Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Several contractors and an employee, who regularly handle public works projects for PennDOT and SEPTA, challenged Philadelphia's requirement for project labor agreements (PLAs) on public projects. These PLAs mandated union recognition and membership, and set workforce diversity goals. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements violated their First Amendment rights and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They were ineligible to bid on certain city projects due to their existing collective bargaining agreements with the United Steelworkers, which is not affiliated with the required unions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to Philadelphia. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the union-eligibility requirement and failed to show that the diversity requirement caused them harm based on race. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' § 1981 claim failed because race was not a but-for cause of their inability to work on city projects with PLAs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the union-eligibility requirement under the First Amendment. The court determined that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury by being ineligible to bid on city projects due to the PLAs. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot despite Philadelphia's subsequent changes to the PLAs, as the plaintiffs sought damages for past violations and prospective relief.The Third Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had standing to raise an Equal Protection claim, as they demonstrated an intent to bid on future projects covered by the PLAs. The court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and § 1981 claims. View "Road-Con Inc v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Jason Lee, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry, was employed by the FBI and held a Top Secret security clearance. After failing three polygraph examinations, the FBI revoked his security clearance and subsequently terminated his employment, as his job required such clearance. Lee contended that the revocation was based on race, national origin, and protected speech, and he brought claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and Title VII.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Lee's claims. It held that his Title VII claims were not timely exhausted, that Title VII preempted his Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that Lee lacked a cause of action to press constitutional claims for damages against individual DOJ officials. The court also denied Lee's motion for leave to amend his complaint to include additional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), barred judicial review of Lee's statutory and constitutional claims. The court reasoned that the decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The court also found that Lee's constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as they involved national security matters committed to the political branches and lacked judicially manageable standards for resolution. View "Lee v. Garland" on Justia Law

A union representing over 9,000 pilots employed by an airline alleged that the airline violated the Railway Labor Act (RLA) by intimidating and disciplining pilots who affiliated with the union. The union claimed that the airline had a history of isolating a special category of pilots known as "check pilots" and "standards check pilots," who are responsible for training and evaluating other pilots. The union alleged that the airline unilaterally established working conditions for check pilots without bargaining and that check pilots were threatened with losing their qualifications if they affiliated with the union. The union also claimed that the airline retaliated against a pilot, Captain Timothy Roebling, by stripping him of his check-pilot qualifications after he joined a union committee.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the union's complaint, concluding that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the RLA and that no exception applied to vest the court with jurisdiction. The district court found that the airline had an arguable basis for its actions under the collective bargaining agreement, making the dispute a "minor" one subject to arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the union had sufficiently pleaded the anti-union animus exception to the RLA's arbitration requirement. The court found that the union's allegations, including threats and retaliatory actions against check pilots, supported the claim that the airline's actions were intended to weaken or destroy the union. The court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the union's complaint sufficiently alleged anti-union animus to warrant judicial intervention. View "Southwest Airlines Pilots Assn v. Southwest Airlines" on Justia Law

In 2018, Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting this claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading him to appeal.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho initially reviewed the case. The court found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course and scope of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. It concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions met the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court granted summary judgment to Crookham and denied Clover’s motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence and arguments that were deemed untimely and insufficient to alter the court’s original decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case on appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham engaged in conduct knowing that employee injury would result. The court found no evidence that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge of a significant risk posed by the drip tape lifter. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to subsequent remedial measures and denied Clover’s motion for reconsideration, concluding that the new evidence presented did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court awarded costs to Crookham as the prevailing party. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

Terrence Richard, a brakeman for Union Pacific Railroad Company, fell from a train and broke his leg while working. He sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Richard claimed that the locomotive engineer’s mishandling of the train caused a surge that led to his fall. The trial court excluded the testimony of Richard’s expert, Richard Hess, a retired Union Pacific engineer, who would have testified that the engineer’s actions caused the surge. The jury found in favor of Union Pacific, concluding the company was not negligent.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine to exclude Hess’s testimony, reasoning that Hess lacked the necessary qualifications and expertise. Hess had intended to testify that the delay between releasing the train brakes and engaging the throttle caused excessive slack action, leading to a surge at the rear of the train where Richard was working. The trial court’s exclusion of this testimony left Richard without an expert to support his claim of negligent train handling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Hess’s testimony. The appellate court found that Hess’s extensive experience as a locomotive engineer qualified him to testify about the train handling practices and the potential dangers of the engineer’s actions. The exclusion of Hess’s testimony was deemed prejudicial because it deprived Richard of critical expert evidence to support his negligence claim. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment for Union Pacific and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Michael Walden applied multiple times for a manufacturing job with General Electric (GE) but failed the required tests each time. He sued GE for age discrimination and his union for unfair representation in his challenges to GE's hiring decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for GE and the union, and Walden appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of GE and the union. The court found that Walden failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because he did not meet the job qualifications, specifically failing the required tests. Additionally, the court found that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Walden did not qualify for the job as he failed the required tests, and thus could not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court also held that issue preclusion barred Walden's claim against the union for unfair representation, as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had already adjudicated and dismissed his unfair representation charge. The court concluded that Walden had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the NLRB, and thus, his section 301 claim under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) failed as a matter of law. View "Walden v. General Electric International" on Justia Law

