Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., alleging violations of the California Labor Code. He brought five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his PAGA claim without leave to amend. The court concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties.The trial court’s decision was based on the interpretation that Osuna needed to have suffered a violation within the one-year period before filing his PAGA notice. Osuna appealed, arguing that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim because he suffered Labor Code violations during his employment with Spectrum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the standing requirements under PAGA. The appellate court held that to have standing under PAGA, an employee must have been employed by the alleged violator and suffered at least one Labor Code violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and does not affect standing.The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

AllService Plumbing and Maintenance, Inc. is a small, family-owned plumbing company in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In 2009, a union organizer named Charles LeBlanc began efforts to unionize AllService’s workforce. An employee, Joe Lungrin, opposed the unionization and informed the company’s Vice President, Luke Hall, about LeBlanc’s activities. The union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hold an election among AllService’s employees. After agreeing on an election date, AllService laid off three employees. The union lost the election, and subsequently filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging that AllService violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by surveilling, threatening, and interrogating employees, and by laying off employees due to their union activities.An NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in 2011 that AllService violated the NLRA and ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off employees with backpay. AllService did not file timely exceptions, and the NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings in 2012. A second ALJ calculated damages in 2013, and the NLRB ordered AllService to pay over $100,000. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning in 2014 invalidated the NLRB’s quorum, leading the Board to set aside its decision and dismiss its enforcement petition.In 2022, the NLRB issued a notice to show cause for re-adopting the 2013 ALJ decision, blaming administrative oversight for the delay. AllService objected, citing significant business losses due to floods in 2016 and 2021. The NLRB ignored these objections and adopted the 2013 decision. The NLRB then applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for summary enforcement of its 2022 order.The Fifth Circuit denied the NLRB’s request for summary enforcement, finding that the Board failed to prove that enforcement would be equitable. The court held that the Board’s delay and administrative neglect were extraordinary circumstances excusing AllService’s failure to exhaust specific objections. The court also granted AllService’s petition for review, finding that the Board lacked substantial evidence to attribute Lungrin’s activities to AllService and to find that the pre-election layoffs were related to union activity. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Allservice Plumbing" on Justia Law

Northeastern University operates a campus police department (NUPD) responsible for the safety and security of its Boston campus. The NUPD includes Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives who oversee Patrol Officers, Community Service Officers, and Detectives. The American Coalition of Public Safety (ACOPS) sought to represent a bargaining unit including these Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives. Northeastern argued that these employees were supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus excluded from the bargaining unit.The Regional Director for Region 1 of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held a hearing and concluded that Northeastern failed to prove that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives were supervisors. The Director found that while Sergeants had some role in assigning duties, they did not exercise independent judgment in doing so. The NLRB denied Northeastern's request for review and certified the union. Northeastern refused to bargain, leading to an unfair labor practice charge. The NLRB granted summary judgment against Northeastern, ordering it to bargain with ACOPS.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the NLRB's conclusion that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives were not supervisors was not supported by substantial evidence and deviated from precedent without adequate explanation. The court held that Sergeants and Sergeant Detectives do exercise independent judgment in assigning duties and managing the Incident Containment Team (ICT) and details. Consequently, the court denied the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement, vacated the unfair labor practice finding against Northeastern, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northeastern University v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Dr. Bruce Cairns, a division chief in the Department of Surgery and Medical Director of the Jaycee Burn Center at UNC Hospitals, was sued by Dr. James Hwang, a former surgeon at the UNC Burn Center. Dr. Hwang alleged that Dr. Cairns harassed him and created a hostile work environment, leading to his resignation. The case also involved a complaint filed with the UNC School of Medicine Human Resources Department, accusing Dr. Hwang of inappropriate behavior at a going-away party. Dr. Hwang claimed that Dr. Cairns falsely accused him of misconduct, including touching female coworkers inappropriately.The Superior Court of Durham County denied Dr. Cairns's motion to dismiss, finding that he was not entitled to public official immunity. The court also denied summary judgment, citing conflicting evidence about the origin of the Human Resources complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Dr. Cairns was a public official entitled to immunity and that Dr. Hwang did not provide sufficient evidence of malice.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that Dr. Cairns was not a public official entitled to public official immunity. The court found that his positions as division chief and Medical Director were not created by statute and did not involve the exercise of sovereign power. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the parties' outstanding arguments. View "Hwang v. Cairns" on Justia Law

