Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff maintains that the Act's three-year statute of limitations for willful violations should apply to his claim because he alleged that his employer willfully violated the Act. Plaintiff asks the court to infer willfulness from the mere fact that he was asked for a period of time to perform job responsibilities typically performed by non-exempt employees even though he was classified as exempt.The court held that the mere allegation of willfulness is insufficient for a plaintiff to secure the benefit of the three-year exception to the Act's general two-year statute of limitations at the pleadings stage. Rather, for the three-year exception to apply at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of willfulness. In this case, plaintiff failed to do so because his allegations permit at most an inference that defendants negligently failed to reclassify him as a non-exempt employee which, without more, is insufficient. The court explained that plaintiff fails to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of defendants' willfulness. Instead, he pleads facts that are merely consistent with defendants' purported willfulness, and thus his claim stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. View "Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc." on Justia Law

A complaint alleged that officers violated a citizen’s rights while conducting a mental health welfare check. Following an internal investigation, they were cleared of misconduct. The Oakland Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), a civilian oversight agency with independent authority to investigate police misconduct, conducted its own investigation. Before CPRA’s formal interrogation of the officers, their counsel demanded copies of all “reports and complaints” prepared or compiled by investigators, citing the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Government Code section 3303(g). CPRA refused to disclose these materials and determined that officers knowingly violated the complainant’s civil rights by entering the residence and seizing property without a warrant, then actively concealed the violation. Based on the failure to disclose the requested material, the trial court ordered the city to disregard the interrogation testimony in any disciplinary proceedings against the officers.The court of appeal reversed. Mandatory disclosure of complaints and reports before any interrogation of an officer suspected of misconduct is inconsistent with the statute's plain language and undermines a core objective—maintaining the public’s confidence in the effectiveness and integrity of law enforcement agencies by ensuring that internal investigations into officer misconduct are conducted promptly, thoroughly, and fairly. Under section 3303(g), an investigating agency’s disclosure obligations should be guided by whether the agency designates otherwise discoverable materials as confidential. Confidential materials may be withheld pending the investigation and may not be used as the basis for disciplinary proceedings absent disclosure; nonconfidential material should be disclosed upon request. View "Oakland Police Officers' Association v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the University in an action alleging retaliation claims against the University under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In this case, plaintiff alleged that the University unlawfully retaliated against him for declining requests to implement age-discriminatory policies against older faculty members. Plaintiff alleged that the University did so by removing him as department chair and by denying his application for promotion.In regard to plaintiff's claim that the University violated the ADEA by removing him as department chair, the court concluded that plaintiff's cat's paw theory of liability failed where plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the supervisor proximately caused plaintiff's removal as chair because the decisionmaker drew a conclusion independent of any alleged influence by the supervisor. The court explained that, in his deposition, the decisionmaker explained that he removed plaintiff based on the faculty grievance committee report and the Title IX investigation report, both of which highlighted the toxic and dysfunctional culture within the department. In regard to plaintiff's denial-of-promotion claim, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that this claim is time-barred. View "Sinha v. Bradley University" on Justia Law

TRC Fabrication, LLC, (TRC) purchased steel tubing from Brown Strauss Steel Co. (Brown Strauss), a company located in Fontana, California. Under the sales contract, Brown Strauss sold the tubing “free on board” to TRC. Brown Strauss contracted with Jay Transport, a trucking company based in Rigby, Idaho, which in turn engaged Dale Kelly, an independent owner-operator of a semi-truck to transport the tubing. Kelly hauled the tubing to Idaho Falls and delivered the load to TRC. When employees of TRC began to unload the tubing from the trailer, a forklift operator dropped the steel tubing, which then slid across the pavement and struck Kelly, seriously injuring his right leg, ankle, and foot. Kelly and his wife Nancy filed a complaint against TRC, seeking to recover damages for negligence and loss of consortium. After TRC filed a motion seeking summary judgment, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the Kellys’ complaint. The district court concluded that Idaho’s worker’s compensation law extended statutory immunity to TRC and limited the Kellys’ recovery to workers’ compensation benefits. The question this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review was whether the immunity afforded a statutory employer applied to TRC to bar the Kellys' complaint for damages. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment, vacated the judgment entered, and remanded the case for further proceedings: the district court erred in concluding that TRC was Kelly’s category one statutory employer. View "Kelly v. TRC Fabrication LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the circuit court determining that the civil provisions of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA), W. Va. Code 21-5-3, had not been recognized by the Supreme Court as a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge claim against Defendants after he was terminated from his employment. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment for Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims for the tort of outrage and retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undisputed facts supported the circuit court's order granting partial summary judgment. View "Greaser v. Hinkle" on Justia Law

