Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division agreeing with the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Darla Potter, an aquaculture worker, was not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. 30104, holding that the Appellate Division did not err.The Appellate Division affirmed the decree of the ALJ granting Potter's petitions for award of compensation for injuries sustained in the course of her employment with Cooke Aquaculture USA, Inc. At issue on appeal was whether Potter's claims fell within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty law or state workers' compensation law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Potter was not a seaman within the purview of the Jones Act. View "Potter v. Great Falls Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals arising from Kenneth Skahan's claims for workers' compensation benefits against his former employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, Employer), the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgments of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board's (LIRAB) decisions, holding that the ICA erred in part.Skahan injured his back while working for Employer, and Employer accepted workers' compensation liability. After Skahan's employment with Employer ended, he experienced mid and low back pain and was diagnosed with diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH) and filed multiple claims for additional workers' compensation benefits. LIRAB determined that Skahan's DISH injury was compensable because it was causally related to his work injury but that his low back injury was not compensable. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the ICA erred in holding that Employer rebutted the Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-85 presumption that Skahan's low back claim was for a covered work injury; (2) LIRAB's finding that Skahan's injury was permanent and stationary and at maximum medical improvement by April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous; and (3) LIRAB's conclusion of law ending Skahan's temporary total disability benefits on April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous. View "Skahan v. Stutts Construction Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's summary judgment dismissing Mary Wilson's Kentucky Whistleblower Act (KWA) claims against Northern Kentucky Area Development District, Inc. (NKADD), holding that NKADD is one of the Commonwealth's political subdivisions, making it a KWA-covered employer and thus potentially liable for Wilson's claims.Wilson brought her KWA claim in circuit court against NKADD, her former employer, alleging that NKADD retaliated against her after she reported a co-worker's fraudulent billing practice by forcing her resignation. The trial court concluded that NKADD was not a KWA-covered employer and granted NKADD's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that NKADD is not a political subdivision of the state because it does not serve an integral function of government; and (2) therefore, NKADD was not subject to the KWA as a political subdivision and was therefore not subject to Wilson's claims under the KWA. View "Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit to invalidate IAM's opt-out procedures as violative of his First Amendment rights, the Railway Labor Act (RLA), and IAM's Duty of Fair Representation. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the IAM's opt-out procedures under the settled decisions of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit. In this case, the court distinguished the three cases plaintiff presented regarding public-sector unions, Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012), Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), and Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), and explained that it is undisputed that applying them to this private-sector dispute would require the court to extend into a new realm. Furthermore, by extension, plaintiff's constitutional avoidance, statutory, and Duty of Fair Representation claims also fail. View "Baisley v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers" on Justia Law

Dassault hired Gipson in 2004; he was promoted in 2006. In 2011, Gipson received a poor evaluation from his supervisor. Gipson complained to HR about his supervisor. Later, Gipson and his supervisor had an argument which ended with security escorting Gipson to HR. Gipson filed an EEOC charge but did not sue. Dassault assigned Gipson a different supervisor. In 2012, Gipson reported to HR a racially offensive email sent by a colleague. The sender was suspended. In 2013, Gipson’s team leader resigned. Gipson assumed some team leader duties. Dassault claims that Gipson was not given “personnel/ supervisor responsibilities.” In 2014, Dassault promoted Gipson to senior manufacturing engineer. Months later Dassault posted an open team leader position. Gipson applied but HR responded that he was not qualified because he had not served as a senior manufacturing engineer for at least 12 months. His application was never forwarded to the decision-makers. Another African-American was selected for the promotion.Gipson claimed that he did not receive the promotion because of his race and because he filed a 2011 EEOC complaint. Dassault later terminated Gipson’s employment as part of a reduction in force. Gipson contends that two Caucasian senior manufacturing engineers, who he alleges had less seniority than him, were offered voluntary demotions in lieu of termination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Dassault on claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. View "Gipson v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted this opinion in its place. The petition for rehearing en banc remains pending.Plaintiff worked as a tool pusher for Helix and was paid a daily rate. Although Helix concedes that it required plaintiff to work over forty hours per week, Helix nevertheless attempts to avoid the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime penalty by characterizing plaintiff as either an executive or highly compensated employee—both of which are exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Helix.The court reversed, holding that an employer can pay a daily rate under 29 C.F.R. 541.604(b) and still satisfy the salary basis test of section 541.602—but only if the employer complies with both the