Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Lozano and Mitchell, former Los Angeles police officers, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the city’s decision to terminate their employment. A board of rights found the two guilty on multiple counts of misconduct, based in part on a digital in-car video system (DICVS) recording that captured them willfully abdicating their duty to assist a commanding officer’s response to a robbery in progress and playing a Pokémon mobile phone game while on duty.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting arguments that the city proceeded in a manner contrary to the law by using the DICVS recording in their disciplinary proceeding and by denying them the protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA, Gov. Code 3300). While Department personnel are not subject to discipline for minor infractions or purely private communications unrelated to their police work, commanding officers are not required to ignore egregious misconduct that is unintentionally captured on a DICVS recording. POBRA did not apply because when the sergeant called the officers in to discuss the radio calls, he did not have evidence that the officers had committed a crime or egregious misconduct. View "Lozano v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the latter part of August 2021, University Health Shreveport, LLC d/b/a Ochsner LSU Health Shreveport and LSU Health-St. Mary Medical Center, LLC (Employer) notified all employees that they were required to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 29, 2021. Employees not vaccinated within the specified time were subject to disciplinary action, including mandatory use of leave time and, ultimately, termination. Employer’s policy permitted exemptions to the vaccine requirement for valid religious and medical reasons. Thereafter, 39 plaintiffs (Employees) filed suit against Employer, challenging the employee vaccine mandate and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief, including a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Louisiana Supreme Court found the issue of a vaccine mandate implemented by a healthcare-employer was resolved by the application of Louisiana Civil Code article 2747, the employment-at-will doctrine. "an employer is at liberty to dismiss an at-will employee and, reciprocally, the employee is at liberty to leave the employment to seek other opportunities. However, these rights are tempered by federal and state provisions, both statutory and constitutional, but no such exceptions apply here. Employees have no statutory claim under La. R.S. 40:1159.7 because there is no healthcare provider-patient relationship alleged here. Employees likewise have no constitutional claim under La. Const. art. I, sec. 5 because the employer is a private actor, and this constitutional provision only limits governmental actors. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated." View "Hayes, et al. v. Univ. Health Shreveport, LLC" on Justia Law

Simpson unsuccessfully applied to work as a Correctional Officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections four times in 2014-2017. Simpson believed the hiring practices underlying those rejections violated his rights—and those of other unsuccessful Black applicants—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Invoking disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Simpson’s class action complaint alleged that, through the use of a five-step hiring process for correctional officers, the Department both intended to discriminate against Black applicants and succeeded in producing that result. The district court denied Simpson’s motion for class certification, finding that none of his proposed classes—a general class of all unsuccessful applicants and five subclasses of candidates dismissed at each step of the hiring process—satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that they present “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis apparently merged Simpson’s disparate impact claims with his disparate treatment claims for intentional discrimination. While disparate treatment claims may require a more searching commonality inquiry, disparate impact claims most often will not: the common questions are whether the challenged policy has in fact disparately impacted the plaintiff class and, if so, whether that disparate impact is justified by business necessity. The court did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify three of Simpson’s disparate impact subclasses. View "Simpson v. Dart" on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance ("WSI") appealed after a district court affirmed an ALJ’s decision reversing WSI’s imposition of derivative premium liability on Brendel Construction, Inc. for unpaid premiums due from one of its subcontractors, Daniel Alvidrez. WSI determined Daniel Alvidrez and Alfredo Frias were roofing subcontractors of Brendel Construction. WSI investigators noticed Frias and Alvidrez each used the same Texas address, and because of this “cross-over information relating to Frias and Alvidrez, [WSI] established two separate accounts.” After unsuccessfully attempting to collect premium amounts from each, WSI imposed derivative liability on Brendel Construction. Brendel Construction appealed to the district court, and WSI cross appealed. The court affirmed imposition of liability as to the Frias account and dismissed as untimely WSI’s cross appeal concerning the Alvidrez account. In Brendel Construction I, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed as to the Frias account and reversed the dismissal of WSI’s cross appeal. On remand, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision determining Brendel Construction was not liable for the Alvidrez account. WSI appealed that last judgment. The Supreme Court determined that even if there was evidence Alvidrez had employees, WSI still had not provided reliable information to support its imposition of premium liability. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Brendel Construction v. WSI" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered in the superior court in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and discharge, holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, her former employer, violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 26 831-840; the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4551-4634; and Me. Rev. Stat. 26 570. The court granted Defendant summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment in favor of Defendant was appropriate; and (2) the court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) because Defendant's electronic service did not violate Plaintiff's right to due process. View "Handlin v. Broadreach Public Relations, LLC" on Justia Law

