Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Oregon the following question: Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on the employer's premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings compensable? View "Buero v. Amazon.com Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether a lump-sum payment that a school district made to settle a principal’s age-discrimination claim should have been included in that employee’s retirement benefit calculation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court disregarded the Retirement Code’s statutory definition of “compensation” and instead deferred to the intent of the settling parties to treat the payment as retirement-covered compensation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Whalen v. Public School Empl. Ret Board" on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

After petitioner was injured on the job while employed by Ameri-Force, he successfully obtained a workers' compensation award after filing a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the U.S. Department of Labor. The Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under the plain text of 33 U.S.C. 928(b) and reversed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, remanding for further proceedings. In this case, all the criteria of an award of attorney's fees under section 928(b) are satisfied as to the claims examiner's August 24, 2016 recommendation. View "Rivera v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Matilde Ek (Mrs. Ek), Karla Ek-Elhadidy, Lucila del Carmen Ek, and Maria Ek-Ewell, filed suit alleging that defendants' employee, Mrs. Ek, contracted COVID-19 at work because of defendants' failure to implement adequate safety measures. Plaintiffs claimed that Arturo Ek subsequently caught the disease from Mrs. Ek while she convalesced at home and subsequently died from the disease a month later. Defendants filed a demurrer asserting that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate an order overruling defendants' demurrer to a wrongful death action. Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Ek's workplace infection constitutes an injury for purposes of the WCA, the court rejected defendants' efforts to apply the derivative injury doctrine to any injury causally linked to an employee injury. The court explained that defendants' interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 1000, which establishes that the fact an employee's injury is the biological cause of a nonemployee's injury does not thereby make the nonemployee's claim derivative of the employee's injury. Furthermore, Snyder's discussion of prior case law applying the derivative injury doctrine does not support applying the doctrine based solely on causation. View "See's Candies, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Ohio National Guard ended its 45-year collective-bargaining relationship with the Union that represents its technicians, who are dual-status employees because their employment is “a hybrid, both of federal and state, and of civilian and military strains.” The Guard announced that it was not bound by the expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that it questioned the applicability of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute to the technicians, then started terminating Union dues deductions. The Union filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). An ALJ found that the Guard is an “agency” under the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(3), the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard, technicians had collective-bargaining rights under the Statute, and the Guard’s actions in repudiating the CBA violated the Statute.The Guard argued that the FLRA cannot regulate state national guards because Congress had not called the militia into service, that its actions were not ULPs, and that the remedies recommended by the ALJ were inappropriate. An FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision. The Sixth Circuit rejected the Guard’s petition for review. The Guard is a federal executive agency in its capacity as the employer of technicians; the FLRA has jurisdiction over the Guard with respect to labor-relations issues under the Statute. It is not unconstitutional for the FLRA to enforce the Statute by issuing orders to state national guards in their role as employers of technicians. View "The Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

After Tyler S. Halsey suffered a heat stroke while working for Townsend Tree Service, his parents filed suit for wrongful death and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims against the supervisor with prejudice, dismissed the claims against Townsend Tree without prejudice, and granted summary judgment to the parent company, The Townsend Corporation of Indiana.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the supervisor breached a duty separate and distinct from the nondelegable duties of Townsend Tree. In this case, plaintiffs stress two allegations: (1) that the supervisor directed Halsey to continue working despite indications of heat exhaustion, and (2) that the supervisor disabled the air conditioning in the work trucks so Halsey could not escape the heat. Under Missouri law, the court concluded that both plaintiffs' allegations are within Townsend Tree's nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and equipment. Because plaintiffs' claims against the supervisor have no reasonable basis in fact or law, the case was properly removed to federal court.The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed Townsend Tree without prejudice and the district court did not err in applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the question of the cause of death was within the special competence of the Missouri Labor Industrial Relations Commission. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Townsend Corporation where it did not incur liability under either Restatement(Second) of Torts Sec. 324A(b) or 324A(c). View "Halsey v. The Townsend Corporation of Indiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the denial of his application for appointment to the medical staff of a dialysis clinic. The superior court denied plaintiff's request for a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In this case, the hearing officer, applying burdens specified in the bylaws, concluded that (1) the clinic sustained its initial burden of presenting evidence to support the denial of staff privileges and (2) plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving that the denial "lacks any substantial factual basis, or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious."The Court of Appeal reversed and concluded that plaintiff is entitled to a writ of administrative mandamus vacating the hearing officer's decision. The court concluded that the burden of proof contained in the medical staff bylaws is not consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard required by Business and Professions Code section 809.3, subdivision (b)(2). The court also concluded that the statute controls in the event of an inconsistency, the application of the bylaws' more demanding burden of proof constituted procedural error, the error deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing and, therefore, was prejudicial. View "Bichai v. DaVita, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, Lax raised concerns about discrimination. After notification of his right to file a formal complaint, Lax filed a formal complaint of disability discrimination against his employer (DHS), alleging he had been improperly placed on indefinite suspension and had his security clearance suspended after he checked himself into a hospital for mental health treatment and missed two days of work.DHS's final agency decision, rejecting Lax’s complaint, was sent to Lax’s work email address on July 17, 2019. One minute later, Lax was sent the password to open an attachment, which contained: the final decision, a “Notice of Appeal Rights,” a privacy statement, and a certificate of service. The “Notice of Appeal Rights” stated that Lax had the right to file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving the final decision. Lax concedes that he opened these emails and read them on the day they were sent but claims that he was unable to open the attached document until the next day; government security measures prevented him from accessing his work email account on any non-work device.On October 16, 2019 (91 days after July 17), Lax filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(f)(1). Lax did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances element for equitable tolling. View "Lax v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jamie Herrmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (“the City”) on her claims for failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Herrmann began working for the City in 2002 and successfully held different positions in the Salt Lake City Justice courts for nine years. Starting in 2011, Herrmann began working as an in-court clerk, which required her to spend more time in court than her previous positions. Herrmann was diagnosed with PTSD, stemming from a nearly decade-long abusive marriage. Her presence in the courtroom during domestic violence cases frequently triggered her anxiety, causing severe migraines that could last for several days at a time and resulting in a significant downturn in her productivity. Herrmann raised three claims under the ADA: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The Tenth Circuit found Herrmann presented some evidence supporting a conclusion that she could not be accommodated within her existing position. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that Herrmann did not meet her prima facie case. As the district court did not address the other elements of Herrmann’s prima facie case the City challenged, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to provide the district court with that opportunity. View "Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law