Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on her claims against the County, her former employer, alleging that it retaliated against her for participating in protected activity in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Title VII suspension-based claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. In this case, plaintiff failed to show that she engaged in statutorily protected activity because she did not communicate or report any sexual harassment before her suspension. In regard to the termination-based claim, the court applied the burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework and concluded that, assuming plaintiff made a prima facie case, the County articulated several legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for her discharge. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the County's reasons are sufficiently intertwined or fishy that rebutting only some of the reasons discredits them all. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the termination-based claim under Title VII. However, given the relatively novel questions of state law, the court dismissed the MWA claims without prejudice so that they can be taken up by the Minnesota state courts. View "Kempf v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

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In 2020 Union Pacific Railroad announced a change to its employee attendance policy. Several regional branches of the union opposed the change and sought an order under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151a (RLA), requiring Union Pacific to submit the change to collective bargaining. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the claim belonged in arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board.The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted Union Pacific’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for the frivolous appeal. For the second time in three years, the Brotherhood has pressed a position squarely foreclosed by settled law. The union’s challenge to the revised policy amounted to a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA. Given the parties’ course of dealing over workplace attendance requirements, there was a clear pattern and practice of Union Pacific modifying its policies many times over many years without subjecting changes to collective bargaining, which provided the railroad with a nonfrivolous justification to unilaterally modify its attendance policy. That reality made this dispute a minor one subject to resolution through mandatory arbitration. View "Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen GCA UP v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

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Hickey filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, alleging that his former employer, Protective Life, had interfered with the exercise of his FMLA rights and had retaliated against him for exercising those rights. Hickey later abandoned his retaliation claim. The district court held that Hickey could not succeed on his interference claim because he was unable to prove that he had suffered any monetary damages as a result of the alleged interference or was otherwise entitled to equitable relief. The court refused to consider a supplemental declaration that, according to the court, contradicted Hickey’s deposition testimony.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly concluded that, without evidence that Hickey suffered harm for which the FMLA provides a remedy, Hickey does not have a cognizable action for FMLA interference, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Hickey’s supplemental declaration as evidence of damages. When Hickey returned from his FMLA leave, he received the same salary and benefits as he had received before his leave. Under the arrangement given him upon his return, his compensation could have diminished after six months but his employment with Protective terminated approximately three weeks after his return for reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave. View "Hickey v. Protective Life Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a collective action on behalf of himself and others employed on All Coast's fleet of liftboats, alleging that, although they were hired for various maritime jobs, they spent most of their time doing something completely terrestrial: using cranes attached to the boats to move their customers' equipment on and off the boats, the docks, and the offshore oil rigs. All Coast classified plaintiffs as seamen and did not pay them overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of All Coast. The court held that the district court's conclusion that the employees' work served the liftboats' operation "as a means of transportation" runs contrary to the regulatory language and the court's precedent interpreting it. Rather, the plain meaning of 29 C.F.R. 783.31, and the illustrative examples in sections 783.32 and 783.34, suggest the employees were not engaged in seamen's work when operating the cranes. Furthermore, the court's previous decision in Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2014), only reinforce that conclusion. In this case, plaintiffs were not doing seamen's work when they were operating the cranes. Finally, it follows that All Coast was not entitled to summary judgment as to the cooks either. View "Adams v. All Coast, LLC" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer and dismissing Employee's claims for retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612, and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws 28-5-7, holding that the district court did not err.Employee took leave from Employer under the FMLA to undergo preventive surgery and then took a second leave for a related surgery that same year. The following year, Employer eliminated Employee's position. As an alternative to termination, Employer offered Employee a newly created, lower level position with a lower salary. Employee declined the position, and Employer terminated her employment. Plaintiff then brought this action. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted. View "O'Rourke v. Tiffany & Co." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims that sought to hold Michael Bloomberg vicariously liable for Nicholas Ferris's offending conduct, holding that Bloomberg was not an "employer" within the meaning of the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL).Plaintiff brought this action against her employer Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor Ferris, and Michael Bloomberg, bringing several claims arising from her alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse. At issue was whether Bloomberg, in addition to Bloomberg L.P., could be held vicariously liable based on his status as owner and officer of the company. Supreme Court denied Bloomberg's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the causes of action against Bloomberg. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that Bloomberg was her employer for purposes of liability under the City HRL. View "Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P." on Justia Law

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Petitioner-appellant Anthony Hernandez was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence after choking his girlfriend. The California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (Department) terminated him from his position as a correctional officer, stating that because of his domestic violence conviction, federal law prohibited him from carrying a firearm, which he needed for the job. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the Department acted reasonably in terminating Hernandez. It was undisputed that federal law makes it a felony to possess a firearm after being convicted in any court of misdemeanor domestic violence, which was defined in part as the use of physical force by “a person similarly situated to a spouse” of a victim. Disputed here was whether Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his girlfriend, given that he had been dating her five or six months and did not share a permanent residence with her. In line with the federal case law, the Court found the evidence was sufficient to support the Department’s determination that Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his victim under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Department acted reasonably in terminating him. View "Hernandez v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

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In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, if the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate, a plaintiff need only show by just and reasonable inference that she was an employee, worked the hours, and was not paid. In this unpaid-overtime case, the district court applied Mt. Clemens because Five Star's timesheets left numerous evidentiary gaps which the Department of Labor filled with consistent testimony that Five Star urged employees not to record their pre- and post-shift work hours. The Department then used this testimony to estimate unpaid hours and calculate back wages.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Five Star's only rebuttal evidence of a summary chart based on the company president's memory failed to negate any raised inferences of unpaid work. Therefore, Five Star fails to show that the district court committed any error concerning its finding of liability or calculation of damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. View "United States Department of Labor v. Five Star Automatic Fire Protection, LLC" on Justia Law

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Under New Jersey’s Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee injured during a social or recreational activity generally cannot receive compensation for those injuries unless a two-part exception is met. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the injuries sustained by claimant Kim Goulding at an event hosted by her employer were compensable. The workers’ compensation court dismissed Goulding’s claim, determining that "Family Fun Day" was a social or recreational event and that the two-part test of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was not satisfied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the injury Goulding sustained while volunteering at her employer-sponsored event was compensable because, as to Goulding, the event was not a social or recreational activity. Even if N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 was applicable here, Goulding would still have satisfied the two-part exception set forth in that statute. Her role at the event, which was planned to be held annually, was the same as her role as an employee, and but for her employment at Friendship House, Goulding would not have been asked to volunteer and would not have been injured. Thus, Goulding’s injury was “a regular incident of employment.” Furthermore, the Court found Friendship House received a benefit from Family Fun Day “beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” The event was not a closed event for the Friendship House team. Rather, it was an outreach event to celebrate and benefit Friendship House’s clients, creating goodwill in the community. View "Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiffs, on behalf of two certified classes of employees, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that their weekly per diem benefits were improperly excluded from their regular rate of pay and thereby decreasing their wage rate for overtime hours.The panel held that the record establishes that the contested benefits functioned as compensation for work rather than as reimbursement for expenses incurred, and that the per diem benefits were thus improperly excluded from plaintiffs' regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. The panel remanded for the district court to enter partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor as to whether the per diem payments to class member employees should be considered part of the employees' rate of pay and to conduct further proceedings. View "Clarke v. AMN Services, LLC" on Justia Law