Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily affirming an arbitration award dismissing Union Interacional UAW, Local 2415's wage grievance claim against Bacardi Corporation, holding that the Union did not identify an error in the arbitration award so egregious as to permit this Court to vacate it.The arbitrator found that the Union's claim was not procedurally arbitrable because the Union failed to comply with the contractual wage grievance procedure. On appeal, the Union argued that either the arbitrator should have deemed the procedural arbitrability defect waived or that the procedural defect did not justify dismissing the entire claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, while the Union's waiver arguments had merit, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority in dismissing the entire claim for lack of procedural arbitrability. View "Union Internacional, UAW Local 2415 v. Bacardi Corp." on Justia Law

Hystron Fibers, Inc. hired Daniel Construction Company in 1965 to build a polyester fiber plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. When the plant began operating in 1967, Hystron retained Daniel to provide all maintenance and repair workers at the plant. Hystron soon became Hoechst Fibers, Inc. Pursuant to a series of written contracts, Hoechst paid Daniel an annual fee and reimbursed Daniel for certain costs. The contracts required Daniel to purchase workers' compensation insurance for the workers and required Hoechst to reimburse Daniel for the workers' compensation insurance premiums. Dennis Seay was employed by Daniel. Seay worked various maintenance and repair positions at the Hoechst plant from 1971 until 1980. The manufacture of polyester fibers required the piping of very hot liquid polyester through asbestos-insulated pipes. He eventually developed lung problems, which were later diagnosed as mesothelioma, a cancer caused by inhaling asbestos fibers. Seay and his wife filed this lawsuit against CNA Holdings (Hoechst's corporate successor) claiming Hoechst acted negligently in using asbestos and in failing to warn of its dangers. After Seay died from mesothelioma, his daughter, Angie Keene, took over the lawsuit as personal representative of his estate. Throughout the litigation, CNA Holdings argued Seay was a statutory employee and the Workers' Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for his claims. The circuit court disagreed and denied CNA Holdings' motion for summary judgment. A jury awarded Seay's estate $14 million in actual damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied CNA Holdings' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again finding Seay was not a statutory employee. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly determined the injured worker in this case was not the statutory employee of the defendant. View "Keene v, CNA Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to identify the reasons for its denial of Employer's request for reconsideration of its order directing Employer to continue paying for Employee's drugs prescribed in connection with Employee's work injuries, holding that the Commission must reconsider Employee's motion in light of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3.After Employer, which was self-insured for workers' compensation purposes, informed Employee that it would no longer reimburse Employee for his prescriptions in connection with his work-related injuries, Employee filed a motion asking the Commission to order Employer to continue paying for his drugs. The Commission granted the motion and denied Employer's request for reconsideration. Employer then sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to vacate its order and deny continued reimbursement for the prescriptions. The court of appeals granted a limited writ. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and denied in part and granted in part the writ of mandamus, holding that the Commission should have considered Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3 in its determination of Employee's motion. View "State ex rel. T.S. Trim Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of CCCERA following the denial of plaintiff's fourth amended petition for writ of mandate (petition) filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Plaintiff alleged that CCCERA and its governing Board improperly reduced his retirement benefits retroactively, pursuant to Government Code section 31539.The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding to reduce plaintiff's retirement allowance. The court explained that, in light of legislative history and the law in existence at the time of plaintiff's retirement, the Board's determination that plaintiff caused his pension to be improperly increased at the time of retirement, pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of section 31539, was not in conformity with the spirit of the law and did not subserve substantial justice. In this case, although the court recognized plaintiff's pre-retirement efforts to increase his compensation earnable in the period before his retirement, which allowed him to maximize his pension and epitomized the act of pension spiking which led to the subsequent enactment of the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA), the court cannot sanction the Board's legally unsupported use of section 31539 to penalize plaintiff for conduct that—while now prohibited under the PEPRA—was expressly permitted at the time of his retirement. View "Nowicki v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law

