Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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After the Department of Corrections (DOC) investigated an allegation that a probation officer was providing special treatment in return for sexual favors and found it to be unsubstantiated, the probation officer sought the investigation records. DOC denied his request and the probation officer appealed to the superior court, which reversed the denial and ordered the records released because the allegation had not been substantiated. DOC appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order because the records were shielded from disclosure by the invasion of privacy exemption to the Public Records Act. View "Alaska Department of Corrections v. Porche" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for Defendant in this workers' compensation case, holding that Plaintiff qualified as Defendants' employee under the Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore, the Act's exclusive remedy provision barred Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff was an employee of a temporary staffing agency when he was injured while on assignment to a client of the agency. The staffing agency provided workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff then sued Defendant, the client for whom he performed the work, alleging common-law negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment for Defendant was appropriate. View "Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against GoJet for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after GoJet terminated him following his Diabetes Type II diagnosis. The jury found in plaintiff's favor and the district court granted him back pay, liquidated damages, and front pay. GoJet appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of GoJet's motion to dismiss, holding that the arbitration provisions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) did not clearly, unmistakably, or explicitly state that plaintiff's FMLA claims could only be brought in arbitration. The court rejected GoJet's arguments that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In regard to damages, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating damages based on minimum hours at GoJet because it plausibly could have found that plaintiff would have worked the minimum number of hours from his termination date onward. However, the court held that the district court erred when it calculated front pay based on two different values for how much work the court expected plaintiff to work at GoJet and SkyWest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded on this issue for the district court to apply a uniform hourly figure to calculate expected earnings at GoJet and SkyWest for the purposes of front pay. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff waived his argument regarding the district court's front pay calculations based on post-trial evidence and his argument regarding the correct methodology for calculating damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to all other issues on appeal. View "Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's challenge to an arbitration award in favor of Defendant, holding that the district court did not err.After Plaintiff was summarily dismissed from his employment he challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint and submitting the grievance to arbitration pursuant to his union's collective bargaining agreement with the union. The arbitrator issued an arbitral award dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's petition for judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the arbitrator's ruling was not in manifest disregard of the law. View "Torres-Burgos v. Crowley Liner Service, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the employer retaliated against him in violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA). The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and concluded that, even assuming plaintiff made a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer offered legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds for the adverse employment action. In this case, the employer offered several reasons for demoting and terminating plaintiff: among other things, plaintiff knew of and approved prohibited invoice practices, encouraged another person to do the same, lied about both, and engaged in unethical practices. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show that the employers' reasons for his termination were pretextual. View "Scarborough v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that Defendant, Plaintiff's employer, timely filed an appeal with the Worker's Compensation Board, holding that Defendant's second petition for reconsideration was insufficient to toll the deadline to file an appeal.An administrative law judge issued an award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for Plaintiff's work-related injuries. Defendant subsequently filed two petitions for reconsideration (PFR), both of which were denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal that Plaintiff argued was untimely because Defendant's second PFR raised the same allegations of error as its first PFR. The Board vacated the ALJ's opinion and award, concluding that when Defendant filed its second PFR, it tolled the time Plaintiff had to file its appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's appeal to the Board was untimely. View "Jolly v. Lion Apparel, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals that Plaintiff was not a "person employed in agriculture" under Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act, holding that Plaintiff was a person employed in agriculture within the meaning of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.650(5) and Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(18) and therefore was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.Plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for an injury she received while working on farmland owned by Defendant. Defendant asserted that it was not required to pay benefits because of the exemption for agricultural employers under Chapter 342 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was an agricultural employee and dismissed her claim. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was an agricultural employee, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was a person employed in agriculture at the time of her injury. View "Brownwood Property, LLC v. Thornton" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court reversing Plaintiff's termination from his employment with the Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS), holding that the court of appeals did not err.Plaintiff was terminated from his position with CHFS for excessive and inappropriate email usage. The Kentucky Personnel Board affirmed the termination. The circuit court reversed the Board's order terminating Plaintiff on the grounds that the Board lacked substantial evidence to terminate Plaintiff and that its decision was arbitrary. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and reinstated the Board's order terminating Plaintiff's employment, holding that the circuit court erred in remanding Plaintiff's case to the Board under Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.150(2). View "Puckett v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services" on Justia Law

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Pittsburgh Logistics Systems, Inc. (“PLS”) was a third-party logistics provider that arranged the shipping of its customers’ freight with selected trucking companies. Beemac Trucking (“Beemac”) was a shipping company that conducted non-exclusive business with PLS. In 2010, PLS and Beemac entered into a one-year Motor Carriage Services Contract (“the Contract”), which automatically renewed on a year to year basis until either party terminated it. The Contract contained both a non-solicitation provision and the no-hire provision. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether no-hire, or “no poach,” provisions that were ancillary to a services contract between business entities, were enforceable under the laws of the Commonwealth. While the Contract was in force, Beemac hired four PLS employees. PLS sued Beemac, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and a violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. PLS also sued the four former employees, alleging they had breached the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions of their employment contracts. The trial court held the worldwide non-compete clauses in the employees' contracts were “unduly oppressive and cannot be subject to equitable modification.” With respect to the contract between the companies, the trial court held the pertinent no-poach clause was void against public policy. “If additional restrictions to the agreement between employer and employee are rendered unenforceable by a lack of additional consideration, PLS should not be entitled to circumvent that outcome through an agreement with a third party.” Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pgh. Logistics Systems, Inc. v. Beemac Trucking, et al." on Justia Law

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Towner was a Ventura County District Attorney (VCDA) investigative commander. VCDA investigator Michael brought an administrative action alleging “fraud, favoritism, and other non-merit based factors in the promotional process.” Towner testified under subpoena at the Civil Service Commission hearing on Michael’s action. VCDA investigated, concluded that Towner had testified falsely, and gave Towner notice of its intent to terminate him for dishonesty. Towner submitted evidence at an administrative hearing to prove his honesty and requested an appeal hearing. The county sought to disqualify the Civil Service Commission from presiding over the hearing based on an asserted conflict of interest because the Commission would be defending its own decision. The County submitted notices of disciplinary action, labeled: “CONFIDENTIAL PERSONNEL DOCUMENT.” The superior court denied the county’s application. The Commission ordered Towner reinstated with full back pay and benefits.Towner filed suit, alleging violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code 3300, POBRA) and negligence per se based on violation of Penal Code 832.7. The court granted the county defendants’ SLAPP motion (strategic lawsuits against public participation), Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court of appeal reversed. The County defendants’ willful disclosure of Towner’s confidential personnel records without complying with mandatory procedures for disclosure was punishable as a misdemeanor under Government Code section 1222, so their disclosure did not constitute protected activity for purposes of a SLAPP motion. View "Towner v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law