Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A former hourly, nonexempt employee of a large lumber manufacturer filed a class action in October 2018 alleging wage and hour violations on behalf of eight classes of present and former employees. Many employees had signed arbitration agreements that precluded class actions and required arbitration of employment-related disputes, but neither the named plaintiff nor other named plaintiffs were signatories. Throughout several years of litigation, the employer did not identify signatory employees or produce the signed arbitration agreements, despite being ordered to do so. The employer participated in extensive discovery and litigation regarding all putative class members, including those who had signed the agreements.The Superior Court of Shasta County reviewed the case and, after extensive discovery disputes, granted class certification for eight classes in November 2022. Following class certification, the employer produced over 3,000 signed arbitration agreements and promptly moved to compel arbitration for class members who had signed the agreements. The plaintiffs opposed this, arguing the employer had waived its right to compel arbitration due to its prior litigation conduct, including failure to produce agreements and treating signatory employees as class members throughout discovery. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, finding waiver under the St. Agnes test, and granted sanctions precluding the employer from presenting evidence of the arbitration agreements or arguing that class members had signed them.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the appeal from the sanctions order. The main holding was that the employer had waived its contractual right to compel arbitration by conduct that was inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, including withholding the agreements and treating signatory employees as class members, as established by clear and convincing evidence. The court dismissed the appeal regarding sanctions for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

A construction company in southern Nevada ceased contributing to a multiemployer pension plan after it stopped operating in the state. The pension plan’s trustees assessed the company for withdrawal liability, asserting the company owed over $2.8 million under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). The company challenged the assessment, arguing it was exempt from liability because its asbestos abatement work qualified for the “building and construction industry” exception in the MPPAA. The company pointed out that asbestos abatement involves removing or remediating hazardous materials from buildings, including demolition and substantial alterations to structures.An arbitrator initially ruled in favor of the pension plan’s trustees, interpreting the “building and construction industry” narrowly to include only work that literally builds new structures, and finding that asbestos abatement did not meet this definition. The company then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to vacate or modify the arbitration award. The district court rejected the arbitrator’s and trustees’ narrow construction, instead adopting a broader understanding of the industry that includes maintenance, repair, alteration, and demolition. The district court granted summary judgment to the company, holding that its asbestos abatement work qualified for the statutory exception, and ordered the return of payments made toward the assessed liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the phrase “building and construction industry” in the MPPAA incorporates the definition established by the National Labor Relations Board under the Taft-Hartley Act, which includes erection, maintenance, repair, and alteration of buildings and structures. Applying this definition, the court ruled that asbestos abatement is covered by the exception, exempting the company from withdrawal liability. View "WALKER SPECIALTY CONSTR., INC. V. BD. OF TR. OF THE CONSTR. INDUS. AND LABORERS JOINT PENSION TRUST" on Justia Law

Michelle Siebrecht worked as a physician assistant in the emergency room at a rural Iowa hospital operated by Mercy Health Services. Her employment contract required her to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period, including weekends. Siebrecht, diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, took FMLA leave twice due to her condition. Upon returning, her doctor imposed restrictions: she could work no more than one 24-hour shift per week and no weekends. Mercy’s CEO expressed concern that these limitations made it difficult to staff the ER and were unfair to other providers. Mercy ultimately chose not to renew Siebrecht’s contract, notifying her that her employment would end after the temporary renewal period.Siebrecht filed suit in Iowa state court, alleging that Mercy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Iowa Civil Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act by discriminating against her based on her disability and retaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. Mercy removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mercy, finding that Siebrecht was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA and ICRA, as she could not perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. The court also concluded that there was no causal connection between her FMLA leave and the termination of her employment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that the ability to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekends was an essential function of Siebrecht’s position and that no reasonable accommodation would have enabled her to perform these functions. The court also found insufficient evidence of FMLA retaliation or pretextual termination. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Siebrecht v. Mercy Health Services - Iowa Corp." on Justia Law

A coal miner was employed at the Burke Mountain Mine Complex until October 2019, when he was told the mine was “shut down” and his job was terminated without receiving advance notice. He brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees against five related mining companies, alleging they failed to provide notice of termination as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act). Evidence at trial showed that the companies shared common officers, directors, ownership, and business addresses, and that personnel and equipment were regularly exchanged among them. Employees testified that the companies operated interchangeably and were managed collectively by the same family.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia certified the class, denied summary judgment to both sides, and submitted the matter to a jury. The jury found the companies liable under the WARN Act, determining that they operated as a single employer and that at least 50 employees suffered an employment loss through termination or reduction in hours. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff and, after trial, denied the defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The companies appealed, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude the companies were a single employer under the WARN Act and that the district court’s instruction regarding the definition of employment loss was correct. The court also found that the companies forfeited any argument regarding an inconsistent jury verdict by failing to object before the jury was discharged. View "Gautier v. Tams Management, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of current and former battalion chiefs employed by the City of Alexandria Fire Department alleged that the City failed to pay them overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The battalion chiefs’ compensation was based on a complex pay structure. Chiefs worked either operational or administrative schedules. Operational chiefs rotated through 24-hour shifts within a nine-day cycle, and administrative chiefs worked a standard 40-hour week. The City paid the chiefs a predetermined amount per pay period, corresponding to either 80 administrative hours or 106 operational hours, regardless of the exact number of hours worked, with additional compensation for hours worked beyond their scheduled shifts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment for the City. The district court found that the chiefs were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under the “highly compensated employee” exemption. Specifically, the court held that the chiefs were paid on an hourly basis and applied the salary basis test found in 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b). The court concluded the chiefs received guaranteed pay that satisfied the regulatory requirements and that the pay had a reasonable relationship to their usual earnings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but for different reasons. The appellate court held that the district court applied the wrong salary basis test, finding that the appropriate test was under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), which applies to employees paid on a weekly or less frequent salary basis. The court concluded that, despite the complexity of the pay system, the chiefs received a predetermined salary not subject to improper deductions and, therefore, were compensated on a salary basis. As a result, the chiefs were correctly deemed exempt from overtime requirements, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Kelly v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

