Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the employer retaliated against him in violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA). The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and concluded that, even assuming plaintiff made a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer offered legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds for the adverse employment action. In this case, the employer offered several reasons for demoting and terminating plaintiff: among other things, plaintiff knew of and approved prohibited invoice practices, encouraged another person to do the same, lied about both, and engaged in unethical practices. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show that the employers' reasons for his termination were pretextual. View "Scarborough v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that Defendant, Plaintiff's employer, timely filed an appeal with the Worker's Compensation Board, holding that Defendant's second petition for reconsideration was insufficient to toll the deadline to file an appeal.An administrative law judge issued an award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for Plaintiff's work-related injuries. Defendant subsequently filed two petitions for reconsideration (PFR), both of which were denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal that Plaintiff argued was untimely because Defendant's second PFR raised the same allegations of error as its first PFR. The Board vacated the ALJ's opinion and award, concluding that when Defendant filed its second PFR, it tolled the time Plaintiff had to file its appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's appeal to the Board was untimely. View "Jolly v. Lion Apparel, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals that Plaintiff was not a "person employed in agriculture" under Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act, holding that Plaintiff was a person employed in agriculture within the meaning of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.650(5) and Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(18) and therefore was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.Plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for an injury she received while working on farmland owned by Defendant. Defendant asserted that it was not required to pay benefits because of the exemption for agricultural employers under Chapter 342 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was an agricultural employee and dismissed her claim. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was an agricultural employee, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was a person employed in agriculture at the time of her injury. View "Brownwood Property, LLC v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court reversing Plaintiff's termination from his employment with the Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS), holding that the court of appeals did not err.Plaintiff was terminated from his position with CHFS for excessive and inappropriate email usage. The Kentucky Personnel Board affirmed the termination. The circuit court reversed the Board's order terminating Plaintiff on the grounds that the Board lacked substantial evidence to terminate Plaintiff and that its decision was arbitrary. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and reinstated the Board's order terminating Plaintiff's employment, holding that the circuit court erred in remanding Plaintiff's case to the Board under Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.150(2). View "Puckett v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services" on Justia Law

Pittsburgh Logistics Systems, Inc. (“PLS”) was a third-party logistics provider that arranged the shipping of its customers’ freight with selected trucking companies. Beemac Trucking (“Beemac”) was a shipping company that conducted non-exclusive business with PLS. In 2010, PLS and Beemac entered into a one-year Motor Carriage Services Contract (“the Contract”), which automatically renewed on a year to year basis until either party terminated it. The Contract contained both a non-solicitation provision and the no-hire provision. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether no-hire, or “no poach,” provisions that were ancillary to a services contract between business entities, were enforceable under the laws of the Commonwealth. While the Contract was in force, Beemac hired four PLS employees. PLS sued Beemac, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and a violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. PLS also sued the four former employees, alleging they had breached the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions of their employment contracts. The trial court held the worldwide non-compete clauses in the employees' contracts were “unduly oppressive and cannot be subject to equitable modification.” With respect to the contract between the companies, the trial court held the pertinent no-poach clause was void against public policy. “If additional restrictions to the agreement between employer and employee are rendered unenforceable by a lack of additional consideration, PLS should not be entitled to circumvent that outcome through an agreement with a third party.” Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pgh. Logistics Systems, Inc. v. Beemac Trucking, et al." on Justia Law

Towner was a Ventura County District Attorney (VCDA) investigative commander. VCDA investigator Michael brought an administrative action alleging “fraud, favoritism, and other non-merit based factors in the promotional process.” Towner testified under subpoena at the Civil Service Commission hearing on Michael’s action. VCDA investigated, concluded that Towner had testified falsely, and gave Towner notice of its intent to terminate him for dishonesty. Towner submitted evidence at an administrative hearing to prove his honesty and requested an appeal hearing. The county sought to disqualify the Civil Service Commission from presiding over the hearing based on an asserted conflict of interest because the Commission would be defending its own decision. The County submitted notices of disciplinary action, labeled: “CONFIDENTIAL PERSONNEL DOCUMENT.” The superior court denied the county’s application. The Commission ordered Towner reinstated with full back pay and benefits.Towner filed suit, alleging violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code 3300, POBRA) and negligence per se based on violation of Penal Code 832.7. The court granted the county defendants’ SLAPP motion (strategic lawsuits against public participation), Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court of appeal reversed. The County defendants’ willful disclosure of Towner’s confidential personnel records without complying with mandatory procedures for disclosure was punishable as a misdemeanor under Government Code section 1222, so their disclosure did not constitute protected activity for purposes of a SLAPP motion. View "Towner v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the union's petition for review, challenging the Board's decision holding that janitorial employees had lost the protection of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) due to unlawful picketing. In this case, with the help of a union, janitorial employees picketed outside the commercial office building where they worked to protest their low wages and poor working conditions. The employees were consequently terminated from their jobs.The panel concluded that the Board erred in determining that the employees' picketing violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA, a provision that prohibits various unfair labor practices, including what is known as "secondary picketing." The panel explained that, while the union may have engaged in coercive activity (picketing and patrolling), the Board's finding that it constituted secondary, as opposed to primary, activity is not supported by substantial evidence. The panel further explained that the union never made any statements or took any actions indicating that an objective of its picketing was to coerce Harvest into pressuring Preferred to meet the employees' demands. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Service Employees International Union Local 87 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining enforcement, against any motor carrier doing business in California, of California's Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made "ABC test" for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors.After determining that CTA has standing to bring suit, the panel held that application of AB-5 to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA), because AB-5 is a generally applicable labor law that affects a motor carrier's relationship with its workforce and does not bind, compel, or otherwise freeze into place the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers. In this case, because CTA is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court erred by enjoining the state from enforcing AB5 against motor carriers operating in California. The panel explained that, by failing to follow precedent regarding labor laws of general applicability, the district court committed a legal error to which the panel cannot defer, even at the preliminary-injunction stage. View "California Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission ordering Plaintiff's reinstatement to his position as a tenured civil service employee, holding that the Commission's determination that the Town of Brookline lacked just cause to discharge Plaintiff was supported by substantial evidence.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) in analyzing whether an employee was fired without just cause, in violation of basic merit principles, the Commission can consider evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory conduct that is generally addressed in the context of a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B; and (2) the Commission did not exceed its authority or lacked substantial evidence in determining that the Town lacked substantial evidence for its decision. View "Town of Brookline v. Alston" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff maintains that the Act's three-year statute of limitations for willful violations should apply to his claim because he alleged that his employer willfully violated the Act. Plaintiff asks the court to infer willfulness from the mere fact that he was asked for a period of time to perform job responsibilities typically performed by non-exempt employees even though he was classified as exempt.The court held that the mere allegation of willfulness is insufficient for a plaintiff to secure the benefit of the three-year exception to the Act's general two-year statute of limitations at the pleadings stage. Rather, for the three-year exception to apply at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of willfulness. In this case, plaintiff failed to do so because his allegations permit at most an inference that defendants negligently failed to reclassify him as a non-exempt employee which, without more, is insufficient. The court explained that plaintiff fails to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of defendants' willfulness. Instead, he pleads facts that are merely consistent with defendants' purported willfulness, and thus his claim stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. View "Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc." on Justia Law