Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2004-2010, all the carriers signed a contract with The Fresno Bee to provide newspaper home delivery services, titled, “Independent Contractor Home Delivery Distribution Agreement.” In a class action alleging violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200), the trial court determined the carriers were independent contractors and entered judgment in favor of The Bee.The court of appeal reversed. Whether the carriers are employees or independent contractors must be determined under the Borello test; the trial court erred in deferring to the Employment Development Department regulations, which are inapplicable. The trial court failed to properly analyze the factors required by Borello. There were disputed issues of fact concerning the newspaper’s right to control necessary operations, as well as secondary factors. The court declined to resolve whether the carriers are employees or independent contractors, and instead remanded for the trial court to address the issue. View "Becerra v. McClatchy Co." on Justia Law

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Akal, a government contractor, repatriates persons ordered removed from the U.S., transporting detainees on airplanes. Akal staffs it flights with air security officers (ASOs). Once the detainees have been transported to their respective destinations, the ASOs are required to return to the U.S. aboard the same aircraft. Because return flights carry no detainees, the ASOs have few affirmative duties during them. On arrival, the ASOs unload and clean the plane and perform other minor administrative duties to prepare for the following day. Akal acknowledges that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207it has to pay its ASOs for overtime spent on the Returns. For Returns lasting longer than 90 minutes, Akal automatically deducts one hour from each shift as a “meal period” and instructs ASOs to disengage from work duties during meal periods.ASOs sued Akal under the FLSA for unpaid wages. The district court granted the ASOs summary judgment, holding that Akal’s automatic “meal period” deductions violated the Act but that Akal had acted in good faith and had not willfully violated the FLSA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Akal was not entitled to make the challenged meal-period deductions from otherwise compensable work. The district court correctly found that Akal acted in good faith and not willfully. View "Gelber v. Akal Security, Inc." on Justia Law

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The child at issue in this case, Grayson, was born on February 14, 2013 to a mother with a significant history of drug abuse; Grayson allegedly had drugs in his system at birth. Shortly thereafter, in March 2013, Grayson was adjudicated a “child in need of care,” placed in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), and entrusted to the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. While in Gafford's, Grayson suffered severe personal injuries, which included brain damage, blindness, and seizures; it was also alleged that the child had bite marks on his thigh and abdomen. Gafford did not disclose these injuries until Grayson was taken to the hospital in May 2013. This suit was filed to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by an infant while in the custody of DCFS and in the physical care of foster parents. After all other claims were dismissed except allegations that DCFS was vicariously liable for the actions of the foster mother, based not only on an employer-employee relationship, but also based on DCFS’s non-delegable duty as the legal custodian of the child, as set forth in Miller v. Martin, 838 So.2d 761 (2003), DCFS filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action, claiming La. R.S. 42:1441.1 barred the application of La. C.C. art. 2320 to DCFS. The district court denied the peremptory exception, and the appellate court denied the ensuing writ application filed by DCFS. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kunath v. Gafford" on Justia Law

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This case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by defendants Shane Taylor ("Taylor") and Shane A. Taylor & Associates, P.C. ("the law firm"), asking the Alabama Supreme Court to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its March 22, 2021, order denying their motion to strike the jury demand in the complaint filed against them by plaintiff Kimberly Hall-Smith, and to enter a new order granting their motion to strike. Taylor was a licensed attorney; Hall-Smith worked as paralegal for the law firm for a period. The law firm and Hall-Smith entered into an "Employee Confidentiality Agreement" ("the agreement"), which included a jury waiver provision should any litigation arise between them. Hall-Smith signed the agreement. Subsequently, the law firm terminated her employment. Hall-Smith then sued Taylor and the law firm alleging Taylor negligently, recklessly, and/or intentionally subjected her to, among other things, "harmful, unwanted, offensive and sexually charged physical contact." She asserted claims of negligence and/or wantonness and the tort of outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress against Taylor and the law firm. Hall-Smith further asserted claims of assault, battery, and invasion of privacy against Taylor. Finally, the complaint included a demand for a trial by jury. Taylor and the law firm filed a motion to strike Hall-Smith's jury demand based on the jury-waiver provision included in the agreement. They asserted that Hall-Smith's claims clearly arose from her employment with the law firm and that their counterclaims against Hall-Smith "are related to both the subject matter of the [agreement] and [Hall-Smith's] employment." The Supreme Court agreed that Hall-Smith's claims against the law firm were related to her employment, and she waived her right to a jury trial as to those claims. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied defendants' motion to strike the demand for a jury trial. The Court issued the writ and directed the trial court to enter an order granting defendants' motion. View "Ex parte Shane Taylor and Shane A. Taylor & Associates, P.C." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit held that, for Copyright Act purposes, the screenwriter Victor Miller was an independent contractor of the film production company Manny, Inc., in 1979, when Miller wrote the screenplay for the landmark horror film Friday the 13th, released in 1980. Manny argues primarily that Miller's membership in the Writers' Guild of America, East, Inc. (WGA), and Manny's participation in the producers' collective bargaining agreement with the WGA in the same period establish that Miller was Manny's employee for Copyright Act purposes.The court concluded that copyright law, not labor law, controls the "work for hire" determination here. The court explained that because the definition of "employee" under copyright law is grounded in the common law of agency and the Reid framework and serves different purposes than do the labor law concepts regarding employment relationships, there is no sound basis for using labor law to override copyright law goals. Furthermore, there was no error in the district court's refusal to treat Miller's WGA membership as a separate Reid factor. The court applied the Reid factors and concluded that Miller was an independent contractor when he wrote the screenplay and is therefore entitled to authorship rights. The court also concluded that the notice of termination that Miller gave under section 203 of the Copyright Act is effective as to Manny and its successors. The court found that the Companies' remaining arguments did not provide a basis for reversal and thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miller. View "Horror Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

