Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Evans served as CEO and a director of Avande, a privately held Delaware corporation that provides medical claims management services to insurance companies and healthcare organizations. Following Evans’s termination, Avande performed an audit and discovered suspect transactions undertaken by Evans while he was serving as CEO. Avande filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on alleged self-dealing transactions and improper expenditures and tortious interference, defamation, and conversion based on acts that Evans allegedly committed after his termination. Evans was found liable for about $65,000 in damages, plus interest. Evans demanded advancement for expenses incurred in connection with the action.The Delaware Chancery court entered judgment in favor of Avande. Avande established that there is no causal link between Evans’s status as a former officer of Avande and the tortious inference and defamation claims; those claims solely concerned Evans’s post-termination conduct. Avande demonstrated that Evans did not succeed but was found liable. View "Evans v. Avande, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim against Miami-Dade County under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Plaintiff claimed she was a county employee and that the County abused the Program to save labor costs; the County argued that Plaintiff was never a county employee. As part of cross-motions, the parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s participation in the Program “solely to acquire “training in forensic photography.” The District Court determined that Plaintiff was an intern, not an employee, using the primary beneficiary test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff does not qualify as a volunteer under the volunteer exception. Further, under the internship exception, an intern learning under an employer is not considered “employed” by the FLSA so long as the intern is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. To determine who the primary beneficiary of an intern-employer relationship is, the court looks to seven non-exhaustive factors.   Here, the facts show that Plaintiff learned forensic photography from a highly regarded county program for free and over a six-month period. And in participating in the Program, Plaintiff clearly understood that she would not be paid and that she was not entitled to a job with Miami-Dade County following her internship.  Further, Plaintiff gained both valuable practical experience and training from forensic photography professionals and Program assignments throughout the entirety of her participation. Likewise, the County’s receipt of some benefit from Plaintiff’s internship under the sixth factor does not transform the County into the primary beneficiary of its relationship with Plaintiff. View "Brandi McKay v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Following a diagnosis of cancer, Opyoke requested information from his employer, Fairmont Tool, about his right to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). For approximately four months, Fairmont failed to advise Opyoke of his FMLA rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1). Opyoke sued, alleging that Fairmont interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, his rights under the FMLA. A jury awarded monetary damages.The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed. Although FMLA interference claims do not require a showing of intent on the part of the employer, proof of an interference violation is not enough to establish injury; an employee must also show that he was prejudiced by the violation. While Opyoke was entitled to FMLA benefits and Fairmont was covered by the FMLA, Opyoke failed to present any evidence that he lost compensation or benefits by reason of Fairmont’s technical violation of the FMLA; he presented no evidence as to how he would have structured his leave had Fairmont advised him of his rights under the FMLA. View "Fairmont Tool, Inc. v. Opyoke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines. She alleged that, while working on an airplane, she heard a passenger refer to her using a racist remark and reported the passenger’s remark to the pilot. The pilot responded by demanding that Plaintiff “step out on the jet bridge with the passenger,” and when she refused the pilot had her removed from the plane. Plaintiff reported the pilot’s conduct to her supervisor, and within two months of these events Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to random drug testing, wrongfully suspended, and ultimately fired. She filed a complaint in state court, alleging retaliation and vicarious liability under the New York City Human Rights Law. (“NYCHRL”) Delta removed the case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, holding that Leroy failed adequately to allege that Delta had discriminated against her and that she therefore failed to allege retaliation for a protected activity under the NYCHRL.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s claims finding that her complaint did not allege facts adequate to support a good-faith, reasonable belief that Delta engaged in discrimination against her. The court explained that the NYCHRL prohibits retaliation for “opposing [the] employer’s discrimination.” To succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must at least have a good-faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. On the facts as alleged, Plaintiff could not have reasonably and in good faith believed that the passenger’s comment or the pilot’s conduct was an unlawful employment practice. View "Leroy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were fired from their Department of Public Safety positions with the Village of Bald Head Island (“the Village”), a municipality located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Following their departures, Village employees published Plaintiffs’ termination letters and department separation affidavits which accused Plaintiffs of violating certain employee policy provisions. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous claims. As relevant here, they brought defamation claims under North Carolina state law against the Village;.the Village Town Manager (“Manager”) ; and the Village Director of Public Safety (“Director”). The district court dismissed the defamation claims against the Village but found the Manager and Director liable for defamation for publishing the termination letters and separation affidavits, respectively. Defendants appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed as to the dismissal of the Village.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s (1) judgment against the Manager for libel per se arising from publication of the separation affidavits; (2) dismissal of all defamation claims against the Village; (3) denial of leave to amend to add the August 28, 2014 email as a third publication; (4) exclusion of the August 28 email for other purposes; (5) exclusion of Facebook posts; and (6) denial of Plaintiffs’ untimely Rule 59(e) motion seeking prejudgment interest. The court reversed the district court’s judgment against the Manager on all libel claims stemming from the publication of the termination letters for lack of actual malice. Finally, the court denied Plaintiffs’ pending motion, purportedly filed under Rule 60, “for corrections based on clerical mistakes, oversights, and omissions.” View "Thomas Cannon v. Calvin R. Peck, Jr." on Justia Law

