Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Washington ballot initiative 1501 prohibits public access to certain government-controlled information, including the personal information of in-home care providers, but permits that information to be disclosed to the providers’ certified exclusive bargaining representatives. The law was challenged under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by in-home providers, required by Washington law to participate in statewide collective bargaining, who are not members of their respective unions and do not pay agency fees. They wanted to inform other individual in-home providers of their right to not pay union agency fees and were unable to obtain the necessary contact information.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Amendment does not guarantee a general right of access to government-controlled information. Whether to disclose government-controlled information is generally left to the political processes but the First Amendment forbids a state from discriminating invidiously among viewpoints. A state does not engage in viewpoint discrimination by disclosing the personal information of public or quasi-public employees to the employees’ certified bargaining representative while denying equal access to the public. Initiative 1501 does not implicate the plaintiffs’ associational freedom; the plaintiffs lack standing to assert the rights of other in-home care providers. Initiative 1501 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause; the challenged provisions satisfy rational-basis review. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting seniors and other vulnerable individuals from identity theft and other financial crimes. There was no evidence that those who voted in favor of Initiative 1501 were motivated by an irrational prejudice or desire to harm the plaintiffs or their message. View "Boardman v. Inslee" on Justia Law

Cook County Sheriff Dart instituted disciplinary proceedings against several Sheriff’s officers (plaintiffs) by filing charges with the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board under Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/3-7011. The plaintiffs filed motions with the Board to dismiss the charges. While the administrative proceedings were pending, the plaintiffs filed suit, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Sheriff, Cook County, the Board, and the Cook County Board of Commissioners, asserting that the Board was not legally constituted because several of its members were appointed to or served terms that did not comply with the Code section 3-7002 requirements.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the plaintiffs challenged the authority of the Board to address the charges, the “authority” exception to the exhaustion requirement applied. The circuit court can adjudicate the requests for back pay and other claims, which do not fall within the particular expertise of the Board. The plaintiffs raised the issue before the Board, which refused to hear them until after the disciplinary proceedings were complete. Given that the Board had not taken any substantive action regarding the disciplinary charges before the filing of the lawsuit, the “de facto officer doctrine” does not apply. View "Goral v. Dart" on Justia Law

In this case involving a subsidy to offset part of the cost of health insurance that Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) provides to retirees receiving an OPERS pension the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Plaintiff stated a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).Plaintiff filed a class action suit against OPERS arguing that reducing the subsidy of any retiree who is reemployed by a public employer that is a member of the OPERS network violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court dismissed the case under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The appellate court reversed, holding that Plaintiff stated a claim under Ohio's Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff alleged facts that, if accepted as true, would entitle him to relief. View "Sherman v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) order that affirmed WSI’s April 2018 order awarding permanent impairment benefits to Jason Tolman and that reversed WSI’s July 2018 order denying benefits for his depression and anxiety conditions. In September 2014, Tolman was injured when he was driving a tanker truck and involved in a single vehicle roll-over accident. WSI accepted his claim for benefits. In April 2018, WSI issued an order awarding Tolman $4,905 in permanent impairment benefits based on a determination that he had sustained a 16 percent impairment of the whole body. In July 2018, WSI issued an order denying benefits in connection with his depression and anxiety, deciding these conditions were not caused by his physical injury and existed before the work injury. Tolman requested an administrative hearing on the orders, and a hearing was held before an independent ALJ in April 2019. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred in applying N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(10)(a)(6) and concluding Tolman established his depression and anxiety conditions were compensable. The Court affirmed that part of the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s April 2018 order; but reversed that part of the ALJ’s order reversing WSI’s July 2018 order, and reinstated WSI’s July 2018 order. View "WSI v. Tolman" on Justia Law

Applecars is a member of a network of Wisconsin used-car dealerships. McCormick owned a majority share in each dealership. Each dealership received management services from Capital M, which McCormick also owned. Capital M tracked shared dealership inventory, held employee records, and issued identical employee handbooks for each dealership; Capital M’s operations manager hired and fired each dealership’s general manager. The employees of each dealership gathered as one for events several times per year. The dealerships advertised on a single website, which included some language suggesting a single entity and some indicators that each dealership is a separate entity. Each dealership properly maintained corporate formalities and records. Capital M billed each dealership separately. Each dealership had a distinct general manager, bank accounts, and financial reports. The dealerships separately filed and paid taxes, paid employees, and entered into contracts.Prince worked at Applecars for several months before he was fired. Prince claims his firing was retaliatory and sued Applecars and its affiliates for racial discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court granted the defendants summary judgment, noting that Applecars had fewer than 15 employees and was not subject to Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There is insufficient evidence to support Prince’s theory that the court should pierce the corporate veil of the network, aggregating the number of employees such that Title VII would apply. View "Prince v. Appleton Auto LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the court of appeals opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the summary judgment granted by the State Employees' Appeals Commission (SEAC) against Appellant on his claim that his alleged protected activity was related to his termination, holding that the court of appeals reached too broad a conclusion to resolve the issue in this case.Appellant appealed his termination, claiming he was a protected whistleblower. SEAC dismissed the complaint, but the superior court reversed. On remand, SEAC granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant's employer. Appellant sought judicial review, claiming that most of his employer's arguments were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply but going further to find that the law-of-the-case doctrine "is applicable only when an appellate court determines a legal issue, not a trial court." The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the court of appeals' opinion and otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals need not have reached so broad a conclusion to resolve the issue. View "Brown v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management" on Justia Law

