Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Applied Materials v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
D.C. was employed by Applied, 1996-2008, and claimed three industrial injuries: a specific injury to her neck and right upper extremity in 2001, a specific injury to her neck and both upper extremities in 2005, and a cumulative trauma injury to her neck, both upper extremities, and psyche ending on her last day working. D.C. claimed her injuries were due to the constant use of a computer keyboard. In 2006, she developed a pain disorder, anxiety, and depression, which she claimed were compensable consequences of her physical injuries. She later claimed that she was sexually exploited by Dr. Massey, the physician primarily responsible for the treatment of her industrial injuries. D.C. was diagnosed with PTSD. Applied's workers’ compensation carriers disputed liability for her psychiatric injuries.A workers’ compensation judge found that all of D.C.’s injury claims were industrial; awarded D.C. 100 percent permanent disability (PD) based on her PTSD alone; found no apportionment; and concluded that the insurers were jointly and severally liable for that award since Dr. Massey treated all three of her industrial injuries. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board generally affirmed.The court of appeal concluded there was substantial evidence of repeated exposure to injury-causing events and new injuries after 2005 that supported the finding of cumulative trauma ending in 2008. D.C. met her burden of proving that her PTSD was a compensable consequence injury that resulted from the treatment for her industrial injuries and that her employment was a contributing cause; as a matter of law, a patient cannot consent to sexual contact with her physician. The court rejected several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The 100 percent PD award must be annulled as based on an incorrect legal theory, the alternative path theory. View "Applied Materials v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law
Hootselle v. Missouri Department of Corrections
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the circuit court awarding a class of Missouri corrections officers $113 million plus post-judgment interest for breach of contract, holding that the circuit court's determination that all preshift and postshift activities are compensable was erroneous.On appeal, the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) argued that the circuit court erroneously determined that MDOC was liable on the corrections officers' breach of contract claims for time spent performing all preshift and postshift activities. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court erred in determining that all corrections officers' preshift and postshift activities were compensable principal activities that must be compensated; (2) because the award of damages and the court's declaratory and injunctive relief were based on the erroneous finding of liability, those rulings were erroneous; and (3) the circuit court correctly determined that MDOC must compensate corrections officers for time spent retrieving keys and radios and time spent monitoring and supervising offenders while not on post. View "Hootselle v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Supreme Court of Missouri
Hager v. M&K Construction
M&K Construction (M&K) appealed a workers’ compensation court’s order (the Order) making it reimburse plaintiff Vincent Hager for the ongoing costs of the medical marijuana he was prescribed after sustaining a work-related injury while employed by M&K. Specifically, M&K contends that New Jersey’s Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis Act was preempted as applied to the Order by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Compliance with the Order, M&K claims, would subject it to potential federal criminal liability for aiding-and-abetting or conspiracy. M&K also claimed medical marijuana was not reimbursable as reasonable or necessary treatment under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). Finally, M&K argued that it fit within an exception to the Compassionate Use Act and was therefore not required to reimburse Hager for his marijuana costs. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined: (1) M&K did not fit within the Compassionate Use Act’s limited reimbursement exception; (2) Hager presented sufficient credible evidence to the compensation court to establish that the prescribed medical marijuana represents, as to him, reasonable and necessary treatment under the WCA; and (3) the Court interpretsed Congress’ appropriations actions of recent years as suspending application of the CSA to conduct that complied with the Compassionate Use Act. As applied to the Order, the Court thus found the Act was not preempted and that M&K did not face a credible threat of federal criminal aiding-and-abetting or conspiracy liability. M&K was ordered to reimburse costs for, and reasonably related to, Hager’s prescribed medical marijuana. View "Hager v. M&K Construction" on Justia Law
Kennedy et al. v. Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System et al.
Two police officers retired from the Anchorage Police Department (APD) due to discrimination and retaliation. Years later, a jury found that they had been constructively discharged and awarded them lost past wages and benefits. The officers requested that the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement System (APFRS) increase their retirement benefits based on the award of lost wages. When the APFRS Board denied their request, they appealed to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision and awarded it attorney’s fees. The officers appealed the court’s decision denying them an increase in retirement benefits, arguing that the Anchorage Municipal Code required a recalculation of benefits. They also appealed the attorney’s fee award as unreasonably high. Because the Anchorage Municipal Code did not permit the requested increase in retirement benefits, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order denying the officers’ administrative appeal. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded fees, the attorney’s fee award was also affirmed. View "Kennedy et al. v. Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System et al." on Justia Law
Trinity Services Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
Trinity employee Victoria’s timecard indicated that she had earned three days of paid leave. The company’s records indicated otherwise. Victoria and her unionized coworkers had a unique paid-leave plan, different from the plan at Trinity’s other, nonunionized facilities. In response to the discrepancy, Victoria’s boss, Rivera, stated, “[T]hat is a problem that the Union created” and “You need to fix that with the Union.” A split panel of the National Labor Relations Board found that these remarks “had a reasonable tendency to interfere with” employees’ labor rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), because there was “no objective basis for blaming the Union” and the remarks came amidst “ongoing contract negotiations and grievance proceedings” regarding paid leave.The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of Trinity, declining to enforce the Board’s order. The National Labor Relations Act protects an employer’s right to “express[] . . . any views, argument, or opinion,” 29 U.S.C. 158(c). Unless the employer threatens “reprisal or force” or promises “benefit[s],” such expressions “cannot be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice.” Rivera’s remarks were “opinion[s]” containing no threats or promises and evoking no future consequences. The court declined to recognize an exception for misstatements involving no threat or promise. Section 8(c) does not require fairness or accuracy and says nothing about materiality or knowledge. View "Trinity Services Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll-Rand de Puerto Rico, Inc.
