Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who was employed with Andersen from 2000-2018, was terminated for violating lock-out, tag-out (LOTO) safety procedures. After plaintiff filed suit against Andersen, he voluntarily dismissed four of his eight claims and the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining four claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that Andersen did not violate the Minnesota Whistleblower Act by terminating his employment in retaliation for his previous sexual harassment and falsified documentation complaint. The court explained that plaintiff failed to show causation between the protected activity and his discharge, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. The court also concluded that plaintiff was unable to establish the causal link necessary for a prima facia case of retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Family Medical Leave Act also failed for lack of causation. View "Lissick v. Andersen Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA in an action brought by plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and a hostile work environment she experienced during her employment at the Kansas City VA.Applying the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims failed at the first step because she did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, or constructive discharge. In this case, many of the events plaintiff presents as adverse employment actions—the decision not to "board" the Coding Document Improvement Program (CDI) position, inadequate training on CDI duties, assignment of additional coding work, her performance review, and the written counseling—are not adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII. View "Watson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in determining that a class of emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics has been properly paid overtime compensation in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime provision.The court also concluded that the district court did not err in determining that a separate class of dual-function firefighter/paramedics were properly classified as partially exempt from overtime compensation because its members are "employee[s] in fire protection activities" who have the "responsibility to engage in fire suppression" activities under 29 U.S.C. 203(y). View "Zimmerli v. The City of Kansas City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court revoking Appellant's pension benefits and denying his request for return of his retirement contributions paid into the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island (ERSRI), holding that the superior court erred in part.The superior court revoked Appellant's pension benefits, denied his request for return of his retirement contributions paid to the ERSRI, and ordered that retirement payments made to his spouse be applied towards his restitution obligations. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in revoking Defendant's pension benefits; (2) did not err in declaring that Appellant's spouse was an innocent spouse and awarding pension payments; (3) erred in directing the spouse to pay her payments as an innocent spouse towards Defendant's restitution obligations; and (4) vacated the portion of the judgment declining to apply Appellant's pension contributions to his restitution obligations. View "Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of State of R.I. v. Randall" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from CRC through its "no-fault" attendance policy, she filed suit alleging that her termination violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRC and dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim where the undisputed evidence established that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position. In this case, many of plaintiff's duties as the sole office assistant required her physical presence at the office and she admitted that her absences burdened co-workers by detracting from the time they could spend on their own duties. Furthermore, because plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, her failure-to-accommodate claim necessarily fails. In regard to plaintiff's retaliation claim under the ADA, the court concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence of the required but-for causal connection.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal because CRC did not deny plaintiff FMLA leave to which she was entitled because it was justified in assessing unexcused absence points. In regard to the FMLA discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between her requests for FMLA leave and her termination. Even assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case of discrimination, the court concluded that CRC had a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for termination that was not pretextual. View "Evans v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and other employees, filed suit against her former employer, US Corrections, L.L.C. (USC), and two other entities, alleging an overtime-pay claim and a recordkeeping claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court dismissed the claims and entered judgment in favor of the employer and the company's payroll administrator.The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Motor Carrier Act's (MCA) exemption governs plaintiff's job with the employer. The court explained that the district court correctly construed the law to determine that the MCA exemption governs the relationship between plaintiff and USC, irrespective of Jeanna's Act and its implementing regulations. However, the court nonetheless concluded that the district court erred in applying the MCA exemption to foreclose the otherwise plausible FLSA overtime-pay claim alleged by plaintiff in her complaint, at least at the pleading stage. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. U.S. Corrections, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a whistleblower-retaliation complaint under 42 U.S.C. 5851 after the NRC rejected his applications for promotions. Petitioner is an NRC employee who made disclosures to Congress and the NRC's Inspector General regarding health and safety risks at a nuclear power plant. The ALJ dismissed the case because the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for such whistleblower actions against the NRC, and the ARB affirmed.After determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, agreeing with the ARB that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for complaints against the NRC. In this case, petitioner failed to make the necessary affirmative showing of waiver with the required unequivocal expression. The court explained that the lesson in its recent decision in Robinson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 917 F.3d 799 (2019), is that the substantive and remedial provisions of a statute may not be coextensive. The court concluded that there is no doubt that the NRC is bound by the prohibitions of section 5851, but that fact alone is simply insufficient to form the basis of an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. View "Peck v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the City of Newport News, alleging that it failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that the City concluded that he could not perform the essential functions of his job as a detective and then offered him the options of either retiring early or accepting reassignment to a civilian position he did not want. Plaintiff reluctantly retired.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that it is generally inappropriate for an employer to unilaterally reassign a disabled employee to a position the employee does not want when another reasonable accommodation exists that would allow the disabled employee to remain in their current, preferred position. The court clarified that it did not hold that an employer can never reassign an employee when there exists a reasonable accommodation that will keep the employee in their current and preferred position. This broad question was not before the court. Nor should this opinion be read in any way to restrict the ability of employers and employees to agree to a voluntary transfer. Rather, the court simply reiterated that reassignment is strongly disfavored when an employee can still do their current job with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation, and that reassignment should therefore be held "in reserve for unusual circumstances." View "Wirtes v. City of Newport News" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Uber's motion to compel arbitration in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a single cause of action for wage violations under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Lab. Code, 2698 et seq. Plaintiff was an Uber driver under a written agreement stating she was an independent contractor and all disputes would be resolved by arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and the agreement delegated to the arbitrator decisions on the enforceability or validity of the arbitration provision.The court concluded, as has every other California court presented with this or similar issues, that the threshold question of whether plaintiff is an employee or an independent contractor cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. The court found that this issue has been resolved adversely to Uber in two cases decided during and after briefing in this case: Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 982, and Contreras v. Superior Court (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461. The court was not persuaded to depart from the analyses in Provost and Contreras and all the authorities they cite. The court rejected Uber's claims to the contrary and affirmed the trial court's order. View "Rosales v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Rite Aid, and her former supervisor. In 2010, a jury returned a special verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded her $3.4 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on compensatory damages on plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Rite Aid and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Rite Aid and the supervisor. In 2014, on retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff $321,000 on her wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid, $0 on her intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against Rite Aid, and $20,000 on her intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against the supervisor. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for another new trial on compensatory damages on plaintiff's wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid and her intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action against Rite Aid and the supervisor. In 2018, at another retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff $2,012,258 on her wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid and $4 million on her intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action against Rite Aid and the supervisor.In regard to the award of past noneconomic damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's rejection of the Martinez II guidance does not require reversal of the judgment and the trial court did not instruct the jury to award duplicative damages. In regard to the award of past economic damages for wrongful termination, the court agreed with Rite Aid that plaintiff's actual post-termination earnings must be deducted from the past economic damages award for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court modified the judgment to reduce the award of past economic damages to plaintiff for wrongful termination by $140,840 to $323,418. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law