Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court
The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of its opinion in light of Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, and Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762. In the prior opinion, the court held that Louisiana law governed the employment relationships at issue here. However, after considering the Supreme Court's recent guidance on the matter, the court concluded that California law applies and that the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment.Ward and Oman establish that California's wage and hour laws apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in California. For workers who perform work in multiple jurisdictions, this test is satisfied if the worker performs some work in California and is based in California. In this case, the crew members of the Adele Elise performed the majority of their work within the boundaries of California. Furthermore, the port of Port Hueneme, where the Adele Elise was docked, and the entire Santa Barbara Channel are inside the state. Therefore, under Ward and Oman, the crew members are entitled to the protection of California law because they performed all or most of their work in California. Finally, the court concluded that there is no preemption. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law
Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of California: Does the evidentiary standard set forth in section 1102.6 of the California Labor Code replace the McDonnell Douglas test as the relevant evidentiary standard for retaliation claims brought pursuant to section 1102.5 of California’s Labor Code? View "Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc." on Justia Law
Harrington v. Department of Veterans Affairs
Harrington, a Bay Pines VA Healthcare System police officer, sent a photograph of a document contained on the secure agency server to a former VA police officer, Hooker, who was no longer employed by VA. VA had provided Hooker with a text file of the contents of that document in response to a FOIA request but did not provide the document itself. Two weeks later, Congress enacted the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017; 38 U.S.C. 714 speeds up removal proceedings, lowers VA’s burden of proof at the Merit Systems Protection Board from a preponderance of the evidence to substantial evidence, and eliminates the MSPB’s authority to mitigate VA’s imposed penalty. The VA brought a removal action under section 714, alleging misconduct by sending the photograph, and issued a decision removing Harrington. The MSPB found that substantial evidence supported the charge of misconduct and did not review the appropriateness of the severity of the penalty.The Federal Circuit vacated. Section 714 does not apply to proceedings instituted based on conduct occurring before its enactment. The proper interpretation of section 714 requires the MSPB to review the entire decision below, including the choice of penalty. View "Harrington v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law
Hildebrandt v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Staples. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in applying the class action tolling rules articulated in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103. The court explained that plaintiff was entitled, due to the pendency of the Wesson and Hatgis class certification proceedings, to claim the benefit of the class action tolling rule established by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538, as adopted by Jolly. Therefore, with the exception of the claim for failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff's claims were time barred. In this case, because plaintiff concedes his claim for failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements is time barred, even if tolling applies, the court affirmed the summary adjudication of that claim. The court reversed summary judgment in all other respects. View "Hildebrandt v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC" on Justia Law
Daumont-Colon v. Coop de Ahorro y Cred Caguas
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that she was fired from her position because of her age, holding that Plaintiff's claims were without merit.After she was discharged, Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). Plaintiff also asserted a number of supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. At trial, once Plaintiff rested, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not contradict the law of the case doctrine when it excluded certain evidence at trial; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence at trial; and (3) did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law. View "Daumont-Colon v. Coop de Ahorro y Cred Caguas" on Justia Law
Emmons v. City of Chesapeake
Plaintiffs, Battalion Chiefs, filed suit against their employer, the City of Chesapeake Fire Department, for non-compliance with the overtime pay requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs argue that none of the FLSA exemptions apply to them, both on their own terms and because the Battalion Chief position falls under a regulatory exception, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b), that categorically withdraws certain first response workers from the exemptions' scope.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the fire department, holding that section 541.3(b) does not categorically except plaintiffs from the FLSA's system of exemptions, because plaintiffs are, first and foremost, managers within the fire department, not frontline firefighters. The court also held that plaintiffs satisfy all four prongs of the executive exemption and, as executive employees, are not due overtime pay under the FLSA. View "Emmons v. City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law
Munoz v. Selig Enterprises, Inc.
Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Selig on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of retaliation under the FMLA where a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff suffered retaliation for intending to use FMLA leave in the future. In this case, there are a number of factual disputes that are material to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim and thus summary judgment was not appropriate. However, the court affirmed in all other respects, holding that plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA and that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that she was terminated as a result of Selig's failure to give her notice of her FMLA rights. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Munoz v. Selig Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law
Jones v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hospital Organization, Inc.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Peoples Health Network in an action brought by former employees, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court concluded that the employees' job duties fall within the administrative employee exemption to the statute.The court agreed and concluded de novo that the evidence created no genuine issue of material fact and the district court had ample support from the record to conclude that plaintiffs were salaried employees; plaintiffs' primary job duties directly relate to the management or general business operations of Peoples Health or its customers; and plaintiffs' primary job duties included the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. The court also concluded that the district court applied the correct standard of review, and the district court made clear in its conclusion that it was applying the summary judgment standard to Peoples Health's burden of proving the administrative exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Jones v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hospital Organization, Inc." on Justia Law
Scalia v. Red Lake Nation Fisheries, Inc.
After the Fishery received two citations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the OSHA Commission dismissed them. The citation stemmed from an incident where a Fishery boat capsized on the reservation in Lower Red Lake and two employees drowned.The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993), was controlling here. The court concluded that OSHA was inapplicable to the Tribe because enforcement of the Act would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the applicable treaty which gave the Tribe fishing rights in the reservation. Even if OSHA applied to Indian activities in other circumstances, OSHA does not apply to an enterprise owned by and consisting solely of members of perhaps the most insular and independent sovereign tribe. View "Scalia v. Red Lake Nation Fisheries, Inc." on Justia Law
Esparraguera v. Department of the Army
Esparraguera was removed for performance reasons from her position as the Army’s top labor lawyer and placed into another high-level position at the same agency but outside the Senior Executive Service (SES). Federal civil service is divided into the competitive service, the excepted service, and the SES, 5 U.S.C. 2101a, 2102, 2103. . Esparraguera’s request for reconsideration was denied by the Under Secretary. She requested an informal hearing under 5 U.S.C. 3592(a)(2), which entitled her to “appear and present arguments” before an official designated by the Merit Systems Protection Board. By statute, she could not avail herself of the ordinary appellate provisions of the Board. Esparraguera submitted exhibits designated A through UU into evidence and read a prepared statement into the record. The Army neither presented evidence nor objected to the entry of these exhibits. Esparraguera did not expressly ask the Board to review her removal—and it did not. The Board official issued the Order Referring Record, which summarized the proceedings. The Army did not change its decision.Esparraguera argued that she was deprived of constitutionally protected property and liberty interests without due process. The Federal Circuit dismissed her appeal. An “Order Referring Record” is not a “final order or decision” of the Board, as required for appellate jurisdiction. View "Esparraguera v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law