Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the term "service charge" is a defined term in the Tips Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, that the disputed charge at issue in this case was properly characterized as a "service charge," and that the "safe harbor" provision of the Act did not apply in this case.Plaintiffs, service employees for Concert Blue Hill, LLC and its managerial staff (collectively, Blue Hill), alleged that Blue Hill violated the Act by failing to remit to them charges identified as "service" charges on invoices sent to patrons but previously described in initial documents as "administrative" or "overhead" charges. The superior court granted Blue Hill's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the action. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the plain meaning of the Act required Blue Hill to remit the disputed charge to Plaintiffs. View "Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming the determination of the compensation judge that Respondent's treatment with opioid medication for a work-related ankle injury that resulted in a pain condition was compensable as a rare case exception, holding that the rare case exception to the treatment parameters did not apply.The opioid medication in this case was non-compliant with the long-term opioid medication parameter promulgated by the Department of Labor & Industry for that form of treatment. At issue was whether the medication was compensable under the workers' compensation laws as a "rare case" exception. The Supreme Court held that the rare case exception did not apply because the circumstances of this case were not exceptional and thus reversed the decision of the WCCA. View "Johnson v. Darchuks Fabrications, Inc." on Justia Law

Hester, employed by Bell-Textron since 1997, suffers from epilepsy and glaucoma. Hester also assists his wife, who has stage-four cancer. In 2017, Hester began reporting to Cribb, who was aware of Hester’s medical history. In 2018, Cribb issued Hester's first poor performance review. Months later, Cribb issued Hester a final warning related to a part that broke during testing. Hester protested and was escorted off-premises. Cribb told him to apply for an employee assistance program. Hester was granted short-term disability coverage and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) based on his epilepsy and glaucoma. A human resources employee fired Hester by telephone weeks later, citing Hester’s “poor mid-year performance review.” Hester was informed that he still had several weeks of FMLA leave remaining. Hester then filed suit, alleging discriminatory termination during the pendency of his FMLA leave and interference with his right of reinstatement at the end of his FMLA leave.The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his complaint. The alleged timeline of events indicates that BellTextron’s termination decision was not “completely unrelated” to the exercise of his FMLA rights. The allegation that Bell-Textron directed Hester to an employee assistance program and guided him through the FMLA application process—rather than simply firing him outright on the basis of poor workplace performance—indicates that Hester’s right to restored employment was still intact when he secured FMLA leave. View "Hester v. Bell-Textron, Inc." on Justia Law

Ohlson was a forensic scientist with the Arizona Department of Public Safety and analyzed blood samples for alcohol content, reported the findings, and testified about those findings in court proceedings. Ohlson advocated for changes in how the lab disclosed batched test results and, contrary to his superiors’ orders, communicated his opinions within the Department, with defense attorneys, and in court hearings. He was disciplined and eventually forced to retire.The district court rejected Ohlson’s allegations of First Amendment retaliation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ohlson’s advocacy in the course of his employment duties could conceivably have adversely affected confidence in the accuracy of the Department’s test results, as well as in the Department. The defendants did not violate any clearly established law; where, as in this case, an employee, in the course of doing the job, has expressed views the employer regards as contrary to its interests, controlling legal principles remain particularly uncertain, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ohlson v. Brady" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute, at issue is who counts as an "employee" under the Texas Anti-Indemnity Act (TAIA). The Fifth Circuit certified the following question to Supreme Court of Texas: Whether the employee exception to the TAIA, Texas Insurance Code 151.103, allows additional insured coverage when an injured worker brings a personal injury claim against the additional insured (indemnitee), and the worker and the indemnitee are deemed "co-employees" of the indemnitor for purposes of the TWCA. View "Maxim Crane Works, LP v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Maner worked as a biomedical engineer in the laboratory of Dr. Garfield for several decades. Maner learned that Garfield and another employee, Shi, were engaged in a long-term romantic relationship. Garfield brought Shi with him to research conferences to which other employees were not invited and conferred upon Shi a greater share of workplace opportunities related to publications and intellectual property than Maner felt she should have received. In 2008, Maner was arrested at work for alleged aggravated sexual assault; he pleaded guilty to a lesser state law offense. Maner subsequently received positive performance reviews and merit pay increases. Garfield approved a remote work arrangement to enable Maner to serve his probation. Garfield’s lab began to suffer a decline in grant funding. In 2011, Garfield submitted a highly negative review of Maner’s performance under the remote work arrangement. Maner’s position was eliminated based on the poor performance review and lack of funding.Maner brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and a Title VII retaliation claim alleging that his termination was for protesting Garfield’s favoritism toward Shi. The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for the employer. Maner’s “paramour preference” reading of Title VII fails the Supreme Court’s test for assessing whether an adverse employment action violated Title VII—whether changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer. Maner failed to establish any causal connection between the claimed protected activity and the termination decision. View "Maner v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Appellant Beverly Sumpter worked as a school aide. She reported an injury to her cervical spine after she repositioned a disabled student in his wheelchair. Sumpter had significant preexisting cervical spine problems. Doctors disagreed about whether the incident she described could have aggravated these problems and if so for how long. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that her work was not the substantial cause of her ongoing disability and need for medical care, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Sumpter appealed, contending that the Board and Commission applied incorrect legal standards and that the Board failed to make findings about material and contested issues. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Sumpter v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District" on Justia Law