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Datalink and its president appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government on its claim to collect back wages on behalf of a native of Iceland and former Datalink employee. The back wages were owing to the employee under federal law governing the H-1B visa program. On appeal, defendants contend that the Government may not use the procedures of the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) to collect the unpaid wages.The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the Government may not rely on the FDCPA to collect back wages on the employee's behalf. The court agreed with defendants that an administrative award of back wages is not an amount "owing to the United States" under the FDCPA, and overruled NLRB v. E.D.P. Medical Computer Systems, Inc., 6 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 1993), as wrongly decided and inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the FDCPA. View "United States v. Bedi" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the Retirement Systems's Administrative Review Board affirming the decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems applying the Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.598, the pension-spiking statute, to assess actuarial costs to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (JCSO), holding that the Retirement Systems erred in part.The Kentucky Retirement Systems assessed the costs because it found a JCSO employee took unpaid leave for two months, causing a temporary decrease in gross compensation in that year, but then returned to his earlier pay. The circuit court agreement with the Retirement Systems, finding that section 61.598 as applied was not arbitrary. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Retirement Systems improperly applied section 61.598 to the pay spikes to the extent the changes in compensation were caused by an isolated transition in JCSO's new accounting method but properly assessed the increased actuarial costs to the extent it was caused by regular overtime work; and (2) different aspects of the circuit court's decision were erroneous. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting permanent partial disability benefits (PPD) to Richard Russell but finding that certain medical expenses were submitted untimely and were therefore non-compensable, holding that there was no error.Russell sustained a work-related injury to his right arm and sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ found that Russell did not timely submit his medical bills, so they were not compensable, but otherwise granted PPD benefits. The Board reversed, concluding that the medical bills were not submitted untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Russell timely submitted his medical expenses. View "Wonderfoil, Inc. v. Russell" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Cincinnati to promote Jay Johnstone to the rank of captain, with backpay, holding that the trial court erred.Johnstone requested to be allowed to participate in a process to be promoted to the position of captain in the City's police department. After an examination, Johnstone was not promoted. Johnstone filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus, which the trial court issued. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a municipal civil service commission may require that a police officer other than a patrol officer serve more than twelve months in the officer's current rank as a condition for being promoted to a higher rank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124.44 does not allow a municipal civil service commission to require that a police officer other than a patrol officer serve more than twelve months in the officer's current rank as a condition for promotion. View "State ex rel. Johnstone v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Irean Amaro filed this wage and hour class action and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) lawsuit against defendant Anaheim Arena Management (AAM) in 2017. At the time, there were already two existing class actions asserting the same claims: one in 2014, and the other in 2016. About a month after filing her lawsuit, Amaro and AAM reached a global settlement that covered the claims asserted in the two prior class actions. The plaintiffs from the prior actions, which included intervener Rhiannon Aller, were not involved in those settlement discussions. Aller intervened in this lawsuit and objected to the settlement. Initially, the trial court denied preliminary approval of the settlement on grounds Amaro had not given the court enough information to determine the adequacy of the settlement. Amaro then engaged in extensive informal discovery and entered into an amended settlement with AAM. The court approved the amended settlement over Aller’s objections and entered judgment per the settlement’s terms. Aller appealed, claiming the court’s approval of the settlement was erroneous for two reasons: (1) the class members’ release in the settlement was improper because it extended to claims outside the scope of Amaro’s complaint, waived class members’ (from all class actions) claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) without obtaining their written consent, and released PAGA claims beyond the limitations period of Amaro’s own PAGA claim; and (2) the court abused its discretion in finding the settlement was not the product of a collusive reverse auction. The Court of Appeal agreed the release was overbroad, but there was nothing inherently wrong with AAM's bypassing the other class action plaintiffs and undercutting their claims by negotiating a settlement with Amaro that extinguished the other suits. Though the Court rejected most of Aller’s arguments, it reversed the judgment and remanded with directions due to the overbreadth of the release. View "Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management" on Justia Law