Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Gezu worked for Charter, 2017-2019. In October 2017, Charter sent an email to all active, non-union employees announcing a new employment-based legal dispute resolution program. The email instructed employees about their right to opt out. The arbitration agreement, which was available in full on Charter’s intranet, required arbitration of all disputes, claims, and controversies that could be asserted in court or before an administrative agency.During his employment, Gezu allegedly suffered discrimination based on his race and national origin and Charter did not take any action to address the discrimination despite being made aware of it. Charter terminated Gezu in May 2019, based on what Gezu alleges were pretextual reasons. Gezu, acting pro se, asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Fifth Circuit affirmed an order granting Charter’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss. There was a valid modification to Gezu’s employment contract, consisting of notice and acceptance. View "Gezu v. Charter Communications" on Justia Law

Appellant Jessica Adams worked for C3 Pipeline Construction, Inc. (“C3”) on a pipeline construction crew. C3 subcontracted with Alpha Crude Connector, LLC (“Alpha Crude” or “ACC”) on an ACC pipeline system in New Mexico and Texas. Adams alleged that three C3 workers sexually harassed her while they were working on this project in New Mexico. She sued C3 and Plains Defendants, Alpha Crude’s corporate successors, under federal and New Mexico law. When Plains Defendants answered the complaint, they moved for summary judgment, attaching their Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) with C3 and affidavits from managers stating that Plains Defendants did not “employ” C3’s workers. Adams opposed the motion, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to take discovery on her alleged “employment” relationship with Plains Defendants, and argued for the first time that Plains Defendants should have been liable for breaching their duty to keep her safe on their premises. The district court granted summary judgment to Plains Defendants, denied Adams’s Rule 56(d) motion, and construed her premises liability argument as a motion to amend her complaint and denied it as futile. That same day, the district court ordered Adams to serve a summons and the complaint on C3, which she did. When C3 did not answer the complaint, the court entered a default judgment against C3 and ordered it to pay Adams $20,050,000. Within 30 days of that order, Adams appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plains Defendants. After its review, the Tenth Circuit: (1) denied Plains Defendants’ motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely; (2) affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and Rule 56(d) rulings; and (3) vacated its denial of Adams’s motion to amend and remanded for further proceedings. View "Adams v. C3 Pipeline Construction, et al." on Justia Law

Zamora sued his former employer, SIS, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code 12900) for employment discrimination based on physical disability, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation, wrongful termination, and other claims after SIS laid him off while he was recovering from an industrial injury. The trial court granted summary adjudication of all but two causes of action. The parties later stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims, and the court entered judgment for SIS.The court of appeal reversed the summary adjudication of the disability discrimination, wrongful termination in violation of FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims. Zamora suffered from a qualifying disability under the FEHA based on his workplace knee injury. FEHA requires employers to make reasonable accommodation for the known disabilities of employees and applicants to enable them to perform the essential functions of a position unless doing so would produce undue hardship to the employer’s operation. The evidence here raises triable issues of fact as to whether Zamora could have worked in another position at SIS with his restrictions and whether he was discharged because of his disability. Zamora presented substantial evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent. View "Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they own an apartment complex and that their tenant purchased a washing machine from Best Buy, which was negligently installed. A resulting water leak resulted in significant damage to the property, rendering several units uninhabitable.Best Buy argued that its subsidiary had a contract with Penn Ridge, under which Penn Ridge “shall provide services . . . as a duly licensed broker of property by the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration … utilizing the services of independent motor carriers to effectuate the pick-up, delivery, and in-home installation of Merchandise” from Best Buy. Carriers are defined under the Agreement as “any independently owned and operated motor carrier under contract with [Penn Ridge] who may also provide Installation Services.” The carriers’ trucks did not display the Best Buy name or logo. Delivery teams did not wear any Best Buy branded clothing. The equipment used by the delivery teams varied among carriers. Penn Ridge alone determined if the carriers were qualified to provide necessary delivery and installation services. The contracts stated the carriers were providing services as independent contractors, Best Buy gave Penn Ridge access to its routing system and required that contractors comply with certain Best Buy policies and procedures.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Best Buy. There is no material dispute that the washing machine was installed by an independent contractor. View "Bacoka v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