A minor was severely injured in an all-terrain vehicle collision in which the other driver was at fault. The minor had medical benefits coverage through a health care plan provided by her father’s employer, the Fairbanks North Star Borough. As allowed by the terms of the plan, the Borough refused to pay the minor’s medical bills until she signed an agreement that included a waiver of certain defenses to the Borough’s subrogation rights, such as the common fund and made-whole doctrines. The minor refused to sign the agreement without reservation and filed suit, seeking a declaration that the Borough could not condition payment of her medical bills on her signature. The superior court decided on summary judgment that the Borough’s health care plan was not a true insurance plan and that, regardless of whether it was interpreted as an insurance policy or an ordinary contract, the parties could lawfully reject subrogation defenses. The minor appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the health care plan was a bargained-for employee benefit rather than a true insurance policy, and that the superior court’s interpretation of it was correct. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Best v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shelly Pritchett worked for the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC), which ran the state’s juvenile correctional facilities. She was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. When her second request for unpaid leave was denied, her supervisor refused to explain the denial or put the denial in writing. On November 1, 2011, Pritchett learned that she would be subject to disciplinary proceedings -- which would result in her termination without a pension -- if she did not resign by the end of the week. Pritchett applied for retirement disability benefits on November 4. Weeks later, her union representative informed the JJC that Pritchett believed she was forced into retirement against her will. The JJC’s Equal Opportunity Office expressed its opinion that the JJC “failed to engage in the interactive process,” which “resulted in a violation of the State Anti-Discrimination Policy,” but opined that Pritchett’s “request for reinstatement [was] mooted by [her] approval for disability retirement.” Pritchett filed a complaint alleging the State violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). A jury awarded Pritchett compensatory damages in excess of $1.8 million and punitive damages of $10 million. The State challenged the punitive damages award. The trial court determined that the punitive damages amount was high but that no miscarriage of justice occurred. The Appellate Division affirmed in large part, but remanded for reconsideration of the punitive damages award, calling upon the trial court to consider the factors discussed in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The State petitioned for certiorari review, arguing that the Appellate Division’s remand instructions were flawed in part because they failed to include direction to the trial court to apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing awards of LAD punitive damages against public entities. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the state, modifying the Appellate Division's order to include instruction that the trial court review the punitive damages award with heightened scrutiny. View "Pritchett v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on his state-law disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as his claims for retaliation and interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Plaintiff's claim stemmed from his termination after taking time off of work for open-heart surgery.The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code where there simply is no medical evidence in the record except for plaintiff's own statements that he was qualified to return to work at any point, let alone before his FMLA leave expired; plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for either of two positions at work; and there was no other request for accommodations outside of the ability to attend dialysis treatments nor any reasonable explanation to account for the contradictory statements about plaintiff's physical capabilities made in the application for social security benefits. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to support that he engaged in any protected activity under state law that led to retaliation by his employer.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not show the prejudice necessary to prevail on an FMLA interference claim. However, in regard to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, the adverse employment action occurred approximately one month after plaintiff's FMLA leave expired. The court concluded that a month is close enough in time to create a causal connection. Therefore, the burden shifts to the employer to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse reaction. Although the employer offered three reasons, the court concluded that they have been adequately rebutted for purposes of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed on all claims except for the FMLA retaliation claim, which it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law