Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

by
This case presented an issue of first impression for the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a noncompetition agreement executed ancillary to the sale of a business terminates upon the death of the individual subject to the covenant not to compete. The Court found that based the specific facts of this case, the noncompetition agreement here did not impose any affirmative obligations on the decedent, and was executed separately from the other agreements relating to the sale of the business. Accordingly, the Court held the noncompetition agreement did not terminate. View "Boyd v. Mills" on Justia Law

by
The employee of a subcontractor on a state public works project sued the prime contractor’s surety bond for unpaid labor under Alaska’s Little Miller Act. The trial court ruled the employee failed to give notice to the contractor within the statutorily required 90 days of his last date of labor on the project. The trial court entered a directed verdict against the employee. The employee appealed to the superior court, which denied the appeal, and then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for hearing. This case presented two issues of first impression: (1) how to define “labor;” and (2) whether “notice” was effective on the date of mailing or the date of receipt. Under the Little Miller Act, the Supreme Court defined “labor” as work that was “necessary to and forwards” the project secured by the payment bond, and held the effective date of “notice” to be the date notice is sent via registered mail. The superior court judgment denying the employee's appeal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dat Luong DBA LVDH Construction v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

by
A federal district court certified two questions of law to the Alaska Supreme Court. Schlumberger Technology Corporation was a Texas corporation providing technology services to the oil and gas industry in Alaska. Travis Buntin worked for Schlumberger in Alaska until early 2016. Shortly thereafter Buntin sued Schlumberger in federal court alleging, among other things, failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA). Schlumberger responded that Buntin was not entitled to overtime compensation because the AWHA exempts individuals employed “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” from overtime payment. Responding to the federal court's questions, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that an employer had to prove that an AWHA exemption applied by a preponderance of the evidence, and reversed precedent to the contrary. The Supreme Court also concluded that the interpretive principle in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) that courts must give federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exemptions a fair interpretation applied when the AWHA text explicitly requires alignment with FLSA interpretations. View "Buntin v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over this petition in error, holding that the district court did not err when it dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.After a hearing involving the presentation of sworn testimony and other evidence conducted pursuant to procedures in the relevant collective bargaining agreement (CBA), a grievance committee of a county with fewer than 150,000 residents decided that the managerial and disciplinary rights of the CBA permitted the county department of corrections to forbid a correctional officer from working certain shifts due to a prior disciplinary action. The correctional officer filed a petition in error, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction because no statute specifically requires an evidentiary hearing before a grievance committee and because the committee decided matters of law concerning the meaning of the CBA rather than matters of disputed fact. View "Champion v. Hall County" on Justia Law

by
Torres started working for Precision in 2011. He was not then legally authorized to work in the U.S. but obtained work authorization about five months later. Torres listed a fake Social Security number on a tax form when he started the job. In May 2012, Torres injured his back at work. Precision did not pay all of the doctor's bills. Torres pursued a workers’ compensation claim. After receiving a September 2011 call from Torres’s lawyer, supervisors confronted Torres. Torres recorded their threatening and profanity-laced statements. Torres was immediately terminated.Torres sued, claiming Precision violated Tennessee law by firing him in retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. The district court rejected the claim, citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. On remand, the district court found Precision liable for retaliatory discharge and held that federal law did not preempt a damage award. The court awarded Torres backpay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law makes it illegal to employ undocumented aliens, but Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law protects them. Because of federal law, the company cannot be required to pay lost wages that the alien was not allowed to earn; the employer is liable for wages the employee could have lawfully received, and for damages unrelated to the employee’s immigration status. View "Torres v. Precision Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Strickland, an African-American Detroit Police Officer since 2008, claims that he has been subjected to race-based harassment throughout his tenure. He cited several incidents, social media posts, and Department reports and having been denied desired shift assignments and training in favor of white officers. A Committee on Race and Equality report concluded that “the department has a growing racial problem” and that African-American officers who complained were retaliated against. On January 22, 2017, off-duty, Strickland pulled into a gas station that, unbeknownst to him, was the site of an active police investigation of a reported incendiary device. He could not see the firetrucks or police cars. When Strickland saw a uniformed sergeant emerge from the fog, he immediately identified himself as an officer but was handcuffed in a way that was extremely tight. A sergeant led him away, belittling him in front of other officers. Strickland was later diagnosed with a bilateral wrist contusion and was suspended for three days without pay. Strickland complained. After an investigation, Strickland was charged with three code of conduct violations.Strickland sued, alleging hostile workplace and illegal retaliation (Title VII), and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming an unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the hostile work environment claim but reversed the grant of qualified immunity to one officer on the excessive force claim and summary judgment in favor of the city on the retaliation claim. View "Strickland v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

by
After defendant pleaded guilty to forced labor, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of roughly $273,000, representing unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, defendant forced the victim to work at his restaurant over 100 hours per week without pay from 2009 to 2014.The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of restitution and concluded that the district court erred in failing to include liquidated damages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for when minimum wages and overtime compensation have not been paid as required, in the restitution award. At bottom, the court concluded that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the FLSA includes liquidated damages provided by the FLSA. The court explained that this fulfills defendant's obligation to compensate the victim for the full amount of the victim's losses, which includes the full value of his labor. Accordingly, the court remanded for recalculation of the restitution award. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

by
After the University dismissed plaintiff from its medical residency program, plaintiff filed suit for wrongful termination and alleged that the University discriminated against her based on age and disability, as well as retaliated against her.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the University, concluding that the University established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. In this case, assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case for age discrimination, the University produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff by explaining that she made an egregious error affecting patient safety despite supervisor and attending efforts. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show evidence of pretext. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the University regarded her as disabled at the time before her termination. View "Canning v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court vacated the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarding permanent total disability (PTD) benefits to Jonathan Parker under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.2, holding that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission erred in applying subsection 2 of section 287.220 rather than subsection 3 of the statute, and remand was required.Before the Supreme Court, the Second Injury Fund argued that Parker should be denied benefits under subsection 3. Parker, in turn, argued that the Supreme Court should award him benefits under subsection 3. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission's decision, holding (1) under Mo. Const. art. V, 18, the Supreme Court is permitted to review only the decisions and findings of the Commission, not to make such decisions in the first place; and (2) therefore, remand to the Commission was required to determine whether Parker was entitled to benefits under subsection 3. View "Treasurer of State as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Parker" on Justia Law

by
The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Because two intervening decisions changed the law applicable to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims and retaliatory hostile work environment claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court with the instruction that it analyze the claims consistent with the intervening decisions. Because the intervening decisions did not, in the court's judgment, affect the resolution of the sex-based hostile work environment claim in this case, the court considered that claim alone and affirmed the district court's decision to enter summary judgment for the Secretary.In this case, the court concluded as an initial matter that most of the named co-worker's conduct lacks the necessary sexual or other gender-related connotations to be actionable sex discrimination. The court explained that nothing in the record allows the conclusion that the coworker's conduct had anything to do with plaintiff's sex; the context surrounding the coworker's inappropriate touching of plaintiff shows that the touching was not sex based; and there is no evidence suggesting that the angry looks, harsh words, and silent treatment that the coworker gave plaintiff were influenced by plaintiff's sex. Even if the coworker's conduct was based on plaintiff's sex, her claim would still fail because the conduct is insufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law