Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Brader v. Biogen Inc.
The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (ADA), and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4, holding that the material facts did not raise a reasonable inference of employment discrimination under state or federal law.After Defendant was terminated from his employment he filed an employment and retaliation complaint under the ADA and Chapter 151B. The district court determined that the undisputed material facts did not raise a reasonable inference that Defendant discriminated or retaliated against Plaintiff because of his disability. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his claims. View "Brader v. Biogen Inc." on Justia Law
International Union of Operating Engineers v. Daley
Wisconsin grants public-sector employees the right to bargain collectively through the State Employment Labor Relations Act (SELRA) and the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA). In 2011, SELRA and MERA were amended by Act 10, which divided Wisconsin state and municipal employees into “[p]ublic safety employee[s],” which includes police officers, firefighters, and deputy sheriffs, and “general municipal employee[s],” i.e., everyone else. A subsequent amendment created a class of “[t]ransit employee[s].” Public safety and transit employees and their unions continue to operate under the pre-Act 10 scheme but for general employees, Act 10 limited the scope of employers’ collective bargaining obligations, prohibiting bargaining over anything except increases to base wages and mandating that general employee unions submit to an annual recertification election. Certification now requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of all employees in the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Act 10 bars public employers from deducting union dues from the earnings of general employees.The Seventh Circuit has previously rejected two challenges to Act 10’s constitutionality and affirmed the dismissal of this First Amendment suit, filed a public-employee labor union and two of its members, challenging the annual recertification requirement, the limitations on collective bargaining, and the prohibition on payroll deduction of union dues. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Daley" on Justia Law
Department of Human Resources v. International Union of Operating Engineers
The State entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Union regarding terms and conditions of employment for certain state employees classified as bargaining unit 12. The State subsequently appealed the trial court’s order denying its petition to vacate or correct an arbitration award determining that DWR had violated article 16.7(G) of the MOU by using purged documents to support the adverse disciplinary action taken against the employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the arbitration award interpreted and enforced article 16.7(G) of the MOU in a manner that constitutes a violation of the constitutional merit principle, because it impedes the ability of state departments to make reasonable and sound employment decisions based on merit. Therefore, the award violated public policy and the trial court erred in denying the petition. The court reversed the trial court's order on the petition and the ensuing judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order vacating the award. View "Department of Human Resources v. International Union of Operating Engineers" on Justia Law
Estate of Gorman v. Mississippi Gaming Commission
Robert Sharp shot and killed John Gorman during a firearm-training exercise ("a multitude of lapses in safety protocols"). Sharp and Gorman were employees of the Mississippi Gaming Commission and were acting in the course and scope of their employment. The Commission Shooting Review Board concluded that the incident “was an accidental discharge of an agency weapon,” it also concluded that the “failure to follow the prescribed policies, procedures and lesson plans” was the most significant contributing factor. After the incident, Gorman’s heirs began receiving automatic workers’ compensation payments. Each heir brought independent actions against the Commission that were later consolidated. Once consolidated, the Commission filed a joint motion for summary judgment in August 2017, stating the exclusivity of Mississippi Workers’ Compensation law barred further remedy. Gorman’s heirs opposed the motion by way of a pleading, memorandum, and a supplement with affidavits and admissions purportedly deemed admitted. The circuit court later granted summary judgment for the Commission. On appeal, the heirs argued: (1) the circuit court erred in determining the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy to recover for the wrongful death of John Gorman; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining complete immunity applied regarding the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Finding no triable issues of material fact in the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Estate of Gorman v. Mississippi Gaming Commission" on Justia Law
Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc.
The plaintiffs attended licensed Michigan cosmetology schools, each of which includes a clinic salon where students work toward the state’s 965-hour practical experience requirement. The salons are open to the public. Customers pay for beauty services provided by students and can purchase products available in the salon. The schools profit from the salons. Students are not compensated for their time. When not working on clients, students wash and fold towels, clean the studio, and perform other janitorial jobs. Students receive academic credit for the time spent on such tasks.The plaintiffs sued, seeking compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that they were owed compensation for certain cleaning work. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court properly focused on the specific work for which plaintiffs seek compensation, rather than on the entirety of the training program, but failed to correctly apply circuit precedent governing FLSA claims in an educational setting. On remand, the court must apply the primary-beneficiary test. Where students in a training environment seek compensation for some of the work they perform during the educational relationship, the court should consider that the students received academic credit and should evaluate the relationship between the challenged activities and the curriculum. Among the specific factors to be considered: the lack of expectation of payment; the educational value of the tasks under scrutiny; the displacement of paid employees, and the school’s competitive benefit. View "Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law
Tompkins v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.