minimum weekly guarantee requirement and the reasonable relationship test. In this case, Helix does not comply with either prong because it pays plaintiff a daily rate without offering a minimum weekly required amount that is paid regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked, and Helix does not comply with the reasonable relationship test. The court noted that its reading of the regulations finds support not only from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, but also in repeated statements by the Labor Department. The court rejected contentions to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Rojas-Cifuentes (Rojas) brought this representative action against his former employer, American Modular Systems, Inc. (AMS), on behalf of himself, other former and current employees of American Modular, and the State of California. Relying on the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Rojas sought to recover civil penalties for labor violations that AMS allegedly committed against its nonexempt employees. He alleged that the “core” of these violations concerned “the systematic failure to keep accurate time and payroll records, and systematic failure to compensate employees for substantial portions of their workday.” The trial court rejected Rojas’s PAGA claim following AMS' motion for summary judgment. The trial court noted those seeking to bring PAGA causes of action must, before filing suit, provide notice to a certain state agency of the laws the employer allegedly violated and the “facts and theories” supporting those allegations. Although the court found Rojas provided written notice to the state before he filed suit, it found his notice failed to include sufficient facts and theories to support his claims. It thus rejected his PAGA cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After Rojas filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the court’s decision, the Court of Appeal directed AMS to show cause why the writ should not be issued. Because, unlike the trial court, the Court found Rojas’s PAGA notice supplied sufficient facts and theories to support at least some of his claims, the Court issued a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to set aside its order granting AMS' motion for summary adjudication. View "Rojas-Cifuentes v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's disability discrimination suit against the United States Patent and Trademark Office and its director, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Plaintiff waived his discrimination claim in a settlement agreement that allowed him to resign from his job instead of being terminated. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that his allegation of an unenforceable waiver was implausible. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the agreement was void because he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to it. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the waiver was binding. View "Perez-Tolentino v. Iancu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Carmen and Jessie Ramirez and their company, Black Magic, alleging that the Ramirezes violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs claimed that the Ramirezes brought them to the United States under the H-2B visa program to work as construction workers, but once plaintiffs arrived in the country, they were made to work as truck drivers. Plaintiffs also claimed that the Ramirezes unlawfully deducted from their paychecks, denied them overtime pay, and sometimes failed to pay them entirely. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' related state law claims, and denied plaintiffs' later-filed motion for leave to amend the complaint.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' RICO claims where plaintiffs failed to adequately plead proximate causation; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend; reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' FLSA claims where plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they handled goods or materials that had at some point travelled interstate, and that they lost wages as a result of the alleged FLSA violations; vacated the dismissal of the state law claims for new consideration of supplemental jurisdiction; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Molina-Aranda v. Black Magic Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Denver Health and Hospital Authority hired Brent Houchin as an Employee Relations Specialist and promoted him to Employee Relations Manager. Throughout Houchin’s time at Denver Health, his supervisor consistently rated his performance as “successful” and “exceptional.” In an employee relations matter concerning the suspected diversion of controlled substances, a former in-house lawyer for Denver Health advised that using an employee’s medical records from off-duty medical care in connection with an internal investigation would violate the privacy requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Houchin objected to this interpretation of HIPAA because he (1) felt that it prevented him from investigating suspected employee diversions of controlled substances and (2) believed that HIPAA permitted the use of such employee information to detect health care fraud and abuse. This disagreement in interpretation would come into play when Houchin's employment was terminated, based on two alleged HIPAA violations relating to an investigation. Following his termination, Houchin appeared to have commenced Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address what he believed to be the discriminatory circumstances of his termination. Houchin then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on his sexual orientation and retaliation for using Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address such discrimination. The Civil Rights Division ultimately issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and Houchin filed a complaint against Denver Health. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). Denver Health moved to dismiss Houchin’s complaint, arguing, among other things, that Houchin’s discrimination and retaliation claims under CADA lie in tort and were therefore barred by the CGIA. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state. The appellate court's judgment dismissing Houchin's claims was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Denver Health v. Houchin" on Justia Law