Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court denying Lyft Inc.'s request to compel arbitration in this purported class action but affirmed the denials of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied.Plaintiffs were Massachusetts-based rideshare drivers who used the Lyft application and platform to find passengers. In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Lyft misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees. At issue on this appeal were rulings concerning Plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunctive relief and the denial of Lyft's request to compel arbitration. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the FAA applies in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' requested injunction. View "Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the Board of Review affirming the decision of a Labor Dispute Tribunal that certain union members employed at a production plant (Claimants) were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the lower tribunals erred.In 2012, representatives of Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC and United Steelworkers Local 5668, the union representing the majority of Constellium's employees, met to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. When the parties could not come to terms Claimants went on strike. After the strike ended, Claimants applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The Tribunal decided that Claimants were not disqualified for benefits under W. Va. Code 21A-6-3(4), the labor dispute provision. The Board and circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the lower tribunals erred in holding that Claimants were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits under the labor dispute provision. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC, v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Houston began working for TDA in 2012. Houston’s responsibilities required on-site inspections to confirm compliance with state and federal regulations. Houston suffers from lupus, anemia, and other illnesses, requiring her to be absent from work and sometimes take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In 2016, Houston returned to her position after a long-term medical leave and submitted a request for accommodations permitting her to telework and to work a compressed workweek. TDA allowed Houston to work four 10-hour days but denied the telework request because Houston’s duties could not be performed solely from home and Houston needed training to improve performance.Later in 2016, Houston received warnings for “failure to meet expectations,” excessive absenteeism and tardiness, inadequate job performance, insubordination, leaving work early, accruing overtime without approval, late arrivals to sites being audited, failure to submit accurate and timely administrative reviews, and failure to follow TDA’s travel policy. An April 2017 warning notified Houston that she was on a 90-day probation period. When the probationary period ended, TDA discharged Houston because of her failure to correct her performance deficiencies, excessive absenteeism and tardiness unrelated to protected FMLA leave, and insubordination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Houston’s FMLA retaliation claim, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and her Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, discrimination claim.TDA established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Houston’s termination; Houston failed to raise a disputed material fact showing that those reasons were pretextual. View "Houston v. Texas Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they moved to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering judgment against the estate. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Burke v. Criterion General Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit filed against the employer of Kasey Christiansen, who was killed at work, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' lawsuit based on a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that bars employees from suiting their employers over work-related injuries. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Act's exclusive remedy provision to dismiss their complaint because the intentional-injury exception applied. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it could not reasonably be inferred that Defendant believed Christiansen's fatal injuries were virtually certain to occur. View "Christiansen v. Harrison Western Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) when it discharged him for reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety condition. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded back pay. The district court denied plaintiff's request for reinstatement and instead awarded three years of front pay, thereafter granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Eighth Circuit concluded that BNSF's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was timely and therefore fell within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)'s 28-day time period; there existed a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the jury's finding that plaintiff's report regarding the danger of wearing a seatbelt while hy-railing is a report of a hazardous safety condition; and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that BNSF intentionally retaliated against plaintiff. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting BNSF's conditional motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of BNSF, reversed the order granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and remanded for the reinstatement of the jury verdict and for the entry of such further relief. View "Monohon v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this lawsuit over a work-related ailment, holding that remand was required.Plaintiff contracted lead poisoning while working for Defendant. A narrow exception in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) allows employees like Plaintiff to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act, and Plaintiff sued Defendant under this exception. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Plaintiff's claim because he did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) although both parties assumed that the WCA covered Plaintiff's condition, Utah law has frequently recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act; and (2) therefore, remand was required to determine if Plaintiff's lead poisoning was an occupational disease. View "Kay v. Bullets" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim and granting summary judgment for Defendants on all remaining counts, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued the City of East Providence, Rhode Island, its School Department, and the School Superintendent, asserting claims arising from what she alleged were unlawful discriminatory employment actions taken against her. The First Circuit resolved all claims in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to plead even a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory employment discrimination was not supported by admissible evidence that would warrant putting the case to a jury. View "Lima v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Elkhorn is a farm labor contractor for a California-based vegetable grower. As part of Elkhorn’s orientation for incoming employees, Martinez-Gonzalez signed employment paperwork that included arbitration agreements. The district court held that the arbitration agreements resulted from undue influence and economic duress and were invalid and unenforceable.The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether Martinez-Gonzalez’s allegation of federal and state labor and wage law violations fell within the scope of the arbitration agreements. Under California law, the doctrine of economic duress did not render the arbitration agreements unenforceable because Elkhorn did not commit a wrongful act and reasonable alternatives were available to Martinez-Gonzalez. Martinez-Gonzalez made the journey from Mexico to California, where he was dependent on Elkhorn housing and had already started work but, while “not ideal,” those circumstances did not constitute a “wrongful act” under California law. No one at Elkhorn told Martinez-Gonzalez that refusing to sign the agreements was a cause for termination. It was clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that MartinezGonzalez lacked a reasonable alternative. The timing and place of the orientation did not show that Martinez-Gonzalez’s will was overborne; the lack of time to consult with attorneys or read the agreements did not improperly induce his signatures. Elkhorn’s representatives’ instructions to sign the agreements quickly were not insistent demands. View "Martinez-Gonzalez v. Elkhorn Packing Co. LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Bank, alleging that the Bank violated 42 U.S.C. 1981 by taking retaliatory employment actions against him because he opposed racial discrimination occurring within his department.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant leave to amend his complaint where he failed to offer any grounds as to why his leave should be granted or how deficiencies in his complaint could be corrected. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1981 when it concluded that he did not engage in a protected activity. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded that plaintiff has successfully pleaded facts that could support a reasonable belief. In this case, plaintiff alleged that he overheard a supervisor state that "he intended to terminate four (4) African American employees." The court explained that a supervisor's considering of the race of an employee when deciding to terminate that employee is an unlawful employment practice. Furthermore, after plaintiff gave a statement to a human resources investigator, he alleges that the company began to retaliate against him by denying his loans, giving him multiple warnings, sending him to unnecessary training, and ultimately terminating him. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scott v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law