Cheryl Butler was hired as an assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 2011. After a mandatory third-year performance review, her contract was renewed, and she became eligible for tenure consideration in the fall semester of 2015. Due to illness, Butler requested an extension of the tenure vote, which was denied, but she was later granted leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the spring semester of 2016. Her tenure committee, chaired by Professor Roy Anderson, concluded that Butler met tenure standards for scholarship and service but not teaching. Consequently, the law faculty voted not to recommend tenure, and Butler's appeals to the SMU Law School Dean and the Provost were unsuccessful. Butler completed the 2016-2017 academic year without teaching any classes.Butler filed a lawsuit against SMU and several of its employees, alleging racially discriminatory tenure standards and processes, and retaliation for her internal complaints about race, disability, and FMLA discrimination. She brought federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, and the FMLA. Additionally, she asserted state-law discrimination and retaliation claims under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21, along with state common law claims for breach of contract and negligent supervision. Against the employee defendants, she claimed defamation, conspiracy to defame, and fraud.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants, citing preemption by Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The court held that the gravamen of these claims was unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, which Chapter 21 specifically addresses. Butler appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding whether Chapter 21 preempts common law defamation and fraud claims against employees based on the same conduct as discrimination claims against the employer.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Chapter 21 does not preempt common law defamation and fraud claims against employees. The court reasoned that Chapter 21 subjects only employers to liability for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and does not immunize individuals from liability for their own tortious actions. Therefore, Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants are not foreclosed by Chapter 21. View "BUTLER v. COLLINS" on Justia Law

In September 2015, Bobby Lykins suffered severe physical and cognitive injuries from a work-related explosion. In 2017, Lykins, his employer Anderson Contracting, Inc., and its insurer SFM Mutual Insurance Co. agreed to a workers’ compensation settlement. An addendum to the settlement was agreed upon in 2018. Both agreements were approved by a compensation judge. In 2022, a conservator was appointed for Lykins, who then petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) to set aside the settlements, alleging they were invalid due to Lykins’ incapacity at the time of signing and fraud by omission.The WCCA found that the evidence raised significant questions about Lykins’ capacity when he signed the settlements and referred the matter to a compensation judge for further fact-finding. The WCCA instructed that if the compensation judge found Lykins appeared to be incapacitated at the time of the settlements, the matter should be referred to district court for a determination of incapacity.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that the WCCA has the authority under Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 3, to set aside an award if the settlement is invalid under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a). The Court affirmed the WCCA’s decision to refer the matter for fact-finding but vacated the part of the WCCA’s decision that required referral to district court. The Supreme Court held that the workers’ compensation courts have the authority to determine whether Lykins was incapacitated when he signed the settlements. The case was affirmed in part and vacated in part. View "Lykins vs. Anderson Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Five employees of the Glenwood Resource Center (GRC), a residence for individuals with severe intellectual and developmental disabilities, left their jobs during a period when the superintendent conducted unauthorized experiments on residents. These experiments included excessive hydration to reduce pneumonia and behavioral health experiments without consent. The plaintiffs, who had different roles and left under various circumstances, sued the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) and other officials, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, among other claims.The Iowa District Court for Mills County dismissed all claims except for the wrongful discharge claim, which was later dismissed on summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify a clearly defined public policy that was violated by their discharge. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their discharge violated a clearly defined public policy. The statutes cited by the plaintiffs, Iowa Code sections 225C.1(2) and 230A.101(1), were deemed too general to support a wrongful discharge claim. Additionally, the court concluded that Iowa Code section 70A.28, which provides remedies for state employees who face retaliation for whistleblowing, is the exclusive remedy for such claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were essentially whistleblower claims and that they had not appealed the summary judgment on their section 70A.28 claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Brodie v. Foxhoven" on Justia Law