A former lieutenant in a county sheriff’s office was accused of using excessive force during two arrests. After an internal investigation was initiated, he was suspended and scheduled for a public hearing before a merit board, which is required under Indiana law for disciplinary actions. The lieutenant alleged that the sheriff manipulated both the investigation and the merit board to ensure an unfavorable outcome for him. Faced with the possibility of an unfair hearing and negative publicity, the lieutenant negotiated a severance agreement with the sheriff: he would resign and waive his hearing in exchange for withdrawal of the charges and a promise of a neutral reference.Despite the agreement, on the day the resignation became effective, two county prosecutors and the sheriff broadly disclosed the excessive-force allegations to local legal professionals and the lieutenant’s current and prospective employers, including through Brady/Giglio disclosures. The disclosures described the alleged misconduct and claimed issues with the lieutenant’s credibility, leading to his suspension from his part-time job and the loss of other employment opportunities. The lieutenant claimed these actions were part of a premeditated scheme to render him unemployable in law enforcement.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint was dismissed. The district court found that absolute and qualified immunity protected the prosecutors and that the sheriff could not be liable because the lieutenant had voluntarily resigned, waiving his due process rights. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity only for Brady/Giglio disclosures made in pending criminal cases. For disclosures to the bar association and employers, neither absolute nor qualified immunity applied at this stage because the alleged coercion through misrepresentation could constitute a procedural due process violation. The appellate court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martin v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

An employee of a car rental company was involved in a motor vehicle collision while working as a transporter, driving a van on company property. The employee was at a complete stop when another vehicle reversed into the van. She reported that her nose struck the steering wheel during the collision, and subsequently experienced pain and symptoms affecting the right side of her face and nose. Medical records from the days following the accident documented her complaints of facial pain, sinus pain, and nasal congestion, and x-ray imaging taken one week after the incident revealed a nondisplaced right-sided nasal fracture. The employer accepted liability for injuries to her neck, back, and right shoulder, but denied that the nasal injury was caused by the collision.The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations found the nasal injury to be compensable under Hawaii’s workers’ compensation law. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) reviewed the case and, based largely on the opinions of two medical examiners selected by the employer, reversed the Director’s decision regarding the nasal fracture. LIRAB concluded that the employer had presented substantial evidence that the nasal injury was not caused by the collision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed LIRAB’s decision, agreeing that credible medical testimony supported the employer’s position.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii reviewed the case and held that the employer failed to meet its initial burden of producing substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the employee’s nasal injury was work-related. The Supreme Court found that the biomechanics opinions relied on by LIRAB lacked proper foundation and did not constitute substantial evidence. The Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ judgment and the relevant portions of LIRAB’s decision and affirmed the Director’s finding that the nasal injury was compensable, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lane v. Avis Budget Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Department of Health & Environment" on Justia Law

Five former employees of a construction company alleged that their employer failed to pay commissions they had earned after leaving the company. Four of the plaintiffs were paid solely by commission, while one received commissions and other compensation. The employer initially lacked a written commission policy but later required employees to sign agreements stating that commissions would be paid only up to 14 days after their departure, with no further commissions paid thereafter. The plaintiffs claimed they were owed significant sums in unpaid commissions after leaving, and three argued that the agreement violated statutory prohibitions against forfeiting wages for time worked as a condition of employment.The employer responded to the complaint by filing a demurrer in the Circuit Court, arguing that Virginia’s wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, did not apply to commissions. The Circuit Court agreed, holding that commissions were not covered by the statute. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the term “wages” in Code § 40.1-29 encompassed commissions. The Court of Appeals relied on the statute’s remedial purpose, previous decisions interpreting “wages” broadly, and an administrative agency’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that Code § 40.1-29 does not cover commissions, either expressly or by implication. The Court determined that the statute’s language and context indicate the General Assembly did not intend for commissions to be included, noting that the legislature has elsewhere specifically distinguished wages, salaries, and commissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia and entered final judgment for the employer. View "Groundworks Operations, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Amazon was accused of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act for refusing to recognize and bargain with the Teamsters Amazon National Negotiating Committee, which represented a group of former Amazon delivery drivers. After Amazon terminated its contract with a delivery service whose drivers were represented by the union, the Teamsters alleged that Amazon and the contractor were joint employers and demanded bargaining rights. Amazon declined, prompting the Teamsters to file unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel filed a complaint against Amazon, alleging threats, retaliation, and refusal to bargain.Following the initiation of the NLRB administrative proceedings, Amazon sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, seeking to enjoin the Board from continuing those proceedings. Amazon argued that the Board’s structure and adjudicative procedures were unconstitutional and requested a preliminary injunction. The Teamsters intervened in the case to represent the interests of the drivers. The district court denied Amazon’s motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Amazon’s constitutional challenge “involved or grew out of” a labor dispute, as defined by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Ninth Circuit held that both the parties and the underlying dispute satisfied the requirements of the Act, as Amazon’s claims were directly connected to a labor dispute between an employer and a union. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue such relief in this context. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law