Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In his employment discrimination action, Nichols obtained a judgment of $1.5 million in damages (later reduced to the statutory cap of $300,000) and $952,156 in equitable relief. His attorney, Longo petitioned for $1,709,345 in attorneys’ fees and $4,460.47 in costs under Title VII’s fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). He submitted that his hourly rate was $550 and that he had worked 3,107.9 hours on Nichols’s case; he requested a 15% upward adjustment, arguing that Nichols’s case was “risky”; the successful outcome; and the deterrent impact of a large award.The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of $774,584.50 in fees and $4,061.02 in costs. Relying on other then-recent fee awards for Longo, the court set the reasonable hourly rate at $360 for attorney work and $125 for paralegal work. The court reduced Longo’s request by 962.1 hours, including 109.2 hours that Longo had billed for trips from his office to the courthouse; 18.5 hours for paralegal work billed at an attorney’s rate; a 10% reduction (298.0 hours) for excessive billing for clerical work; and another 20% reduction (536.4 hours) for general excessive billing. The court permitted Longo 2,145.8 hours at an attorney’s rate and 18.5 hours at a paralegal’s rate and denied Longo fees for litigating the fee petition, noting Longo’s lack of billing judgment and overly voluminous petition. View "Nichols v. Illinois Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's orders involving plaintiff and Union Pacific's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in this suit under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the lack of damages or equitable relief at the district court level did not strip this court of subject matter jurisdiction. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court improperly granted plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where a reasonable jury could find Union Pacific attempted to fit plaintiff into an appropriate job within the corporation's reorganized structure upon his return from deployment, thereby leading to the conclusion Union Pacific reemployed him in accordance with the escalator position principle. The court reversed the district court's JMOL decision on the reemployment claim.In addressing the denial of its own JMOL motion, Union Pacific raised affirmative defenses for the first time on appeal. The court will not consider Union Pacific's new arguments on appeal. Nonetheless, on the record before the court and on de novo review, the court concluded that the district court should have granted Union Pacific's motion for JMOL because no reasonable jury could find in favor of plaintiff on his reemployment claim. In this case, the record does not support the conclusion that Union Pacific failed to place plaintiff in the position that he would have otherwise been in had he not been deployed. Finally, because plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his reemployment claim, he does not qualify as a prevailing party for the purpose of recovering attorney fees. View "Quiles v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment against the Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce on its claims that voter-initiated legislation establishing an emergency minimum wage in Portland violated the Portland City Code and the Maine Constitution, holding that there was no error.After voters approved the initiative at issue, Plaintiffs, employers with employees in Portland, filed a complaint asserting that the initiative was invalid and that, if it was valid, it would not take effect until January 1, 2022. Intervenors filed a cross-claim seeking declaratory relief establishing the effective date of the emergency provision as December 6, 2020. The superior court concluded that the emergency provision was validly enacted pursuant to the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code and dismissed Intervenors' cross-claims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the initiative was validly enacted; and (2) the emergency provision was effective as of January 1, 2022. View "Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal previously issued an opinion in this case on September 18, 2018, in which it affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court granted review in January 2019, deferring consideration and disposition until it decided a related issue in Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 9 Cal.5th 762 (2020). In September 2020, the Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the September 18, 2018 opinion and to reconsider this appeal in light of Oman. This case arose from a certified wage and hour class action following a judgment after a bench trial in favor of defendants Certified Tire and Service Centers, Inc. (Certified Tire) and Barrett Business Services, Inc. (collectively defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Certified Tire violated the applicable minimum wage and rest period requirements by implementing a compensation program, which guaranteed its automotive technicians a specific hourly wage above the minimum wage for all hours worked during each pay period, but also gave them the possibility of earning a higher hourly wage for all hours worked during each pay period based on certain productivity measures. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing on the applicability of Oman to the issues presented in this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded that that plaintiffs’ appeal lacked merit, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "Certified Tire & Service Centers Wage & Hour Cases" on Justia Law

Adamo filed several tort claims, alleging that it requested the Union to provide 47 operators for a demolition job, indicating that the project was time-sensitive and that the Union willfully refused to provide Adamo contact information for proposed workers, refused to give reasonable assurances that operators were experienced, trained and qualified, and refused to fulfill Adamo’s request to verify their qualifications. Adamo alleged that the Union sent unqualified workers, who created unsafe working conditions and caused damage for which Adamo was liable. Adamo partially staffed the project with its own workers; the Union allegedly ordered these workers to stop work and used “intimidation” to displace the experienced workers with unqualified workers. As a result of the Union’s interference, Adamo claims it breached its contractual obligations. Adamo also contends that the Union and its president have been “intentionally and maliciously" made "unprivileged, injurious, false and defamatory statements concerning Adamo,” which are affecting Adamo’s good reputation in the community.The district court concluded that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, preempted all Adamo’s claims and dismissed them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Whether the defendants’ conduct was justified or improper is inextricably intertwined with and dependent upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The only allegedly defamatory statements were published in the context of a labor dispute, and required a showing of actual malice; the falsity of those statements defends on the terms of the agreement. View "Adamo Demolition Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers" on Justia Law