Several estates filed a lawsuit against Tyson Foods Inc. and several of its corporate executives and plant supervisors, alleging gross negligence and fraud after four former workers at Tyson Foods’ pork processing plant in Waterloo died from COVID-19. The plaintiffs claimed that Tyson failed to implement adequate safety measures and misled workers about the risks of COVID-19, leading to the workers' deaths.The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County dismissed the case, concluding that Iowa’s Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA) provided the exclusive remedy for the estates’ claims, thus lacking subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead gross negligence to fall within an exception to the IWCA and that the claims were improperly "lumped" together without specifying each defendant's duty or claim.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded gross negligence against the executive and supervisor defendants, thus falling within the IWCA’s exception. The court found that the petition provided fair notice of the claims and that the allegations met the elements of gross negligence: knowledge of the peril, knowledge that injury was probable, and a conscious failure to avoid the peril. The court also held that the fraudulent misrepresentation claims against the supervisor defendants were not preempted by the IWCA, as intentional torts fall outside its scope.However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the corporate defendants, Tyson Foods and Tyson Fresh Meats, as the IWCA’s exclusivity provisions barred any direct tort claims against employers. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the breach-of-duty claims against Adams and Jones due to waiver. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Mehmedovic v. Tyson Foods Inc." on Justia Law

Sergeant John Babcock, a member of the Newton police department, was transferred from his position as a traffic sergeant with regular daytime hours to a night shift sergeant position. This transfer occurred after Babcock had been actively involved in union activities, including disputes with the police chief, David MacDonald. Despite receiving an eight percent pay increase as stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Babcock's new position required him to work irregular nighttime hours, weekends, and holidays, which he claimed negatively impacted his family life.The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (CERB) reviewed the case after the union filed a charge of prohibited practice, alleging that the transfer was retaliatory. The hearing officer initially found that while the transfer was an adverse employment action and the union had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the city had rebutted this by producing evidence of Babcock's insubordination and misconduct. The hearing officer concluded that the city's reasons for the transfer were legitimate and dismissed the complaint.Upon appeal, the CERB disagreed with the hearing officer's conclusion, finding that the city failed to produce evidence that Babcock's misconduct was the reason for his transfer. The CERB determined that the transfer was indeed retaliatory and ordered that Babcock be reinstated to his previous position.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the CERB's decision. The court held that Babcock's transfer constituted an adverse employment action despite the pay increase, as it resulted in a material disadvantage in the terms and conditions of his employment. The court also concluded that a generally good work record is not a necessary element to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The city's failure to produce evidence linking Babcock's misconduct to the transfer decision meant that the union's prima facie case of retaliation remained unrebutted. View "City of Newton v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Winston R. Anderson, a former Intel employee, brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against the trustees of Intel Corporation’s proprietary retirement funds. Anderson alleged that the trustees breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by investing in hedge funds and private equity funds, and their duty of loyalty by steering retirement funds to companies in which Intel Capital had already invested.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Anderson’s claims, concluding that he had not plausibly alleged a breach of either the duty of prudence or the duty of loyalty. The court found that Anderson failed to provide a meaningful benchmark to compare the performance of Intel’s funds and did not plausibly allege a real conflict of interest for the duty of loyalty claim. Anderson was granted leave to amend his complaint, but the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Anderson did not state a claim for breach of ERISA’s duty of prudence because he failed to provide a sound basis for comparison, as the funds he compared to Intel’s funds had different aims, risks, and potential rewards. The court also held that Anderson did not state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty because he did not plausibly allege a real conflict of interest, only the potential for one. The court emphasized that ERISA requires prudence based on the methods employed by fiduciaries, not the results achieved, and that generalized attacks on hedge funds and private equity funds as a category are insufficient to state a claim. View "Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee" on Justia Law