Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), failed to compensate her for past workplace injuries, holding that the trial justice properly dismissed the complaint.The trial justice found that the superior court did not have jurisdiction over certain claims because they were committed to the Workers' Compensation Court, that Plaintiff did not properly articulate other claims, and that the complaint failed adequately to inform Defendant of the nature of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims on appeal were without merit. View "Barnes v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Time Warner petitions for review of a Board ruling that Time Warner committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by coercively interrogating employees about communications leading to an unprotected demonstration and work stoppage that contravened the no-strike agreement between Time Warner and the Union.The Second Circuit held that the Board's standard, interpreted to prohibit Time Warner from coercively questioning employees who participated in an unprotected work stoppage about any communication prior to the stoppage except to identify actual participants, represented an unexplained and unjustified departure from the Board's precedents. The court explained that the portion of the Board's standard requiring that in coercive questioning, employers "focus closely" on unprotected activity where it might touch on protected activity has a reasonable basis in law, but the Board's requirement that an employer "minimize" intrusion into Section 7 activity in such questioning, at least as understood by the Board in this case, does not. Because the Board's enunciated standard, at least as applied here, lacks a reasonable basis in law, the court vacated the Board's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Board should determine, employing a standard consistent with its precedent, whether Time Warner's questioning interfered unreasonably with employees' rights protected by Section 7. View "Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Dylan filed suit in district court seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The district court converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion to compel arbitration and granted the motion, dismissing Dylan's complaint without prejudice.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal; clarified that the district court had federal question jurisdiction to decide whether Dylan was entitled to the declaratory relief requested; and held that, because the Funds have adequately initiated arbitration, regardless of timing, Dylan is required to arbitrate by the terms of the CBA. The court also agreed with the district court's analysis that it was proper in this case to compel arbitration and dismiss Dylan's complaint without prejudice. The court considered Dylan's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Dylan 140 LLC v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute arising from an employee's death, the Supreme Court remanded the determination that the employer's insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage and workers' compensation insurance was entitled to a lien on a portion of settlement proceeds received by the estate, holding that, given a lack of factual findings, there was no way to evaluate whether the court clearly erred in its assessment of the various factors impacting an equitable allocation.Charles Luze died in a work-related accident. His employer paid his wife, Jeanette Luze, workers' compensation benefits. Jeanette, as the representative of Charles's estate, then brought suit against the negligent driver and settled the claim. The estate also settled a claim against the New FB's insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage, Zurich American Insurance Company, which was also New FB's workers' compensation carrier. The circuit court determined that Zurich was entitled to a statutory workers' compensation lien on fifty percent of the settlement proceeds received by the estate and was able to subrogate against its own settlement payment of underinsured benefits. The Supreme Court remanded in part, holding (1) this Court was unable meaningfully to review the circuit court's allocation determination; and (2) the circuit court properly allowed Zurich to subrogate against the amount it paid in underinsured motorist benefits. View "Luze v. New FB Co." on Justia Law

Knudtson worked for Trempealeau County for over 45 years. She eventually became a paralegal/office manager in the District Attorney’s Office. When his friend, the Jackson County District Attorney, died, McMahon, the Trempealeau County District Attorney, closed his office for a day and encouraged his staff to attend the funeral. Knudtson refused to attend because she wanted to complete work at the office. McMahon offered Knudtson three choices: work from home, attend the funeral, or take a vacation day. The disagreement became a bitter dispute. The County placed Knudtson on paid leave. Knudtson declined another position at the same pay grade. The County had no other available position and terminated her employment.Knudtson filed suit, citing the Establishment Clause because the funeral took place at a church and involved a religious service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Knudtson acknowledged that when she stated that she did not want to attend the funeral, she did not know that it would be a religious service; her decision not to attend had nothing to do with its religious nature. Organizing a delegation from a public office to attend a funeral normally raises no implication that the government, or any officials, endorse the deceased person's religion. View "Knudtson v. Trempealeau County" on Justia Law

