Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment against a group of jockeys who demanded higher wages and refused to rice and vacated the orders permanently enjoining the work stoppage and imposing $1,190,685 in damages, holding that the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs an injunction and summary judgment.Plaintiffs, an association of horse owners and the owner of a racetrack, brought this action against the jockeys and their spouses who refused to race, alleging that Defendants engaged in a group boycott in violation of federal antitrust law. The district court granted an injunction, concluding (1) the jockeys were independent contractors and had acted in concert to restrain trade, and (2) the jockeys could not benefit from the labor-dispute exemption because of their independent contractor status. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the labor-dispute exemption applied in this case; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs and injunction and summary judgment. View "Confederacion Hipica de Puerto Rico v. Confederacion de Jinetes Puertorriqueños, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, served in the Intelligence Division. When a new captain took over, he made personnel changes, including the transfer or detachment of 17 male officers and 5 female officers across the department. Two males and two females were transferred out of the Intelligence Division. Plaintiff was transferred to the Fifth District.Shortly after her transfer, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. Around the same time, Plaintiff sought to transfer out of the Fifth District. The Captain made an informal request for Plaintiff’s transfer, but no formal request was ever made. Eventually, the following year, Plaintiff was transferred back into the Intelligence Division.Plaintiff filed gender discrimination and retaliation claim in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff’s transfer from the Intelligence Division to the Fifth District did not constitute an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s pay and rank remained the same after the transfer. The transfer did not affect her future job prospects. An employee’s reassignment, absent proof of harm resulting from that reassignment, is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. View "Jatonya Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, State of Mo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class-action lawsuit alleging that SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The parties reached a settlement agreement. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), SC Data moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff first alleged that SC Data took an adverse employment action based on her consumer report without first showing her the report. The court reasoned that the right to pre-action explanation to the employer is not unambiguously stated in the statute’s text. Next, the plaintiff asserts that SC Data obtained her consumer report without first obtaining an FCRA compliant disclosure form. The court found that plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure. Finally, the plaintiff’s last claim asserts that she did not authorize SC Data to obtain a consumer report. She did authorize a company to conduct a criminal background search. The court found that plaintiff has not pleaded any facts demonstrating concrete harm—a prerequisite for Article III standing. As such, she lacks standing to pursue her failure-to-authorize claim. The court vacated the district court's orders. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case concerning the enforceability of a non-compete agreement the Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' judgment on appeal and the circuit court's final order in favor of Lorna Gagnon with respect to her alleged breach of a non-solicitation clause as to one real estate agent but otherwise affirmed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment as to this issue.A non-compete agreement restricted Gagnon, a former employee of Prudential Locations, LLC, from establishing her own brokerage firm in Hawaii within one year after terminating her employment with Locations and from soliciting persons employed or affiliated with Locations. The Supreme Court held (1) the ICA erroneously failed to address whether the non-compete and non-solicitation clauses were ancillary to a legitimate purpose not violative of Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 480; (2) restricting competition is not a legitimate ancillary purpose; (3) to establish a violation of a non-solicitation clause, there must be evidence that the person subjective to the clause actively initiated contact; and (4) as to the non-compete clause, summary judgment was proper, but as to the non-solicitation clause, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Gagnon actively initiated contact. View "Prudential Locations, LLC v. Gagnon " on Justia Law

Dr. Dubnow, a board-certified physician with more than 40 years of experience, was Chief of the Emergency Department at Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC). In 2017, he diverted an ambulance transporting an infant to Lake Forest Hospital, located a few minutes away from the FHCC. Lake Forest has a Level-II trauma center and is staffed with pediatric specialists. The child was pronounced dead upon arriving at Lake Forest. The FHCC, a VA hospital, investigated Dubnow’s diversion decision. This investigation eventually resulted in his removal. A review board concluded that none of the grounds for his removal were supported but the final reviewing authority reversed the review board’s decision. The district court affirmed the VA’s removal decision.The Seventh Circuit vacated the removal. The VA failed to properly apply the deferential “clearly contrary to the evidence” standard when reviewing the board’s decision to overturn Dubnow’s removal; the decision was arbitrary. The relevant question was whether the diversion was appropriate; if so, Dubnow’s removal could not be sustained. To conclude that treating the patient at the FHCC was possible, or even appropriate, is not to conclude that diverting the ambulance to a better-equipped hospital was inappropriate. A “conclusion that there was ‘no need’ to divert the patient is two steps removed from the analysis” under 38 U.S.C. 7462(d). View "Dubnow v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are “business development managers” tasked with persuading corporate customers to purchase vehicles for their fleets. The task often requires over 40 hours of effort per week, and the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to overtime compensation. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are covered by the administrative exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).Under the FLSA, employees who work over 40 hours per week are generally entitled to time-and-a-half overtime compensation. However, not all workers qualify, as the statute exempts employees working in “a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” The plaintiffs contend that they do not meet the third prong of the exemption, which requires that they exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance. The court reasoned that a worker need not have “limitless discretion” or a total lack of supervision to qualify as an administrative employee. Further, the defendant pointed to ample evidence that the plaintiffs exercised discretion in their job pursuits. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that the administrative exemption in the FLSA applies to the plaintiffs. View "Alicia Brown v. Nexus Business Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the conclusion of the workers' compensation commissioner that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury rather than an unscheduled whole body injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2), holding that there was no error.Claimant sustained a work-related injury that was diagnosed as a "full thickness rotator cuff tear that has retracted to the level of the glenoid, severe AC arthrosis, tendonitis and tearing of the biceps tendon." In seeking permanent partial disability benefits, Claimant argued that her injury qualified as an unscheduled injury to the body as a whole, entitling her to industrial disability benefits. The commissioner concluded that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled injury to the shoulder, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined (1) Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2)(n); and (2) substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that Claimant failed to prove her biceps tear resulted in a permanent disability to her arm under section 85.34(2)(m). View "Chavez v. MS Technology LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Employer's motion for a new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following a jury trial on Employee's claims of sex and gender identity discrimination and dismissing Employee's claims against a third-party administrator on summary judgment, holding that the court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's denial of Employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the jury's verdict as to Employee's sex discrimination claims, holding that the district court erred in submitting the sex discrimination claim to the jury; (2) affirmed the jury's verdicts as to employee's gender identity discrimination claims; (3) affirmed the jury's damages award in favor of Employee in the full amounts that the jury entered; and (4) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Employer. View "Vroegh v. Iowa Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations.In 2015, Appellant was injured while working for Liberty Trailer and sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. In 2019, Appellant requested additional benefits. An administrative law judge found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under a plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(b)(1), Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. View "Wynne v. Liberty Trailer" on Justia Law