Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Holmes began working for the USPS in 1989. An investigation revealed that another letter carrier, Baxter, was selling marijuana from Baxter’s postal truck. Surveillance video showed Holmes and other USPS employees engaged in transactions with Baxter while on duty. Baxter later admitted to selling marijuana from his USPS vehicle; six other letter carriers admitted to purchasing marijuana from Baxter. Holmes denied purchasing marijuana while on duty. The surveillance video showed two relevant interactions between Baxter and Holmes, while on duty.At pre-disciplinary interviews, Holmes invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Following a Notice of Proposed Removal, Holmes met with the deciding official, Bush, and stated that he “wanted to apologize,” and that he “made this little mistake.” Bush issued a termination, explaining that removal was consistent with the penalties received by the other employees. Bush considered Holmes’s lengthy federal service and lack of disciplinary record but concluded that they did not outweigh the support for his removal. In five grievance arbitrations, the arbitrators mitigated the penalty to long-term suspension without back pay. Holmes instead appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, arguing that the agency had insufficient evidence to find that he purchased marijuana from Baxter.The Board upheld his removal. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the removal was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law,; or unsupported by substantial evidence, 5 U.S.C. 7703(c) View "Homes v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting the City of Plainview's motion to dismiss Donald Hall's contract and statutory claims, holding that the City had a contractual obligation to pay accrued paid time off (PTO) to Hall.After the City terminated Hall's employment as manager of the City's municipal liquor store it refused to pay Hall accrued PTO due to Hall's failure to provide sufficient notice per the requirements of the City's personnel policies and procedures manual. Hall sued the City for breach of contract and violation of Minn. Stat. 181.13. The district court dismissed Hall's contract and statutory claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) disclaimer provisions in the City's employee handbook stating that the handbook's policies should not be construed as a contract did not unambiguously allow the City to refuse to pay accrued PTO in accordance with the employer policy set forth in the handbook; and (2) Minn. Stat. 181.13(a) does not create an independent substantive right to payment of accrued PTO in the absence of a contract between the employer and employee. View "Hall v. City of Plainview" on Justia Law

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A county employee decided to retire. In December 2012, he submitted his application for retirement to the county’s retirement authority. In January 2013, the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act took effect, mandating the forfeiture of pension benefits/payments if a public employee is convicted of any felony under state or federal law for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his official duties (Gov. Code 7522.72(b)(l)). In February 2013, the employee was indicted for stealing county property. In April 2013, the county pension authority approved the employee’s retirement application, fixing the employee’s actual retirement on the December 2012 day he submitted his application. The employee began receiving monthly pension checks starting from December 2012. In December 2015, the employee pled guilty to embezzling county property.The county pension authority reduced the employee’s monthly check in accordance with the forfeiture provision. The court of appeal concluded the provision does apply to the employee because the employee merely initiated the process of retiring. Even if the employee was retired, and the forfeiture provision was applied to him, there would be no violation of the California Constitution’s provision against the undue impairment of the employee’s contract with his governmental employer, nor would that application constitute an ex post facto law. View "Wilmot v. Contra Costa County Employee's Retirement Association" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Providence denying Petitioner's application for an accidental disability retirement, holding that the Board relied on legally competent evidence.Petitioner, a firefighter, injured his right shoulder while lifting a patient. After he had recovered, he sustained a second work-related injury to his right shoulder. When a doctor evaluation concluded that he could not return to working full duty Petitioner submitted an application for an accidental disability retirement. The Board denied the application. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the Board ignored the legally competent evidence before it when it denied his application for an accidental disability retirement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that some evidence supported the Board's decision. View "Starnino v. Employees' Retirement System of City of Providence" on Justia Law

