Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Dr. Smolinski is a Supervisory Physician in the Traumatic Brain Injury Clinic of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), an Army hospital in Germany. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and occasionally saw patients at LRMC as a visiting provider. The Army purportedly changed the salary Smolinski was offered and delayed his move to a new position. Smolinski’s subsequent complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221, alleged those actions were retaliation for his wife’s 2017 patient complaint, his 2018 testimony in an investigation into an officer, and his 2019 Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaints.The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction because Smolinski failed to establish that those activities were protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Smolinski failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that his wife’s patient complaint was a protected disclosure, and did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of retaliation for his OSC complaints. With respect to Smolinski’s claims alleging retaliation for his 2018 testimony, however, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the Board to consider those claims on the merits. View "Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Pascoag Fire District and Pascoag Fire and Rescue Association (the district) and International Association of Firefighters, Local 4908 (the union) (collectively, Defendants) in this action alleging breach of duty of fair representation and breach of contract, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a trained firefighter and emergency medical technician who worked for the district, brought this action after he was terminated based on his conduct and performance during a rescue run. Plaintiff began the grievance process between the district and the union, but the union informed Plaintiff that it had decided not to seek arbitration for his grievance. Plaintiff then brought this complaint. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the trial justice's grant of summary judgment. View "Eddy v. Pascoag Fire District" on Justia Law

In response to the Port of Portland continuing to assign refer work to members of a particular union after leasing Terminal 6 to ICTSI. ILWU engaged in high-profile work stoppages and other coercive activity at Terminal 6. Ocean-going cargo traffic ceased for more than a year. ILWU’s actions forced ICTSI to buy back the remainder of its lease and leave Terminal 6. ICTSI filed charges against ILWU with the NLRB. The ALJ found that because the dispute was between ILWU and the Port, ILWU violated 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(B), prohibiting unions from interfering with secondary employers (ICTSI). A jury awarded ICTSI more than $93.5 million. The court conditioned its post-trial rulings on ICTSI accepting remittitur of damages. ICTSI declined The district court certified its post-trial order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A court of appeals may assert jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b) if the district court determines that the order rests on a controlling question of law, there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion as to that question, and an immediate resolution may materially advance the termination of the litigation. The court of appeals enjoys broad discretion to refuse to accept it. The question on which ILWU relied was not a question of law; the parties’ dispute about whether ICTSI became a primary employer under the circumstances was a question of fact. View "ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union" on Justia Law

Charter fired Smith in 2018. Smith filed a federal diversity action under Montana’s wrongful-discharge statute, alleging that Charter lacked “good cause” to fire him, Mont. Code 39-2- 904(1)(b). The district court granted Charter summary judgmentThe Ninth Circuit held that the disposition of the appeal turns on a question of Montana law: whether a defendant in a wrongful-discharge action may establish good cause for the dismissal on grounds that were not set forth in the employee’s termination letter. The Montana Supreme Court held in 1995 (Galbreath), that an employer could not rely on such additional grounds, but some courts have concluded that later statutory amendments superseded Galbreath’s rule. The court certified to the Supreme Court of Montana the question: Whether, in an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to Montana Code section 39-2-904, an employer may defend a termination solely for the reasons given in a discharge letter, as the court held in Galbreath, or whether the 1999 statutory amendments have superseded the Galbreath rule. View "Smith v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Danny Brock on his negligence claim against Mark Edwards, holding that the circuit court erred in overruling the motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) filed by Peter Dunne, defendant ad litem for Edwards.Brock was injured in a work-related accident involving co-worker Edwards. Brock filed a petition alleging a negligence claim against Edwards. Edwards died before trial, and Dunne was substituted as defendant ad litem. The jury returned a verdict in Brock's favor, and the circuit court entered judgment for $873,000 in Brock's favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in overruling Dunne's motions for directed verdict and JNOV because Edwards was immune from liability pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.1 and Brock failed to make a submissible case of common law negligence. View "Brock v. Dunne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Defendant was not entitled to an award of workers' compensation benefits because his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, holding that there was no error.Defendant, a field service specialist for DISH Network, Inc,. was an a car accident after he choked on a sandwich and blacked out while traveling to his first appointment. Defendant sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded benefits, but the Commission denied compensation because Defendant failed to prove his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Education of the Jefferson City Public School District to terminate Tammy Ferry's contract with the District, holding that the Board had the authority to terminate the contract.The Board decided to terminate Ferry's contract after she transferred confidential student information from the District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision, finding that Ferry had not "disclosed" confidential student information, as that term is defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the Board's findings that Ferry violated the Board's policies and procedure and did so willfully were supported by competent and substantial evidence; and (2) the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the Board to terminate Ferry's indefinite contract with the District. View "Ferry v. Board of Education of Jefferson City Public School District" on Justia Law

