Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698 (PAGA)) authorizes “aggrieved employees” to file lawsuits on behalf of the state seeking civil penalties for Labor Code violations, and allocates 75 percent of the recovered penalties to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent to all employees affected by the violation. Before filing suit, the PAGA plaintiff must submit notices of the alleged violations to LWDA and the employer.The first aggrieved employee submitted a notice of alleged Labor Code violations by his employer to the LWDA and subsequently filed a complaint. That employee later sought to amend his complaint to substitute in as the named plaintiff another aggrieved employee who had worked for the same employer. The superior court granted the employer summary judgment, concluding that the amended PAGA complaint cannot relate back to the original PAGA complaint where the second employee submitted his PAGA notice after the original complaint was filed, reasoning that allowing relation back grants the employee “more time to recover civil penalties than the LWDA itself would have.”The court of appeal reversed. Relation back would not grant the LWDA or any aggrieved employees the potential for any more than they had under the original complaint; if relation back does not apply, UBS avoids exposure to potential liability for civil penalties over some period of time. View "Hutcheson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the judgment of the superior court declaring that the construction of "regular compensation" set out in Public Employee Retirement Administration Comm'n v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 478 Mass. 832 (2018) (Vernava), is not limited to accidental disability retirement under Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch, 32, 7 and remanded for an order of dismissal of count two of the complaint, holding that no actual controversy was raised as to the second issue.At issue was whether the term "regular compensation" defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 1 excludes vacation or sick leave pay used to supplement workers' compensation payments. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the interpretation of "regular compensation" in Vernava applies consistently across uses of the term in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 5-7, thereby applying to superannuation, ordinary disability, and accidental disability retirement, and does so retroactively; and (2) no actual controversy was raised by the abstract issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies in hypothetical disputes over future Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission memoranda interpreting appellate opinions. View "Worcester Regional Retirement Board v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission" on Justia Law

McDonald filed a putative class action, alleging that her former employer, Bronzeville, collected, used, and stored sensitive biometric data from employees in a fingerprint timekeeping system, violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act,740 ILCS 14/1. McDonald alleged that she was never provided with nor signed a release and had never been informed of the purposes or length of time for which her biometric information was stored. Bronzeville argued that the claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries transpiring in the workplace, and that an employee has no common-law or statutory right to recover civil damages from an employer for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.The circuit court rejected Bronzeville’s argument, reasoning that privacy rights are neither a psychological nor physical injury and not compensable under the Compensation Act. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an employee's claim against an employer for liquidated damages under the Privacy Act, available without further compensable actual damages being alleged or sustained and intended to have a preventative and deterrent effect, is not the type of injury that categorically fits within the purview of the Compensation Act, a remedial statute designed to provide financial protection for workers that have sustained an actual injury. View "McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Barnes Bullets asking the district court to rule that the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) barred Layne Kay's claim, holding that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) may bar Kay's lawsuit.Kay contracted lead poisoning while working at Barnes and sued Barnes under the exception to the WCA permitting employees like Kay to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act. Barnes moved for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Kay's claim where Kay did not present sufficient evidence that Barnes acted intentionally. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Utah law recognizing lead poisoning as an occupational disease raises a significant question as to whether the ODA, not the WCA, covered Kay's claim. View "Kay v. Barnes Bullets" on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FLRA adopted a new threshold for when collective bargaining is required. Under the new standard, the duty to bargain is triggered only if a workplace change has "a substantial impact on a condition of employment." Labor unions challenged the FLRA's decision to alter the bargaining threshold, maintaining that the FLRA's new standard is both inconsistent with the governing statute and insufficiently explained.The DC Circuit held that the FLRA's decision to abandon its de minimis exception in favor of a substantial-impact threshold was not sufficiently reasoned, and thus is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. In this case, the cursory policy statement that the FLRA issued to justify its choice to abandon thirty-five years of precedent promoting and applying the de minimis standard and to adopt the previously rejected substantial-impact test is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court granted the labor unions' petitions for review and vacated the FLRA's policy statement. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Owen transferred his ownership interests in real estate and construction-related firms he had founded to a new entity, Blue Mountain, as part of a joint venture with Acolyte. Acolyte acquired a 50 percent ownership interest in Blue Mountain; Owen became the company’s CEO. In his employment contract, Owen agreed to a covenant barring him from soliciting Blue Mountain’s customers for a three-year period following the termination of his employment. Years later, Owen was terminated for cause. Months later, Owen established a new construction company to compete with Blue Mountain. He sent letters to building and construction companies, including Blue Mountain customers. describing this new venture. Blue Mountain obtained injunctions, prohibiting Owen from soliciting Blue Mountain’s customers, and summary adjudication of its breach of contract claim.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Owen’s arguments that the nonsolicitation covenant was unenforceable because it did not meet the requirements of Business and Professions Code section 16601, an exemption to section 16600’s general ban on non-competition covenants and that his communications with Blue Mountain’s customers were not solicitations as a matter of law. Under section 16601, Owen disposed of all of his ownership interest while concurrently agreeing to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified geographic area in which the business sold. The court upheld an award to Blue Mountain of approximately $600,000 in attorney fees as the prevailing party. View "Blue Mountain Enterprises, LLC v. Owen" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in this dispute between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103 (the Union) and Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC over Johnson Controls' compliance with the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), holding that the district court erred by failing to order arbitration as called for by a clause in the CBA.Johnson Controls' Norwood, Massachusetts facility entered into a CBA with the Union, a labor organization that represented employees of the company, that contained an arbitration clause. The Union filed a grievance concerning Johnson Controls' reduction in its matching contribution to the company's 401(k) plan, which Johnson Controls denied. When the Union filed a demand for arbitration Johnson Controls brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA. The district court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable. The First Circuit reversed, holding that nothing in the record showed that the parties intended to exclude this type of dispute from the scope of the arbitration clause. View "Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103" on Justia Law