Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Bradley Hirdman filed a complaint against his former employer, Charter Communications, LLC, alleging violations of various Labor Code sections under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Hirdman claimed that Charter improperly classified him as an "exempt employee" for calculating paid sick leave, arguing he should have been classified as a "nonexempt employee" and thus entitled to a different calculation method. Charter contended that Hirdman was correctly classified as an exempt outside salesperson, exempt from overtime compensation requirements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Charter's motion for summary adjudication, agreeing that the statutory language was unambiguous and that section 246, subdivision (l)(3) applied to exempt outside salespersons like Hirdman. The court found that Charter properly calculated and paid sick leave in the same manner as other forms of paid leave.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory language of section 246, subdivision (l)(3) was clear and unambiguous, applying to all exempt employees, including outside salespersons. The court rejected Hirdman's argument that the term "exempt employees" should be limited to those exempt under administrative, executive, or professional exemptions. The court also found that the legislative history and a Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter did not support Hirdman's interpretation. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Charter correctly calculated paid sick leave for Hirdman and other outside salespersons. View "Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Latonia Lister, the first African-American female firefighter in Las Vegas, sued the City of Las Vegas for employment discrimination under Title VII, alleging sex- and race-based discrimination and retaliation. The case stemmed from an incident on April 7, 2019, where her supervisor, Captain Michael Benneman, made offensive comments while feeding a dog. Lister reported the incident and later experienced additional incidents she considered discriminatory and retaliatory. She eventually requested a transfer out of her station.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the case. At trial, the jury found that the April 7 incident was severe or pervasive and objectively and subjectively offensive but was not motivated by race or gender. The jury concluded that the City did not discriminate against Lister or retaliate against her in violation of Title VII. Despite finding no liability, the jury awarded Lister $150,000 in damages. The district court reconciled the verdict by setting aside the damages award and entered judgment for the City. Lister's motion for a new trial was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions were not erroneous and did not contain prejudicial errors. The court found no conflict between the instructions and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not resubmitting the verdict to the jury. The court determined that the district court acted within its discretion by polling the jury to clarify the verdict and reconciling the verdict on its own. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the City and the denial of Lister's motion for a new trial. View "LISTER V. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

Robert Platt, an employee of Sodexo, Inc., sued his employer, claiming that a monthly tobacco surcharge on his employee health insurance premiums violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Platt brought claims on behalf of himself and other plan participants to recover losses under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3), and a breach of fiduciary duty claim on behalf of the employer-sponsored health insurance plan (the Plan) for losses under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Sodexo sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision it unilaterally added to the Plan after Platt joined.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Sodexo’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no enforceable arbitration agreement because Sodexo unilaterally modified the Plan to add the arbitration provision without Platt’s consent. The court found that Platt did not agree to arbitrate his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that an employer cannot create a valid arbitration agreement by unilaterally modifying an ERISA-governed plan to add an arbitration provision without obtaining consent from the relevant party. The court held that Platt is the relevant consenting party for claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3) and that he did not consent to arbitration because he did not receive sufficient notice of the arbitration provision. However, the court held that the Plan is the relevant consenting party for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and that the Plan consented to arbitration.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sodexo’s motion to compel arbitration for Platt’s claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3). It reversed in part the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and remanded for the district court to consider Platt’s unconscionability defenses and the severability of the representative action waiver and any other arbitration clauses found unconscionable. View "PLATT V. SODEXO, S.A." on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

Perfection Bakeries Inc. paid into the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union’s Industry Pension Fund for its employees in Michigan and Indiana. The company later ceased contributions, first in Michigan and then in Indiana, incurring "withdrawal liability" under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. The Fund calculated this liability using a four-step formula outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1381. Perfection Bakeries challenged the Fund's calculation, arguing that a specific calculation was performed at the wrong step.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund, holding that the statutory text unambiguously required the credit to be applied as part of the second adjustment step.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Fund correctly applied the partial-withdrawal credit at step two of the four-step formula. The court concluded that the statute's language and structure supported the Fund's interpretation, which incorporated all of section 1386, including the credit for previous partial withdrawals, at step two. The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the statutory context and the repeated cross-references to section 1386 throughout the four-step formula. The court rejected Perfection Bakeries' arguments, including the contention that the partial-withdrawal credit should be applied after all four steps, and upheld the Fund's calculation method. View "Perfection Bakeries Inc v. Retail Wholesale & Dept Store International Union" on Justia Law

