Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Lopez worked for Whirlpool under the supervision of Gralund. Various people, including Gralund and Penning, assigned Lopez to fill in areas of the line. Penning was not a supervisor. Lopez alleges that Penning began touching her in inappropriate ways. She asked him to “back off.” There were more incidents of touching but Lopez did not report them to HR, any supervisor, or her union. Lopez later testified that she “[made] it clear to [Gralund].” Lopez and Penning subsequently had two disputes about how Lopez was to perform her job. Lopez then made her first written complaint, which noted incidents involving her working conditions but did not mention Penning’s harassment. Lopez later reported “that [she] felt like [Penning] was retaliating” by hovering and staring at her. Lopez resigned four days later, apparently without mentioning “Penning” or “harassment” in her voicemail.Lopez sued for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. During discovery, Whirlpool spent time and money on multiple depositions that never occurred. Whirlpool invoked 28 U.S.C. 1927; the magistrate imposed a $2,000 sanction against Lopez’s counsel. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sanction order and the subsequent entry of summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool. Lopez failed to raise a triable fact on what Whirlpool knew or should have known about Penning’s conduct; she never gave Whirlpool an opportunity to take corrective action. View "Lopez v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Henin began working Canadian Pacific (CP) in 2003. CP terminated Henin’s employment in 2015, citing rule violations. Henin filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, alleging violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act. After investigating, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration dismissed Henin’s complaint in a Decision, dated January 11, 2019. Henin received the Decision on January 22. On January 28, Henin filed with the Administrative Review Board a petition for review. On February 5, the Clerk issued a notice indicating acceptance of Henin’s petition. On February 26, the Board dismissed Henin’s petition as untimely. In his motion for reconsideration, Henin explained that he did not receive the Decision until 11 days after its issuance; that before the Decision, there had been no case activity since 2017; and that between December 22, 2018, and January 25, 2019, the federal government experienced a “shutdown.”The Board reinstated Henin’s claim as timely but immediately dismissed it, citing a complaint that Henin filed in federal court under 49 U.S.C. 20109(d)(3), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction to review employee claims de novo if, like here, the Secretary of Labor does not issue a “final” decision within 210 days of the complaint’s filing date. The Eighth Circuit denied CP’s petition for review. The Board properly granted reconsideration and appropriately utilized its equitable powers to control its own docket and to recognize the record’s incongruities and the 11-day delay in service. View "Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Administrative Review Board United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this discrimination and retaliation action, holding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in part.Plaintiff filed suit against Abbott Laboratories alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-34, Puerto Rico Law 100 and Puerto Rico Law 155. A jury found for Plaintiff and awarded $4 million for emotional distress and $250,000 for back pay. The district court entered judgment against Abbott on all counts but reduced the damages to just over $500,000. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Abbott was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's ADEA claims and her corresponding claims under Law 100 and Law 115; but (2) Abbott failed to preserve its challenge to a separate finding that Abbott retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting to the State Insurance Fund. View "Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Laboratories P.R. Inc." on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) appealed a district court judgment affirming an ALJ’s revised order on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety & Ins. v. Sandberg, 2019 ND 198, 931 N.W.2d 488 (“Sandberg I”). The ALJ’s revised order made additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and again found John Sandberg had sustained a compensable injury and was entitled to benefits. Under its deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part; however, in light of the ALJ’s revised order, the Court remanded the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits should have been awarded on an aggravation basis and the proper calculation of those benefits under N.D.C.C. 65-05-15. View "WSI v. Sandberg, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Casco, Inc.'s claim for dolus under Article 1902 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 3408, awarding relief to Casco on its claims for unjust impairment and unjust termination under Puerto Rico's Dealer Protection Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, 278 (Law 75) and granting judgment on John Deere Construction & Forestry Company's counterclaim to recover amounts owed to it by Casco, holding that Casco was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the jury's findings of liability against Deere under Law 75 were not unreasonable, and the district court correctly denied Deere's post-judgment motions regarding the Law 75 claims; (2) the district court properly dismissed Casco's dolus claim as not legally viable; (3) the district court correctly granted relief on Deere's counterclaim; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to upset the jury award or order a new trial on damages. View "Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Construction & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Lincare, Inc. and rejecting Jeffrey Joseph's racial discrimination challenge to the termination of his employment, holding that the district court erred in excluding several documents from the summary judgment record and that Joseph had enough evidence to warrant a trial.On appeal, Joseph argued, among other things, that the district court erred in excluding several documents as