Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC
The Fourth Circuit held that "job sharing" a single full-time position with a willing partner does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation that an employer must provide under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court explained that, if the job share in question did not exist at the time it was proposed as an accommodation, the ADA does not require the employer to create the new position to accommodate a disabled employee.In this case, the court concluded that providing plaintiff with the job share position with another employee was not a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA—not because the position was not "vacant" but because the position she sought did not exist. Therefore, summary judgment should have been granted to Sanofi on plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim on this ground. Furthermore, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable accommodation, Sanofi cannot separately be liable for failing to engage in the interactive process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanofi. View "Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC" on Justia Law
Cooper v. City of St. Louis, Missouri
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the City on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment based on religion. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding plaintiff from introducing testimony and a report by the City's retained but non-testifying expert psychiatrist who had conducted an independent medical examination of plaintiff.The court concluded that the expert's report would have been cumulative with other testimony regarding causation and damages, and any discussion of damages was immaterial because the jury never reached that issue. Therefore, the exclusion did not result in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case, and the court need not consider whether the district court abused its substantial case management and discovery discretion in excluding the expert's independent medical examination report and testimony, an issue the court has not previously addressed. View "Cooper v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law
National Labor Relations Board v. NP Palace LLC
Slot-machine technicians at Palace Casino voted to organize. The NLRB certified Local 501 to represent them. The union asked Palace to produce documents. Palace refused, believing that the union should not have been certified. Certification is not a final agency action, so an employer cannot seek judicial review but must first refuse to bargain and suffer an unfair labor practice charge to obtain judicial review, with the claimed invalidity of certification serving as an affirmative defense.The Board found that Palace violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (5). Palace claimed that an order to furnish all requested information would require disclosure of confidential information, like its plans to combat illegal gaming activity and money laundering. The Board concluded that Palace raised a specific confidentiality interest that was “legitimate on its face,” and ordered Palace to bargain over the union’s request. Separately, the Board ruled that the customer complaints requested by the union were not presumptively relevant to the union’s duty as the employees’ bargaining representative but might be relevant in a particular case, and remanded that issue “for further appropriate action.” The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to the confidentiality order but dismissed the “customer complaints” remand and not being a final order subject to review. View "National Labor Relations Board v. NP Palace LLC" on Justia Law
Dept. of Talent & Econ. Dev. v. Great Oaks Country Club
This case stemmed from a dispute over the unemployment-insurance tax rate applicable to Great Oaks Country Club, Inc (Great Oaks). The Department of Talent and Economic Development/Unemployment Insurance Agency (the Agency) determined that Great Oaks was not entitled to the new-employer tax rate under the Michigan Employment Security Act (the MESA), specifically MCL 421.13m(2)(a)(i)(A) and (B). An ALJ determined that because Great Oaks had eight quarters of no employment or payroll before January 1, 2014, it was entitled to the new-employer tax rate. The ALJ further ruled that the phrase “beginning January 1, 2014” in MCL 421.13m(2)(a)(i)(A) and (B) was the date by when a client employer must have accrued eight quarters of not reporting employees or payroll. The Agency appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (the MCAC), and the MCAC affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals adopted the interpretation of Section 13m offered by the Agency, which maintained that a client employer must have switched to client-level reporting before January 1, 2014, to be assessed the new-employer tax rate (the conversion-date interpretation). The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in this context, Section 13m was best understood according to the interpretation offered by Great Oaks: that a client employer must have accrued the relevant number of calendar quarters in which it reported “no employees or no payroll” by January 1, 2014, to be assessed the new-employer tax rate (the accrual-date interpretation). And because Great Oaks reported no employees or payroll for eight consecutive calendar quarters before January 1, 2014, the Supreme Court held that Great Oaks was entitled to be assessed the new-employer tax rate under Section 13m of the MESA. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the matter remanded to the Agency for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Talent & Econ. Dev. v. Great Oaks Country Club" on Justia Law
Williams v. Bullock
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court ruling that Plaintiff's employer had complied with Iowa Code 35C.6 when it terminated the employment of Plaintiff, a military veteran, from his job as a police officer at the University of Iowa's (UI) Department of Public Safety (DPS), holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff was charged with misconduct after he violated DPS policies. Following arbitration, Plaintiff was terminated and was later reinstated without back pay. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari alleging that DPS violated section 35C.6 in his initial termination. The district court ruled that DPS had complied with section 35C.6 as interpreted in Kern v. Saydel Community School District, 637 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 2001). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to overrule Kern; and (2) the district court correctly determined that the State complied with Iowa Code 35C.6 in terminating Plaintiff. View "Williams v. Bullock" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Iowa Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
Andrew v. Hamilton County Public Hospital
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Hamilton County Public Hospital's motion for summary judgment concerning Plaintiff's defamation claim and Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL) claim, holding that Plaintiff's defamation and statutory wage claims failed.Plaintiff, a general surgeon, was employed by the hospital. After an investigation, Plaintiff's employment through a for-cause provision in his contract was terminated. The hospital subsequently made two reports to the Iowa Board of Medicine and the National Practitioner Data Bank. Plaintiff then brought this action. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the defamation and IWPCL claims, but the district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed on interlocutory appeal, holding (1) Plaintiff's defamation claim failed because the challenged portions of the reports were nonactionable opinions; and (2) Plaintiff's statutory wage claim failed because he did not perform work for which he was not paid. View "Andrew v. Hamilton County Public Hospital" on Justia Law
WSI v. Felan, et al.