Brian Trematore Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (Trematore) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 25 (Local 25) for a project at High-Tech High School in Secaucus, New Jersey. The CBA, initially formed under § 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), was later converted to a § 9(a) agreement when Local 25 demonstrated majority status. The CBA included an evergreen clause, automatically renewing unless terminated with notice, and a non-repudiation clause. Trematore ceased employing Local 25 members in September 2018 and later subcontracted work to non-union workers, leading to grievances and an unfair labor practice charge by Local 25.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Trematore's motion for judgment and granted Local 25's cross-motion, holding that the CBA remained in effect due to the evergreen provision and non-repudiation clause. The court found that Trematore could not repudiate the CBA under the one-employee unit rule and that the grievance regarding subcontracting was arbitrable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The appellate court held that Trematore was bound by the CBA through its evergreen provision and non-repudiation clause, making its attempted repudiation ineffective. The court also held that the grievance concerning subcontracting was arbitrable, as it fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the CBA. The court concluded that the CBA remained in effect and that Trematore was not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Brian Trematore Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 25" on Justia Law

John Baldwin sued Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging he was unlawfully removed from his position following a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Baldwin, who had degenerative arthritis and underwent a double hip replacement, experienced a bursitis flare-up while working, leading to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Despite being cleared by his orthopedic surgeon and a physical exam, Union Pacific's Chief Medical Officer imposed work restrictions based on Baldwin's exercise tolerance test results, which showed low aerobic capacity and mild hypertension. Baldwin was ultimately prevented from returning to his job.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied both parties' summary judgment motions. Baldwin voluntarily dismissed his disparate impact and ADEA claims, proceeding to trial on the ADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. The jury found that Union Pacific discriminated against Baldwin based on a perceived disability but concluded he posed a direct threat to himself. The district court entered judgment for Union Pacific and denied Baldwin’s motion for a new trial, which challenged the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Baldwin argued that the jury instructions misallocated the burden of proof and omitted essential elements of the direct threat defense. The court found that while the direct threat instruction was incomplete, it did not affect the trial's outcome. The business judgment instruction was deemed appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the instructions, taken as a whole, did not mislead the jury or affect Baldwin's substantial rights. View "Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

James Trambly was employed by the University of Nebraska-Kearney as a help desk associate and later promoted to workstation support specialist. His job performance declined after the promotion, leading to a negative evaluation and further issues. In November 2018, Trambly accused a co-worker of interfering with his email, and in January 2019, he removed a hard drive from a university computer without authorization, violating university policy. He was terminated on February 8, 2019. Trambly filed a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, concluding that Trambly failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. The court also denied Trambly's motion to amend his complaint to include a claim under Title II of the ADA, ruling that employment-based discrimination claims could only arise under Title I.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Trambly did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he suffered from an impairment that substantially limited his major life activities. The court also found that Trambly's retaliation claims were unsupported, as the alleged adverse actions were not materially adverse or causally linked to his protected conduct. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of leave to amend the complaint, agreeing that Title II of the ADA does not apply to employment-based discrimination claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Trambly v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska" on Justia Law

Patricia Conway, a registered nurse, was terminated from Mercy Hospital St. Louis for refusing to comply with the hospital's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required all employees to be vaccinated unless they obtained an approved medical or religious exemption. Conway requested a religious exemption, which was denied. She was subsequently terminated and filed a lawsuit alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital, finding that as a religious organization, the hospital was exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Conway appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Mercy Hospital qualifies as a "religious organization" under § 2000e-1(a) due to its structure, mission, and affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church. The court found that the hospital's religious identity and mission, supported by uncontroverted facts, met the criteria for the exemption.The court also rejected Conway's arguments that Mercy Hospital waived its exemption by complying with the CMS mandate and that it should be estopped from invoking the exemption due to its internal vaccine policy. The court concluded that compliance with federal regulations does not waive a statutory exemption and that the hospital's policy did not constitute a clear representation that would induce detrimental reliance.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital, upholding the exemption for religious organizations under Title VII. View "Conway v. Mercy Hospital St. Louis" on Justia Law

A certified nursing assistant was hired by a nursing care facility in February 2017. A week into her employment, she signed an acknowledgment that included a 180-day limitations period for bringing any employment-related claims. She reported inappropriate behavior by upper management and alleged retaliation by her manager. She was terminated in July 2017 and filed a complaint in April 2020, alleging various claims including violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA).The Macomb Circuit Court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition, dismissing the plaintiff's claims based on the 180-day limitations period in the acknowledgment. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the shortened limitations period was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, relying on precedent that upheld such limitations periods in employment contracts.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the contractual limitations period was enforceable. The Court held that while contractually shortened limitations periods are generally permitted, they require close judicial scrutiny when included in non-negotiated, adhesive employment agreements. The Court overruled previous decisions that did not apply this scrutiny and reinstated the framework from Camelot Excavating Co. and Herweyer v. Clark Hwy Servs., which require a reasonableness analysis for such limitations periods.The Court concluded that the 180-day limitations period in the plaintiff's employment agreement was adhesive and warranted close judicial scrutiny. The case was remanded to the Macomb Circuit Court to develop a full record and determine the reasonableness of the shortened limitations period and whether it was unconscionable. If found unreasonable or unconscionable, the statutory three-year limitations period would apply. View "Rayford v. American House Roseville I LLC" on Justia Law