Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Trinity employee Victoria’s timecard indicated that she had earned three days of paid leave. The company’s records indicated otherwise. Victoria and her unionized coworkers had a unique paid-leave plan, different from the plan at Trinity’s other, nonunionized facilities. In response to the discrepancy, Victoria’s boss, Rivera, stated, “[T]hat is a problem that the Union created” and “You need to fix that with the Union.” A split panel of the National Labor Relations Board found that these remarks “had a reasonable tendency to interfere with” employees’ labor rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), because there was “no objective basis for blaming the Union” and the remarks came amidst “ongoing contract negotiations and grievance proceedings” regarding paid leave.The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of Trinity, declining to enforce the Board’s order. The National Labor Relations Act protects an employer’s right to “express[] . . . any views, argument, or opinion,” 29 U.S.C. 158(c). Unless the employer threatens “reprisal or force” or promises “benefit[s],” such expressions “cannot be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice.” Rivera’s remarks were “opinion[s]” containing no threats or promises and evoking no future consequences. The court declined to recognize an exception for misstatements involving no threat or promise. Section 8(c) does not require fairness or accuracy and says nothing about materiality or knowledge. View "Trinity Services Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court excluding two documents from the summary judgment record and granting summary judgment for Defendant on all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that the district court erred in excluding the two documents from the summary judgment record.Defendant terminated Defendant's employment after he had been employed for thirty-three years. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging wrongful termination of his employment under state law and age discrimination under federal and state law. Defendant moved to strike two of Plaintiff's documents on the grounds that they had been produced after the discovery cut-off date and that they were not properly authenticated. The district court granted the motion to strike the documents and then granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed the order excluding the documents and vacated the entry of summary judgment, holding that the court erred in striking the documents and that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment. View "Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll-Rand de Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

Tracy Green sued her employer, General Atomics, based on its alleged failure to provide accurate, itemized wage statements showing “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” Green maintained that General Atomics “failed to identify the correct rate of pay for overtime wages” because its wage statements showed “0.5 times the regular rate of pay rather than 1.5.” General Atomics moved for summary judgment, contending its wage statements complied with the statute because they showed the total hours worked, with their standard rate or rates, and the overtime hours worked, with their additional premium rate. The trial court issued an order denying the motion. General Atomics challenged that order by petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by determining that General Atomics’ wage statements violated Labor Code section 226: “While other formats may also be acceptable, given the complexities of determining overtime compensation in various contexts, the format adopted by General Atomics adequately conveys the information required by statute. It also allows employees to readily determine whether their wages were correctly calculated, which is the central purpose of section 226.” The Court therefore granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "General Atomics v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Labor Management Relations Act forbids employers from directly giving money to unions, 29 U.S.C. 186(a); an exception allows an employer and a union to operate a trust fund for the benefit of employees. Section 186(c)(5)(B) requires the trust agreement to provide that an arbitrator will resolve any “deadlock on the administration of such fund.” Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund, which is a tax-exempt entity under ERISA 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9). A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend a tax return. Three trustees, those selected by the companies, filed suit, seeking authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration.The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries may sue for a breach of statutory fiduciary duty in federal court without exhausting internal remedial procedures, this complaint did not allege a breach of fiduciary duties but rather alleges that the employer trustees’ own fiduciary duties compelled them to file the action to maintain the trust’s compliance with tax laws. These claims were “not directly adversarial to the [union trustees] or to the Fund.” View "Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25" on Justia Law

Wyatt began working as a Nissan project manager in 2013. For two years she received positive annual performance reviews. During those years, Wyatt twice had medical leave. Nissan restored Wyatt to her position and granted nearly all the work accommodations recommended by Wyatt’s doctor. In 2015, Wyatt began working on a project headed by Mullen who sexually harassed and assaulted her. Wyatt’s complaints led to Mullen leaving the company. At the same time, Wyatt took medical leave for back surgery. Upon her return, she and her doctors requested workplace accommodations, similar to those she had previously requested. Nissan denied her request for a 40-hour workweek. Wyatt claims that managers harassed her about her requests and gave Wyatt her first “below expectations” annual evaluation, Wyatt filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her managers later issued Wyatt a Performance Improvement Plan. Wyatt refused to sign the PIP, believing that it was retaliatory. In February 2017, Wyatt took medical leave and continues to be on leave.Wyatt filed suit, alleging hostile work environment, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; failure-to-accommodate, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101l