Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a challenge to former RCW 43.43.120(23)(a) (2001), which excluded certain overtime from the calculation of the monthly pension benefit granted under the Washington State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS). Four Washington State troopers (Troopers) hired before the statute became effective claimed this exclusion of voluntary overtime from the calculation of their monthly pensions was an unconstitutional impairment of their contract with the State in violation of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 23 of the Washington State Constitution. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled: (1) the statute of limitations was three years and accrued at retirement; (2) there remained issues of material fact regarding whether the change was offset by comparable benefits; and (3) the change was reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose. After review of that ruling, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the statute of limitations and on comparable benefits. However, the Court vacated its legitimate public purpose ruling as premature given that the issue of comparable benefits remained for trial. The matter was remanded for additional proceedings. View "Hester v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation claim upon finding that Appellant failed to provide reasonable notice of her injury to her employer, holding that the ALJ applied the incorrect provision of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.185(1).Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that she sustained cumulative trauma injuries to her neck, back, and hands while working as a nurse. Applying the notice provisions of section 342.185(1), the ALJ found that Appellant's delay of almost two years from the original manifestation date was untimely. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ALJ erred in applying section 342.185(1) to Plaintiff's claim because, as of July 14, 2018, the notice provisions of section 342.185(1) do not apply to cumulative trauma injuries; and (2) under section 341.285(3), which specifically addresses a claimant's notice requirements for cumulative trauma injuries, Appellant's claim was timely. View "Anderson v. Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board upholding the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Plaintiff a thirty percent enhancement of benefits from his employer, Defendant, as a result of workplace safety violations, holding that the safety-violation benefit enhancement did not apply.Plaintiff sustained a serious work-related injury while employed by Defendant, a temporary staffing company. At issue before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was entitled to the thirty percent enhancement under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1) for Defendant's alleged workplace violations. The ALJ denied enhanced benefits. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not liable for section 342.165's enhancement of benefits because extending liability for the safety violations at the facility where Defendant sustained his injuries to Defendant pursuant to the "intentional failure" standard in section 342.165(1) was contrary to the current statute and caselaw. View "Maysey v. Express Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Workers' Compensation Board, holding that Mark Ivey's pre-employment lower back disc herniation and two surgeries required an impairment rating to be carved out of his permanent partial disability rating for which his employer, ViWin Tech, would be responsible.An ALJ assigned a whole-person impairment of twenty-eight percent and rejected a carve-out for a pre-existing injury. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a plain reading of the relevant statutes and the AMA Guides, the ALJ erred in concluding that a carve-out was unwarranted. View "Viwin Tech Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Ivey" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Nelson responded to a report of an armed robbery in a high-crime area; she alleges that the radio dispatcher ignored her repeated emergency calls for information and assistance. Shift sergeant Bucki was responsible for listening to the radio transmissions and contacting the dispatcher if that person failed to respond. Nelson alleges that Bucki did not intervene when the dispatcher ignored her requests for help. Bucki later denied wrongdoing and refused to investigate why the dispatcher ignored Nelson. In her incident report, Nelson complained about the dispatcher’s failure to respond; months later, she discovered that Sergeant Boffo had edited the report to remove her complaints. Nelson developed PTSD, which she alleges was aggravated by the stress of learning that Boffo had edited her report. She has been unable to work, but remains employed by the police department and receives disability benefits. Nelson filed charges of race and sex discrimination with the EEOC and Illinois Department of Human Rights.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of her substantive due process rights by failing to protect her from danger and her procedural due process rights by causing her PTSD and depriving her of a property interest in her job. There was no conscience-shocking abuse of government power nor any affirmative action on by Bucki. View "Nelson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's entry of summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims. Likewise, the court reached the same conclusion about the one employee's sex-based hostile work environment claim. However, after summary judgment was entered in this case, Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S. Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020), clarified that retaliatory hostile work environment claims are not governed by the "severe or pervasive" standard applied by the district court here. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order as to that claim and directed the district court to analyze the claim in light of Monaghan. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether the court of appeal properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), where Farm Bureau argued that the “regular use” exclusion in its automobile insurance policy issued to plaintiff precluded uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, because plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff in this matter, Charles Higgins, was injured in an automobile accident while operating a truck owned by his employer, AT&T. The other driver in the accident was underinsured, and AT&T did not carry UM coverage on the truck. Higgins subsequently filed the instant suit against his personal UM insurer, Farm Bureau. Because the Supreme Court found the policy’s “regular use” exclusion impermissibly derogated from the requirements of the Louisiana uninsured motorist statute (the “UM statute”), La. R.S. 22:1295, the Court found this exclusion inapplicable and reversed the decision of the court of appeal. View "Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on whether an employee who suffers from noise-induced hearing loss was entitled to indemnity benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which conferred such benefits to employees who sustained “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident.” James Hartman, Jr. was employed by the St. Bernard Parish Fire Department. During the course of his employment, Hartman was exposed to injurious levels of noise, which resulted in permanent hearing loss. Testing from 2006 to 2017 showed a gradual increase in hearing loss. The Fire Department opposed Hartman's claim for compensation, asserting, among other things, that his claim for work-related hearing loss was not covered by La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which applied only where the permanent hearing loss was “solely due to a single traumatic accident.” Finding that cumulative hearing loss incurred as a result of repeated exposure to high noise levels on the job did not constitute “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident” as required for the award of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments below. View "Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying BNSF Railway Company summary judgment and entering final judgment in favor of Robert Dannels, holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) does not preempt an injured railroad employee's state law bad faith claims.Dannels was employed by BNSF when he suffered a disabling back and spine injury. Dannels sued BNSF under FELA to recover damages, and the jury returned a verdict in Dannels' favor. Dannels subsequently filed claims for bad faith and punitive damages against BNSF. The district court entered final judgment against BNSF. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the FELA does not preempt a railroad worker's right to seek redress for all bad faith conduct in the adjustment of a claim. View "Dannels v. BNSF" on Justia Law