Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant, his employer, did not substantially comply with Iowa Code 730.5(15) when it drug tested him and then terminated him after he tested positive for methamphetamine, holding that equitable relief was appropriate based on the facts of this case.After Plaintiff was randomly selected for a drug test the lab technician rejected Plaintiff's first sample for being insufficient. The second sample tested positive for methamphetamine. Following Plaintiff's termination, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing him of the drug test results and his right to get a confirmatory test. Plaintiff then brought this complaint alleging that the letter did not substantially comply with section 730.5. The district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Defendant failed to substantially comply with section 730.5(7)(j)(1) when it failed to include the cost of a retest in its notice to Plaintiff. View "Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that two of Employer's employees were improperly classified as engaged in safety-sensitive positions so that they should never have been drug tested and were entitled to relief and that two other employees were not aggrieved by Employer's actions in attempting to comply with the statutory requirements, holding that there was no error.Employer in this case amended its drug-testing policy to allow for unannounced random drug testing. Plaintiffs, three employees who tested positive and were terminated and a fourth who failed to provide an adequate sample, brought this action under the civil remedies provision of Iowa Code 730.5 arguing that Employer failed to follow statutory requirements involving workplace drug testing. The district court granted relief to two of the four plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) two of the employees should not have been tested under Employer's testing program and were entitled to relief; and (2) the other two employees were not entitled to relief. View "Dix v. Casey's General Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In its petition seeking a workplace violence restraining order, Goals alleged that its employee and shareholder, A.K., needed protection from Rosas because he “verbally harassed and threatened” her, making her feel unsafe. Goals claimed Rosas told A.K. that he owned firearms, and caused her to have panic attacks. The court denied a request for a temporary restraining order, citing insufficient evidence that Rosas threatened A.K. with violence, and set the matter for hearing on June 10, 2019. On June 1, Rosas was timely served with the petition and a notice of hearing.Rosas filed an opposition on June 7, denying every allegation in the petition, arguing that the petition lacked evidentiary support and had been filed for an improper purpose (related to ongoing civil litigation). He sought sanctions and requested a two-week continuance because he was “out of town on a charitable bicycle ride,” and needed more time to prepare for the hearing. Neither Rosas nor his counsel appeared in court for the hearing. In Rosas’s absence, a judge denied a continuance and, after hearing A.K.'s testimony, granted the requested two-year restraining order. The court of appeal affirmed. Code of Civil Procedure 527.8(o) does not require trial courts to grant respondents a continuance once they have responded to a petition for a restraining order. View "Goals for Autism v. Rosas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against FCI and its owners, alleging claims under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court entered judgment on the WARN Act claim in favor of plaintiffs and on the FLSA claim in favor of FCI. While FCI's appeal was pending, plaintiffs sought to dismiss the appeal because FCI had failed to post the appeal bond ordered by the district court.The Fourth Circuit declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss the appeal after considering the facial invalidity of the bond and prejudice to the parties. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in determining that FCI was an "employer" covered by the WARN Act. The court explained that FCI employed fewer than 100 employees on August 6, 2018, and is therefore not an "employer" whose shutdown activities are covered by the WARN Act. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the WARN Act claim. View "Schmidt v. FCI Enterprises LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Grenada appealed a Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the findings of the Mississippi Department of Employment Security Board of Review (Board of Review) that a terminated police officer was entitled to unemployment benefits. The Board of Review found that Stefan Sanders failed a fitness-for-duty exam due to psychological problems and that the City of Grenada had acted reasonably by discharging Sanders. But because Sanders’s mental condition was outside his control, the Board of Review found that he was entitled to receive unemployment compensation. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Board of Review’s decision that Sanders was entitled to unemployment benefits was supported by substantial evidence, thus it affirmed the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Board of Review’s decision. View "City of Grenada v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Petitioner, holding that the WCC's Appellate Division acted in excess of its statutory authority in concluding that R.I. Gen. Laws 45-21.2-9 conferred authority to award attorneys' fees in this case.Petitioner, a firefighter with the City of Woonsocket, sustained a work-related injury and applied for accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits with Respondent, Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island. Respondent denied Petitioner's ADR application, finding that Petitioner had failed to prove that is injury arose out of and in the course of his duties as a firefighter. On appeal, the trial judge granted Petitioner's petition seeking ADR benefits and awarded a counsel fee to Petitioner's counsel. The Appellate Division upheld the fee award and imposed an additional fee for counsel's work before the Appellate Division. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly has not conveyed specific statutory authority upon the WCC to award attorneys' fees and costs in successful ADR appeal claims. View "Koback v. Municipal Employees' Retirement System of R.I." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a years-long dispute between Robert Elgee and the Retirement Board of the Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho (“PERSI”) regarding the payment of retirement benefits accrued during Elgee’s service as a magistrate judge. Elgee became eligible for PERSI benefits in 2010, but operating under an erroneous interpretation of the statutes it administers, PERSI maintained Elgee was not then entitled to receive benefits. Eleven years, numerous administrative determinations, and two judicial review actions later, the parties continued to disagree on issues relating to the calculation of benefits, the interest due on benefits, and whether Elgee was entitled to damages for the tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of retroactive benefits. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court as to the applicable rate of interest, reversed as to the remaining issues, and remanded for entry of judgment. On remand the district court was directed to enter judgment that reflected: (1) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest at the regular rate of interest under the PERSI statutes was affirmed; (2) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest from 2013, rather than 2010, was set aside; (3) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due benefits under the contingent annuitant option, rather than the regular retirement option was affirmed; (4) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee failed to prove his tax loss claim in 2018 was set aside; and (5) the PERSI Board’s determination that tax loss damages were not available under the PERSI statutes was affirmed. View "Elgee v. Retirement Brd. of the Public Employee (PERSI)" on Justia Law

Daza worked as a geologist for INDOT from 1993 until the agency fired him in 2015. In 2017, he sued, citing 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. He alleged that INDOT and its officials had discriminated against him based on race, color, age, and political speech and had retaliated against complaints he made regarding the alleged discrimination.Days after the district court granted INDOT summary judgment in 2018, Daza filed a second action, again alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, age, and political speech, contending that INDOT’s failure to rehire him for the vacancy left after INDOT dismissed him was an independent act of discrimination and retaliation because INDOT filled his position with a young and inexperienced white man. In the first suit, Daza had expressly contended that INDOT’s failure to rehire him and its decision to hire an unqualified replacement proved that INDOT was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in favor of INDOT. Claim preclusion barred the second case. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Walmart in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging age discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The court assumed that plaintiff met his prima facie burden under the McDonnell Douglas standard, but concluded that Walmart offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment, the violation of the Hazardous Materials Endorsement policy while on a Third Written (a policy meaning he could be fired if disciplined again). The court also concluded that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find that Walmart's proffered reason for firing him was pretextual. View "Gardner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

A California regulation mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Union organizers sought access to property owned by two California growers, who sought to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking and the growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the government, rather than appropriating private property for itself or a third party, imposes regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property, courts generally determine whether a taking has occurred by applying the “Penn Central” factors. When the government physically appropriates property, the flexible Penn Central analysis has no place. California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is “a fundamental element of the property right.” The duration of a physical appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due. The California regulation is not transformed from a physical taking into a use restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organizers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time.The Court distinguished restrictions on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals on the premises; isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access; and requirements that property owners cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits. Government inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law