Coffey was employed by the Railway as a locomotive engineer. In 2012, a train that Coffey was operating derailed; a drug test revealed the presence of amphetamines in Coffey’s system. Coffey was permitted to continue working, but he was subject to follow-up drug testing for five years. In 2016, a test showed the presence of amphetamines and codeine. Coffey explained that he had prescriptions for Adderall, which he took for ADHD, and codeine (Tylenol #3), which he took for a back condition. Railway requested that Coffey provide medical records. Six weeks later, Coffey ruptured his Achilles tendon and took medical leave for 10 months. When his physician cleared him to return to work, Railway again requested the records it had previously requested. After two more demands, Railway received some records but was unsatisfied because they failed to include specifically requested information such as medication side effects. In anticipation of a disciplinary hearing, Coffey submitted approximately 400 pages of medical records. Upon determining that those records still did not address much of the required information, Railway terminated Coffey’s employment.The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Railway’s demands violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court and Fourth Circuit rejected Coffey’s subsequent suit. Railway made a lawful request under the ADA. Its inquiries were related to Coffey’s job and were required by federal regulation. Complying with federal regulations is, by definition, a business necessity. View "Coffey v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Paine appealed a superior court decision granting judgment on the pleadings for his employment discrimination claim against defendant, Ride-Away, Inc. Plaintiff suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for many years, which substantially limited a major life activity. He was employed by defendant at its facility in Londonderry, New Hampshire as an automotive detailer in May 2018. In July 2018, his physician prescribed cannabis to help treat his PTSD, and plaintiff enrolled in New Hampshire’s therapeutic cannabis program. Plaintiff submitted a written request to defendant for an exception from its drug testing policy as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Plaintiff explained that he was not requesting permission to use cannabis during work hours or to possess cannabis on defendant’s premises. Plaintiff was informed that he could no longer work for the company if he used cannabis. After plaintiff notified defendant that he was going to treat his PTSD with cannabis, his employment was terminated in September 2018. Plaintiff sued for employment discrimination, based on defendant’s failure to make reasonable accommodation for his disability. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that, because marijuana use was both illegal and criminalized under federal law, the requested accommodation was facially unreasonable. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. The sole question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the court erred in ruling that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with New Hampshire law could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. The Supreme Court held the trial court erred in determining that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with RSA chapter 126-X could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. "[P]laintiff’s disability is PTSD, not the illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Paine v. Ride-Away, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying Day & Zimmerman's (D&Z) motion to dismiss this lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against D&Z, a company incorporated in Delaware that maintained its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, seeking overtime wages pursuant to section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiff alleged that D&Z failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees and former employees their FLSA-required overtime wages. D&Z moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California (BMS), 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) and claiming that the claims subject to the motion to dismiss could not be brought in a Massachusetts federal court. The district court denied the motion, thus declining to extend BMS's personal jurisdiction requirements to FLSA cases brought in federal court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying D&X's motion to dismiss the nonresident opt-in claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc." on Justia Law