Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court answered two questions certified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that publicly funded work on rolling stock, like train cars, does not fall under the statutory definition of "public works" and that the work on rolling rock in this case did not qualify as "public work."At issue were two aspects of a project to design and install a comprehensive communications network to prevent train collections and other dangerous movements called field work and onboard work. Field work included building and outfitting radio towers on land adjacent to train tracks, and onboard work involved installing electronic components on train cars and locomotives. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant, which subcontracted to install system components on trains and rail cars. Plaintiff sued Defendant for failing to pay prevailing wages. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that onboard work did not fall within the scope of the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked whether the onboard work for the project fell within the definition of "public works" under Cal. Labor Code 1720(a)(1). The Supreme Court answered that the onboard work performed in this case was not itself "public work." View "Busker v. Wabtec" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by holding that Cal. Labor Code 1772 does not expand the categories of public work that trigger the obligation to pay at least the prevailing wage under Cal. Labor Code 1771.Plaintiffs, unionized engineers who operated milling equipment to break up existing roadbeds, brought a suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, failure to pay the prevailing wage for loading an equipment from an offsite location onto trailers and bringing it to the job site - known as mobilization - done in connection with public works projects. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, ruling that mobilization was not covered by prevailing wage protection. Plaintiffs appealed the mobilization decision, and the Ninth Circuit certified the question of whether the mobilization activity was covered by section 1772. The Supreme Court held that, where there was no contention that mobilization qualified as "public work," section 1772 did not provide a basis for requiring Plaintiffs to be paid the prevailing wage for that work. View "Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Baltimore City had breached its contract with two out of three sub-classes of police officers and firefighters and finding that Ordinance 10-306 retrospectively divested the members of those sub-classes of benefits they had earned, holding that there were no factual or legal errors in the circuit court's rulings.Baltimore City maintained a Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System (the Plan) to provide pension benefits to members of the City's police and fire departments. In 2010, the City enacted Ordinance 10-306, under which the City changed some of the key terms of the Plan. Plaintiffs commenced a class action lawsuit alleging claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract. The circuit court certified a class of plaintiffs and three sub-classes: a retired sub-class, a retirement-eligible sub-class, and an active sub-class. The circuit court granted judgment for all but the active sub-class, ruling that, as to currently employed members who had not yet reached retirement eligibility, Ordinance 10-306 did not affect vested benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Ordinance retrospectively divested retired and retirement-eligible members of the benefits they had earned. View "Cherry v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed an arbitration award that reinstated a member of the union to her former position after she was discharged by the company. The court concluded that the parties agreement authorized the arbitrator to determine whether there has been a violation of the parties' agreement within the allegations set forth in the grievance. In this case, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement's just cause provision and the provision does not specify that the same just cause is sufficient to justify all types of adverse action.The court also concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the record does not establish that the employee committed abuse as defined by the cited statutes, or that allowing her to return to work after a suspension violates public policy. View "WM Crittenden Operations, LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant failed to pay her wages in accordance with Minnesota law, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.Plaintiff worked as an on-site property caretaker at an apartment complex owned by Defendant. Because she also lived in an apartment on the property, Plaintiff was compensated primarily with credits toward her monthly rent. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's use of rent credits to pay her wages violated Minnesota law and that Defendant failed to pay her for every hour she worked during her on-call shifts. The district court dismissed all three claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Defendant. View "Hagen v. Steven Scott Management, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit granted Ridgewood's petition for review of the Board's order finding that Ridgewood committed several unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The court agreed with Ridgewood that it did not coercively interrogate Preferred applicants during job interviews; that the Board's discriminatory hiring finding is not supported by substantial evidence; and that Ridgewood was not a Burns successor and was not obligated to recognize and bargain with the union or respond to the union's information requests. Accordingly, the court denied the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Ridgewood Health Care Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging violations of the Health Care Facility Licensure Act (HCFLA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-401 to -476, and granting summary judgment to DHHS on the claims alleging violations of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101 to -1125, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs were two former employees of a state hospital who highlighted inadequate record keeping for hospital psychiatrists. Plaintiffs were subsequently fired. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging violations of the NFEPA and the HCFLA. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims based on the HCFLA on sovereign immunity grounds and then granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS on the NFEPA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiffs did not establish that they engaged in protected activity, the district court properly entered summary judgment against them on the NFEPA claims; and (2) because the State did not waive its sovereign immunity to suit under the HCFLA, the court properly dismissed those claims. View "Baker-Heser v. State" on Justia Law

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Zuniga, employed by Alexandria Care as a housekeeper, 2006-2012, filed a putative class action, alleging violations of the Labor Code and the governing Industrial Welfare Commission wage order, including failure to provide required meal periods, failure to provide required rest periods, failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in the discharge of their duties, and failure to maintain required records. She also asserted a cause of action for unfair and unlawful business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and a representative action for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, 2698). The Labor Workforce Development Agency advised Zuniga it did not intend to investigate the allegations. The court granted Alexandria’s motion to compel arbitration of Zuniga’s individual claims and stayed the PAGA claim. The parties settled Zuniga’s individual claims without settling the PAGA claim. The court entered judgment in favor of Alexandria on the representative claim.The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two proposed expert witnesses and the spreadsheets prepared by one expert’s company, which provided the basis for the expert’s opinions establishing Alexandria’s Labor Code violations. The court erred in excluding the expert testimony even if the spreadsheets lacked the foundation necessary to be admitted into evidence, and the error was prejudicial. View "Zuniga v. Alexandria Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

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California Labor Code section 1197.1 (b) authorized the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the Division) to issue a citation to an employer if the Division “determines that a person has paid or caused to be paid a wage less than the minimum under applicable law.” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether certain employers, farm labor contractor Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. (Zepeda), and Zepeda’s “client employers,” Anthony Vineyards, Inc. (AVI) and Richard Bagdasarian, Inc. (RBI) (collectively “Employers”), committed minimum wage violations that would support the Division’s issuance of section 1197.1 citations. It was undisputed that the Employers paid all of the employees at issue at least the minimum wage by payday. Nevertheless, the Division contended it properly issued section 1197.1 minimum wage citations because the Employers did not promptly pay the final wages of the employees who were purportedly discharged or deemed by the Division to have quit in accordance with the prompt payment mandates of Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203. The Division contended that the failure to pay wages on the dates that the employees were discharged or within 72 hours of when they quit subjected the Employers to waiting time penalties under section 203, and constituted independent minimum wage violations that supported the issuance of section 1197.1 citations, even though the Employers paid final wages that were at or above the minimum wage on or before payday, in accordance with the minimum wage law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Division improperly issued the section 1197.1 minimum wage citations to the Employers. Therefore, the the superior court properly issued a peremptory writ of administrative mandate directing the Division to dismiss the citations with prejudice. View "Jamie Zepeda Labor Contracting v. Dept. of Industrial Relations etc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal rejecting Appellant's challenge to the denial of his motion to disqualify A. Robert Singer as a hearing officer in a peer review proceeding, holding that the record did not establish that Singer should be disqualified for financial bias under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 809.2, subdivision (b).A medical executive committee adopted a recommendation to terminate Appellant's medical staff membership and hospital privileges. Appellant requested a peer review hearing to review the recommendation, and the hospital president exercised authority delegated by the medical staff to select Singer to serve as the hearing officer. Appellant challenged Singer's appointment on grounds of financial bias, but Singer denied the challenge. The peer review panel upheld the revocation of Appellant's staff membership and privileges. The superior court denied Appellant's petition for a writ of administrative mandate, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances surrounding Singer's appointment did not create an intolerable risk of bias that would require disqualification under section 809.2(b). View "Natarajan v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law