Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendants due to Plaintiff's having failed to comply with her discovery obligations, which had earlier been the subject of a conditional order of dismissal, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that Defendants had discriminated against her in retaliation for her whistleblowing activities and that she was entitled to relief under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Ultimately, the hearing justice granted Defendants' motion for final judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff had, over a five-year period, repeatedly failed to comply with her discovery obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice acted within her discretion in ordering the entry of final judgment. View "Boss v. Chamberland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer, the Institute of International Education, for discrimination in violation of federal, state, and local, employment law. The district court referred the matter to New York’s mediation program and the parties reached an agreement to settle the case. The parties committed that agreement to writing, signed it, had their counsel sign it, and had the mediator sign it. The week after the mediation, Plaintiff contacted the district court seeking to revoke her acceptance of the mediation agreement and to continue the litigation. The Institute then moved to enforce the mediation agreement. The district court enforced the mediation agreement and entered judgment in favor of the Institute.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court judgment. The court concluded that the mediation agreement bound the parties to its terms. The court reasoned that the case is not one in which the language of the agreement merely committed the parties to “work together in accordance with the terms and conditions outlined in” the agreement, which would be an agreement to continue negotiating. And while this language was pre-printed, the parties could have crossed it out if they did not intend to acknowledge that agreement on all issues had been reached or they could have added language in the handwritten portion of the mediation agreement reserving the right not to be bound by the mediation agreement’s terms until the final agreement was drafted. Further, the court found that Plaintiff was not under duress when she signed the mediation agreement. View "Murphy v. Inst. of Int'l Educ." on Justia Law

Former employees of Nationwide Motor Sales Corporation sued the company and its owners (collectively, Nationwide) in district court, alleging fraudulent payment practices that reduced employees’ sales commissions and final paychecks. Nationwide produced its Employee Handbook’s provision requiring arbitration. The employees contended that the arbitration agreement is invalid because Nationwide retains the right to change, delete, or modify the policies. The district court denied Nationwide’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the Arbitration Agreement illusory due to the Modification Clause   Applying Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that the promise to arbitrate was illusory because, on the agreement’s signature page, the employer retained the right to amend or abolish the agreement without notice to the employees. Further, in reviewing the plain meaning of the Acknowledgement Receipt “as a whole,” it is clear that the Modification Clause applies to the Arbitration Agreement. View "Michael Coady v. Nationwide Motor Sales Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and reversed the dismissal of his unlawful termination and retaliation claims. The court reasoned that to state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. Here, Plaintiff alleged facts crucial to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”   Next, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. The court held that Plaintiff’s claim passes muster at the pleading stage.   However, the court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he was subject to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment. View "Charles Holloway v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an office services and facilities management company, refused to bargain with a labor union based on its position that the union was not a "properly certified representative of its employees." In turn, the union filed a claim with the NLRB, claiming that Petitioner violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain in good faith. The NLRB found in the union's favor.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, rejecting Petitioner's argument that the prosecution was ultra vires. Petitioner claimed that President Biden's removal of the NLRB General Counsel was unlawful and that his replacement lacked authority to bring the complaint against Petitioner. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that no provision of the NLRA protects the General Counsel of the NLRB from removal.The Fifth Circuit then rejected the merits of Petitioner's claim, finding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the NLRB's decision. Thus, the court granted NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Exela Enterprise Solutions v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to clarify the application of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) when the plaintiff's employing entity does not meet the WVHRA definition of "employer," as set out in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(d).Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against her former employer alleging violations of the WVHRA and other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved for dismissal of the WVHRA claim on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to allege that Defendant satisfied the numerosity portion of the WVHRA definition of "employer." The district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court ordered that a question of law be certified. The Supreme Court answered that an entity that does not meet the WVHRA's definition of employer may not be potentially liable to its own employee as a "person," as defined in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(a), for an alleged violation of W. Va. Code 5-11-9(7). View "Pajak v. Under Armour, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) entered an order that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. Sections 158(a)(1) and (5), including failure to bargain in good faith for a successor CBA, withholding relevant bargaining information, unlawfully declaring an impasse and unilaterally implementing altered terms and conditions of employment. With one dissenting member, the Board also concluded that Defendant unlawfully threatened and terminated ten workers who engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage. In opposition to the order, Defendant made several arguments including that the dissenting board member correctly concluded that the ten employees terminated for an unauthorized work stoppage were not engaged in collective activity protected by Section 7 and therefore the terminations did not violate Section 8(a)(1).   The Eighth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board’s Order finding that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court agreed with the Board that Defendant failed to establish that the Union’s Section 9(a) right to be the ten employees’ exclusive bargaining representative made their spontaneous work stoppage -- a concerted attempt to question their terms and conditions of employment -- unprotected activity under Emporium Capwell.  Further, the court found that Defendant failed to preserve certain issues by challenging the special remedies before the Board, either in its objections to the ALJ’s recommended remedies or by a motion for reconsideration when the Board added the reimbursement remedy. View "NLRB v. Noah's Ark Processors, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee Christie Mitchell appealed a summary judgment order in favor of NBT Bank, N.A. regarding its policy of deducting her overtime compensation from her commissions so that she was never paid more than gross commissions regardless of how many hours she worked in a week. She contended the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) required the bank to pay her entire gross commissions plus overtime wages. Because the FLSA contained no such requirement, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. NBT Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Fast Food Workers Committee and Service Employees International Union, sought review of the NLRB’s (“Board”) approval of the settlement agreements between the Board’s General Counsel on the one hand, and McDonald’s and a group of McDonald’s franchisees on the other. Amongst Petitioners' many objections, their primary concern is the agreements’ failure to determine whether McDonald’s is a joint employer with its franchisees. Another significant objection is directed to the participation of one of the Board’s Members in this decision. It is claimed that he should have been recused   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review, finding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in issuing its order approving the settlements and that Petitioners’ recusal argument was not properly presented.Petitioners argued that Board was arbitrary and capricious in approving the settlements, in light of the unions’ objections. The court held that the Board acted well within its discretion in approving the settlements, given the Board’s discretion to approve settlements and its careful and comprehensive analysis of the reasonableness of the settlements. Petitioners also contended that the Board’s order was invalid because a member should have recused himself. The court held that Petitioners’ did not meet their obligation to make clear that they were bringing a constitutional challenge before the NLRB and the court. View "Fast Food Workers Committee v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against the Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund (“Administrators”), alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant and Plaintiff appealed arguing that the district court’s ruling was erroneous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Administrators. Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly required her to demonstrate that her proffered comparators were strictly identical. The court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present evidence that any male physician shared characteristics that would render them similarly situated. Further, even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, her claim would not succeed because she did not rebut Defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for declining to renew her contract.   The court further affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could not establish that her protected conduct was the “but for” reason for the alleged adverse employment action.   Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. The court found that although Plaintiff endured severe treatment by her supervisor, she did not establish that the treatment was based on her gender. View "Saketkoo v. Admin Tulane Educ" on Justia Law