Frederick Meiners, III was employed as Assistant Fire Chief with the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 (“District”). In early 2016, Meiners agreed to retrieve a repaired ambulance unit from Hattiesburg, but informed his supervisor, provisional fire chief Kenneth Moore, that he first had to attend a speaking engagement with a ladies’ group that would last approximately thirty minutes. At 1:08 p.m. that day, Jennifer Glorioso, the wife of Fire Equipment Operator Glorioso (hereinafter referred to as “FEO Glorioso”), photographed Meiners sitting at a table at the La Madeleine restaurant with his wife and his lawyer. She later sent a text message containing this photograph to her husband. At 2:30 p.m., District Fire Chief Brady Anderson advised Chief Moore that Meiners was not yet back from his meeting and offered to pick up the ambulance himself. Chief Moore declined Anderson’s offer. After being reassured by Meiners he was on his way back to the District, Chief Moore received a text from an unknown phone number that contained a photograph of Meiners taken at the restaurant. Chief Moore then provided a written notice of investigation to Meiners, stating that he was “initiating an investigation into an incident involving you in a matter which occurred on February 19, 2016, specifically, conflicting details regarding a speaking engagement while on duty.” The notice of investigation also stated the “persons conducting this investigation will be Corianne Green and a PMI representative.” Chief Moore then placed Meiners on administrative leave with pay. After a hearing, Meiners was terminated from his employment with the district based on his conduct on the date of the ambulance pickup. The termination was affirmed by the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 Civil Service Board (“Board”). Upon review, a district court reversed and remanded, finding that untruthfulness alone, did not mandate termination, where the misconduct did not result in a detrimental effect on the efficient and orderly operation of the fire department. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to impose discipline other than termination. The Court reversed judgment and reinstated the Board's decision. View "Meiners v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection Dist. No. 4 et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michelle Kramer filed a wage and hour lawsuit against her employer, defendants Traditional Escrow, Inc. (Traditional), and its alleged alter ego, Annette Scherrer-Cosner. A few months after defendants answered the initial complaint, their counsel withdrew, and defendants subsequently chose not to participate in this case. Plaintiff continued to serve defendants with all case documents, including an amended complaint, at their address of record. But, in violation of the California Rules of Court, defendants changed their mailing address without giving notice to plaintiff or the trial court. As a result, they did not receive any of the documents that plaintiff served on them after their counsel withdrew. Eventually, default and default judgment were entered against them due to their failure to answer the amended complaint. Defendants moved to set aside the default and vacate the judgment, arguing they were entitled to equitable relief because they had been prevented from responding to the amended complaint due to extrinsic fraud and extrinsic mistake. The trial court granted the motion, finding that defendants were unaware the complaint had been amended. It also found that after filing the amended complaint, plaintiff’s counsel misrepresented to Cosner’s divorce attorney, who was unaffiliated with this matter, that defendants were in default and could not file an answer. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing equitable relief was unwarranted. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: "Defendants cannot deliberately neglect this lawsuit and go off-grid, so to speak, and then complain that they lacked notice of the proceedings." The trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Kramer v. Traditional Escrow" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated Supreme Court's judgment declaring that Defendants violated the second subdivision (h) of Administrative Code of the City of New York 13-218 by excluding police officers in tier 3 of the state retirement system from the retirement benefits conferred by that subdivision reinstated, holding that the relevant part of section 13-218 rendered those officers eligible for credit for certain periods of unpaid childcare leave.At issue was the policy of the City of New York that tier 3 officers are not eligible for certain benefits available to officers in tier 2 of the New York City Police Pension Fund retirement plan, including the mechanism that allows police officers to obtain credit for certain periods of absence without pay for childcare leave. Supreme Court awarded Plaintiffs judgment, declaring that affected police officers were entitled to the childcare leave benefit. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 13-218 renders officers of the New York City Police Department who are members of the tier 3 retirement system are eligible for credit for periods of unpaid childcare leave and that the grant of such benefits for those officers is consistent with the Retirement and Social Security Law. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Connie Schoeffel worked for Thorne Research, Inc. (“Thorne”) as a kitchen manager. In 2016, Thorne announced that it would be moving its operations from Idaho to South Carolina. For those employees who would not be relocating to South Carolina, Thorne offered an employee retention program to encourage them to continue working at the Idaho facility until the South Carolina facility was ready. As part of this program, Thorne prepared a “Release of Claims Agreement” (“the Agreement”) providing that Thorne would pay participating employees “bargained-for compensation” in exchange for giving up certain rights, including the right to quit before their positions were eliminated. Schoeffel signed this Agreement approximately six weeks before her last day of work. After her separation, Schoeffel filed for unemployment benefits without reporting the retention payments as income. Around the time Schoeffel received her fourth benefit payment, the Department learned of the payments that Thorne owed Schoeffel under the Agreement. The Department determined that those payments constituted reportable “severance pay” under Idaho Code section 72-1367(4). Consequently, the Department determined that Schoeffel was receiving severance pay and was required to repay the unemployment benefits she had received. Schoeffel appealed to the Department’s Appeals Bureau, which initially ruled in her favor but affirmed the Department’s decision on reconsideration. Schoeffel then appealed to the Industrial Commission which affirmed the Appeals Bureau’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the payments were reportable severance pay, applying Parker v. Underwriters Labs, Inc., 96 P.3d 618 (2004). "[B]ecause the primary purpose of the Agreement was to secure the relinquishment of Schoeffel’s right to quit, rather than to compensate her for her past service to Thorne, they were not made 'as a result of' severance under Idaho Code section 72-1367(4). Therefore, the retention payments do not constitute reportable severance pay." The Commission's decision was reversed. View "Schoeffel v. Idaho Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law