Tiffina McQueen petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order directing her that her compulsory counterclaims would be tried separately from the claims raised by Yukita Johnson, the plaintiff below. In 2020, Johnson sued R&L Foods, LLC, petitioner, Michael McQueen ("McQueen"), Michael London, and Joe Fortner alleging McQueen threatened her over her work performance one day. Johnson phoned Fornter, a regional manager and reported McQueen; she asked Fortner if she could leave and go home. Fortner allegedly phoned McQueen over Johnson's allegations, but did not give Johnson permission to leave for the day. Notwithstanding the call, Johnson alleged McQueen still berated her, with petitioner joining in, retreving a handgun from a bag she was carrying, and gave the gun to her brother, McQueen. Johnson alleged McQueen fired several shots at her while inside the restaurant. As she fled, McQueen allegedly gave the gun to London, another employee, and London then fired several more shots at her from inside the restaurant. Johnson averred that customers of the restaurant and of a nearby business called law-enforcement officers of the incident. Johnson alleged that, after the shooting, she telephoned Fortner and told him about the incident and that Fortner telephoned the petitioner and then drove to the restaurant. Law-enforcement officers arrested McQueen and London. Johnson alleged that law-enforcement officers caught petitioner attempting to destroy video-surveillance footage of the incident and attempting to hide the handgun that was used in the incident. Petitioner was arrested for tampering with evidence. Johnson further alleged that, unbeknownst to the law-enforcement officers, Fortner had instructed petitioner to delete the video-surveillance footage of the incident. R&L Foods terminated Johnson's employment, but did not terminate petitioner's. Johnson asserted multiple claims arising from the altercation with petitioner and her brother. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that nothing in the facts of this case demonstrated that separate trials on Johnson's claims or in the counterclaim would further the convenience of the parties, would avoid prejudice to the parties, or would be "conducive to expedition and economy." Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it ordered separate trials in this case. The petition was granted and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte Tiffina McQueen." on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision concluding the State, as employer, lacked just cause to terminate grievant Patrick Ryan on account of actions he took as a member of the State workforce, and reducing grievant’s discipline to a fifteen-day suspension. Grievant cross-appealed, contending the Board erred in imposing the fifteen-day suspension. After its review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Board’s findings were inadequate to enable informed appellate review. For that reason, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the Board for further factfinding. View "In re Grievance of Patrick Ryan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, procedural due process claim, and equal protection claim against the DOE and UFT for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In regard to the fair representation claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice but clarified that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has not limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has defined the requirements of a cause of action under the National Labor Relations Act to extend only to circumstances in which the employer is not a state or a political subdivision of a state. In this case, because plaintiff cannot allege that he worked for an "employer" under the Act, he fails to state a claim against UFT for violating its duty of fair representation, and his complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).In regard to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the DOE, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support the inference that the alleged racial discrimination and First Amendment retaliation resulted from an official custom or policy. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the DOE deviated from New York Education Law 3020-a procedures and this amounted to a constitutional due process violation. Furthermore, plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator was biased fails because due process does not require that pre-termination hearings occur before a neutral adjudicator. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim of discrimination against public school teachers in New York City based on different procedures for selecting disciplinary hearing arbitrators. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a new equal protection claim on appeal due to treatment of public school employees represented by a different union, that claim is not properly before the court. View "Green v. Department of Education of the City of New York" on Justia Law

In 1993, the County and the Orange County Employee Retirement System (OCERS) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), allowing the County to access surplus investment earnings controlled by OCERS and depositing a portion of the surplus into an account to pay for county retirees' health insurance. The county adopted the Retiree Medical Plan, funded by those investment earnings and mandatory employee deductions. The Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested rights. The labor unions then entered into MOUs, requiring the county to administer the Plan and that retirees receive a Medical Insurance Grant. In 1993-2007, retired employees received a monthly grant benefit to defray the cost of health insurance. In 2004, the county negotiated with its unions to restructure the underfunded program, reducing benefits for retirees.Plaintiffs filed suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The 1993 Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested right to benefits. The Plan was adopted by resolution and became law with respect to Grant Benefits, part of the MOUs. The MOUs expired on their own terms by a specific date. Absent express language providing that the Grant Benefits vested, the right to the benefits expired when the MOUs expired. The Plan was not unilaterally imposed on the unions and their employees without collective bargaining; the unions executed MOUs adopting the Plan. The court rejected an assertion that the Grant Benefit was deferred compensation and vested upon retirement, similar to pension benefits. View "Harris v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Tradesmen International and Laborworks Industrial Staffing Specialists were staffing agencies that placed temporary workers with host employers. Tradesmen staffed a worker at a Dochnahl Construction site. Laborworks staffed workers at a Strategic Materials recycling facility. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) cited the staffing agencies for Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) violations arising from the staffing operations. In both cases, the citations were vacated by the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board), finding that the staffing agencies were not liable employers under WISHA. The Department appealed the decisions to the superior court. As to Laborworks, the superior court reinstated the citations, and as to Tradesmen, the superior court affirmed the Board and vacated the citations. In both cases, the Court of Appeals determined that the staffing agencies were not liable employers under WISHA and vacated the citations. After its review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals as to Tradesmen and reversed as to Laborworks. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Tradesmen Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the determination of the Medical Commission Hearing Panel that Scott Triplett failed to meet his burden to show entitlement to a right hip replacement, holding that the Medical Panel's decision was neither arbitrary or capricious.The Medical Panel determined that Triplett did not meet his burden of proof to establish that the hip replacement surgery was a reasonable and necessary medical treatment for any injury related to his work injury. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Panel's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. View "Triplett v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law