After five years of litigation that culminated in a lengthy combined jury and bench trial, plaintiffs representing a subclass of retail workers were awarded $2,000,000 in damages against defendant Apple Inc. (Apple) for violations of certain California wage-and-hour labor laws. The trial court memorialized this award in its September 2017 judgment, noting that costs would be determined at a later time. Shortly after entry of the judgment plaintiffs filed a memorandum of costs, and several months later moved for attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This case presented a single question for the Court of Appeal's determination: in a civil case where the prevailing party is entitled to recover certain litigation expenses and attorney’s fees from the losing party, when does postjudgment interest on an award of prejudgment costs begin to run? The Court held accrual begins on the date of the judgment or order that establishes the right of a party to recover a particular cost item, even if the dollar amount has yet to be ascertained. View "Felczer v. Apple" on Justia Law

Guivini Gomez was a former employee of the Regents of the University of California (Regents) who sued the Regents, as the named plaintiff in a purported class action, claiming the Regents failed to pay her the required minimum wage for all hours she worked. However, she did not allege the Regents set her hourly wage below the minimum wage as established by California law. Instead, she contended the Regents’ time-keeping procedures of rounding hours and automatically deducting 30 minute meal breaks resulted in her not receiving the minimum wage for all hours she actually worked. In addition to claiming the Regents did not pay her the minimum wage, Gomez also sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act. The superior court sustained the Regents’ demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in their favor. Gomez appealed, but finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Gomez v. Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a noncompetition agreement executed ancillary to the sale of a business terminates upon the death of the individual subject to the covenant not to compete. The Court found that based the specific facts of this case, the noncompetition agreement here did not impose any affirmative obligations on the decedent, and was executed separately from the other agreements relating to the sale of the business. Accordingly, the Court held the noncompetition agreement did not terminate. View "Boyd v. Mills" on Justia Law

The employee of a subcontractor on a state public works project sued the prime contractor’s surety bond for unpaid labor under Alaska’s Little Miller Act. The trial court ruled the employee failed to give notice to the contractor within the statutorily required 90 days of his last date of labor on the project. The trial court entered a directed verdict against the employee. The employee appealed to the superior court, which denied the appeal, and then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for hearing. This case presented two issues of first impression: (1) how to define “labor;” and (2) whether “notice” was effective on the date of mailing or the date of receipt. Under the Little Miller Act, the Supreme Court defined “labor” as work that was “necessary to and forwards” the project secured by the payment bond, and held the effective date of “notice” to be the date notice is sent via registered mail. The superior court judgment denying the employee's appeal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dat Luong DBA LVDH Construction v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

A federal district court certified two questions of law to the Alaska Supreme Court. Schlumberger Technology Corporation was a Texas corporation providing technology services to the oil and gas industry in Alaska. Travis Buntin worked for Schlumberger in Alaska until early 2016. Shortly thereafter Buntin sued Schlumberger in federal court alleging, among other things, failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA). Schlumberger responded that Buntin was not entitled to overtime compensation because the AWHA exempts individuals employed “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” from overtime payment. Responding to the federal court's questions, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that an employer had to prove that an AWHA exemption applied by a preponderance of the evidence, and reversed precedent to the contrary. The Supreme Court also concluded that the interpretive principle in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) that courts must give federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exemptions a fair interpretation applied when the AWHA text explicitly requires alignment with FLSA interpretations. View "Buntin v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation" on Justia Law