Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-appellees Darrell Reeves and James King worked as welding inspectors for Enterprise Products Partners through third party staffing companies, Cypress Environmental Management and Kestrel Field Services. Reeves brought a collective action claim to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. King later consented to join the putative collective action and was added as a named plaintiff. Enterprise argued that both Reeves and King signed employment contracts with their respective staffing companies that contained arbitration clauses for disputes. The Tenth Circuit found that indeed both plaintiffs’ respective contracts contained arbitration clauses, and that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, these agreements require the claims to be resolved in arbitration. “Because Reeves and James’s claims allege substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by Enterprise and non-defendant signatories, Cypress and Kestrel, arbitration should be compelled for these claims.” The Court reversed the district court’s denial of Enterprise’s motions to compel. View "Reeves, et al. v. Enterprise Products Partners" on Justia Law

In 2008, FTS technicians filed suit alleging that they were unlawfully deprived of overtime compensation for the prior three years. The district court authorized a collective action; 293 technicians opted in to the collective action. In 2011, a jury returned verdicts of liability and determined the average number of unrecorded hours worked per week by each testifying technician. Based on those findings, the court applied a 1.5 multiplier for calculating uncompensated overtime, calculated damages for all technicians in the collective action, and entered a judgment. The Sixth Circuit upheld the certification of the case as a collective action and the jury’s verdicts but held that the district court erred in applying a 1.5 multiplier, and in failing to calculate the hourly rates to reflect the actual hours Plaintiffs worked.After a remand from the Supreme Court, FTS sought to raise new issues that were unrelated to the recalculation of the hourly rate and correcting the multiplier. The district court barred FTS from raising most of those arguments, recalculated damages, and entered judgment. The court also substantially granted Plaintiffs’ counsel’s petition for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court was constrained on remand to the specific issues; its mandate rule barred FTS and from raising arguments on judicial estoppel, aggregate judgment, and sufficiency of the evidence. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court denying Lyft Inc.'s request to compel arbitration in this purported class action but affirmed the denials of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied.Plaintiffs were Massachusetts-based rideshare drivers who used the Lyft application and platform to find passengers. In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Lyft misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees. At issue on this appeal were rulings concerning Plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunctive relief and the denial of Lyft's request to compel arbitration. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the FAA applies in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' requested injunction. View "Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the Board of Review affirming the decision of a Labor Dispute Tribunal that certain union members employed at a production plant (Claimants) were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the lower tribunals erred.In 2012, representatives of Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC and United Steelworkers Local 5668, the union representing the majority of Constellium's employees, met to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. When the parties could not come to terms Claimants went on strike. After the strike ended, Claimants applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The Tribunal decided that Claimants were not disqualified for benefits under W. Va. Code 21A-6-3(4), the labor dispute provision. The Board and circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the lower tribunals erred in holding that Claimants were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits under the labor dispute provision. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC, v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Houston began working for TDA in 2012. Houston’s responsibilities required on-site inspections to confirm compliance with state and federal regulations. Houston suffers from lupus, anemia, and other illnesses, requiring her to be absent from work and sometimes take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In 2016, Houston returned to her position after a long-term medical leave and submitted a request for accommodations permitting her to telework and to work a compressed workweek. TDA allowed Houston to work four 10-hour days but denied the telework request because Houston’s duties could not be performed solely from home and Houston needed training to improve performance.Later in 2016, Houston received warnings for “failure to meet expectations,” excessive absenteeism and tardiness, inadequate job performance, insubordination, leaving work early, accruing overtime without approval, late arrivals to sites being audited, failure to submit accurate and timely administrative reviews, and failure to follow TDA’s travel policy. An April 2017 warning notified Houston that she was on a 90-day probation period. When the probationary period ended, TDA discharged Houston because of her failure to correct her performance deficiencies, excessive absenteeism and tardiness unrelated to protected FMLA leave, and insubordination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Houston’s FMLA retaliation claim, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and her Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, discrimination claim.TDA established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Houston’s termination; Houston failed to raise a disputed material fact showing that those reasons were pretextual. View "Houston v. Texas Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they moved to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering judgment against the estate. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Burke v. Criterion General Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit filed against the employer of Kasey Christiansen, who was killed at work, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' lawsuit based on a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that bars employees from suiting their employers over work-related injuries. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Act's exclusive remedy provision to dismiss their complaint because the intentional-injury exception applied. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it could not reasonably be inferred that Defendant believed Christiansen's fatal injuries were virtually certain to occur. View "Christiansen v. Harrison Western Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) when it discharged him for reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety condition. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded back pay. The district court denied plaintiff's request for reinstatement and instead awarded three years of front pay, thereafter granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Eighth Circuit concluded that BNSF's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was timely and therefore fell within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)'s 28-day time period; there existed a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the jury's finding that plaintiff's report regarding the danger of wearing a seatbelt while hy-railing is a report of a hazardous safety condition; and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that BNSF intentionally retaliated against plaintiff. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting BNSF's conditional motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of BNSF, reversed the order granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and remanded for the reinstatement of the jury verdict and for the entry of such further relief. View "Monohon v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this lawsuit over a work-related ailment, holding that remand was required.Plaintiff contracted lead poisoning while working for Defendant. A narrow exception in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) allows employees like Plaintiff to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act, and Plaintiff sued Defendant under this exception. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Plaintiff's claim because he did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) although both parties assumed that the WCA covered Plaintiff's condition, Utah law has frequently recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act; and (2) therefore, remand was required to determine if Plaintiff's lead poisoning was an occupational disease. View "Kay v. Bullets" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim and granting summary judgment for Defendants on all remaining counts, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued the City of East Providence, Rhode Island, its School Department, and the School Superintendent, asserting claims arising from what she alleged were unlawful discriminatory employment actions taken against her. The First Circuit resolved all claims in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to plead even a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory employment discrimination was not supported by admissible evidence that would warrant putting the case to a jury. View "Lima v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law