Chicago offers public-school teachers higher pay if they earn extra college credits. Graham sought a higher salary under this program in July 2015, only to have her application ignored. She tried again in September and was fired on the ground that her application had been backdated, which the Board of Education considered fraud. A hearing officer ordered her reinstated with back pay. Graham alleges the Board did not honor this decision in full, published a declaration that she is a fraudster, and refused to consider her for open positions. Graham sued, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by discriminating against her on account of sex and race and of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by depriving her of pension and health benefits.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint does not identify other employees who received better treatment from the school system but It is enough for a plaintiff to assert that she was treated worse because of protected characteristics. The school system’s plans are exempt from ERISA. Because the state not only funds the charter schools but also approves their establishment and continued existence, it is not appropriate to treat them as private institutions subject to public regulation. View "Graham v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a) generally requires that covered workers be paid extra for overtime work, but it exempts from that requirement some retail and service employees who are paid bona fide commissions. Brex auto repair technicians claimed that Brex’s complex payment plan is not a true commission so that under the Act they are paid hourly wages and are entitled to overtime pay. To arrive at a technician’s take-home pay, “Brex starts with the total cost charged to customers for each technician’s weekly repairs and applies a series of divisions, multiplications, and additions, some of which are redundant.” The hourly wage has a floor that applies even if the mechanic’s hourly production is anemic during a particular pay period, which is one and a half times the applicable state minimum wage, rounded up. The alternative wage floor is triggered in only 16 percent of paychecks; 84 percent of Brex paychecks are paid on the commission scale.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Brex based on the bonafide commission exemption. Undisputed evidence showed that there was substantial hourly and weekly variation in pay and that the guarantees are “computed in accordance with a bona fide commission payment plan or formula under which the computed commissions vary in accordance with the employee’s performance on the job.” View "Reed v. Brex Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit certified a question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03, holding that the outcome of this appeal depended upon a question of Massachusetts law, upon which the Massachusetts courts have not spoken.Plaintiffs, owners of 7-Eleven franchise operated in Massachusetts, alleged that 7-Eleven misclassified them was independent contractors rather than employees, in violation of Massachusetts law. At issue was a conflict between the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law (ICL), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B, and the Federal Trade Commission's Franchise Rule making it allegedly impossible for 7-Eleven to satisfy federal law. The district court held that, due to this conflict, the ICL did not apply and therefore, its franchisees were properly classified as independent contractors. The First Circuit certified a question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court regarding the issue and retained jurisdiction pending resolution of the certified question. View "Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former employer, a restaurant chain, and to his former manager. The court concluded that, although plaintiff presented a prima facie case that the restaurant discriminated and retaliated against him, he failed to offer persuasive evidence that the restaurant's proffered, permissible reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful action. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer's reasons for firing him—lying and preparing a dish incorrectly—constitute pretextual reasons to cover over racial discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to support his tortious interference claim. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, PRIDE, a non-profit that employs individuals with disabilities, hired Johnson, an African-American. Johnson endured repeated race-based harassment by his fellow PRIDE employee Palomares. Johnson’s colleague corroborated that Palomares used racially offensive language and generally treated non-Hispanic employees worse than their Hispanic counterparts. Beyond his mistreatment by Palomares, several other workplace incidents occurred that Johnson viewed as harassing. Johnson made multiple complaints regarding Palomares’s harassing behavior and was told, “you’ve just got to be tough and keep going.” Ultimately, Johnson angrily confronted Palomares at PRIDE’s worksite. Johnson was written up and told to “follow instructions and remain respectful.” Johnson interviewed for a supervisory carpentry position. PRIDE selected a Hispanic individual for the position, who, unlike Johnson, had supervisory experience. Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. PRIDE’s Human Resources Director, acknowledged that Johnson reported that Palomares had been harassing him but PRIDE ultimately “did not find that any harassment.” Later that month, PRIDE called Johnson to discuss problems with his attendance. Johnson said coming into work was “too stressful,” declared that he was resigning, and walked out.The district court dismissed Johnson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation when he complained about the discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment for the employer was proper as to most of Johnson’s claims, but the court erred in its ruling on Johnson’s hostile work environment claim. View "Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc." on Justia Law