Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claim brought under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA) as time-barred, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Corrections (DOC).In granting summary judgment for the DOC, the district court held that since Plaintiff's grievance procedures took longer than 120 days from the date of her termination her claim was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the limitation period on Plaintiff's WDEA claim was tolled from the time she commenced her grievance until the grievance procedures were exhausted; and (2) excluding the period during which the limitation period was tolled, Plaintiff timely filed her claim within the one-year statute of limitations. View "Shepherd v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a start‐up company and its founder (Marlowe), sued the company’s former chief legal officer, Fisher, to recover losses from an arbitration award that held them liable for years of unpaid wages owed to Fisher himself. The award comprised unpaid wages and statutory penalties totaling $864,976 and an additional $366,460 because Fisher did not receive written notice of his contract nonrenewal. Plaintiffs alleged that Fisher advised them to enter into what they now say was an illegal agreement to defer Fisher’s compensation until the company was able to secure more funding.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Even if Marlowe was Fisher’s client regarding her own compensation agreement and a decision not to purchase directors and officers insurance, the plaintiffs failed to plead any plausible malpractice claims arising from those matters. Plaintiffs did not allege that they would have opted against using the compensation agreements had Fisher fully advised them. The company violated the Illinois Wage Act by failing to pay Fisher as agreed. The agreement did not aggravate or add to those violations; it made sense as an interim measure to forestall litigation by acknowledging the obligation and committing the company to one way to satisfy it. View "UFT Commercial Finance, LLC v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denying Appellant's first preliminary injunction motion, holding that this Court had no appellate jurisdiction.Appellant filed a class action complaint in the Massachusetts district court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2) alleging that Uber Technologies, Inc. misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors instead of employees. Appellant filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requiring Uber to alter its classification. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, due to the procedural posture of this case, this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the circuit court denying the motion filed by the Grant County Commission to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the Commission was not a proper defendant to the statutory claims asserted by Plaintiff.In the underlying complaint, Plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from the termination of her employment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was not a proper party because it was neither Plaintiff's employer nor was it a health care entity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was an improper defendant in this case, and therefore the circuit court committed clear legal error in denying the motion to dismiss; and (2) the circuit court erred by not affording the Commission immunity from Plaintiff's intentional tort claim. View "State ex rel. Grant County Commission v. Honorable Lynn A. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the DOE, alleging that the TEA had discharged her in retaliation for whistleblowing. Congress enacted a broad-based whistleblower protection program as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA). The NDAA prohibits any recipient of federal dollars from retaliating against whistleblowers who report an abuse of that money.The Fifth Circuit granted the TEA's petition for review, vacated the offending order, and remanded for prompt entry of dismissal. The court agreed with the TEA that the DOE's investigation of plaintiff's complaint and award of damages violated Texas's sovereign immunity. The court explained that whistleblower-retaliation investigations into a state, like any other administrative proceedings brought by private parties, are barred by sovereign immunity. The court joined two other federal courts that have directly addressed the issue and held that the NDAA is not adequately clear for any waiver from sovereign immunity to be effective. Furthermore, the clarity required for a waiver of sovereign immunity to be "knowing" cannot be met by regulations clarifying an ambiguous statute. Rather, the needed clarity must come directly from the statute. View "Texas Education Agency v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five former employees of CB&I who worked as laborers on a construction project in Louisiana, quit before the project ended and thus made them ineligible to receive the Project Completion Incentive under the term of that plan. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court seeking the bonus for the period they did work, arguing that making such employees ineligible for bonuses amounts to an illegal wage forfeiture agreement under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act. LA. STAT.ANN. 23:631, 23:632, 23:634. After removal to federal court, the district court concluded that the incentive program was an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan because it required ongoing discretion and administration in determining whether a qualifying termination took place.