Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cactus Farms in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff was exempt from coverage under the FLSA because he was an agricultural employee. In this case, plaintiff's load assessments were on-the-farm practices "incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations" regardless of whether the assessment was for the transportation of pigs between farms or for their transportation from a farm to processing. View "Bills v. Cactus Family Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary injunction sought by Best Home Health & Hospice, LLC (Best Home) to prohibit three registered nurses (collectively, the Nurses) who left Best Home's employ and began working for a competing company, from working for Best Home's competitor, holding that the district court abused its discretion.The Nurses in this case quit working for Best Home and went to work for one of Best Home's competitors. Best Home sued them for breach of the non-compete provision in their employment contracts and requested a preliminary injunction to prohibit them from working for its competitors. The district court enjoined the Nurses from working for Best Home's competitors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Best Home did not show it was likely to succeed in establishing that the non-compete provision was consistent with public policy, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by enjoining the Nurses from working for Best Home's competitors; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the Nurses to present evidence on how enforcement of the non-compete provision would harm the public interest. View "Brown v. Best Home Health & Hospice, LLC" on Justia Law

Logan, an African American man, was a Chicago Aviation Security Officer. In 2015, he applied for a promotion. He was not selected but was placed on a “Pre-Qualified Candidates” list for future vacancies. Two sergeant positions became available. Logan was second on the list. The city informed him that a city policy made internal candidates ineligible for promotion if they had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous 12 months. Logan had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous year.Logan alleges that he was wrongfully singled out for discipline. After his suspension, Logan complained about being bullied at work and about “discrimination against black officers.” After he filed a grievance, an arbitrator concluded that while Logan committed misconduct sufficient to warrant discipline, the length of his suspension was excessive. The arbitrator ordered Logan's promotion with back pay and benefits.Logan then filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of his race and gender and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Other than the fact that Logan is a member of a protected class, there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that his race caused him to be disciplined. Logan failed to show that his belief that he was opposing an unlawful employment practice was objectively reasonable. View "Logan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2002, Farfield contracted with SEPTA for improvements on Philadelphia-area railroad tracks. The federal government partially funded the project. Work concluded in 2007. As required by federal regulation, Department of Labor (DOL) prevailing wage determinations were incorporated into the contract. Farfield was required to submit to SEPTA for transmission to the Federal Transit Administration a copy of Farfield’s certified payroll, setting out all the information required under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3142(a), with a “Statement of Compliance” averring that the information in the payroll was correct and complete and that each worker was paid not less than the applicable wage rates and benefits for the classification of work performed, as specified in the applicable wage determination. Falsification of a payroll certification could subject Farfield to criminal penalties or civil liability under the False Claims Act (FCA).A union business manager suspected that Farfield had won government contracts with low bids by intending to pay less-skilled workers to perform certain work that would otherwise have been the bailiwick of higher-skilled, higher-paid workers. Ultimately, the union filed a qui tam FCA complaint. The United States declined to intervene. The court entered a $1,055,320.62 judgment against Farfield: $738,724.43 to the government and $316,596.19 to the union, plus $1,229,927.55 in attorney fees and $203,226.45 in costs. The Third Circuit affirmed. In view of the totality of the circumstances, Farfield’s Davis-Bacon violations were not minor or insubstantial. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Farfield Co" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its decision holding that management of a television station committed unfair labor practices under subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by making two unilateral changes to the existing terms of the conditions of employment after a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.The panel rejected management's argument that it was entitled to make changes to the terms and conditions of employment under the "contract coverage" doctrine. Rather, the panel found that the Board's decision was rational and consistent with the NLRA. In this case, the Board applied its longstanding rule that after a CBA has expired, unilateral changes by management are permissible during bargaining only if the CBA "contained language explicitly providing that the relevant provision" permitting such a change "would survive contract expiration." Nexstar Broad. Inc., 369 NLRB No. 61, 2020 WL 1986474, at *3 (Apr. 21, 2020). Furthermore, there was no explicit language in the CBA to allow management to make unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment in the post-expiration period. Finally, the panel rejected management's arbitration claims. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's suit brought against Defendant, his employer, asserting claims of age-based discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's statutory analog, holding that this Court will not adopt any version of the single filing rule that would excuse the procedural failings associated with Plaintiff's suit.In moving to dismiss the complaint, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff neglected to first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Plaintiff argued in response that the district court should adopt and apply the "single filing rule," otherwise known as the "piggyback rule," which would allow him to vicariously satisfy his exhaustion obligation by relying upon a timely-filed administrative complaint against his employer made by a similarly-situated plaintiff. The district court declined to adopt the single filing rule, dismissed Plaintiff's ADEA claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Puerto Rico law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint. View "Perez-Abreu v. Metropol Hato Rey LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing on summary disposition the denial of Appellant's appeal from the denial of unemployment benefits, holding that following the plain language of Utah Code 35A-4-403 in requiring a claimant who has obtained a work-search deferral to be nonetheless able and available to accept full-time employment does not produce an absurd result.Appellant sought unemployment benefits after he was temporarily laid off from his job. The Department of Workforce Services denied benefits because Appellant had indicated on his application that he was unavailable to accept full-time work because he would be returning to his former employer. The Department deferred the requirement that Appellant actively seek employment while receiving benefits but still required him to be able and available to accept full-time work under section 35A-4-403. The ALJ and the workforce appeals board denied Appellant's appeal. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that interpreting the statute to require a claimant who had obtained a work-search deferral to nonetheless be able and available to accept full-time employment worked an absurd result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department properly denied Appellant's claim for unemployment. View "Arnold v. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Union Pacific in Missouri state court, alleging age discrimination, constructive discharge, and hostile work environment claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff also filed suit against Missouri resident Foster B. McDaniel, claiming that McDaniel aided and abetted Union Pacific in its discriminatory acts. After Union Pacific removed to federal court, the district court granted McDaniel's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion to remand. The district court later granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in dismissing McDaniel on the basis of fraudulent joinder because plaintiff's complaint failed to make a colorable claim that McDaniel directly oversaw or was actively involved in discrimination. The court also concluded that the district court did nor err in determining plaintiff did not administratively exhaust his constructive discharge claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Union Pacific summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because plaintiff failed to establish age-related harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish the existence of a hostile work environment. View "Henson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NCO in an action brought by plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to put forth evidence establishing that they worked overtime hours and that NCO had constructive knowledge of their claimed overtime hours. The court need not reach the questions whether plaintiffs' claims are foreclosed by the statute of limitations or whether they are entitled to liquidated damages. View "Rapp v. Network of Community Options, Inc." on Justia Law

The Company operates an electrical system from a central “control room” where 16 system operators and 15 dispatchers manage electrical transmission and facilitate fieldwork. Outside the control room, the Company deploys about 300 field employees. System operators oversee and remotely control the transmission system and prioritize work needs and resources. Field supervisors select crews to undertake the work and prepare and communicate switching instructions for field employees.The Union petitioned for an election to determine whether system operators would join an existing bargaining unit. The Company argued that they were supervisors, not “employee[s]” and not “entitled to the Act’s protections [or] includable in a bargaining unit.” The Board’s Regional Director found that system operators were not supervisors and directed the Company to conduct a self-determination election. In a second election, the system operators voted to join the bargaining unit. The Board upheld the Regional Director’s decision concerning whether system operators have the authority, using independent judgment, to assign employees to places or responsibly to direct employees.The Board found that the Company’s subsequent refusal to bargain violated the Act. The Third Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence established that system operators lack the authority to assign employees to a place under 29 U.S.C. 152; system operators cannot assign field employees to times. The Board permissibly concluded that system operators’ purported direction of field employees does not require independent judgment. View "Atlantic City Electric Co v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law