Conner sued her employer, EMS, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, alleging that she was underpaid for non-overtime hours worked during weeks in which she also worked overtime. To determine the overtime rate for 24 on/48 off EMS personnel, the employee’s regular hourly pay rate was determined by dividing her annual salary by 2,928 hours (based on the 24 on/48 off schedule; the overtime rate was the resultant hourly rate multiplied by 1.5. To calculate a “revised semi-monthly rate,” the hourly rate was multiplied by 2,080 (40 non-overtime hours per week for 52 weeks), then divided by 24. When an employee worked overtime during a particular pay period, EMS added the overtime amount to the revised semimonthly wages. Conner alleged that this “revised semi-monthly rate” unlawfully paid her regular wages using overtime compensation. She claims her annual salary established by ordinance represents her compensation for regular wages and that for each semimonthly pay period, she should be paid regular wages (her salary divided by 24) plus any overtime.The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, holding that the Act permits an action for “gap time” that is not directly covered by its overtime or minimum wage provisions. The complaint must plausibly allege that the employee worked overtime in at least one week and was not paid all straight-time wages due under an employment agreement or statute. The employee need not “identify a particular week.” View "Conner v. Cleveland County" on Justia Law

Taleetha Fuentes filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer Cavco Industries and Cavco’s surety, Sentry Casualty Company (collectively, Defendants). Fuentes filed her complaint in July 2019, and the Defendants denied the claim. During discovery, the Defendants filed a motion to compel in October 2019, which was granted. Following no response from Fuentes, the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions, and Fuentes again did not respond. On December 19, 2019, the full Idaho Industrial Commission issued an Order Dismissing Complaint, citing Industrial Commission Judicial Rule of Procedure (JRP) 12(B). Five months later, in May 2020, Fuentes responded to the initial discovery requests and moved to retain the case on the active calendar, but her filing and motion were returned “unfiled” as explained in an email from the assigned Referee. Fuentes also moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and filed a petition to vacate the order of dismissal under JRP 15. The Commission denied both motions. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Commission acted in excess of its powers when it misapplied JRP12(B) in the initial dismissal order, and in applying JRP 16 to Fuentes' case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision to dismiss Fuentes’ case, and vacated the order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fuentes v. Cavco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Cirrincione appealed an order denying class certification in a wage-and-hour action he filed against his former employer, defendant American Scissor Lift, Inc. (ASL). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff argued reversal was required for a number reasons, including that the trial court’s ruling rested upon improper merits determinations and incorrect assumptions. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of class certification. View "Cirrincione v. American Scissor Lift" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction against Skinner Services, Inc., and four individuals (collectively, Skinner) to prevent Skinner's acceleration of efforts to insulate their individual and corporate assets to avoid a meaningful recovery for Plaintiffs in the underlying action, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs, former low-wage employees of Skinner Demolition, sued Skinner on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated workers for unpaid wages. The court entered a protective order to prohibit Skinner from retaliating against any workers who participated in or assisted in the litigation. Skinner was subsequently held in contempt for violating the protective order. In the meantime, Skinner created four separate entities, which Plaintiffs alleged were used to dissipate or hide assets. The district court granted Plaintiffs' ensuing motion for injunctive relief, finding that Skinner likely had violated state and federal wage laws and was trying to transfer assets from its laborers' reach. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) had the authority to enter the preliminary injunction; and (2) did not abuse its discretion. View "Pineda v. Skinner Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's summary judgment as to damages for claims outside the two-year statute of limitations, holding that the court erred by tolling the statute of limitations far beyond two years based on an erroneous interpretation of the notice requirements of the Minimum Wage Act, Nev. Const. art. XV, 16.Respondents, the named representatives in this class action, were taxi drivers who brought suit against their former employer (Appellants) and its owner, alleging that Appellants failed to pay them minimum wage. The district court severed the claims against the owner and entered summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) this matter was properly in front of the district court because plaintiffs in a class action may aggregate damages for jurisdiction; (2) the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations; (3) damages were reasonably calculated; (4) claims against the owner were properly severed; (5) the attorney fees award and award of costs must be reconsidered; (6) the judgment was properly amended; and (7) the district court erred in denying a motion to quash a writ of execution without conducting an evidentiary hearing. View "A Cab, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law