Plaintiff, a carman for Metro-North, filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, alleging unlawful retaliation for his refusal to walk outdoors to another building in the railyard in allegedly unsafe winter conditions or, in the alternative, for his reporting those unsafe conditions to a foreman.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Metro-North's motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error. The court adopted the "reasonableness" definition in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act context, which means that a "reasonable belief contains both subjective and objective components," and applied it in the FRSA context. The court agreed with Metro-North and the district court that plaintiff has not identified a genuine dispute of material fact over whether the walkways were safe or over the reasonableness of his own assessment. In this case, plaintiff did not submit any specific evidence to support his generalized contention that the walkways at the railyard were unsafe, other than to assert that other employees slipped as they walked. The court concluded that plaintiff's subjective assessment alone cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.The court agreed with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and held that some evidence of retaliatory intent is a necessary component of an FRSA claim. The court considered the Eighth Circuit's Gunderson factors and concluded that plaintiff's protected activity was not a contributing factor in his discharge. Finally, the court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Tompkins v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co." on Justia Law
Hensley v. Montana State Fund
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Hensley v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law
Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran
Innova, wanting to hire a citizen of India with a bachelor’s degree as a computer programmer, sought an H-1B “specialty occupation” visa on his behalf. Under the relevant regulation, Innova had to establish that a “baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.” Although the Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) provides that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree,” and that a bachelor’s degree is the “[t]ypical level of education that most” computer programmers need, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the application, concluding that “the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required.”The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that USCIS’s denial was arbitrary and capricious. USCIS’s suggestion that there is “space” between "typically needed," per the OOH, and "normally required," per the regulation is "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." The regulation is not ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted. USCIS misrepresented the OOH and failed to consider key evidence, namely, OOH language providing that a “bachelor’s degree” is the “[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation.” View "Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran" on Justia Law
Auge v. Fairchild Equipment, Inc.
Auge, an experienced industrial-equipment salesman, started with Fairchild in 2013, with a base salary of $50,000 and a commission of 30% on the gross profits from most new equipment sales. Days after the company’s plan for calculating compensation changed in 2017, Auge abruptly quit. Fairchild deposited his commissions into his bank account. He demanded more. He believed he was entitled to a 30% commission on all anticipated gross profits, not just those “booked” in 2017. He also requested immediate payment on several “rental purchase option[s],” even though Fairchild’s policy was not to pay commissions on these rent-to-own arrangements until the end of the rental term. In Fairchild’s view, Auge lost those commissions once he quit.Auge sued for breach of contract and for alleged violations of the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act. The district court dismissed the suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part but reversed with respect to “rental purchase options,” finding the contract provision ambiguous so that summary judgment was inappropriate. Fairchild owed Auge nothing for other commission, so the Act did not apply. View "Auge v. Fairchild Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law
A&A Maintenance Enterprise, Inc. v. Ramnarain
The Union represented the workers at the Old Brookville campus. In 2016, LIU contracted out that work to A&A, which became the employer of those workers and assumed an existing collective bargaining agreement, set to expire in August 2017. A&A and the Union entered into a successor CBA, which requires Union membership after 30 days but allows A&A to hire “substitute employees” “to fill in for employees who are out on disability or worker’s compensation or approved extended leaves.” The Union rejected a provision that would have permitted A&A to use non-union “temporary employees” at will for up to 90 days. The agreement has an arbitration provision.Union members noticed new, non-union employees in late 2017. A&A indicated that they were "substitute employees." The Union determined that the number of claimed substitutes exceeded the number of members out on disability, worker’s compensation, and other approved leaves of absence and sent a written grievance. The Union framed the arbitration issue: whether A&A violated the CBA by utilizing temporary employees ... to perform bargaining unit work. A&A argued that the Arbitrator was confined to the issue proposed by the Union in its original grievance, which mentioned only “substitute employees.”The arbitrator held that A&A had violated the CBA and issued an award of $1,702,263.81. The Second Circuit affirmed. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority. While worded differently, the issue that the arbitrator ruled on was substantially identical to the issue in the grievance letter. A party that has previously agreed to arbitrate cannot frustrate the process by refusing to agree on the form of the issue. The arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was more than colorable. View "A&A Maintenance Enterprise, Inc. v. Ramnarain" on Justia Law