Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Mirich v. State ex rel., Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Two
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Number Two (the Board) dismissing Appellant from his teaching contract with Laramie County School District Number Two (the District) after Appellant disciplined his daughter at school, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board's dismissal decision.At issue was whether district policies and professional conduct standards applied to Appellant, a teacher, who disciplined his child, a student, on school grounds during school hours. The Board concluded that those policies and standards applied to Appellant and dismissed him. The district court affirmed the dismissal and affirmed the Board's decision to pay Appellant only a pro-rata portion of extra-duty pay for coaching track and no bonus following his suspension with pay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the Board's decision dismissing Appellant; and (2) there was no Board decision on extra-duty or bonus pay for this Court to review. View "Mirich v. State ex rel., Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Two" on Justia Law
Esterline Technologies Corp. v. Brownlee
The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Petitioners - Respondent's employer, its corporate parent, and a fellow employee - asking the court to dismiss Respondent's declaratory judgment action because declaratory judgment would be improper on the facts, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear this petition.Respondent was injured in a workplace accident and received workers' compensation benefits because of his injuries. Respondent brought this declaratory judgment action, arguing that the petition was necessary to establish the legal relations between the parties. Petitioners filed this petition for writ of prohibition arguing that the Workers' Compensation Commission held exclusive jurisdiction for any claims Respondent had against his employers. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Respondent's remedies against his employer were those outlined under the Workers' Compensation Act. View "Esterline Technologies Corp. v. Brownlee" on Justia Law
Elder v. Kentucky Retirement Systems
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming denial of disability retirement benefits by the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems, holding that the lower courts misinterpreted the holding in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. West, 413 S.W.3d 578 (Ky. 2013), leading to multiple errors.At issue was the proof required of a public employee with less than sixteen years' credit to establish that his genetic condition that was present at conception but dormant until after twelve years on the job was not a "pre-existing" condition disqualifying him from benefits under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.600(3)(d). Defendant was denied benefits, and the circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's reading of West and its denial of disability retirement benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple errors occurred, and each error was arbitrary, capricious, View "Elder v. Kentucky Retirement Systems" on Justia Law
Martin v. Warrior Coal LLC
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decisions of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Workers' Compensation Board that the twelve percent interest on workers' compensation income benefits that were due but unpaid under the prior version of Ken. Rev. Stat. 342.040 applied in this case, holding that the six percent interest rate provided for in the 2017 amendment to the statute was applicable to all of Appellant's due but unpaid benefits.After the 2017 amendment, section 342.040 now provides for an interest rate of six percent on due but unpaid benefits. In 2016, Appellant experienced a compensable injury. Appellant filed a claim after the effective date of the amendment in 2017 and was awarded income benefits by an ALJ in 2018. Both the ALJ and the Board concluded that the twelve percent interest rate continued to apply to that portion of Appellant's benefit award that was attributable to the period before the 2017 effective date of the amendment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the General ASsembly's non-codified but express language regarding its intent with respect to the interest rate set forth in the 2017 amendment, the entirety of Appellant's benefit award was subject to the amended six percent interest rate. View "Martin v. Warrior Coal LLC" on Justia Law
Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing this complaint brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 344, holding that the KCRA does not bar an employe from discharging an employee because of the disability of an individual with whom the employee associates.After Employer terminated Employee's employment for lack of work Employee sued, alleging that his firing violated the KCRA. Specifically, Employee claimed that Employer discriminated against him for his association with his wife, who suffered from cystic fibrosis. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the text of the KCRA does not support a cause of action for discrimination based on an employee's association with a disabled individual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee failed to state a claim supported under Kentucky law. View "Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC" on Justia Law
Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation
Igasaki, a gay, Japanese-American, suffers from gout. From 1994 until his 2015 termination at age 62, Igasaki was an IDFPR staff attorney. In 2011, Forester gave Igasaki a good performance review; in 2012, Forester rated Igasaki poorly, providing specific examples of deficient performance. In 2013, IDFPR placed Igasaki on a corrective action plan. He subsequently received three reprimands. Igasaki made limited progress on seven of 12 plan requirements. The plan listed: failure to meet 50 deadlines; sleeping while at work; problems finding files; and lack of preparation for administrative proceedings. In 2014, the Igasaki was suspended for incompetence. Igasaki’s corrective action plan was again renewed. Igasaki received another suspension for insubordination. In Igasaki’s 2014 review, Forester rated him as needing improvement in all categories. In 2015, Forester noted that he had not progressed on six of the 12 requirements; for the first time, Igasaki formally requested accommodation for his gout. IDFPR granted Igasaki an ergonomic keyboard and authorization for an administrative assistant; Igasaki’s request for flexible deadlines, not supported by a doctor’s note, was denied. IDFPR terminated him weeks later.After filing charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Igasaki sued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IDFPR, rejecting claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2), age discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623), and disability discrimination (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112). View "Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law
Schwamberger v. Marion County Board of Elections
Schwamberger, a former deputy director of the Marion County Board of Elections sued the Board and its former director, Meyer, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the defendants’ actions constituted First Amendment retaliation, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Each Ohio County Board of Elections must have four members divided equally between the two major parties. The deputy director (Schwamberger) and the director (Meyer) are always members of opposite political parties, R.C. 3501.091, and deputy directors serve at the pleasure of their county boards. Schwamberger was terminated for impermissibly commenting on the election process, and therefore on policy and political issues related to her deputy-director position, after attempting to complain about errors in the 2018 election to the Board.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Schwamberger’s suit. Schwamberger’s speech proximately caused her termination but that speech implicated policy concerns; she was a policymaking employee, so her speech was unprotected. Schwamberger has not demonstrated a property interest in her position. Under Ohio law, she was an at-will employee who served at the pleasure of the Board. Even if the Board did act “arbitrarily” regarding her discharge, its actions do not create a constitutional claim. View "Schwamberger v. Marion County Board of Elections" on Justia Law
Stanley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
At issue in this appeal was whether claimant Curtis Stanley filed a timely complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") when Stanley filed his complaint more than five years after his industrial accident and more than one year after receiving his last payment of income benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) held it did not have continuing jurisdiction to entertain Stanley’s complaint against ISIF for non-medical benefits. The Commission found Idaho Code section 72-706 barred Stanley’s complaint and dismissed it. Stanley appealed, arguing continuing jurisdiction over medical benefits alone was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over complaints against ISIF and that the Commission erred in determining section 72-706 barred his complaint. Finding the Commission erred in determining section 72-706 barred Stanley's complaint, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Stanley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers
After the railroad fired a train engineer for defecating on a train-car connector, an arbitration board reinstated him. The railroad sought to vacate the arbitration award in federal court, but the district court upheld the engineer's reinstatement by enforcing the award.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Board applied the governing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and acted within the scope of its authority. The court rejected the railroad's contention that the remedy creates new prerequisites to the CBA's discipline requirements. The court shared the district court's bewilderment at the Board's conclusion that a company cannot fire someone for purposefully defecating on company property. Even so, the court cannot review the merits. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers" on Justia Law
Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc.
In this action brought under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claim against American Airlines, Inc. and later granting Allied Pilots Association's (APA) motion for summary judgment, holding that that APA did not breach its duty of fair representation and that Plaintiff could not maintain a claim against American Airlines.In 1999, Bryan's then-union submitted a grievance on his behalf alleging that his then-employer violated the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement and that APA, the successor to the previous union, breached its duty of fair representation under the RLA by withdrawing from pursuing his grievance to arbitration based on an allegedly inadequate investigation into the grievance's merits. Bryan also suit American Airlines, the successor to his previous employer, for his previous employer's alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The district court disposed of the claims through dismissal and summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) APA did not breach its duty of fair representation under the RLA; and (2) based on Bryan's own concession, he could not maintain a claim against American Airlines. View "Bryan v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law