Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming the decision of the compensation judge finding that Respondent sustained an occupational disease of hearing loss and ordering Relator to pay medical benefits under Minn. Stat. 176.135, subd. 5, holding that further proceedings were required.Respondent developed hearing loss after a career of handling occupational safety and health compliance and monitoring workplace noise levels. Respondent filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Relator, his most recent employer. The compensation judge ruled in favor of Respondent and denied his claim for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. The WCCA affirmed and clarified that the PPD issue was moot because of a Pierringer settlement between Respondent and one of his former employers. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the occupational disease finding was supported by the evidence; (2) the award of medical benefits was appropriate under Minn. Stat. 176.135, subd. 5; and (3) the compensation judge did not properly apply the Pierringer settlement precedent, potentially prejudicing Relator's interests. View "Sershen v. Metropolitan Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Angela Gates appealed a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendant, her former employer, on plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination under the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and retaliation under both the Vermont Parental Family Leave Act (PFLA) and Vermont’s workers’ compensation law. Defendant hired plaintiff as a “molder” in 1996. In May 2015, plaintiff reported to defendant that she injured her left knee outside of work. She subsequently took approximately twelve weeks of leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the PFLA, which ran concurrently. Plaintiff returned to work full-time as a "molder" in August 2015 after exhausting her FMLA/PFLA leave. She returned to molder work, but it caused pain in her knee. Plaintiff was reassigned to work as a "finisher," which again aggravated her knee. After a third period of recovery and return to work, plaintiff testified that when she returned, she was told there was no work she could do that was a light-duty task. "Ultimately, plaintiff had the burden to present some admissible material by which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her - that she was indefinitely incapable of performing the essential functions of her job - was a lie. She failed to do so." The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s retaliation claims. View "Gates v. Mack Molding Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Vicki Hebert filed a putative class action against Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Barnes & Noble), alleging it willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). According to Hebert, Barnes & Noble willfully violated the FCRA by providing job applicants with a disclosure that included extraneous language unrelated to the topic of consumer reports. The Act required employers like Barnes & Noble provide a job applicant like Herbert a standalone disclosure stating that the employer may obtain the applicant’s consumer report when making a hiring decision. Barnes & Noble moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable jury could find its alleged FCRA violation was willful. The company asserted it included the extraneous information in its disclosure due to an inadvertent drafting error. The trial court agreed with Barnes & Noble, granted the company’s motion, and entered judgment in the company’s favor. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court, determining a reasonable jury could have found that Barnes & Noble acted willfully because it violated an unambiguous provision of the FCRA, at least one of the company’s employees was aware of the extraneous information in the disclosure before the disclosure was displayed to job applicants, the company may not have adequately trained its employees on FCRA compliance, and/or the company may not have had a monitoring system in place to ensure its disclosure complied with the FCRA. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hebert v. Barnes & Noble, Inc." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) sued law firm Boechler, P.C., and Jeanette Boechler, individually, to collect unpaid workers’ compensation premiums and penalties, and to enjoin them from employing others until they complied with the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act, including paying the premiums and penalties. The firm appealed the district court’s ultimate judgment holding the firm liable for the premiums and penalties, and Boechler appealed the order dismissing the personal liability claim against her without prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgments, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "WSI v. Boechler, PC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. SEIU, Local 1984 (SEA), and intervenors New Hampshire Troopers Association, New Hampshire Troopers Association-Command Staff, New Hampshire Probation and Parole Officers Association, and New Hampshire Probation and Parole-Command Staff Association, appealed a Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) order denying petitioner’s request for declaratory relief. They argued the PELRB erred by ruling that the state legislature’s vote accepting a fact-finder’s report and recommendations pursuant to RSA 273-A:12, III (2010) was not binding upon respondent State of New Hampshire. In 2018, the unions and the State began negotiating the terms of a multi-year collective bargaining agreement. After the negotiations reached an impasse, the parties proceeded to impasse resolution procedures and engaged a neutral fact finder to assist them with resolving their disputes. The unions accepted the fact-finder’s report, but the Governor did not. In addition, the Governor declined to submit the report to the Executive Council for its consideration. The parties treated the Governor’s actions as a rejection of the report pursuant to RSA 273-A:12, II; from there the matter was submitted to the legislature. The legislature voted to adopt the fact-finder’s report. The unions took the position that the legislature’s vote was binding upon the State with respect to the cost items set forth in the report. The State took the opposite position, asserting that the legislature’s vote was merely advisory and did not result in a binding agreement between the parties. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the legislature’s vote was advisory and did not bind the State. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Troopers Association et al." on Justia Law