Christine Larson, doing business as Active Nutrition, appealed a judgment entered after the district court ordered Larson’s appeal be dismissed and denied her request for a writ of mandamus. In a notice of decision dated January 27, 2021, Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) informed Larson that it had determined Active Nutrition is an employer subject to N.D.C.C. tit. 65, the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act, and that Active Nutrition was required to submit all earned wages for all employees for the previous four years and pay premiums, assessments, penalties, and interest accrued. The notice of decision also advised Larson that she could appeal the decision by “[s]ubmit[ting] a written request to WSI within 30 days to have the decision reconsidered[.]” On February 25, 2021, Larson mailed a written request for reconsideration to WSI. WSI received the request on March 1, 2021. On March 10, 2021, WSI sent Larson notice it received her request for reconsideration but the request was not timely. The notice also informed Larson that WSI’s decision dated January 27, 2021 was final. On May 27, 2021, Larson sent WSI a second request for reconsideration. Larson argued her first request for reconsideration was timely because WSI’s notice of decision was served by regular mail and therefore three additional days should be added to the time computation under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(e). On June 8, 2021, WSI informed Larson it had received her second request, the request was not timely, and the decision was final. To the North Dakota Supreme Court, Larson argued her request for reconsideration was timely. Alternatively, she requested a writ of mandamus determining her request was timely and to direct WSI to review the merits of her request. The Supreme Court concluded Larson did not appeal from an appealable order and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Larson v. WSI" on Justia Law

Rusco Operating, L.L.C. and Planning Thru Completion, L.L.C. are two companies that offer an online application (“app”) that connects oil field workers looking for work with oil-and-gas operators looking for workers. The companies seek to intervene here because some app-using workers have opted-in as plaintiffs alleging claims for unpaid overtime, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, against an operator that used the app to hire them. The app companies’ asserted interests in the litigation related to arbitration agreements between them and the workers, their belief that a win by the workers would destroy their business model, and a demand for indemnity allegedly made by Defendant operator for liability it might incur as to Plaintiffs’ claims. The district court found these interests insufficient to justify intervention and denied leave   The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the arbitration agreements at issue give rise to sufficient interest in this action to support the app companies’ intervention. The court explained that Appellants  have shown adequate interest in the subject of this lawsuit by virtue of their contracts with the parties, and “disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the [Intervenors’] ability to protect [their] interest.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2). By contrast, no other party in this action will adequately represent the Intervenors’ interest. They should therefore be allowed to intervene of right. View "Field v. Rusco Operating" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought promotion to the position he claimed he likely would have attained had he not served in the military. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in an action brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act by a longshore worker who returned to employment following service in the U.S. Air Force, and remanded.   The court held that certain hours credits and elevation in longshore worker status, as set forth in a collective bargaining agreement, qualified as “benefits of employment” under USERRA. The court further held that, under the “escalator principle,” Plaintiff could pursue a USERRA discrimination claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to reinstate him to the “Class B” position he was reasonably certain to have attained absent his military service. The court left to the district court to decide in the first instance whether a five-year statutory limitation based on the duration of Plaintiff’s military service applied. View "LEON BELAUSTEGUI V. ILWU" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division of State Police (the Division) appealed a Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) order reversing the Division’s non-disciplinary removal of an employee pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rule, Per 1003.03, and ordering him reinstated subject to certain conditions. The Division argued the PAB: (1) erred by reversing the employee’s removal; and (2) exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the employee’s reinstatement subject to certain conditions. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the Division failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the PAB’s decision to reverse the employee’s removal was clearly unreasonable or unlawful. However, the PAB exceeded its statutory authority by imposing certain conditions upon the employee's reinstatement. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Saxon, a Southwest Airlines ramp supervisor, frequently loads and unloads cargo alongside the ramp agents. Alleging that Southwest was failing to pay proper overtime wages to ramp supervisors, Saxon brought a putative class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Saxon’s employment contract required her to arbitrate wage disputes individually; she claimed that ramp supervisors were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1.The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce according to the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the word. By referring to “workers” rather than “employees,” the FAA directs attention to “the performance of work” and the word “engaged” similarly emphasizes the actual work that class members typically carry out. Saxon is a member of a “class of workers” based on what she frequently does, physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes, and not on what Southwest does generally. Exempted workers must at least play a direct and “necessary role in the free flow of goods” across borders. Cargo loaders exhibit this central feature of a transportation worker. View "Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon" on Justia Law