Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Charter created a program for resolving and ultimately arbitrating employment-related disputes. Individuals who received an offer from Charter were required to complete a web-based onboarding process as a condition of employment; they were prompted to review and accept various policies and agreements, including the arbitration agreement and the program guidelines. After agreeing to submit all employment-related disputes with Charter to arbitration, Ramirez was hired in July 2019. In May 2020, Charter terminated Ramirez. Ramirez filed suit, alleging multiple claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration and sought attorney fees in connection with its motion pursuant to the arbitration agreement.The court denied Charter’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the requirement was substantively unconscionable because it shortened the statute of limitations for FEHA claims, failed to restrict attorney fee recovery to only frivolous or bad faith FEHA claims (contrary to FEHA), and impermissibly provided for an interim fee award for a party successfully compelling arbitration. The court of appeal affirmed. The arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, which establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability, and the agreement contained a high degree of substantive unconscionability. The arbitration agreement is permeated by unconscionability and cannot be enforced. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) allows employees to bring a civil action for penalties against their employer on behalf of themselves and other current and former “aggrieved” employees for Labor Code-related violations. La Face, a cashier at a Ralphs, brought a PAGA action, alleging that Ralphs violated an Industrial Welfare Commission order that required employers to provide seating when the nature of the work reasonably permitted the use of seats, or, for a job where standing was required, to provide seating for employee use when their use did not interfere with an employee’s duties.The trial court held that PAGA actions were equitable in nature and not triable to a jury and that Ralphs had not violated the order. The court of appeal affirmed, first holding that there is no right to a jury trial in a PAGA action. PAGA is an administrative enforcement hybrid. If tried to a jury, the parties would gain a jury trial right not otherwise available to either the agency or employers. Many violations would be based on rights that did not exist at common law. The court noted that even when lulls occurred in a Ralphs cashier’s primary duties, the cashiers were still required to move while fulfilling other tasks. View "LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co." on Justia Law

In this case concerning two restrictive clauses within a non-compete agreement the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the entry of summary judgment in favor of Lorna Gagnon, a former employee of Prudential Locations, LLC (Locations), holding that summary judgment was improper as to one agent as to a non-solicitation clause.The non-compete agreement in this case restricted Gagnon from establishing her own brokerage firm in the state within one year after terminating her employment with Locations and from soliciting persons "employed by" or "affiliated with" Locations. The two restrictive clauses at issue were a non-compete clause and a non-solicitation clause. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Gagnon as to the non-compete clause because the clause was not ancillary to a legitimate purpose; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to one agent with respect to the non-solicitation clause. View "Prudential Locations, LLC v. Gagnon" on Justia Law

After RMC implemented new staffing grids for registered nurses at its acute-care hospital, the Union filed a grievance under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and later sought arbitration. The grievance alleged that “the hospital intends to displace bargaining unit (BU) RNs [with] supervisory RNs in the performance of BU work as expressed in the hospital’s staffing grids” that were implemented in June 2020 and that “removed RNs in the BU.” RMC refused to process the grievance, claiming that the CBA did not cover the Union’s allegations of wrongdoing. The Union filed suit, seeking to compel arbitration.The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Union. The CBA defines “grievance” as “[a]n alleged breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement,” sets forth the process for submitting grievances to RMC, and provides that if the grievance is not resolved by the parties, “the Union may advance the grievance to arbitration.” Article 38(1)(F) exempts from arbitration certain disputes. Because the grievance alleges displacement of bargaining unit nurses, which is covered by Article 3, and not issues related to nurse-to-patient staffing levels, which are covered by Article 38, Article 38(1)(F)’s arbitration exemption does not apply. View "National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Standley was employed by the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration. Standley contends that over several years he sought to ensure that the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS) for nuclear detection, was funded and supported, believing this was required under section 1065 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. He claims his superiors attempted to block funding and his work on SABRS. In 2015, Standley sent an email entitled “Obstruction of Public law 110- 118, NDAA 2008, Maintenance of Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection System” to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, with copies to Department of Defense representatives, and the Office of Special Counsel. Following several additional unsuccessful attempts to change DOE's position, Standley filed an unsuccessful appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that DOE and its employees retaliated against him for his efforts to change the DOE policy by not selecting him for any of three DOE Director positions posted in 2014-2017. Standley claimed he was engaging in protected whistleblowing when he opposed efforts to defund SABRS. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Section 1065 does not require that the DOE provide its SABRS program to the Secretary of Defense. The court acknowledged “Standley’s well-intentioned beliefs about the mission,” and his pro se status, but found his challenges to a government policy decision with which he disagreed unavailing. View "Standley v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