WSI appealed a judgment ordering payment of death benefits to Gloria Felan. In 2017, Fred Felan was injured when driving a loaded truck that tipped on its side. Julie Schulz of KBO Farms, Fred’s employer, arrived at the scene a short time later. Fred declined an ambulance but agreed to allow Schulz to drive him to the hospital. At the hospital Fred complained of left chest and rib pain. X-rays taken at the hospital did not reveal any fractures. The next morning, Schulz picked Fred up from the hotel. She noted Fred was falling asleep during the meal and expressed concern he should return to the hospital to get checked again. Fred declined. Fred was discovered dead in his hotel room two days after the accident. WSI accepted Fred’s claim for injuries relating to his truck accident for contusion of thorax. WSI also did not believe Fred died from his work-related injury because Fred had multiple health problems including some related to his heart and diabetes. An autopsy confirmed Fred died of congestive cardiomyopathy and arteriosclerotic heart disease. Gloria thereafter filed a claim for death benefits. WSI would deny this claim, but an ALJ reversed the agency’s denial. WSI argued the ALJ and the district court misapplied the law by failing to properly apply N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the ALJ and district court, finding the ALJ was not provided objective evidence of the claimed injury: Fred died of a cardiac arrhythmia caused by blunt force trauma to his chest cavity. However, a medical expert admitted there was no objective medical evidence that an arrhythmia occurred. Rather, the conclusion the expert reached was a result of deductive reasoning. “As our precedent indicates, objective medical evidence may be established by a physician’s medical opinion based on an examination, a patient’s medical history, and the physician’s education and experience. However, objective medical evidence may not be established solely by deductive reasoning. On this record, the ALJ erred in concluding there was objective medical evidence of a cardiac arrhythmia.” View "WSI v. Felan, et al." on Justia Law
Simmons v. Trans Express Inc.
The Court of Appeals held that, under NY City Civ Ct Act 1808, small claims judgments do not have collateral estoppel or issue preclusive effect but that such judgments may have the traditional res judicator or claim preclusive effect in a subsequent action involving a claim between the same parties arising out of the same transaction at issue in a prior small claims court action.Plaintiff brought an action against her former employer in a small claims part of Civil Court seeking damages arising out of the alleged nonpayment of wages. After Defendant satisfied the small claims judgment, Plaintiff commenced this action in the federal district court seeking additional damages based on Defendant's failure to pay her overtime wages. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the federal litigation was barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion. In response, Plaintiff argued that NY City Civ Ct Act 1808 rendered small claim preclusion inapplicable to small claims judgments unless the subsequent action raised precisely the same claim or theory as the earlier action. The district court rejected Plaintiff's argument but certified a question to the Court of Appeals asking for an interpretation of section 1808. The Court of Appeals answered the question as set forth above. View "Simmons v. Trans Express Inc." on Justia Law
Taite v. Bridgewater State University
The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this case alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.Plaintiff, who was Black, sued Bridgewater State university's Board of Trustees and Office of Equal Opportunity and a University administrator (collectively, Defendants) alleging that she was not hired for a University position because of her race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's aggregate package of proof sufficed to survive Defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Taite v. Bridgewater State University" on Justia Law
Taylor v. Ernst
Taylor was fired from his job as a Cook County Sheriff’s officer. He sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ways, Whittler, and Ernst under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor, a charge that Taylor denies. Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offered evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserted that Ways and Whittler, Sheriff’s Office officials, are liable because they reviewed Ernst’s final report and endorsed his recommendation of termination.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst. Taylor presented evidence of Ernst’s significant role in the investigative and disciplinary proceedings that brought about Taylor’s termination. Any reasonable official in Ernst’s position would have known that intentional racial discrimination toward another employee was unconstitutional and what Taylor alleges against Ernst is textbook racial discrimination: the word “n****r,” used by Ernst, a white man, aimed at Taylor on several occasions. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler; evidence that they played key roles in approving Ernst’s termination does not signal that either harbored any racial animus or that they knew or suspected that Ernst was motivated by race. Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending. View "Taylor v. Ernst" on Justia Law