Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to United Airlines in two consolidated actions brought by certified classes of United pilots and flight attendants who reside in California, alleging that wage statements they received from United failed to comply with California Labor Code 226.The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether California Labor Code 226 applied. The California Supreme Court held that the statute applied "if the employee's principal place of work is in California." The California Supreme Court set forth a set of principles defining section 226's permissible reach called the "Ward test."The panel held that section 226, as applied to plaintiffs under the Ward test, did not fall within either of the categories that are virtually per se invalid. Furthermore, the panel did not find merit in United's argument that application of the Ward test results in direct regulation of interstate commerce. The panel rejected United's contention that applying section 226 to plaintiffs under the Ward test violated the dormant Commerce Clause; held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did not preempt application of section 226 to plaintiffs where any connection between section 226 and United's prices, routes, and services was tenuous at best; and held that plaintiffs' claims under section 226 were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The panel declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, and remanded to the district courts to determine whether United complied with section 226 and, if not, what relief should be awarded. The panel directed the district courts to modify the class definitions in both cases to conform to the California Supreme Court's definition of section 226's permissible reach, and to modify the class period in the Ward case to extend to the date of judgment. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Ninth Circuit received an answer from the California Supreme Court to a certified question, the panel amended and reissued its opinion. The panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jan-Pro in a putative class action involving back wages and overtime claims, holding that the so-called ABC test in Dynamex Ops. W. Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), which determines whether workers are independent contractors or employees under California wage order laws, applies retroactively to this case.In this case, the district court had no opportunity to consider whether Plaintiffs are employees of Jan-Pro under the Dynamex standard, and neither party had the opportunity to supplement the record with regard to the Dynamex criteria. The panel remanded to the district court to consider the question in the first instance with the benefit of a more developed record. As an aid to the district court, the panel offered observations and guidance. On remand, the district court should consider all three prongs of the ABC test and, in doing so, may wish to consider authorities from other jurisdictions that apply the test. View "Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Barracuda hired Choochagi. In 2013, Choochagi reported to Human Resources that his supervisor made inappropriate sexual comments. The company investigated. In 2014, Choochagi began experiencing severe migraine headaches and eye irritation, which required medical treatment. Choochagi was permitted to take time off as requested. Choochagi was later terminated. Barracuda characterized Choochagi as a “poorly performing employee” who made “baseless discrimination claims” after he was terminated. Choochagi filed suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and alleged wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The trial court granted summary adjudication on most of Choochagi’s claims. A jury returned a defense verdict for Barracuda on the remaining claims.The court of appeal affirmed. Choochagi’s evidence was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Choochagi was informed of his right to CFRA leave, whether he requested CFRA leave, and whether any such request was denied. Absent evidence of such a request, Choochagi could not have suffered an adverse employment action because he exercised his right to take CFRA leave. Barracuda submitted evidence that it had policies and procedures in place to prevent discrimination and harassment and that the HR department directed an immediate investigation of Choochagi’s complaint. View "Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

ALADs sought a writ of mandate and declaration that a provision of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ALADS and the County of Los Angeles is unenforceable based on the ground that it violates wage garnishment law and the Labor Code. The trial court sustained the county's demurrer to the petition on the ground that ALADS did not exhaust administrative remedies.The Court of Appeal concluded, in light of Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 918, that ALADS's administrative remedies are inadequate, and thus dismissal on that ground was improper. However, the court concluded that dismissal was proper because ALADS's petition does not state valid claims against the county. The court explained that the home rule doctrine gives the county the exclusive right to regulate matters relating to its employees' compensation. In this case, the county's MOU with ALADS, approved by the board of supervisors, is a lawful exercise of that exclusive right, and the Labor Code provision at issue does not apply to a charter county. Therefore, ALADS cannot allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action. View "Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Martinez, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, has four decades of experience including general and orthopedic-surgery residencies and a spine fellowship. In 2016, a hospital hired Martinez on a three-year contract as its only orthopedic surgeon. In 2017, UPMC bought the hospital. UPMC’s representatives told Martinez that they would continue his contract and discussed acquiring new equipment. A month later, UPMC’s chief operating officer and its executive director of the musculoskeletal division fired Martinez, explaining only that the hospital was “moving in a different direction and [Martinez’s] services were no longer needed.” They stated that his firing “had nothing to do with [his] performance.” Martinez was then 70 years old. After firing him, the hospital hired two doctors, including Hunter, who took over at least some of Martinez’s job functions. The hospital posted an opening for an orthopedic surgeon. Martinez applied three times but got no response. The hospital hired Jarvis.Martinez sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging that Hunter and Jarvis were “significantly younger,” “less qualified,” and “less experienced” than Martinez. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed. The hospital knows the younger doctors’ exact ages and specialties, and discovery will let Martinez uncover those and other details in time for summary judgment and trial. View "Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this medical fee dispute between a health care provider and a worker's compensation insurance carrier over the proper amount of reimbursement for services rendered to a covered patient, holding that that administrative law judge (ALJ) who heard the case properly applied the rules of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation in allocating the burden of proof.The provider initiated a dispute resolution proceeding, and the Division determined that the provider was entitled to more than the carrier believed was due. The Division ordered the carrier to pay the additional amount. The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) upheld the Division's determination. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in placing the burden of proof on the carrier at the SOAH hearing and that the error prejudiced the carrier's substantial rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ properly applied the Division's rules in concluding that the carrier had failed to meet its burden of proof. View "Patients Medical Center v. Facility Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