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the employee benefit at issue—a bonus for completing the project—is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA. The court explained that the plan involves a single and simple payment; determining eligibility might require the exercise of some discretion, but not much; and the plan lacks the complexity and longevity that result in the type of "ongoing administrative scheme" ERISA covers. Therefore, there is no federal jurisdiction over this action. The court vacated and remanded for the case to be returned to state court. View "Atkins v. CB&I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, a former police officer, alleging claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under Title VII and Texas law, as well as a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In this case, plaintiff worked as an officer for the Windcrest Police Department but resigned during her first, probationary year.In this same-sex sexual harassment case, the court conducted a two-step inquiry pursuant to E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The court concluded that plaintiff's claim failed at the first prong of the inquiry where the alleged conduct was not sex discrimination. The court explained that plaintiff did not allege that another officer's conduct was motivated by sexual desire nor does plaintiff otherwise contend that the conduct was sexual in nature or a display of explicit sexual animus. As for plaintiff's contention that the other officer treated women worse than men, these allegations are highly speculative. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim. The court also concluded that plaintiff's constructive discharge, retaliation, and sex discrimination claims also failed. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the city violated her privacy by surreptitiously activating her police body camera when she was off duty and filming her inside her apartment. The court explained that plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing that the city has a policy or practice of furtively recording employees off duty, even if she was recorded remotely. View "Newbury v. City of Windcrest" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the determination of the district court that the Freeborn County Board of Commissioners acted arbitrarily when it set the 2019 salary of the Freeborn County Sheriff at $97,020, holding that the district court did not clearly err.In the salary appeal, the district court concluded that the Board acted arbitrarily and without sufficiently taking into account the responsibilities and duties of the sheriff's office because the testifying commissioners did not explain why they decided on a salary of $97,020. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court's findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in setting aside the Board's salary decision because there was reasonable support in the record for the court's determination that the Board's salary decision was arbitrary. View "In re Year 2019 Salary of Freeborn County Sheriff" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Handy Technologies, Inc.'s motion to dismiss this putative class action and to compel individual arbitration, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Maisha Emmanuel's suit.Emmanuel, who worked as a cleaner for Handy Technologies, Inc., brought this complaint on behalf of individuals who had worked for Handy as cleaners, alleging that Handy had misclassified the putative class members as independent contractors rather than employees, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1. Handy moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that the Independent Contractor Agreement that Emmanuel signed required arbitration of the claims at issue. The district court granted Handy's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed Emmanuel's putative class action claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ruling that, under Massachusetts law, Emmanuel had entered into an agreement to arbitrate; and (2) Emmanuel's unconscionability-based challenged to the ruling below failed. View "Emmanuel v. Handy Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Xanthopoulos, a Mercer consultant, detected securities fraud; his internal complaints failed. He went to the SEC website, and, in March 2014, Xanthopoulos submitted his first TCR Form. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley OSHA Form, which may be used to notify OSHA of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint, the SEC’s TCR Form does not affirmatively indicate that submission of the form will initiate a formal lawsuit under the federal securities law. Xanthopoulos allegedly submitted seven TCR Forms through June 2018; in his 2018 submissions, he mentioned Mercer’s mistreatment of him as an employee, not just the securities fraud. Every TCR Form Xanthopoulos submitted specifically referenced a whistleblowing award.As Xanthopoulos predicted in those filings, Mercer fired him in October 2017. Xanthopoulos filed an OSHA administrative complaint in September 2018, alleging violations of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. OSHA dismissed the complaint as untimely because Xanthopoulos filed 350 days after Mercer discharged him. He responded that “there was no[] 180-day-period[] in which [he] could have decided in clear conscience, that [he] had every information needed, to contact OSHA.” Xanthopoulos, then represented by counsel, argued that he filed his claim in the wrong forum, which tolled the statute of limitations: the TCR Forms constituted Sarbanes-Oxley claims mistakenly filed with the SEC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The reports to the SEC did not toll the 180-day period for his Sarbanes-Oxley complaint. Xanthopoulos has not articulated a sufficient ground to equitably toll his untimely complaint. View "Xanthopoulos v. United States Department of Labor Administrative Review Board" on Justia Law