The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court excluding two documents from the summary judgment record and granting summary judgment for Defendant on all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that the district court erred in excluding the two documents from the summary judgment record.Defendant terminated Defendant's employment after he had been employed for thirty-three years. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging wrongful termination of his employment under state law and age discrimination under federal and state law. Defendant moved to strike two of Plaintiff's documents on the grounds that they had been produced after the discovery cut-off date and that they were not properly authenticated. The district court granted the motion to strike the documents and then granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed the order excluding the documents and vacated the entry of summary judgment, holding that the court erred in striking the documents and that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment. View "Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll-Rand de Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law
General Atomics v. Super. Ct.
Tracy Green sued her employer, General Atomics, based on its alleged failure to provide accurate, itemized wage statements showing “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” Green maintained that General Atomics “failed to identify the correct rate of pay for overtime wages” because its wage statements showed “0.5 times the regular rate of pay rather than 1.5.” General Atomics moved for summary judgment, contending its wage statements complied with the statute because they showed the total hours worked, with their standard rate or rates, and the overtime hours worked, with their additional premium rate. The trial court issued an order denying the motion. General Atomics challenged that order by petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by determining that General Atomics’ wage statements violated Labor Code section 226: “While other formats may also be acceptable, given the complexities of determining overtime compensation in various contexts, the format adopted by General Atomics adequately conveys the information required by statute. It also allows employees to readily determine whether their wages were correctly calculated, which is the central purpose of section 226.” The Court therefore granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "General Atomics v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25
The Labor Management Relations Act forbids employers from directly giving money to unions, 29 U.S.C. 186(a); an exception allows an employer and a union to operate a trust fund for the benefit of employees. Section 186(c)(5)(B) requires the trust agreement to provide that an arbitrator will resolve any “deadlock on the administration of such fund.” Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund, which is a tax-exempt entity under ERISA 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9). A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend a tax return. Three trustees, those selected by the companies, filed suit, seeking authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration.The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries may sue for a breach of statutory fiduciary duty in federal court without exhausting internal remedial procedures, this complaint did not allege a breach of fiduciary duties but rather alleges that the employer trustees’ own fiduciary duties compelled them to file the action to maintain the trust’s compliance with tax laws. These claims were “not directly adversarial to the [union trustees] or to the Fund.” View "Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25" on Justia Law
Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc.
Wyatt began working as a Nissan project manager in 2013. For two years she received positive annual performance reviews. During those years, Wyatt twice had medical leave. Nissan restored Wyatt to her position and granted nearly all the work accommodations recommended by Wyatt’s doctor. In 2015, Wyatt began working on a project headed by Mullen who sexually harassed and assaulted her. Wyatt’s complaints led to Mullen leaving the company. At the same time, Wyatt took medical leave for back surgery. Upon her return, she and her doctors requested workplace accommodations, similar to those she had previously requested. Nissan denied her request for a 40-hour workweek. Wyatt claims that managers harassed her about her requests and gave Wyatt her first “below expectations” annual evaluation, Wyatt filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her managers later issued Wyatt a Performance Improvement Plan. Wyatt refused to sign the PIP, believing that it was retaliatory. In February 2017, Wyatt took medical leave and continues to be on leave.Wyatt filed suit, alleging hostile work environment, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; failure-to-accommodate, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101l and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted Nissan summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Wyatt’s ADA discrimination claim and claims that were based on retaliatory harassment but reversed with respect to Wyatt’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on adverse employment actions. View "Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law
Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc.
Vesey, an African American woman, began work in 2012 for Envoy as a Quad Cities Airport station agent. In 2014, she drove a jet bridge into an aircraft and received a serious reprimand that remained in effect for two years. In 2016, Vesey and other Envoy employees lodged workplace-related complaints against each other. Envoy investigated and found Vesey’s allegations of bias and favoritism unsubstantiated. Weeks later, Vesey reported that a coworker, Masengarb, directed racist remarks and actions at her. Envoy found that complaint substantiated and fired Masengarb. Vesey claimed that others undertook a campaign of retaliation and harassment against her. An investigation uncovered several instances in which Vesey violated policies concerning the use of her travel benefit. Given that finding and the active reprimand, the investigator recommended termination.
Vesey sued Envoy, alleging retaliation and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Envoy. Vesey does not allege retaliatory motives by Envoy’s investigators who recommended her termination, or by the committee members who approved it. The mere fact that an employee’s wrongdoing was reported by a biased supervisor with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive does not establish liability. A reasonable jury could not have concluded that Vesey was terminated for any reason other than her abuse of travel benefits. View "Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc." on Justia Law