and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted Nissan summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Wyatt’s ADA discrimination claim and claims that were based on retaliatory harassment but reversed with respect to Wyatt’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on adverse employment actions. View "Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Vesey, an African American woman, began work in 2012 for Envoy as a Quad Cities Airport station agent. In 2014, she drove a jet bridge into an aircraft and received a serious reprimand that remained in effect for two years. In 2016, Vesey and other Envoy employees lodged workplace-related complaints against each other. Envoy investigated and found Vesey’s allegations of bias and favoritism unsubstantiated. Weeks later, Vesey reported that a coworker, Masengarb, directed racist remarks and actions at her. Envoy found that complaint substantiated and fired Masengarb. Vesey claimed that others undertook a campaign of retaliation and harassment against her. An investigation uncovered several instances in which Vesey violated policies concerning the use of her travel benefit. Given that finding and the active reprimand, the investigator recommended termination. Vesey sued Envoy, alleging retaliation and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Envoy. Vesey does not allege retaliatory motives by Envoy’s investigators who recommended her termination, or by the committee members who approved it. The mere fact that an employee’s wrongdoing was reported by a biased supervisor with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive does not establish liability. A reasonable jury could not have concluded that Vesey was terminated for any reason other than her abuse of travel benefits. View "Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walmart, alleging three violations of California Labor Code's wage-statement and meal-break requirements; first, plaintiff alleged that Walmart did not provide adequate pay rate information on its wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code 226(a)(9); second, he claimed that Walmart failed to furnish the pay-period dates with his last paycheck, section 226(a)(6); and third, he asserted that Walmart did not pay adequate compensation for missed meal breaks, section 226.7(c). Plaintiff sought relief under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the meal-break claim because he did not suffer injury himself. The panel explained that PAGA's features diverge from the assignment theory of qui tam injury in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. V. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), and they depart from the traditional criteria of qui tam statutes. In regard to the two wage-statement claims, the panel held that plaintiff had standing but that Walmart did not breach California law. The panel explained that, because Walmart must retroactively calculate the MyShare overtime adjustment based on work from six prior periods, the panel did not consider it an hourly rate "in effect" during the pay period for purposes of section 226(a)(9). Therefore, Walmart complied with the wage statement law here. The panel also held that Walmart's Statements of Final Pay do not violate the wage statement statute. View "Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jackie Usher and Eric Leung, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (sometimes collectively, plaintiffs), appealed a judgment in favor of defendant Shirley White (Shirley). In 2014, plaintiffs brought a putative wage-and-hour class action lawsuit against defendants White Communications, LLC (White Communications or the company) and DirecTV, LLC (DirecTV). Under California Labor Code section 558.1, a “natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent” of an employer may be personally liable if that person, on behalf of the employer, “violates, or causes to be violated” certain wage and hour laws as provided in the statute. The court granted summary judgment for defendant, concluding as a matter of law she was not liable under section 558.1 because it found undisputed evidence that she did not participate in the determination to classify plaintiffs as independent contractors. The court therefore held defendant did not “cause[]” any violation of the enumerated sections of the Labor Code, as set forth in section 558.1 and in plaintiffs’ operative complaint. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court’s analysis and affirmed its judgment. View "Usher v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the Commissioner of Education had jurisdiction over a group of teachers' grievances and that some of the grievances were untimely and others were timely, holding that the grievances were timely filed.Teachers at Dallas Independent School District (DISD) objected to the district's method of evaluating teacher performance and filed grievances. DISD denied the grievances as untimely. The Teachers appealed to the Commissioner, who concluded that the untimely presentation of the grievances to the school board deprived him of jurisdiction. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Teachers' grievance; (2) the Teachers' grievance was timely filed with DISD, and therefore, the portion of the court of appeals' judgment upholding the dismissal of portions of the grievance as untimely was erroneous; and (3) the portion of the court of appeals' opinion reversing the dismissal of part of the grievance is affirmed. View "Davis v. Morath" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding Benjamin Melton workers' compensation benefits for a loss of foot and a partial loss of legs function after his leg was amputated below the knee, holding that the court's factual findings were not clearly wrong and there was no error of law.On appeal, Melton argued that the trial court erred in determining his loss and in deciding not to award a penalty regarding permanent loss of his foot or vocational rehabilitation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court (1) did not determine Melton's loss based on use of his prosthesis; (2) did not clearly err in not awarding Melton a total loss for use of his left leg; (3) properly awarded a combined total of 193 weeks of compensation; (4) did not clearly err in failing to award a waiting-time penalty, interest, and attorney fees with respect to late payment of permanent disability benefits for the loss of Melton's foot; and (5) did not err in denying vocational rehabilitation benefits. View "Melton v. City of Holdrege" on Justia Law