Ostrowski worked for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department before a workplace injury left him permanently disabled. He now receives a monthly pension payment from the County. Lake County’s disability pension plan does not provide cost-of-living increases, while its pension plan for non-disabled retirees does. Ostrowski filed suit, arguing that the difference between the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court held that Ostrowski’s suit was barred by a 2017 waiver that he signed while settling a “reasonable accommodation” claim against Lake County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ostrowski’s claims were not barred by the waiver, but failed on the merits; the court noted a general exclusion in the agreement for matters affecting Ostrowski’s pension. Retired and other former workers are not protected by Title I of the ADA and Ostrowski forfeited his arguments with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Ostrowski’s Equal Protection claim qualified only for rational basis review. Lake County has a legitimate interest in providing pension plans that meet the differing needs of distinct groups; the cost-of-living adjustment is one of several relevant differences in the plans. The court reversed an award of fees and costs. View "Ostrowski v. Lake County, Indiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a floor supervisor at the Defendant hotel and casino. In 2015, Defendant required all employees to sign a new arbitration policy as a condition of employment. Plaintiff signed the new policy. The following year, Defendant fired Plaintiff after Plaintiff accepted counterfeit $100 bills during his shift. In 2019, Plaintiff obtained a right-to-sue letter from DFEH and brought causes of action under wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation and harassment.In 2020, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's claim, but failed to move to compel arbitration. However, on December 23, 2020, 13 months after Plaintiff filed his lawsuit, Defendant moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, finding that the 13-month wait prejudiced Plaintiff and that Defendant had waived its right to compel arbitration.The Second Appellate District reversed, finding Plaintiff's allegations of prejudice were insufficient. Waiver does not occur merely by participating in litigation; the case must reach the point of judicial litigation before a court will find a party waived the right to compel arbitration. The court also rejected Plaintiff's claim that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club" on Justia Law

Defendant operates an acute care facility as well as a vocational and career-training program intended to help individuals facing barriers to employment find jobs. Disabled individuals who complete the program are eligible for job placement, possibly as janitors for Social Security Administration facilities. The Union sought to represent all janitors; however, Defendant objected, claiming that the janitors have a "rehabilitative" relationship and not an employment relationship. The NLRB determined the janitors are statutory employees. After a vote, the Union passed, but Defendant refused to recognize it.The Fourth Circuit held that the Board's determination that the janitors were statutory employees was supported by the evidence. Thus, the NLRB had jurisdiction to certify the Union and, by refusing to acknowledge the Union, Defendant violated labor laws. View "Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) appealed after a jury found the company liable for negligence and elder abuse arising from an NWL annuity sold to plaintiff-appellant Barney Williams by Victor Pantaleoni. In 2016, Williams contacted Pantaleoni to revise a living trust after the death of Williams’ wife, but Pantaleoni sold him a $100,000 NWL annuity. When Williams returned the annuity to NWL during a 30-day “free look” period, Pantaleoni wrote a letter over Williams’ signature for NWL to reissue a new annuity. In 2017, when Williams cancelled the second annuity, NWL charged a $14,949.91 surrender penalty. The jury awarded Williams damages against NWL, including punitive damages totaling almost $3 million. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed judgment, concluding that Pantaleoni was an independent agent who sold annuities for multiple insurance companies and had no authority to bind NWL. Williams petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to consider the agency relationship in light of Insurance Code sections 32, 101, 1662, 1704 and 1704.5, and O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company, 36 Cal.4th 281, 288 (2005). After the appellate court issued its opinion on transfer from the California Supreme Court, both Williams and NWL filed petitions for rehearing on various grounds. Upon consideration of those petitions, the Court of Appeal “remain[ed] confident” its prior opinion was correct and reissued that opinion with minor modifications. The Court affirmed the judgment finding NWL liable for negligence and financial elder abuse. However, punitive damages assessed against NWL were reversed. View "Williams v. National Western Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, sued Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”) for negligence after he sustained injuries in a railcar collision. The district court granted summary judgment to KCSR. Plaintiff argued that section 287.280.1, the civil-action provision, authorizes his civil action because KCSR failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance. KCSR responded that it is not liable because Plaintiff “was insured by his immediate . . . employer,” triggering the exemption from liability for statutory employers in section 287.040.3. According to Plaintiff, however, section 287.040.3 exempts KCSR from workers’ compensation liability only, not liability from civil actions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of KCSR. The court held that because Plaintiff was insured by his immediate employer, KCSR is not liable and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court reasoned that Missouri’s workers’ compensation statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 287.120.1, imposes liability on employers for workplace injuries. However, nowhere in section 287.040 does the text differentiate between workers’ compensation liability and civil liability. Accordingly, the court interpreted “liable as in this section provided” to mean “liable as an employer”; that is, liable as a statutory employer. Thus, KCSR’s potential liability, therefore, is liability “as in [section 287.040] provided,” so it enjoys the immunity from suit. View "Nathan Blanton v. KC Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law