In its 2018 “Janus” holding, the Supreme Court reversed course on 41 years of jurisprudence sanctioning agreements between state-government agencies and unions authorizing the unions to collect fair-share fees from non-union members to cover costs incurred representing them. Ocol, a math teacher in the Chicago public school system, filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201 against the Unions, the Attorney General of Illinois, and members of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, seeking recovery of payments he had previously made under protest to the Union. He also challenged the constitutionality of the exclusive representation provisions of Illinois law as they applied to non-union members.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of all of his claims. Acknowledging circuit precedent, Ocol conceded defeat on his Section 1983 claim for a refund of his fair-share payments and his First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation. The court granted Ocol’s request for summary affirmance so that he may seek a petition for certiorari to pursue his arguments in the Supreme Court. View "Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union" on Justia Law

In this case brought under the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Plaintiff $762,525 in compensatory damages, holding that the causation standard for retaliation claims under the Act is a "but-for" standard.Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, her employer, alleging that Defendant had retaliated against her in violation of the Act after it learned that she had filed a qui tam action against it and one of its largest customers. The jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages, and the district court denied Plaintiff's subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) retaliation claims under the Act must be evaluated under the "but-for" causation standard; (2) the "substantial motivating factor" instruction given to the jury was erroneous, but the instruction was not plain error; (3) the jury supportably found sufficient evidence against Defendant on the retaliation claim; and (4) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "Lestage v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

Williams, a Chicago school social worker, suffers from depression, anxiety, and chronic sinusitis. For the 2013–14 school year, Williams received an evaluation score that placed him in the “developing” category, and was given a Professional Development Plan. Social workers' hours depend on the school they are serving on a particular day. The Board denied Williams's first accommodation request, for consistent work hours. During the 2014–15 school year, Williams was cited for interrupting a teacher, failing to read a student’s individual educational plan before a meeting, speaking inappropriately about his personal life, making personal calls during school hours, and failing to report to work. Williams was twice denied titles that may be awarded to “proficient” social workers. Williams filed a discrimination charge and another accommodation request, seeking a consistent start time, a reduced caseload, and assignment to a single school. The Board denied these requests but assigned him to schools with 7:45 a.m. start times. Williams's third accommodation request sought a private office, dedicated equipment, and exemption from evaluations. The Board supplied Williams with HEPA filters, computer monitors, and access to a private meeting space; it denied his other requests. Williams was not selected for special assessment teams because he did not have the “proficient” rating and was not bilingual. He filed his second charge of discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, rejecting claims that the Board discriminated against Williams because of his disability and gender, failed to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him for filing discrimination claims. View "Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, UMC, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Plaintiff claimed that she and several other elderly employees were fired and replaced by younger respiratory therapists, whom UMC paid at a lower rate. Both parties agreed that plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of age discrimination and that UMC articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for her termination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of UMC, holding that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute over the veracity of UMC's proffered reasons for plaintiff's discharge. In this case, UMC's articulated reasons for plaintiff's termination were her poor performance and demonstrated lack of effort to change her behavior. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create doubt as to whether this reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. View "Salazar v. Lubbock County Hospital District" on Justia Law

The appellants owned Joy Holiday, a travel company operating bus tours for Chinese-speaking travelers. In 2009, Kao, a Taiwanese national, came to the U.S. after accepting a job offer from Joy. Joy filed an H-1B visa application stating it wished to employ Kao at an hourly salary of $29.30. Before receipt of the visa, Kao moved into the appellants’ home and began working for Joy. Kao was paid monthly: $2,500 less $800 for rent. The appellants characterized the payments as an allowance or stipend. Joy’s accountant characterized the payments as salary despite Kao not being on the payroll. Kao received no itemized statements. After receipt of the visa, Kao was put on Joy’s payroll with a $2,500 monthly salary. Kao normally worked 10-12 hours daily. His rent was reduced to $600. In January 2011, Kao was demoted and his salary was reduced to $2,000. Kao moved into an apartment but the payroll records reflect the $600 rent deduction through April 2011. Kao’s employment was terminated in May 2011.Kao filed suit, alleging violations of federal and state law regulating minimum wage and overtime pay, 29 U.S.C. 201; Lab. Code 1194, 1194.2. The court of appeal found that Kao was a non-exempt employee, entitled to recover unpaid wages under his statutory claims and remanded with instructions to calculate the wage and overtime payments for Kao’s entire employment. The court subsequently affirmed the award on remand: $481,088.94 for unpaid wages, attorney fees, and costs, with prejudgment interest. Kao was employed by Joy and it was appropriate to invoke the alter ego doctrine to hold the appellants personally liable. View "Kao v. Joy Holiday" on Justia Law