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The Sixth Circuit denied the consolidated petition for review brought by three coal mine operators challenging the Benefits Review Board's adverse black lung benefits determination. Honoring the Board's customary requirement that issues be raised first with the ALJ, the court held that the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenge.In this case, the court's review of the Department of Labor's regulations reveals a regulatory exhaustion requirement applicable to ALJ proceedings. The court explained that black lung benefits adjudication regulations require that litigants raise issues before the ALJ as a prerequisite to review by the Benefits Review Board. Moreover, the Board's longstanding practice of treating issues not raised below as forfeited confirms this conclusion. The court also concluded that by failing to comply with the Board's timeliness requirements, the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenges. Furthermore, the operators failed to identify an applicable exception that would excuse failure. Finally, the panel noted that, while it did not see evidence that the operators acted with a nefarious motive, the court is nonetheless mindful not to invite "sandbagging" or "judge-shopping" in future black lung proceedings. View "Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Employee's petition for review challenging the validity of Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment, holding that the offer was valid under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.475(8).Under section 616C.475(8), an employer may offer temporary, light-duty employment to an injured employee instead of paying temporary total disability benefits. In this case, Employee argued that the location, schedule, wages, and duties of the offered temporary employment as a secretary was not substantially similar to Employee's pre-injury position as a fire captain. The Supreme Court held (1) the offered employment here was substantially similar to the pre-injury position as to both schedule and number of hours, as well as wages, benefits, and location, and thus, Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment was reasonable and complied with section 616C.475(8); and (2) therefore, Employee's temporary total disability benefits were properly terminated. View "Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether the general-specific rule applied to a second degree manslaughter charge stemming from a workplace death. The State initially charged Phillip Numrich under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), RCW 49.17.190(3), the specific statute that punished employer conduct resulting in employee death. The State also charged the employer with second degree manslaughter. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the manslaughter charge based on the general-specific rule, and the employer sought and was granted direct review. Specifically, the issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court properly denied Numrich’s motion to dismiss a second degree manslaughter charge when one of his employees was killed at the construction site. While consideration of the employer’s motion for direct discretionary review was pending, the State moved to amend the information to add an alternative charge of first degree manslaughter. The trial court granted the motion to amend but sua sponte imposed sanctions against the State based on the timing of the amendment. The employer sought review of the order granting the amendment and the State sought review of the order imposing sanctions. The Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying the employer’s motion to dismiss the manslaughter charge under the general–specific rule. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to amend the information to add an alternative first degree manslaughter charge. Finally, the Court held the trial court did not err in imposing sanctions on the State under the circumstances of this case. View "Washington v. Numrich" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Amber Pharmacy and others, alleging claims of discrimination, retaliation, demotion and a hostile work environment. After removal to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all but a portion of plaintiff's Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) claim.In regard to plaintiff's claim of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Eighth Circuit assumed that plaintiff established a prima facie case, but that defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating plaintiff's position and demoting her: the need to restructure the financial department to put a stronger emphasis on accounting and more effectively implement the new operating system. The court concluded that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient and did not satisfy her burden of showing age was a motivating factor in defendants' decision to restructure. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).Given the similarities between the federal and state ADEA claim, the court concluded that it was appropriate for the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and grant summary judgment on the Nebraska ADEA claim. Because plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was neither novel nor complex, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would not offend principles of comity and fairness. The court concluded that the district court erred in splitting plaintiff's claim that her employer retaliated against her for reporting Medicaid and HIPPA issues and for filing charges with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. The court vacated the district court's order on the NFEPA claim with instructions to remand the claim in its entirety to state court so that Nebraska courts may resolve the novel questions of state law. View "Starkey v. Amber Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court upholding a hearing officer's conclusion that Montana State University-North (MSU-N) retaliated against Dr. Randy Bachmeier for reporting and pursuing a claim of sexual harassment against his supervisor, holding that the district court erred in reinstating the hearing officer's first decision as the final agency decision in this matter.The hearing officer's original order concluded that Bachmeier failed to demonstrate that his supervisor sexually harassed him but that MSU-N retaliated against Bachmeier. The HRC rejected the hearing officer's conclusion that Bachmeier was discriminated against, upheld the hearing officer's retaliation conclusion, and remanded the case. The hearing officer issued a second decision concluding that Bachmeier had been sexually harassed. The Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC) then issued a final agency decision reducing the damages award for sexual harassment but leaving untouched the retaliation award. The district court voided the hearing officer's second decision and remanded with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer's first decision as the final agency decision. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion by concluding that the HRC did not have the authority to modify the hearing officer's first decision; and (2) correctly upheld the hearing officer's retaliation conclusion. View "Montana State University-Northern v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

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Rehfield sued the Diocese, alleging retaliatory discharge and violation of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/1). Rehfield was an educator for more than 43 years. In 2012, Rehfield was hired as the principal of St. Raphael Catholic School in Naperville. In 2016, Rehfield alerted teachers about an out-of-state parent, MacKinnon, whom Rehfield believed to present a threat based on his emails concerning his daughter. Eventually, the police issued an arrest warrant for MacKinnon. Against the advice of the police and the supervising priest, Rehfield distributed a photograph of MacKinnon and informed her staff to call 911 if they saw MacKinnon. In May 2017, the Naperville Sun published an inaccurate story about the situation: “Man vowed to ‘terrorize’ Naperville school: authorities.” Days after a meeting with angry parents, the Diocese terminated RehfieldThe trial court dismissed, reasoning that Rehfield was employed pursuant to a contract and “[c]ommon law retaliatory discharge claims may only be asserted by employees terminable at will.” The trial court also cited the doctrine of ecclesiastic abstention. The appellate court affirmed, stating that Rehfield was not a secular employee but a “member of the clergy.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Rehfield’s formal title (lay principal) does not necessarily indicate a religious role but her job duties entailed numerous religious functions in furtherance of the school’s Catholic mission. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that she was a minister and that the ministerial exception bars her whistleblower claim. View "Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet" on Justia Law