid avenue for administrative appeal of his 2011 termination from his police employment and affirmed a 2014 injunction directing the city to vacate Morgado’s termination and reinstate him pending administrative appeal. Morgado was reinstated but was suspended without pay retroactive to his 2011 termination. In 2018 he obtained an order holding San Francisco in contempt for failure to comply with the injunction and requiring the city to vacate “unconditionally” Morgado’s termination and suspension, compensate him with front pay and benefits lost, and “refrain from ... any other action” against Morgado.San Francisco offset the payment owed to him based on his post-termination earnings from side income as a mortgage broker, a deduction of $181,402. Morgado obtained a second order of contempt, directing the city to pay Morgado the amount deducted and to re-assign him to administrative duties. The court of appeal vacated that order as not resting upon a “clear, intentional violation of a specific, narrowly drawn order.” The trial court again found the deduction inapplicable and ordered the city to pay the amount deducted. The court of appeal reversed, citing precedent that entitles the city to deductions for Morgado’s side income, and remanded for recalculation of the amount. View "Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the employee demonstrated his assent to the arbitration clause by signing the acknowledgment, and the employer had no duty to call the arbitration agreement to the employee's attention. The court found that provisions in the arbitration clause concerning arbitrator's fees and costs and attorney fees are unenforceable, but they may be severed, and the rest of the agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to sever the offending provisions concerning arbitration fees and costs and attorney fees from the agreement and otherwise grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Conyer v. Hula Media Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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Lowe, born in 1958, worked for Walbro for 41 years and was promoted several times, becoming the Cass City facility Area Manager in 2014. Cass City evolved from producing carburetors to focus on blow molding and robotics. In 2016, Walbro hired 35-year-old Davidson as General Manager. Davidson testified that Lowe’s understanding of robotics and blow molding was limited, so Lowe relied heavily on two subordinates for equipment maintenance. Davidson removed those subordinates from reporting to Lowe. Lowe was left managing only one portion of the building and conducting general facility maintenance. Lowe alleges that Davidson made several disparaging statements about Lowe’s age. In 2018, Walbro hired Rard as Senior Human Resources Manager. Rard testified that she noticed that Lowe was serving as the Area Manager but had only a few janitors reporting to him. She recommended that Lowe’s position be eliminated. Rard also testified that she received complaints about Lowe engaging in bullying, vulgarity, and sexual innuendoes. Walbro terminated Lowe.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, Lowe’s age discrimination claims under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Davidson’s age-related remarks could lead a reasonable jury to find that Walbro acted on a predisposition to discriminate on the basis of age. Lowe raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the animus was a but-for cause of his termination. Walbro has not demonstrated as a matter of law that it would have terminated Lowe regardless of any age-related animus. View "Lowe v. Walbro LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that when an at-will employee consents, without objection, to the collection of his or her urine sample under the "direct-observation method," the at-will employee has no cause of action for common-law invasion of privacy.Plaintiffs were former and current at-will employees of Defendant. Defendant had a workplace substance-abuse policy requiring employees to submit a urine sample for drug testing under the direct-observation method, under which a same-sex monitor was required to accompany the employee to the restroom to visually observe the employee produce the urine sample. While Plaintiffs did not know at the time they consented that their urine samples would be collected under the direct-observation method they proceeded with the drug test under the direct-observation method without objection. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Defendant violated their privacy by requiring them to submit their urine samples under the direct-observation method. The trial court granted judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs had not stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' invasion-of-privacy claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC" on Justia Law

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Under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by his or her employer's Labor Code violations may be authorized to act as an agent of the LWDA to recover such penalties in a civil action. In the cases underlying these consolidated appeals, Plaintiffs Starks and Herrera, each acting as the LWDA's agent, separately filed substantially identical PAGA actions against their former employer, Vortex. Starks eventually settled with Vortex and Herrera moved to vacate the judgment and intervene in the Starks action.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Herrera's motion to intervene in the Starks action was untimely. The court also held that, because the LWDA accepted the proceeds from the judgment in the Starks action, Herrera, as the LWDA's agent, cannot attack that judgment. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Herrera action, because Herrera's PAGA claim, in substance, is encompassed within the Starks judgment, and thus its maintenance is barred by the LWDA's acceptance of the benefits of the Starks judgment. View "Starks v. Vortex Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Marietta Education Association serves as the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district’s employees. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), Thompson sued the Association and the Marietta Board of Education, arguing that Ohio’s scheme of exclusive public-sector union representation violates the First Amendment. Under Ohio law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public employees in a bargaining unit upon proof that a majority of the bargaining unit’s members wish to be represented by the union, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.05(A)(1). Public employers are then prohibited from bargaining with individual employees and other labor organizations. Ohio law sets a broad scope for collective-bargaining negotiations. Thompson is not a member of the Association. She objects to its policies but because the union has been designated as her bargaining unit’s “exclusive representative,” the union has a statutory right to represent her. Thompson argued that Ohio’s system of exclusive public-sector bargaining violates her First Amendment rights.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio’s take-it-or-leave-it system is in direct conflict with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME (2018). In deciding Janus, however, the Court did not overrule Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984). Which directly controls the outcome of this case. View "Thompson v. Marietta Education Association" on Justia Law