unauthenticated hearsay evidence and in granting summary judgment. The First Circuit agreed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in excluding the documents as "unauthenticated and hearsay evidence," and the error was not harmless; and (2) the record, supplemented with the stricken documents, provides a reasonable basis for a jury finding in Joseph's favor. View "Joseph v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Gold Medal Bakery, Inc. and dismissing Robert Thompson's claims brought after he was fired, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.After he was fired, Thompson brought this complaint alleging that Gold Medal terminated his employment in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and federal and state disability discrimination laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Gold Medal on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that, as a matter of law, Thompson could not establish that he was a "qualified individual" under the Americans with Disabilities Act at the time of his firing; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Gold Medal on Thompson's FMLA retaliation claim; and (3) Thompson's remaining arguments were unavailing. View "Thompson v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) denying the claim for benefits filed by deputy John France, who developed post-traumatic stress disorder after he shot and killed a man, holding that the administrative law judge erred by failing to apply the standard required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B).Under section 23-1043.01(B), employees may receive compensation for mental injuries if an unexpected, unusual or extraordinary employment-related stress was a substantial contributing cause of the mental injury. An ALJ denied France's claim for benefits, concluding that the shooting incident was not "unusual, unexpected, or extraordinary." The Supreme Court set aside the ICA's decision, holding (1) under section 23-1043.01(b), a work-related mental injury is compensable if the specific event causing the injury was objectively "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary"; (2) under this objective standard, an injury-causing event must be examined from the standpoint of a reasonable employee with the same or similar job duties and training as the claimant; and (3) the ALJ erred by limiting her analysis to whether France's job duties encompassed the possibility of using lethal force in the line of duty and failing to consider whether the shooting incident was unexpected or extraordinary. View "France v. Industrial Commission of Arizona" on Justia Law

A Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) plaintiff may not be compelled to arbitrate whether he or she is an aggrieved employee. Petitioners filed suit against Zum under PAGA, alleging that Zum misclassified them and others as independent contractors and thus violated multiple provisions of the California Labor Code. The trial court granted Zum's motion to compel arbitration and ordered into arbitration the issue of arbitrability of petitioners' suit.The Court of Appeal reversed the order compelling arbitration, concluding that the delegation of the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator frustrates the purpose of PAGA and is therefore prohibited under California law. The court explained that the California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, and several Courts of Appeal are uniform in holding that PAGA claims are not waivable and are not arbitrable. Furthermore, under that case law and in light of the very nature of a PAGA claim, a court – not an arbitrator – must decide all aspects of the claim. The court further explained that the only exception is when the state, as real party in interest, has consented to arbitration. However, the state did not consent here. The court concluded that the "preliminary" question of whether petitioners are "aggrieved employees" under PAGA may not be decided in private party arbitration. View "Contreras v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Ronald Throupe, a Professor of Real Estate at the University of Denver ("DU"), brought an employment discrimination claim under Title IX against DU as well as several faculty and staff members. In 2013, Throupe was a candidate to serve as director of the Real Estate and Construction Management department. DU ultimately hired outside of the school, bringing in Barbara Jackson to lead the department. According to Throupe, upon Jackon’s arrival, she made clear in conversations with professors, she would force some of the tenured real estate faculty members to leave. In 2014, the University Title IX office was contacted multiple times about Throupe's relationship with a foreign graduate student. In an email to University officials, Jackson concluded "Ron believes he has done nothing but help this girl, but his behaviors have been totally unprofessional and inappropriate, his father/daughter views perverted, and his obsession out of control." The Title IX investigator and DU’s Manager of Equal Employment had a follow-up meeting with Throupe. Afterward, he sent an email to the Manager of Equal Employment formally reporting a hostile work environment. When Throupe later asked whether any actions had been taken in response to his report, the investigator told Throupe his claim “did not result in any formal investigation by the Office of Equal Employment.” However, the school issued him a written warning, admonishing him from further contact with the student. Throupe maintained that Jackson continued to harass him even after the written warning. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Although Throupe had dedicated little space in his briefing to arguing any theory of sex discrimination, the district court identified two theories of sex discrimination in Throupe’s argument: that defendants created a hostile work environment and engaged in disparate treatment against him. But the court determined that Throupe had failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under either of these theories. Having dismissed Throupe’s sole federal claim, the district court declined to consider the remaining state law claims due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, specifically concluding the district court did not err in concluding that Throupe failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex. View "Throupe v. University of Denver" on Justia Law