Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Brooks, an African American police officer, made statements on multiple occasions complaining that his employer, the Kankakee, Illinois, favored white officers. The City issued a reprimand letter, ordering Brooks to stop making such statements and warning him that he faced discipline up to and including termination should he engage in further public disparagement. Brooks filed a complaint, alleging that Kankakee had retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), by failing to promote him and by issuing to him a reprimand letter after he had engaged in protected activity. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Brooks attempted to introduce a new claim alleging that the City’s promotional policies had a disparate impact on minority officers.The district court dismissed Brooks’s disparate impact claim and granted the City summary judgment on his failure-to-promote retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on Brooks’s retaliation-by-reprimand claim, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Brooks’s statements constituted protected activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the City. The jury was entitled to conclude that each of Brooks’s statements included varying degrees of factual falsehoods. While the district court instructed the jury to find more than legally required (three acts of retaliation), a proper jury instruction would not have made a difference in the outcome. View "Brooks v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

Southard worked for Newcomb, then filed a putative class action, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, plus state-law claims. Newcomb removed the case to federal court. Southard amended his complaint to delete the FLSA claim. Newcomb moved to dismiss Southard’s complaint or to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court concluded that the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 3-4 and denied Newcomb’s motion, then remanded Southard’s remaining state-law claims to state court.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To invoke FAA remedies, the parties must have entered into a “written agreement for arbitration.” Courts evaluate whether an agreement qualifies as FAA arbitration based on the common features of classic arbitration: a final, binding remedy by a third party, an independent adjudicator, substantive standards, and an opportunity for each side to present its case. Southard’s application for employment states: I accept that any complaint or conflict that cannot be resolved internally may be referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution unless prohibited by law, before any other legal action is taken. The employee handbook states the employee agrees "to Alternative Dispute Resolution a forum or means for resolving disputes, as arbitration or mediation, that exists outside the state or federal judicial system, unless prohibited by law," and If there is a conflict that cannot be resolved, "both agree that the matter will be referred to mediation.”. The parties agreed to alternative dispute resolution generally, not arbitration specifically. View "Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Union and AT&T entered into a contract governing certification of the Union to represent non-management employees and the relationship between the parties, requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes over “the description of an appropriate unit for bargaining” and the definition of “nonmanagement” employees. All other disputes arising under the contract “shall not be subject to arbitration.” Disputes that are subject to arbitration must “be submitted to arbitration administered by, and in accordance with, the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” The AAA’s Labor Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his own jurisdiction, “including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” After AT&T acquired Time Warner, the Union initiated discussions about “appropriate potential bargaining units in the newly acquired company.” The parties could not reach an agreement. The Union sought to compel arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding the dispute did not lie within the categories of arbitrable disputes, and that it (as opposed to the arbitrator) could make that threshold determination.The D.C. Circuit vacated. The agreement delegates threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The question of whether the parties’ dispute falls within the contract’s arbitration clause, then, is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide. The district court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the dispute must be submitted to arbitration. View "Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Finberg became the Chief Operating Officer of Adams, a produce distributor. Grinstead was Adams’s CEO. In 2011, federal authorities investigated Adams for fraud against the Department of Defense. Finberg claims he was unaware of the scheme until later when suppliers and Adams’s CFO discussed the scheme in front of him. Finberg agreed to gradually end the scheme to avoid further detection. Adams hired a law firm to internally investigate its operations, which revealed that CEO Grinstead had engaged in extensive fraud. PNC Bank froze the business’s accounts; Adams was unable to promptly pay suppliers $10 million. Adams declared bankruptcy. Grinstead pled guilty to wire fraud, misprision of felony, and multiple failures to file tax returns. Finberg pled guilty to misprision of a felony. A disciplinary complaint was filed against Adams with the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, alleging violation of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. 499b(4), by failing to promptly pay suppliers. The determination that Adams violated the Act triggered the Act’s employment bar for each person who was responsibly connected to the violation.An ALJ found that Finberg was responsibly connected. A USDA Judicial Officer affirmed, finding that Finberg exercised judgment, discretion, or control once he learned of the fraudulent scheme and failed to report. The D.C. Circuit reversed The agency lacked substantial evidence that Finberg’s activities contributed to Adam’’s violation of the Act. View "Finberg v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discriminatory discharge and failure to accommodate claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) against his former employer.In regard to plaintiff's disability-discrimination claim, the court concluded that the employer articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for his termination and plaintiff failed to establish a factual dispute as to pretext where the record is replete with evidence concerning his deficient performance, none of which was related to his disability or his period of leave. In regard to plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff's performance issues were linked to his disability, and the record simply does not support that an accommodation would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his position. View "Vinh v. Express Scripts Services Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged his discharge in federal court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear his claims brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus Act because the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the discipline of VA employees and was the exclusive remedy for review of plaintiff's employment discharge. The district court also held that while the VBA did not bar plaintiff's procedural due process claims, the claims were not colorable because he received all the process due to him.