Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Gracia’s former employer, SigmaTron, fired her 13 years ago after she filed sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Gracia prevailed in a 2014 trial on a Title VII retaliation claim. She found new work at a different company. In 2015, SigmaTron described Gracia’s lawsuit in public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Gracia filed another Title VII retaliation claim, plus claims for retaliation under the Illinois Human Rights Act, defamation, and invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed Gracia’s defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and later granted SigmaTron summary judgment on the Title VII and Illinois Human Rights Act claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gracia failed to present specific facts to show any injury in fact and expressly acknowledged that SigmaTron’s disclosures did not affect her current employment, with which she is content. That admission left the district court without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Title VII claim on the merits. As for Gracia’s state law claims, the district court was right to conclude that the allegations failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Gracia v. SigmaTron International, Inc." on Justia Law

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White has been employed as a commercial airline pilot since 2005 and has also served in the U.S. Air Force since 2000, first on active duty and now on reserve duty. As a reservist, he is required to attend periodic military-training sessions. White has taken periods of short-term military leave, usually for a day or two at a time, during which he did not receive pay from United. Under United’s collective bargaining agreement, pilots receive pay when they take other short-term leaves of absence, such as jury duty or sick leave. United also maintains a profit-sharing plan for its pilots that is based on the wages they earn; pilots who take paid sick leave or paid leave for jury duty earn credit toward their profit-sharing plan, while pilots who take short-term military leave do not. White initiated a class action under the 1994 Uniformed Services Employee and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which is intended to prevent civilian employers from discriminating against employees because of their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301(a). The district court dismissed White’s complaint.The Seventh Circuit reversed. USERRA’s mandate that military leave be given the same “rights and benefits” as comparable, nonmilitary leave requires an employer to provide paid military leave to the same extent that it provides paid leave for other absences. Paid leave falls within the “rights and benefits” defined by the statute. View "White v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

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On September 28, 2018, Cheli, a computer system administrative assistant for the District, since 2014, was taken into a meeting with about 25 minutes’ notice. The District’s superintendent and Director of Computer Services terminated Cheli because a female student had alleged that Cheli had sexually harassed her three weeks prior. Cheli denied the allegations. The Board retroactively memorialized Cheli’s termination on October 9, 2018. Cheli never received notice of the Board meeting and did not receive written notice of the charges or the evidence against him but received a notice of termination via certified mail stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.” That notice informed Cheli that he could request the written report. The District did not provide the report upon Cheli’s request.A collective bargaining agreement governed Cheli’s employment and provides for discipline for reasonable cause. An employee is entitled to a conference, attended by a representative of his choice, and a written explanation for the discipline. The District’s Policy Manual, however, contains a provision titled “Employment At-Will.”Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The collective bargaining agreement established that Cheli could not be terminated except “for reasonable cause,” which created a protected property interest for which he was entitled to due process View "Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the University as barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's action involved employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and he sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The court held that Texas A&M is an agency of the State of Texas, so a suit against the former is a suit against the latter. Furthermore, neither of the two exceptions to sovereign immunity apply in these circumstances. In this case, Congress did not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity, and the State did not knowingly and plainly waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit. View "Sullivan v. Texas A&M University System" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

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After the Ninth Circuit received an answer from the California Supreme Court to a certified question, the panel amended and reissued its opinion. The panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jan-Pro in a putative class action involving back wages and overtime claims, holding that the so-called ABC test in Dynamex Ops. W. Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), which determines whether workers are independent contractors or employees under California wage order laws, applies retroactively to this case.In this case, the district court had no opportunity to consider whether Plaintiffs are employees of Jan-Pro under the Dynamex standard, and neither party had the opportunity to supplement the record with regard to the Dynamex criteria. The panel remanded to the district court to consider the question in the first instance with the benefit of a more developed record. As an aid to the district court, the panel offered observations and guidance. On remand, the district court should consider all three prongs of the ABC test and, in doing so, may wish to consider authorities from other jurisdictions that apply the test. View "Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2012, Barracuda hired Choochagi. In 2013, Choochagi reported to Human Resources that his supervisor made inappropriate sexual comments. The company investigated. In 2014, Choochagi began experiencing severe migraine headaches and eye irritation, which required medical treatment. Choochagi was permitted to take time off as requested. Choochagi was later terminated. Barracuda characterized Choochagi as a “poorly performing employee” who made “baseless discrimination claims” after he was terminated. Choochagi filed suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and alleged wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The trial court granted summary adjudication on most of Choochagi’s claims. A jury returned a defense verdict for Barracuda on the remaining claims.The court of appeal affirmed. Choochagi’s evidence was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Choochagi was informed of his right to CFRA leave, whether he requested CFRA leave, and whether any such request was denied. Absent evidence of such a request, Choochagi could not have suffered an adverse employment action because he exercised his right to take CFRA leave. Barracuda submitted evidence that it had policies and procedures in place to prevent discrimination and harassment and that the HR department directed an immediate investigation of Choochagi’s complaint. View "Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

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ALADs sought a writ of mandate and declaration that a provision of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ALADS and the County of Los Angeles is unenforceable based on the ground that it violates wage garnishment law and the Labor Code. The trial court sustained the county's demurrer to the petition on the ground that ALADS did not exhaust administrative remedies.The Court of Appeal concluded, in light of Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 918, that ALADS's administrative remedies are inadequate, and thus dismissal on that ground was improper. However, the court concluded that dismissal was proper because ALADS's petition does not state valid claims against the county. The court explained that the home rule doctrine gives the county the exclusive right to regulate matters relating to its employees' compensation. In this case, the county's MOU with ALADS, approved by the board of supervisors, is a lawful exercise of that exclusive right, and the Labor Code provision at issue does not apply to a charter county. Therefore, ALADS cannot allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action. View "Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Martinez, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, has four decades of experience including general and orthopedic-surgery residencies and a spine fellowship. In 2016, a hospital hired Martinez on a three-year contract as its only orthopedic surgeon. In 2017, UPMC bought the hospital. UPMC’s representatives told Martinez that they would continue his contract and discussed acquiring new equipment. A month later, UPMC’s chief operating officer and its executive director of the musculoskeletal division fired Martinez, explaining only that the hospital was “moving in a different direction and [Martinez’s] services were no longer needed.” They stated that his firing “had nothing to do with [his] performance.” Martinez was then 70 years old. After firing him, the hospital hired two doctors, including Hunter, who took over at least some of Martinez’s job functions. The hospital posted an opening for an orthopedic surgeon. Martinez applied three times but got no response. The hospital hired Jarvis.Martinez sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging that Hunter and Jarvis were “significantly younger,” “less qualified,” and “less experienced” than Martinez. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed. The hospital knows the younger doctors’ exact ages and specialties, and discovery will let Martinez uncover those and other details in time for summary judgment and trial. View "Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this medical fee dispute between a health care provider and a worker's compensation insurance carrier over the proper amount of reimbursement for services rendered to a covered patient, holding that that administrative law judge (ALJ) who heard the case properly applied the rules of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation in allocating the burden of proof.The provider initiated a dispute resolution proceeding, and the Division determined that the provider was entitled to more than the carrier believed was due. The Division ordered the carrier to pay the additional amount. The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) upheld the Division's determination. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in placing the burden of proof on the carrier at the SOAH hearing and that the error prejudiced the carrier's substantial rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ properly applied the Division's rules in concluding that the carrier had failed to meet its burden of proof. View "Patients Medical Center v. Facility Insurance Corp." on Justia Law