Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation determining that a copy of a letter to Appellant's insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits did not constitute a petition for a hearing, holding that the Department and the circuit court did not err.Appellant injured his left and right shoulder at work. Western National Insurance (Insurer), the workers' compensation for Appellant's employers, paid workers' compensation benefits. Five years later, Appellant sent a letter to Insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits and sent a copy of this letter to the Department requesting that the Department determine that the letter constituted a petition for hearing. The Department concluded that the letter was not a petition for hearing because it lacked the information required by ARSD 47:03:01:02. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Appellant's letter did not satisfy ARSD 47:03:01:02. View "May v. Spearfish Pellett Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against CJS Solutions, a Florida entity doing business as The HCI Group, in the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs moved to certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The putative class of plaintiffs was composed of all HCI employees hired on a per-project basis who were not paid wages for out-of-town travel to and from remote project locations. After the district court conditionally certified a collective action limited to claims arising out of travel to and from Minnesota, it granted summary judgment for HCI on the ground that plaintiffs were not employees when traveling.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in finding defendant had not waived its jurisdictional defense to plaintiffs' claims for certification of collective actions covering all of defendant's employees for all of their travel time anywhere in the United States; the district court properly excluded all claims with no connection with the forum state of Minnesota; and, in regard to the out-of-town travel claims, the district court did not err in finding that two plaintiffs were not employees when traveling and that defendant had no obligation to pay for their time. View "Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and, alternatively, a writ of procedendo ordering Respondents to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his appeal of the mayor's appointment of another detective sergeant to the position of lieutenant with the City of Youngstown Police Department, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writs.Relator, a detective sergeant with the Youngstown Police Department, brought this action against Respondents, the Youngstown Civil Service Commission and its president, Vice President, and secretary, challenging the decision of the City's mayor to appoint to the position of lieutenant the examinee who ranked first on the eligibility list. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to issue a decision determining his appeal was moot; (2) this Court declines to address Relator's constitutional argument; and (3) Relator's procedendo claim failed. View "State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Anthem provides health insurance and hires nurses to review insurance claims. The company pays those nurses a salary but does not pay them overtime. Canaday, an Anthem nurse who lives in Tennessee, filed a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206. claiming that the company misclassified her and others as exempt from the Act’s overtime pay provisions. A number of Anthem nurses in other states opted into the collective action.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the out-of-state plaintiffs on personal jurisdiction grounds. In an FLSA collective action, as in the mass action under California law, each opt-in plaintiff becomes a real party in interest, who must meet her burden for obtaining relief and satisfy the other requirements of party status. Anthem is based in Indiana, not Tennessee. General jurisdiction is not an option for out-of-state claims. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. The out-of-state plaintiffs have not brought claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee. View "Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Will Taylor, Ken Gorman and Nicholas Wayman, individuals who formerly conducted bail fugitive recovery, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc (FCS), a surety admitted to write bail in California. Plaintiffs sued FCS and other bail-agent entities and individuals for, among other things, fraud, various Labor Code violations, as well as statutory damages under the Labor Code, conversion, unfair competition, discrimination and wrongful termination, alleging in part that FCS was a co-employer with the right to control the manner in which they performed their assignments. FCS moved for summary judgment on grounds plaintiffs were not FCS employees as a matter of law, disposing of their claims based on the Labor Code as well as for fraud and conversion, which related to misrepresentations of their employment status or withholding final paychecks. The trial court granted the motion, in part ruling FCS did not employ plaintiffs for purposes of causes of action based on the Labor Code or dependent on an employment relationship; plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and conversion were barred by the “new right-exclusive remedy doctrine”; and plaintiffs could not make out a claim for unfair competition on their allegations that FCS violated the law. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by its ruling. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Taylor v. Financial Casualty & Surety" on Justia Law

During Castilleja's 15 years as Bexar County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) community service officer, he had multiple reprimands and termination warnings. After Castilleja was transferred in 2014, his new manager suspected Castilleja was violating overtime rules. An investigation by Assistant Chief Kelly confirmed Castilleja was routinely taking unapproved overtime and using his work computer to send union-related emails. Castilleja only received counseling and was put on a “performance improvement plan.” Castilleja’s 2015 evaluation rated him “satisfactory” overall but gave him the lowest rating in multiple categories. In 2016, Castilleja was sworn in as president of the Bexar County Probation Officers Association (BCPOA), having served in the union since 2007. Castilleja switched units and other issues came to light, resulting in an audit of Castilleja’s former cases. Brady recommended termination, citing Castilleja’s disregard of “the basic ten[e]ts of case management,” multiple policy violations, plus two instances of conducting union business while at work, and one use of work email to send union-related emails. Meanwhile, the BCPOA issued a no-confidence petition calling for Anderson’s removal. Days later, Anderson heard Castilleja’s appeal. Anderson fired Castilleja.Castilleja and the Union sued Anderson and Brady in their individual and official capacities, claiming that Castilleja was fired in retaliation for union-related speech and association in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. The evidence established valid reasons for firing Castilleja. View "United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Burlington appealed the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part its special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the antiSLAPP statute). A former employee had filed a putative class action complaint alleging that Burlington forces its employees to pay for business losses incurred for common on-the-job mistakes by misusing California's shoplifting statute. In a prior opinion, the court reversed the lower court's determination that Burlington's conduct amounted to extortion as a matter of law and was therefore unprotected by the anti-SLAPP statute. On remand, the trial court sustained Burlington's motion to strike two of the four causes of action in the complaint, and denied the motion with respect to the other two causes of action.In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that the employee's pleadings, declaration, and accompanying evidence support her Labor Code section 2802 claim that she personally incurred a necessary loss in direct consequence of the discharge of her duties or obedience to the directions of her employer. Therefore, plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to survive Burlington's special motion to strike. The court affirmed the order in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gallano v. Burlington Coat Factory of California, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, AmeriHome, in a putative class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime compensation and unlawful business practices. The superior court granted AmeriHome's motion to compel arbitration, ordered arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.In light of the uncertainty of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's appeal from the order compelling arbitration and the absence of any delay or prejudice our intervention at this stage would cause, the court found this an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretion to treat the appeal from that order as a petition for writ of mandate. The court denied the petition on the merits, concluding that Labor Code section 229 does not exempt plaintiff's wage claim from arbitration. In this case, neither the choice-of-law provision nor the arbitration agreement contains "unambiguous language" making it "unmistakably clear" that the parties intended to incorporate section 229 while agreeing to arbitrate "any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to" plaintiff's employment at AmeriHome.The court also concluded that the superior court properly exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure 1281.2 to order arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims. The court explained that the superior court reasonably concluded the conditions for invoking the third-party litigation exception did not exist because plaintiff's lawsuit did not arise out of the same transaction as the Brooks action, and there was no likelihood of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. Furthermore, even when the third-party litigation exception applies, the superior court has discretion to "order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration." Therefore, the court affirmed the order dismissing the putative class claims, dismissed the order compelling arbitration, and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss this amended complaint brought by Plaintiff seeking a determination that Defendants - the City of Wilmington, the Wilmington Police Department, and the mayor of the City - breached the collective bargaining agreement between the police union and the City when he was terminated for an alleged violation of the City's resident requirement, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Specifically, the Court of Chancery held that Plaintiff's claims fell within the grievance procedure and were therefore subject to arbitration, and where Plaintiff did not follow the grievance process that was provided in the collective bargaining agreement, a complete remedy otherwise existed in the form of the grievance process outlined in the agreement. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law