Eric Gilbert filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing his interest in retirement accounts worth approximately $1.7 million. The issue was whether these accounts could be accessed by creditors due to alleged violations of federal law governing retirement plans. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the accounts were protected from creditors, and the District Court affirmed this decision.The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the trustee John McDonnell's complaint, which sought to include the retirement accounts in the bankruptcy estate, arguing that the accounts violated ERISA and the IRC. The court found that the accounts were excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which protects interests in trusts with enforceable anti-alienation provisions under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The District Court upheld this ruling, agreeing that ERISA's anti-alienation provision applied regardless of the alleged violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the retirement accounts were excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2) because ERISA's anti-alienation provision was enforceable, even if the accounts did not comply with ERISA and the IRC. The court also dismissed McDonnell's claims regarding preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances, as the transactions in question did not involve Gilbert parting with his property. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's decisions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, shorten the time for briefing, and strike certain items from the appellate record. View "In re: Gilbert" on Justia Law

Kimminee Costello, an event manager for Thompson Catering & Special Events, traveled to Las Vegas for a work conference. After the conference ended, she had some free time before her flight and decided to shop for souvenirs. While descending stairs at her hotel, she tripped and injured her right ankle, requiring multiple surgeries. Costello filed for workers' compensation benefits, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed her claim, finding that her injury occurred during a personal errand, not within the scope of her employment.The ALJ's decision was appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which reversed the ALJ's ruling and remanded the case for further findings on medical benefits and indemnity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision, leading Thompson Catering to appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the ALJ misapplied the traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule. The Court determined that Costello's brief shopping trip did not constitute a substantial deviation from her employment. The injury occurred during a period of enforced hiatus while she awaited her return flight, and the deviation was minor and insubstantial. Therefore, the injury was deemed work-related and compensable under Kentucky law. View "THOMPSON CATERING & SPECIAL EVENTS V. COSTELLO" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Information Practices Act (IPA). Wentworth claimed that the Regents failed to engage in the interactive process, provide reasonable accommodations, and invaded his privacy by leaking information about student complaints and his disability accommodations to the media.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on three of Wentworth’s causes of action under FEHA and IPA, denied his motion to compel discovery responses, and denied his request for a retrial on a cause of action for which the jury left the verdict form blank. The court also denied Wentworth’s post-judgment request for attorney’s fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary adjudication on the claims for failure to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations, finding that the Regents had offered reasonable accommodations and engaged in the interactive process in good faith. However, the court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy cause of action, finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents violated the IPA by leaking a letter about student complaints and disclosing information about Wentworth’s disability accommodation.The court also reversed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, remanding for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was the prevailing party under the IPA and whether he was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his right to object to the verdict form by failing to raise the issue before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. UC Regents" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, employees of the State of California providing dental care to inmates, filed a lawsuit seeking compensation for time spent on pre- and post-shift safety and security activities. These activities included going through security and handling alarm devices. The defendants, including the State of California and related departments, filed a demurrer, arguing that these activities were not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, leading to the plaintiffs' appeal.The trial court ruled that the activities in question were not integral and indispensable to the plaintiffs' principal work of providing dental care, thus not compensable under the FLSA. The plaintiffs argued that the trial court improperly decided a factual question and that their claims were viable. The defendants maintained that the trial court's decision was correct and also argued that the plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing their employment, that the relevant statutes did not apply to government employers, that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust contractual remedies, and that the claims were time-barred.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, concluded that the trial court erred in not accepting the plaintiffs' allegations as true for the purposes of the demurrer. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of contract and that the defendants' affirmative defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies could not be resolved at the demurrer stage. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' contract claim was not time-barred. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision in part and reversed it in part, allowing the breach of contract claim to proceed. View "Bath v. State" on Justia Law