Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated petitions for review, RadNet challenges the Board's decisions finding unfair labor practices based on RadNet's refusal to bargain with the Union on behalf of six separate bargaining units, each representing certain technical workers employed at a different RadNet facility in Southern California. RadNet contends that all six certifications are marred by defects in election procedure, election misconduct, or underlying representation issues.The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that the Regional Director did not abuse its discretion in determining that certain Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Technologists and Nuclear Technologists were not guards within the meaning of section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); RadNet's claim that the elections were a priori defective because they were conducted pursuant to the Board's 2014 revised election rules lacks merit; although the Board abused its discretion in choosing to postpone the counting of ballots and the disclosure of results until the conclusion of voting in all ten of the individual unit elections, the error was harmless; the Board did not abuse its discretion by overruling RadNet's union affiliation objection, and in any event, RadNet has shown no prejudice; even assuming the veracity of RadNet's factual allegations, the court was unpersuaded that the Board abused its discretion in overruling the four separate objections concerning the conduct of individual elections, and the court saw no specific evidence of prejudice to the fairness of the election; and the Board did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to the General Counsel without allowing relitigation of certain underlying representation issues. View "RadNet Management, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Appellants, truck owner/operators who performed work as putative independent contractors for East Coast, filed suit alleging that they were actually employees rather than independent contractors and were therefore wrongfully deprived of statutory protections and benefits given to employees. After the first portion of a bifurcated trial on appellants' claim under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the trial court ruled that appellants were independent contractors rather than employees, and disposed of appellants' claims.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that, since the trial court's ruling, the California Supreme Court has decided that Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, should be applied retroactively. The court explained that Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944, which held so, is controlling here, and thus the judgment may not be affirmed on the legal grounds that the trial court adopted. In regard to East Coast's alternative contention, the court concluded that federal law does not preempt application of the ABC test to motor carriers. In this case, the trial court should consider in the first instance whether appellants were misclassified as independent contractors under the ABC test. View "Parada v. East Coast Transport Inc." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded on plaintiff's age discrimination and gender discrimination claims, affirming the Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Plaintiff sought rehearing, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in her case also undermined the court's Trask-based rejection of her Title VII retaliation claim and that an intervening 11th Circuit decision, Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020), gutted the precedent on which the court had relied in rejecting her hostile work environment claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in plaintiff's case undermined Trask v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016), to the point of abrogation and that the standard that the Court articulated there now controls cases arising under Title VII's nearly identical text. The court also held that Monaghan clarified the court's law governing what the court called "retaliatory-hostile-work-environment" claims, and that the standard for such claims is, as the court said there, the less onerous "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" test articulated in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), rather than the more stringent "severe or pervasive" test found in Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims and remanded for the district court to consider those claims under the proper standards. View "Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act as well as retaliation and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff was employed by the school district as principal of a middle school until the school district concluded that plaintiff had violated several district policies and voted not to renew her contract.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district. In regard to plaintiff's state-law discrimination claims, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination where she failed to show either that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals who were outside her protected class. The court also concluded that plaintiff's sex discrimination claim failed where the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was not replaced by someone outside her protected class and she failed to raise a dispute of fact to show that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated individuals. The court further concluded that plaintiff's age discrimination claim failed where the school district rebutted the presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract. In this case, the school district's investigation found, among other things, that plaintiff engaged in impermissible fundraising activities and worked on an outside film project during her working hours. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to present evidence that the school district's stated reasons were pretextual. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's due process claim where she failed to establish that she has a protected liberty interest. View "Ross v. Judson Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division holding that recovery of a claimant's schedule loss of use (SLU) award by his estate is limited to the portion of the award that would have been due to the claimant for the period prior to the claimant's death, holding that the Appellate Court did not err.Claimant in this case died from a cause unrelated to his workplace injury during the pendency of his claim for permanent partial disability benefits. The Court of Appeals held that Claimant's estate was not entitled to a lump sum payment of a posthumous schedule loss of use award issued to Claimant pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Law, holding that the estate may recover only reasonable funeral expenses and the portion of the SLU award that would have been due to Claimant before death. View "Estate of Youngjohn v. Berry Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