Weinert roofing employees could drive directly to job sites around Green Bay or could carpool from the shop using a company truck. For carpool employees, Weinert paid travel time at time-and-a-half the minimum wage and did not count travel time toward an employee’s 40-hour workweek. Weinert paid more than minimum wage for job-site work; job-site overtime pay was higher than travel time pay. Anderson, a Weinert seasonal employee, filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and Wisconsin law. Three other employees joined the action. Anderson converted the collective action into an individual FLSA action, which settled. Anderson then sought class certification (FRCP 23) for the state claims. Anderson identified 37 former or current Weinert employees to include in the class and requested the inclusion of employees Weinert expected to hire in 2019.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification. Employees to be hired in a future period cannot be included in the class. Anderson failed to show that joinder of the 37 employees in a single lawsuit (with multiple named plaintiffs) would be impracticable, as required by Rule 23(a). Anderson did not identify any difficulty in locating or contacting potential class members; the class lacked the geographical spread that might render joinder impracticable. Prevailing under the Act allows a plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and costs, offsetting some of the disincentive created by the small damages available. The numerosity requirement focuses on whether joinder would be impracticable, not whether each potential class member could bring a separate lawsuit. View "Anderson v. Weinert Enterprises Inc." on Justia Law

Roger Leishman, an openly gay man, began employment with the Washington Attorney General’s office (AGO) as chief legal advisor to Western Washington University in 2015. Shortly after starting work, Leishman began exhibiting serious trichotillomania, anxiety, and other symptoms he disclosed to his employer. He would later be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which was also disclosed to his employer. In January 2016, Leishman learned he did not receive a raise given to other assistant attorney generals, due to complaints his supervisor made about his conduct at work. Leishman contended his supervisor’s complaints were based on homophobic beliefs. Leishman made a formal request for reasonable accommodation of his disability, which the AGO denied. Leishman drafted a discrimination complaint. In response, the supervisor denied making the comments, accused Leishman of faking his disability, and refused to support his then-pending accommodation request. The AGO retained Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC (OMW) to conduct an independent investigation into Leishman’s discrimination complaint and his supervisor’s allegations. The OMW report concluded Leishman did not establish discrimination against him based on sexual orientation, and his conduct during a meeting with his supervisor violated expected standards of conduct for his position. The AGO thereafter terminated Leishman’s employment effective June, 2016. Leishman filed suit against the AGO. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which Leishman agreed to release his claims against the State and its officers. However, he also sued OMW, alleging the firm was not acting as the AGO’s agent, and his claims against the OMW were not barred by the settlement. The trial court granted OMW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; the Court of Appeal reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Leishman v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, Appellee Carl Sadler was injured while working as a production manager for Philadelphia Coca-Cola Company (“PCCC”). PCCC issued a notice of compensation payable, acknowledging Sadler’s injuries as a right pinky finger amputation and a low back sprain, and providing that Sadler was entitled to a weekly disability rate of $652 based upon an average weekly wage of $978. On August 13, 2013, Sadler was charged with a crime in New Jersey. Because he could not post bail, Sadler remained incarcerated for 525 days, until January 22, 2015, when he pled guilty. At sentencing, immediately after accepting Sadler’s plea, the trial court sentenced him to 525 days of incarceration, gave him credit for time served, and immediately released him from custody. Months later, Sadler filed a petition seeking review of his average weekly wage. PCCC responded with a suspension petition, contending that Sadler was not entitled to retain the benefits he received while incarcerated and asking that his benefits be adjusted to prevent him from being unjustly enriched for the amounts received during that time. The petitions were heard by a workers’ compensation judge, who concluded that PCCC was entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid to Sadler during his pre-conviction incarceration. The judge did not provide for a future credit against benefits to be paid to Sadler, but rather ordered that PCCC should petition the Supersedeas Fund for reimbursement. PCCC appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and Sadler cross-appealed. The Board modified the workers’ compensation judge’s decision by allowing PCCC to seek a credit against Sadler’s future payments, but affirmed in all other respects. Sadler appealed to the Commonwealth Court. He maintained that his workers’ compensation benefits had been improperly suspended because he spent no time in incarceration after his conviction, as is required pursuant to the clear language of Section 306(a.1). The Commonwealth Court agreed. PCCC appealed, asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding it was not entitled to a reimbursement of the benefits paid to Sadler during his pre-conviction incarceration while awaiting trial. Finding no merit to PCCC's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Sadler v. WCAB (Apl of: Phila Coca-Cola Co.)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding an administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of benefits to Deborah Duckworth, holding that the ALJ had the authority to determine the manifestation date for cumulative trauma injury and properly applied controlling law to the facts of this case.On appeal, Ford Motor Company argued that the ALJ exceeded the scope of his authority in determining the manifestation dates of Duckworth's cumulative trauma injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ had the authority to determine the manifestation date of Duckworth's cumulative trauma injury; and (2) Ford Motor Company was not deprived of due process because it had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the statute of limitations issue. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Duckworth" on Justia Law