Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Mendoza applied for employment with FTU. Mendoza cannot read English. A supervisor interviewed Mendoza in Spanish and filled out the application form, which Mendoza signed. All of the acknowledgments Mendoza signed were in English. FTU’s director of human resources later testified that it was his practice to review the FTU Employee Handbook, including an arbitration policy, in Spanish if appropriate, and to give Spanish-speaking employees a Spanish-language version of the Handbook. Mendoza denied receiving the Spanish-language Handbook.FTU hired Mendoza as a temporary, interstate truck driver. Mendoza filed a putative class action, alleging Labor Code violations: failure to pay minimum wages, to provide rest periods, to provide meal periods, to provide accurate wage statements, and to pay all wages owed upon termination. Mendoza opposed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the Handbook, which stated that it was not a contract and was merely for informational purposes, did not create a binding agreement and that any agreement was void for lack of mutual consent or voidable based on unilateral mistake.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. It was for a court to decide whether the parties had entered into an agreement to arbitrate. In these circumstances, the parties have not entered into either an express or an implied contract to arbitrate. View "Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of First Care in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that First Care unlawfully terminated them from their positions at an assisted-living facility. First Care claimed that plaintiffs were terminated because, as mandatory reporters, they had failed to immediately report observed abuse.The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege a claim of retaliation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(1)(c) where they have failed to identify any demand by First Care to engage in an unlawful action. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1104(1) failed because plaintiffs ultimately failed to identify a similarly situated comparator. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the district court's exclusion of investigator notes and reports on hearsay grounds. View "Walker v. First Care Management Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The NLRB affirmed an ALJ‘s finding that Wendt engaged in numerous unfair labor practices under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), (5) based on five incidents and actions.The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to: Wendt’s plant manager’s denial of an employee’s request for the presence of a union representative during questioning that resulted in a suspension; the reassignment of a Union bargaining team member to a lower level of work and the denial of his requests for overtime following a temporary layoff during negotiations; Wendt’s promotion of three Union employees into plant supervisor positions without hiring anyone to fill the vacant unit roles while requiring the new supervisors to continue doing some of the unit work from their previous roles; and, following the Union’s certification, Wendt’s delay of evaluation of unit employees and accompanying wage increases for about six months. The court reversed with respect to the temporary layoffs during bargaining; the NLRB did not adequately address Wendt’s “past practices” argument. View "Wendt Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's federal and Massachusetts state law employment discrimination claims, holding that that court erred in granting summary judgment as to several of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, an online home furnishings company with a principal place of business in Massachusetts, sued Defendant bringing claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4.1, 4.4, and 4.4A. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's state and federal claims for failing to remedy sexual harassment; and (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Forsythe v. Wayfair, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant United Airlines (“United”) appealed a district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), and its motion for new trial. A jury found that United discriminated against two flight attendants, Plaintiffs-Appellees Jeanne Stroup and Ruben Lee by terminating them because of their ages in willful violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). United filed its motions with the district court, contending, among other things, that the jury’s verdict was based on legally insufficient evidence and the court erred in admitting Plaintiffs’ testimony about their emotional distress. The district court denied the motions. United contended: (1) the district court erred in denying its JMOL motion because (a) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United discriminated against Plaintiffs because of their ages in violation of the ADEA, and (b) similarly, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United acted willfully in committing any ADEA violation; and (2) the court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it admitted Plaintiffs’ allegedly irrelevant and highly prejudicial emotional distress testimony. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that, not only did United violate the ADEA by discriminating against Plaintiffs, but it did so willfully. Furthermore, the Court determined the district court did not err by admitting the challenged emotional distress testimony. View "Stroup, et al. v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment ruling in favor of Defendant, a marketing company, holding that district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs, who worked as "brand representatives" for Defendant, qualified as outside salespeople under governing law.Plaintiffs sued Defendant on behalf of themselves and other brand representatives, seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and analogous state wage laws, alleging that they failed to receiver overtime wages for working over forty hours per week. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's outside sales exemption and thus were not entitled to overtime compensation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs fell within the outside sales exemption, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1). View "Modeski v. Summit Retail Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) appeals from the circuit court’s order reversing the MDES Board of Review’s determination that Danny Leeton was an employee of Dover Trucking, LLC (Dover). Because the agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the circuit judge erred by reversing it. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and MDES' decision was reinstated. View "Mississippi Department of Employment Security v. Dover Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that Charlene Hassler had breached a court-modified agreement and granting summary judgment for Circle C Resources on its breach of a noncompete agreement claim, holding that the blue pencil rule is no longer permitted to make noncompete agreements reasonable.When she was hired by Circle C as a nursing assistant Hassler signed a noncompetition agreement prohibiting Hassler from soliciting Circle C's clients for twenty-four months after their employment relationship ended. After Hassler was hired by a new provider Circle C brought this action seeking damages for breach of the noncompete agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for Circle C, concluding that the noncompete agreement was reasonable enforceable if the geographical area subject to restriction were narrowed. The court then narrowed the restrictions accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court no longer permits use of the blue pencil rule to make noncompete agreements reasonable; and (2) because the duration and geographical terms of the noncompete agreement were unreasonable the entire agreement was void in violation of public policy. View "Hassler v. Circle C Resources" on Justia Law

Warfield, a securities broker, contended before an arbitration panel that his former employer, ICON, wrongfully terminated him without just cause. Warfield’s employment fell within the ambit of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), so arbitrators resolved the dispute under FINRA Rule 13200(a). Warfield argued the mere fact that disputes over his employment relationship had to be resolved by arbitration implied that he could only be fired for cause. The panel awarded him $1,186,975.The district court refused to enforce the award (9 U.S.C. 9), holding that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law because North Carolina is an “at-will” employment state that does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination without just cause. The Fourth Circuit reversed. ICON has not made the “exceedingly difficult showing” necessary to demonstrate that the arbitrators acted with manifest disregard of the law. ICON never cited any North Carolina case rejecting the specific proposition that the arbitrability of an employment relationship implies for-cause protections. Even if ICON had the better argument before the arbitrators, there was still an argument and the issue is “subject to reasonable debate,” View "Warfield v. ICON Advisers, Inc" on Justia Law

Bannister has been employed by the VA for over two decades. While working as a pharmacist at the Baton Rouge Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System, Bannister received a notice of proposed removal under 38 U.S.C. 714 based on conduct unbecoming a federal employee. The notice alleged that Bannister had repeatedly spoken rudely and inappropriately to veterans and coworkers, had “yell[ed] and scream[ed]” at pharmacy personnel after being informed that she had been assigned to provide curbside triage to patients.The VA issued a final decision sustaining the charge but mitigating the proposed penalty to a 30-day suspension. After considering Bannister’s “written replies” “along with all the evidence developed and provided to [Bannister],” the deciding official “found that the charge as stated in the notice of proposed removal [was] supported by substantial evidence.” Bannister contested whether the charged conduct occurred, and she alleged as an affirmative defense that the VA suspended her in reprisal for protected whistleblowing activity. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld Bannister’s suspension.The Federal Circuit rejected her whistleblower claim but found that the Board’s decision as to the underlying suspension rested on an incorrect statement of law. On remand, the Board should apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. View "Bannister v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law