In 2010, Felten filed a qui tam complaint alleging that his then-employer, Beaumont Hospital, was violating the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act by paying kickbacks to physicians and physicians’ groups in exchange for referrals of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE patients. Felten also alleged that Beaumont had retaliated against him by threatening and “marginaliz[ing]” him for insisting on compliance with the law. After the government intervened and settled the case against Beaumont, the district court dismissed the remaining claims, except those for retaliation and attorneys’ fees and costs.Felten amended his complaint to add allegations of retaliation that took place after he filed his initial complaint: he was terminated after Beaumont falsely represented to him that an internal report suggested that he be replaced and that his position was subject to mandatory retirement. Felten further alleged that he had been unable to obtain a comparable position in academic medicine because Beaumont “intentionally maligned [him].”The district court dismissed the allegations of retaliatory conduct occurring after Felten’s termination. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects a relator from a defendant’s retaliation after the relator’s termination. View "Felten v. William Beaumont Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2008, State Bank, a Fentura subsidiary, hired Wollschlager to deal with “problem loans.” Wollschlager’s contract provided a golden parachute worth $175,000 if the Bank fired him early. In 2009, the FDIC deemed the Bank “troubled.” In 2010, Wollschlager negotiated an amended agreement worth $245,000. Wollschlager's 2011 separation agreement provided that the $245,000 payment would comprise $138,000 (one year’s salary) within 60 days of Wollschlager’s departure; $107,000 plus his base compensation through the end of the year ($28,000) would be paid once the Bank’s conditions improved. Fentura did not seek FDIC prior approval. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve subsequently approved the $138,000 installment. FDIC regulations “generally limit payments to no more than one year of annual salary.” In 2013, Fentura sought approval to pay the remainder, acknowledging that the agreements required prior approval. The FDIC refused, citing 12 U.S.C. 1828(k).The district court granted the FDIC judgment on the record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed The statute says that the agency should withhold golden parachute payments for misconduct and should also consider whether the employee “was in a position of managerial or fiduciary responsibility,” the “length of” the employment, and whether the “compensation involved represents a reasonable payment for” the employee’s services. The FDIC reasonably found that the payment would result in a windfall of two years’ salary for an employee who worked for just three years and that the Bank never sought initial approval. View "Wollschlager v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

The Hayward Walmart store is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It is especially busy on Fridays and Saturdays during the summer. Walmart offered Hedican a job as one of eight full-time assistant managers. Hedican then revealed that, as a Seventh-day Adventist, he cannot work between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday. The store’s manager believes that each assistant manager should have experience with all available schedules and all of the store’s departments. The human resources department concluded that accommodating Hedican would leave the store short-handed at some times, or would require hiring a ninth assistant manager, or would compel the other seven assistant managers to cover extra weekend shifts despite their preference to have weekends off. Hedican was told he could apply for an hourly management position, which would not be subject to the rotation schedule. Hedican filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, under Title VII, which forbids employment discrimination on account of religion, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1).The district court granted Walmart summary judgment, finding that an hourly management job would have been a reasonable accommodation, even though the pay of that position is lower. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title VII does not place the burden of accommodation on fellow workers, so accommodating Hedican’s religious practices would require Walmart to bear more than a slight burden if he became an assistant manager. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Walmart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

As a Chicago Midway International Airport ramp supervisor, Saxon supervises, trains, and assists a team of ramp agents—Southwest employees who physically load and unload planes. Ostensibly her job is purely supervisory but Saxon and other ramp supervisors frequently fill in as ramp agents. The ramp agents are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Supervisors are excluded and agree annually as part of their contract of employment—not separately—to arbitrate wage disputes. Believing that Southwest failed to pay ramp supervisors for overtime work, Saxon filed a putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219. Southwest moved to dismiss or stay the suit pending arbitration (Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 3).The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, citing the FAA exemption for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The last category refers not to all contracts of employment, but only to those belonging to “transportation workers.” The act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is commerce, as that term was understood at the time of the FAA’s 1925 enactment. Airplane cargo loaders, as a class, are engaged in that commerce, as seamen and railroad employees were; Saxon and the ramp supervisors are members of that class. View "Saxon v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Western Montana Community Health Center (WMMHC) and dismissing Plaintiff's claim brought under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-901 - 915, holding that the district court's grant of summary judgment was not an abuse of discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) WMMHC satisfied its burden to demonstrate that it had legitimate business reasons constituting good cause for terminating Plaintiff as program manager; (2) Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the reason for the termination was false or arbitrary; and (3) WMMHC met its burden of demonstrating that it did not violate the express provisions of its written personnel policies. View "Buckley v. Western Community Mental Health Center" on Justia Law