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim under the APA because the VBA is a comprehensive statutory scheme that precludes APA review; the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional claim because plaintiff did not present a colorable due process claim; and there is no basis for mandamus jurisdiction because plaintiff has not established a clear right to any relief or a clear duty of the VA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision but remanded solely so that the district court can amend its judgment to reflect that it is a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hakki v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in her employment discrimination action. Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. DHS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After plaintiff did not file a response, the district court granted DHS's motion.The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments unrelated to the grounds on which her claims were dismissed are waived. The court also concluded that plaintiff cannot proceed with a Rehabilitation Act claim as it is precluded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); the district court properly determined that plaintiff's section 1983 claim is preempted by Title VII; and, because plaintiff failed to name the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party defendant. View "Kaswatuka v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the Sheriff of Broward County, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Sheriff retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by suspending him with pay pending an investigation into his conduct.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment action. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff only five days after he was suspended with pay in accordance with the governing collective bargaining agreement. The court agreed with the district court that a five-day suspension with pay does not constitute adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court explained that such a temporally-limited suspension pending an investigation into alleged misconduct would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. View "Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration in a putative class action brought by Massachusetts residents who have worked as Uber drivers, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting Uber from classifying drivers in Massachusetts as independent contractors, as well as an order directing Uber to classify its drivers as employees and comply with Massachusetts wage laws.The panel concluded that Uber drivers, as a nationwide class of workers, do not fall within the so-called "interstate commerce" exemption to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The panel explained that Uber drivers, even when crossing state lines or transporting passengers to airports, are merely conveying interstate passengers between their homes and their destination in the normal course of their independent local service. Therefore, interstate movement cannot be said to be a central part of the class members' job description. The panel found the analysis of the minority of district courts that have found to the contrary unpersuasive.The panel also concluded that plaintiffs' claims and requested injunctive relief are arbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement and plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief would have upended the status quo rather than maintained it. Therefore, the district court properly addressed the motion to compel arbitration first.Finally, the panel concluded that the injunctive relief requested, reclassification of drivers' status from "independent contractors" to "employees" is not a public injunctive relief that may be allowed to them to avoid arbitration. In this case, the relief sought by plaintiffs is overwhelmingly directed at plaintiffs and other rideshare drivers, and they would be the primary beneficiaries of access to overtime and minimum wage laws. View "Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Islam, a tenured electrical and computer engineering professor at University of Michigan, received an additional appointment at UM’s medical school. Upon joining the faculty, he executed an employment agreement and agreed to abide by UM’s bylaws, which provide that patents issued or acquired as a result of or in connection with administration, research, or other educational activities supported directly or indirectly by funds administered by the University and all revenues derived therefrom are the property of the University. Property rights in computer software resulting from activities that received no support are the property creator. In cases involving both University-supported activity and independent activity, property rights in resulting work products are owned as agreed upon before any exploitation thereof.In 2012, Islam took an unpaid leave-of-absence from UM to start a new Biomedical Laser Company. During his leave, Islam filed provisional patent applications. Upon returning to UM, he filed non-provisional applications claiming priority to those provisional applications. Islam later assigned the patent rights to Omni. Those patents are ancestors of the patents-in-suit, which are not directly related to Islam’s teaching. UM refused to confirm Islam’s ownership of his inventions, noting the expenditure of medical school funds to support the cost of Islam’s space, time required to process Islam’s appointment to the medical school, and “medical school faculty partners who have helped springboard ideas.”In 2018, Omni sued Apple, asserting infringement. The district court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Federal Circuit affirmed. UM’s bylaws did not effectuate a present automatic assignment of Islam’s patent rights. View "Omni Medsci, Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law