Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Dorsa joined Miraca, which offers pathology services for healthcare providers. His employment agreement contained a binding arbitration clause. Dorsa claims that, during his employment, he observed Miraca giving monetary donations and free services to healthcare providers to induce pathology referrals, in violation of the AntiKickback Statute, the Stark Law, and the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1). Dorsa lodged internal complaints. Dorsa claims that Miraca fabricated a sexual harassment complaint against him. Dorsa filed a qui tam action against Miraca in September 2013. Days later, Miraca fired Dorsa, citing workplace harassment. Dorsa added an FCA retaliation claim.The government investigated the FCA claims and, in 2018, intervened for purposes of settlement, under which Miraca agreed to pay $63.5 million to resolve FCA claims. Miraca moved to dismiss the remaining retaliation claim, citing the arbitration clause, Dorsa argued that the clause did not apply because his claim was independent from the employment agreement. Miraca then asserted that the court did not have the authority to decide a threshold question of arbitrability. The district court ruled in favor of Dorsa. Miraca later moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. Miraca forfeited and waived its arguments about the district court’s authority to decide threshold questions of arbitrability and its ruling on the merits. Filing the motion to dismiss was inconsistent with Miraca’s later attempts to rely on the arbitration agreement. View "Dorsa v. Miraca Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

RiverStone operates quarries in three midwestern states. Under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), RiverStone contributed to the Fringe Benefit Funds for certain employees, based on hours worked by the members of the bargaining unit. The CBA expired in May 2016. Nothing in the agreement imposes on RiverStone an obligation to make contributions after the agreement. RiverStone sought a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to make contributions to the employees’ pension fund on behalf of individuals hired after the CBA expired. The Funds filed a counterclaim.The district court granted RiverStone summary judgment, holding that RiverStone did not have a contractual duty to contribute to the Funds on behalf of the new employees and that it lacked jurisdiction to evaluate noncontractual sources of liability, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) so the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute is over an obligation that does not arise under any contract. Once a CBA has expired, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1145, does not confer jurisdiction on the district court to determine whether the employer’s failure to make post-contract contributions violated the NLRA. View "RiverStone Group, Inc v. Midwest Operating Engineers Fringe Benefit Funds" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that BevMo's policy, requiring the presence of two persons in any store while open, regularly requires employees to forgo off-duty, uninterrupted meal and rest periods, or, alternatively, premium pay for non-compliant meal and rest periods. In their Contra Costa County representative suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), the plaintiffs gave notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. More than a year before that suit, Paez had filed a PAGA representative action against BevMo in Los Angeles, concerning the two-person policy. While their petition for judicial coordination (Code Civ. Proc. 404) with the Los Angeles PAGA suit was pending, the Contra Costa trial court stayed the suit.After the petition for coordination was denied, the court denied a motion to lift the stay, concluding that the stay was warranted under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The court of appeal denied a petition of mandamus relief. The trial court did not err in applying the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule to this dispute. If that rule is mandatory, PAGA does not clearly abrogate the rule; if the court had discretion to weigh policy concerns in deciding whether to apply the rule, the court did not abuse its discretion. View "Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants claiming they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act. The district court entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants. After the court entered its order, but before the clerk had entered a separate judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff filed a notice stating that he had accepted an offer of judgment that Defendants had extended in which they agreed to pay him four thousand dollars plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.   Plaintiff maintained that, under Rule 68(a), he could accept the offer anytime up to fourteen days after Defendants had served him with it, and therefore it had survived the court's grant of summary judgment. The clerk nevertheless entered judgment consistent with the summary-judgment order. Plaintiff moved the court to amend the judgment to reflect the terms in the offer of judgment. The district court, relying on Perkins, granted Plaintiff’s motion, and the clerk entered a new judgment. Defendants appealed, maintaining that the judgment should have reflected the court's summary judgment ruling rather than the offer of judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied Defendants' requested relief and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and from the court’s order granting Plaintiff only one dollar in attorneys' fees. The court reasoned that only its’ en banc court may overrule a prior panel's decision. Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only one dollar in fees. View "Stetson Skender v. Eden Isle Corporation" on Justia Law