Adams, a member of the Arizona Air National Guard, worked in human resources for Customs and Border Patrol (the agency). In 2018, Adams performed three periods of National Guard military service. Between April 11 and July 13, Adams was activated under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to support a military personnel appropriation (MPA) tour in support of Twelfth Air Force; July 18-July 30, he was ordered to attend annual training under 32 U.S.C. 502(a). Between July 28 and September 30, Adams was again activated under section 12301(d) to support an MPA tour. Both 12301(d) orders stated that they were “non-contingency” activation orders.Under 5 U.S.C. 5538(a), federal employees who are absent from civilian positions due to certain military responsibilities may qualify to receive the difference between their military pay and what they would have been paid in their civilian employment during the time of their absence (differential pay). Adams requested differential pay for each of his periods of service. Adams appealed the agency's denials. The Merit Systems Protection Board held that the denials did not violate the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Entitlement to differential pay requires service under a call to active duty that meets the statutory definition of a contingency operation. None of Adams’s service meets the statutory requirements for differential pay, View "Adams v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

FCI Miami employees work in several departments. When the Custody Department was short-staffed, FCI either left Custody positions vacant or paid a Custody employee overtime. In 2016, FCI notified the union (AFGE) that it planned to start using Non-Custody employees to fill vacant Custody positions; it called the process “augmentation.” AFGE sought to negotiate the matter. FCI denied the request, stating that it had implemented augmentation consistent with the Master Agreement, which permits FCI to change the shift or assignment of Custody and Non-Custody employees: FCI viewed augmentation as “reassignment.”AFGE filed a formal grievance. An arbitrator concluded that FCI had breached a binding past practice of non-augmentation and violated the Master Agreement by implementing and failing to bargain over augmentation. FCI filed exceptions. The Federal Labor Relations Authority concluded that the arbitrator award failed to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement because the Master Agreement unambiguously “gives [FCI] broad discretion to assign and reassign employees”—encompassing the practice of augmentation— and set aside the award. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute allows for judicial review of an Authority decision arising from review of arbitral awards only if “the order involves an unfair labor practice, 5 U.S.C. 7123(a)(1). The Authority decision does not “involve” an unfair labor practice. View "American Federation of Government Employees Local 3690 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. The City asked the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, but the trial court concluded that an appeal to the HR Commission was unnecessary. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found for plaintiff and awarded him about $4 million, including $2 million in past noneconomic damages and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages. The trial court subsequently denied the City's motion for a new trial.The Court of Appeal concluded that the involvement of plaintiff's direct superior in the underlying dispute, on one hand, and his expected role in deciding plaintiff's appeal, on the other, violated the requirements of due process and therefore excused plaintiff from proceeding with his administrative appeal. The court also found no reversible evidentiary error by the trial court. However, the court agreed with the City that the $3.5 million noneconomic damages award -- comprising $2 million in past and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages -- was so excessive as to suggest it resulted from passion or prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the awards for past and future noneconomic damages and remanded for a new trial on these issues, unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the awards to $1 million and $100,000, respectively. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Briley v. City of West Covina" on Justia Law

In this case in which in which a sales representative of Alarm Protection Technology (APT) sought to challenge a set of steps taken by APT to insulate itself from claims for unpaid compensation, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying a motion filed by Plaintiff.Plaintiff, a former sales representative for APT, filed an action alleging that APT and related parties owed him $348,434 in unpaid commissions. This appeal concerned steps taken by APT to insulate itself, including its payment of an advance in exchange for the execution of a confession of judgment, the entry of a judgment by confession, the issuance of a writ of execution against Plaintiff's claims for unpaid commissions, APT's subsequent purchase of those claims, and APT's substitution as plaintiff on the claims against itself. At issue were the district court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for return of excess proceeds and unused property from APT's purchase of his claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that APT was not required to (1) establish the value of Plaintiff's claims before executing on them and purchasing them, (2) presume that the true value of the claims was established in the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint, and (3) return to Plaintiff exceeds proceeds or remaining property on the basis of those allegations. View "Alarm Protection Technology, LLC v. Bradburn" on Justia Law

In this case in which a sales representative of Alarm Protection Technology (APT) sought to challenge a set of steps taken by APT to insulate itself from claims for unpaid compensation, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying two motions filed by Plaintiff.Plaintiff, a former sales representative for APT, filed an action alleging that APT and related parties owed him $143,000 in treble damages for unpaid commissions. This appeal concerned APT's payment of an advance in exchange for the execution of a confession of judgment, the entry of a judgment by confession, the issuance of a writ of execution against Plaintiff's claims for unpaid commissions, APT's subsequent purchase of those claims, and APT's substitution as plaintiff. Plaintiff specifically appealed the denial of his motion to vacate the judgment by confession and quash the writ of execution of his claims and his motion for return of excess proceeds and unused property from APT's purchase of his claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that APT was not required to (1) establish the value of Plaintiff's claims before executing on them and purchasing them, (2) presume that the true value of the claims was established in the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint, and (3) return to Plaintiff exceeds proceeds or remaining property on the basis of those allegations. View "Alarm Protection v. Crandall" on Justia Law