STA, an association of businesses involved with the transport of cargo at the Port of Baltimore, and the Longshoremen’s union (ILA) entered into trust agreements to create funds that provide employee benefits in accordance with the Labor Management Relations Act. The agreements provide an equal number of trustees representing the labor union and trustees representing the employers. Not all companies that do business at the Port are STA members. The Union Trustees sought to expand the definition of “Employer” in the trust agreements to include non-STA employers engaged in the same businesses as STA-affiliated employers at the Port, to include “any employer who signs a CBA [collective bargaining agreement] with the ILA or its [local affiliates] that requires contributions to the Trust.” Expanding the definition would increase the number of contributors to the trusts. The Management Trustees opposed the amendment, creating a deadlock, and refused the Union Trustees’ request to arbitrate. The Union Trustees sued to compel arbitration under 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although courts incorporate a “presumption of arbitrability” in employer-union arbitration disputes when an arbitration agreement exists, here the trust agreements provide a “positive assurance” that arbitration may not be compelled. View "Krueger v. Angelos" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeffrey Booth, then an installation service manager for Appellee Home Depot, U.S.A., noticed at a job site that a customer was being charged for window wraps that were not needed. Booth phoned and emailed his supervisor about the perceived overcharge. The next day, Appellee began an investigation of Booth for an email he sent ten days earlier critiquing a colleague's work performance. After a one-day investigation of the allegation in the email, and two days after the overcharge report, Appellant Booth was terminated. Booth sued Home Depot in Oklahoma state court claiming wrongful termination under Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (1989), alleging his job performance was good and that the email investigation was only a pretext for the real reason for termination -- his reporting of the overcharging of customers to his supervisor. Home Depot removed the Oklahoma County case to the federal district court under diversity jurisdiction. In his amended federal complaint, Booth claimed that the overcharging of customers violated the Oklahoma Home Repair Fraud Act and/or the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Home Depot did not dispute that, if overcharging occurred, it would violate those acts. Home Depot argued that the violation of the statutes did not articulate a clear mandate of Oklahoma public policy sufficient to support a Burk tort. The federal district court agreed with Home Depot that the statutes did not articulate a clear public policy and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Booth then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which then certified a question about the statutes to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Supreme Court responded: the OHRFA and the OCPA protect specific individual consumers against fraud with criminal and civil remedies for those individual victims. "The Court will not expand our public policy exceptions to include protection from economic harm. Without a clear mandate from the Legislature, the Acts do not qualify as an established public policy." View "Booth v. Home Depot, U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tiffany Litzsinger worked for the Adams County Coroner’s Office from 2013 until she was terminated in 2018. During her time there, Litzsinger suffered from anxiety and depression, both of which worsened in the months leading up to her termination. After an anxiety episode, Adams County granted Litzsinger temporary leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When Litzsinger returned from her FMLA leave, the Coroner placed Litzsinger on probation for myriad violations of workplace policies. Shortly after Litzsinger’s probation began, the Coroner terminated Litzsinger for violating the terms of her probation. Litzsinger sued the Coroner’s Office under the FMLA and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming the Coroner terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under both statutes. The district court granted summary judgment for the Coroner’s Office because Litzsinger failed to demonstrate that the Coroner’s reason for terminating her was pretextual. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a rational jury could not find that the Coroner’s proffered reason for firing Litzsinger was pretextual. View "Litzsinger v. Adams County Coroner's Office" on Justia Law

In 2015, Powley joined RCX as a driver. RCX accommodated multiple requests for leave, specific trucks, and specific shifts based on doctors’ notes. In May 2018, Powley became a dispatcher. On August 8, Powley provided a doctor’s note stating, “Patient needs day shift work.” The note did not mention headaches. RCX rearranged schedules to accommodate her. Powley also requested she return to driving, stating that the noise in the office “gave her a headache.” On September 18, Powley submitted a doctor’s note saying: “Must have 11 hrs between shifts.” On September 28, Powley sent RCX an email stating the office noise “interferes with my ability to perform my duties,” restating her desire to return to driving, and reiterating her frustration with the arrangement of the office. She did not mention headaches or back pain. RCX treated this as a resignation.Powley sued, citing failure to accommodate her disabilities and unlawful retaliation in response to her request for an accommodation, under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Powley did not actually seek a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Powley received many reasonable accommodations for her back pain by submitting doctor’s notes but never submitted a doctor’s note or indicated that her request to return to driving was connected to her back pain. She complained about noise, light, and office layout and did not suggest that her request was based on medical needs. View "Powley v. Rail Crew Xpress, LLC" on Justia Law

OSHA investigated DRTG, a Houston construction company, following a worksite fatality. DRTG employees provided DRTG’s business address, which is also the home address of DRTG’s sole owner. On September 13, OSHA issued a citation and a notice of a proposed penalty to DRTG, mailed to the provided address by USPS certified mail. After an unsuccessful delivery attempt was made on September 16, USPS left a standard delivery slip saying that the certified mailing would be held at the Post Office for pick-up; DRTG never retrieved the mailing. OSHA sent the citation by UPS Next Day Air on September 23. According to UPS tracking, the citation was successfully delivered to DRTG’s doorstep on September 24. DRTG had 15 working days to file a notice of contest, which OSHA calculated from the date of the UPS delivery as October 16. DRTG did not file the notice by the deadline. The citation became a final order on October 16, 29 U.S.C. 659(a). The next day, an OSHA representative spoke with Padron regarding documentation required by the citation. A "next of kin letter" sent by OSHA to a DRTG employee who was the deceased employee’s cousin, was received on October 18, was immediately forwarded to DRTG’s counsel.On November 5, OSHA received DRTG’s notice of contest, which was ultimately rejected as untimely. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. DRTG was properly served with notice. View "D.R.T.G. Builders, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law