A&D Interests, Incorporated (doing business as the “Heartbreakers Gentlemen’s Club”), petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. Petitioners argue that the district court should not have certified a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action comprised of “exotic” dancers who had worked at Heartbreakers in the last three years.   The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner’s motion for a writ of mandamus in their Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. The court held that none of the three causes of the arbitration agreement prohibit potential plaintiffs from participating in collective action.   The court analyzed whether mandamus is warranted and found that Petitioners met the first requirement because the relevant issue will become moot before Petitioners can file an appeal. The court held that the second requirement is met because ensuring judicial neutrality and preventing district courts from needlessly stirring up litigation is good cause for a writ to issue. Thus, the court held that in light of In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2019), the district court clearly and indisputably erred. View "In re: A&D Interests" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment against public school teacher Sheri Mimbs, on the basis that Mimbs failed to institute her whistleblower action within one year after discovering the alleged acts of retaliation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Mimbs’s complaint was timely with respect to one of the acts giving rise to her retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the school district. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mimbs v. Henry County Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nicole Leshane, Steve Garner, Justin Prasad, Isaac Saldana, and Maurice West sued defendants Tracy VW, Inc. and RJ Gill Ventures, Inc. alleging several Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of themselves as defendants’ former employees, on behalf of others similarly situated, and on behalf of the state pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. After defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint alleging violations of the Labor Code solely as representatives of the state under the Private Attorneys General Act. Defendants continued to seek arbitration of plaintiffs’ individual claims and dismissal of their class-wide claims pursuant to the arbitration agreements each plaintiff signed. The trial court denied defendants’ petition to compel arbitration finding plaintiffs’ claim under the Private Attorneys General Act was not subject to arbitration citing Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014). Defendants appealed the trial court’s order. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Leshane v. Tracy VW, Inc." on Justia Law

After a 21-year career as a firefighter with the City of Pocatello, Richard Nelson was diagnosed with leukemia. Nelson brought a workers’ compensation claim against the City. The Industrial Commission determined that the City failed to rebut a statutory presumption of causation with substantial and competent evidence. The City appealed, arguing there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Nelson’s cancer was caused by his employment. The City also argued Idaho Code section 72-438(14)(b) unconstitutionally discriminated between the employers of firefighters who had cancer and the employers of other employees who claim to have contracted an occupational disease. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Nelson v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

As a condition of Plaintiff’s employment, she agreed to be bound by Defendant’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy (“ADR Policy”), which provided that “final and binding arbitration” would be the exclusive means for resolving “covered disputes” between the employee and employer. Plaintiff provided the required notice of alleged Labor Code violations. The agency did not respond to her notice within the time provided by statute, allowing Plaintiff to file PAGA representative claims. Plaintiff’s lawsuit also alleged class claims. Relying on the ADR Policy, Defendant requested Plaintiff stipulate to arbitrate her individual claims, strike her class claims, and stay her PAGA claims pending the outcome of arbitration. Plaintiff refused; she instead amended her complaint to drop the class claims, leaving only the PAGA claims that were asserted on behalf of herself and all other similarly aggrieved employees. After an unsuccessful mediation, Defendant moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argued that there is no distinction between the agent binding the principal to arbitration under a power of attorney in Kindred Nursing and an employee binding the State of California in a PAGA action.   The Second Appellate Division affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The court reasoned that both Epic Systems and Kindred Nursing involved private actions between private parties asserting private rights. It did not involve an action between an employer and a representative of the state to recover civil penalties on the state’s behalf to benefit the general public. View "Wing v. Chico Healthcare & Wellness Centre" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Board of Review affirming the decision of the Office of Judges denying Appellant's request to add C5-6 spondylosis with C6 radiculopathy as a compensable condition, holding that Appellant was entitled to a permanent partial disability award.Appellant suffered a compensable injury to his shoulder, neck and back while working for Respondent. After the injury, Appellant developed cervical radiculopathy. At issue was whether cervical radiculopathy should be added as a compensable condition of Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with directions to add cervical radiculopathy as a compensable condition, holding that Appellant proved a causal connection between his compensable injury and his cervical radiculopathy. View "Moore v. ICG Tygart Valley, LLC" on Justia Law