Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Lax raised concerns about discrimination. After notification of his right to file a formal complaint, Lax filed a formal complaint of disability discrimination against his employer (DHS), alleging he had been improperly placed on indefinite suspension and had his security clearance suspended after he checked himself into a hospital for mental health treatment and missed two days of work.DHS's final agency decision, rejecting Lax’s complaint, was sent to Lax’s work email address on July 17, 2019. One minute later, Lax was sent the password to open an attachment, which contained: the final decision, a “Notice of Appeal Rights,” a privacy statement, and a certificate of service. The “Notice of Appeal Rights” stated that Lax had the right to file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving the final decision. Lax concedes that he opened these emails and read them on the day they were sent but claims that he was unable to open the attached document until the next day; government security measures prevented him from accessing his work email account on any non-work device.On October 16, 2019 (91 days after July 17), Lax filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(f)(1). Lax did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances element for equitable tolling. View "Lax v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jamie Herrmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (“the City”) on her claims for failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Herrmann began working for the City in 2002 and successfully held different positions in the Salt Lake City Justice courts for nine years. Starting in 2011, Herrmann began working as an in-court clerk, which required her to spend more time in court than her previous positions. Herrmann was diagnosed with PTSD, stemming from a nearly decade-long abusive marriage. Her presence in the courtroom during domestic violence cases frequently triggered her anxiety, causing severe migraines that could last for several days at a time and resulting in a significant downturn in her productivity. Herrmann raised three claims under the ADA: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The Tenth Circuit found Herrmann presented some evidence supporting a conclusion that she could not be accommodated within her existing position. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that Herrmann did not meet her prima facie case. As the district court did not address the other elements of Herrmann’s prima facie case the City challenged, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to provide the district court with that opportunity. View "Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the superior court allowing Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, holding that an employer cannot terminate an at-will employee for exercising the right to file a rebuttal to be included in the employee's personnel file, as provided by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 52C.After protesting his termination, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The superior court allowed Plaintiff's motion to dismiss, concluding that the right to submit a rebuttal was not a sufficiently important public policy to support Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that termination of an at-will employee simply for filing a rebuttal expressly authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 52C constitutes a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Meehan v. Medical Information Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

After being fired from the CTA, Miller and McGuire (both Caucasian) sued their former employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal (42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Illinois state law. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Despite receiving two extensions, however, Miller and McGuire failed to respond. Finding no persuasive excuse for this failure, the district court denied their third extension and took up the motion without a responsive pleading. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence did not support the claims and granted CTA summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension, and evidence of basic elements of a retaliation claim was lacking. Miller and McGuire could not avoid summary judgment based on the suspicious timing of their discharges alone unless, “[a]t minimum,” they first produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Bonds (a CTA officer) knew of their EEO complaints. They did not. Undisputed evidence showed that CTA had legitimate (nonracial) reasons for terminating Miller and McGuire’s employment and these reasons were not pretextual. View "Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed an order denying certification of a class of persons who worked without pay for American Film Institute (AFI). The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that common issues would not predominate over individual ones. In this case, the putative class members who expected no compensation were not employees under California law; the class that plaintiff moved to certify is broad enough to include persons who expected to be paid; and thus, if the case were to proceed as a class action, the trier of fact would need to decide whether each class member expected to be paid or was in fact a volunteer. View "Woods v. American Film Institute" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission summarily denying Petitioner's second request for modification of an earlier order, holding that the circuit court erred.The Commission issued an order approving Petitioner's request for four additional weeks of physical therapy for her left shoulder that was injured due to a workplace accident. More than three years later, Petitioner filed a request for modification of the earlier order denying her request for authorization of surgery. The Commission denied the request without a hearing. Petitioner then filed a second request for modification, which the Commission denied without a hearing. The circuit court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's summary denial of Petitioner's request for modification was not subject to judicial review. View "Sanders v. Board of Education of Harford County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Employer's motion to dismiss a petition for judicial review as untimely, holding that the district court correctly dismissed Claimant's petition for judicial review.Claimant sustained a work injury and pursued workers' compensation benefits. The workers' compensation benefits ordered Employer to pay temporary total disability benefits related to Claimant's right extremity injury but rejected Claimant's claim that she had also sustained a right shoulder occupational injury. According to Iowa Code 17A.19(3), Claimant had thirty day to file a petition for judicial review. Claimant's attorney failed to file the petition by the deadline. When the attorney realized his oversight, Claimant filed a petition for judicial review. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District and dismissing Clarence Lowe's tort claim, holding that the District is a political subdivision under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that Lowe's notice was untimely.Lowe claimed he was injured while working for the District and brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Lowe sent a note of tort claim to the Indiana attorney general, who received the notice 263 days after Lowe's injury. The District argued that, for purposes of the Act, it was a political subdivision rather than a state agency and that because Lowe failed to serve it with a notice within 180 days after his injury, the Act barred his claim. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment against Lowe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District was a political subdivision under the Act and that Lowe's arguments neither factually nor legally excused his failure to provide timely notice. View "Lowe v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District" on Justia Law

Glacier Northwest Inc. claimed the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 (Local 174) was liable for concrete product loss during a strike and for an alleged misrepresentation by a union representative that Glacier claims interfered with its ability to service a concrete mat pour. The trial court ruled the strike-related claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and granted summary judgment for Local 174 on the misrepresentation claims. Glacier appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the preemption issue but affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the misrepresentation claims. The Washington Supreme Court granted review and accepted amicus curiae briefing from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, to address whether an employer’s state tort claims against its truck drivers’ union were preempted by the NLRA, and whether any claims that were not preempted were properly dismissed by the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded the NLRA preempted Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its concrete product because that loss was incidental to a strike arguably protected by federal law. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of Glacier’s misrepresentation claims because the union representative’s promise of future action was not a statement of existing fact on which those claims could be properly based, and because the statement was not a proximate cause of Glacier’s losses. View "Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the appellate division of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Plaintiff's petition for award of compensation, holding that an employee is not required to give notice of his occupational disease claim to his former employer's insurer when the employer no longer exists.Nearly twenty years after retiring from his employment Plaintiff underwent surgery for lung cancer and was later diagnosed with asbestosis. Plaintiff filed five petitions for award of compensation, each alleging a different date of injury and naming and different employer and insurer pairing. The ALJ (1) found that Plaintiff's last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred when he was working for Auburn Sheet Metal, which was insured by Maine Employers' Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) but no longer existed, and (2) granted Plaintiff's petition for an award of compensation. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiff was not required to provide notice to MEMIC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that the workers' compensation statute does not impose on an injured employee whose employer no longer exists the duty to give notice to the insurer. View "Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal" on Justia Law